Three tables accompany this article. The first lists the season leaders in IBB in the American and National Leagues, 1955-79, plus the total number of IBB each year. The second lists the top 50 batters based on IBB received. These batters are also ranked by the ratio of IBB to total plate appearances. The third table is a listing of the 50 pitchers who have faced the most batsmen since 1955, ranked according to the frequency with which they yielded IBB.

There have been 27,543 intentional bases on balls in the major leagues, 1955-1979. This works out to an average of one for every 116 plate appearances. There is quite a marked difference between the two leagues, however. In every season, the National League has had more IBB than the American League. This gap had widened markedly since the introduction of the Designated Hitter in the AL in 1973. On the average, one out of every 99 plate appearances in the NL is an IBB, while only 1 out of every 140 AL batsmen is purposely passed. Because of the fact that in four seasons (1961, 1977-79) the AL has operated with two more teams than the NL, the AL has had 50.7%, and the NL 49.3%, of all major league plate appearances over the last 25 seasons. In addition, the AL has had 52.1%, and the NL 47.9%, of major league bases on balls during this period. However, the AL has only had 42.0%, and the NL 58.0%, of all intentional walks. One out of every 12.3 AL BB is intentional, but one out of every 8.2 NL BB is, which shows quite a dramatic contrast between the leagues in the incidence of intentional walks.

Both Frank Robinson, while playing with Cincinnati, and Willie McCovey of San Francisco, have led the major leagues four times in IBB. Robinson’s span was consecutive, from 1961 to 1964, although he was tied with Bill Mazeroski, the only NL second baseman to appear among the league leaders, in 1962.

In the American League, three players, Ted Williams of Boston and Harmon Killebrew and Rod Carew of Minnesota each led the league for three seasons. Williams’ seasons were consecutive, 1955-57; it is likely that his string might have been longer if IBB had been recorded before 1955. Killebrew is the only third baseman to lead either league, in 1966, and tied with Reggie Jackson in 1969; he also led while playing first base in 1967. Carew led while playing first in 1977-78, and is the only second baseman to lead the AL, in 1975.

All of the 16 original franchises have had at least one player lead the league in IBB except Cleveland. The Angels, Pilots-Brewers, Mariners, and Blue Jays, all expansion teams, have never had a league leader. In the NL, the expansion Mets, Houston, and Montreal have never had a league leader. Dave Winfield of San Diego became the first player from a National League expansion team to lead the league, with 24 in 1979.

The highest season total of intentional walks is 45, by Willie McCovey in 1969. He had quite a margin over runner-up Hank Aaron, who had 19, and AL co-leaders Killebrew and Jackson, who had 20. McCovey also had 40 IBB in 1970. These are the only instances of any player receiving twoscore or more IBB in a season. Ted Williams’ 33 in 1957 is the highest AL season total. Williams had his 39th birthday during that season, in which he won his second last batting crown. No other player in either league has achieved a season total of 30 or more IBB.

McCovey had 5 seasons, including four in a row (1968-71, and 1973), of 20 or more IBB, a major league record. Three American Leaguers have been able to reach the 20 plateau twice: Harmon Killebrew turned the trick in consecutive seasons, 1969-70, as did Frank Howard, 1970-71; Reggie Jackson did it in 1969 and 1974. Jackson’s 20 in 1974 marks the highest total of IBB received while the DH was in effect.

Hank Aaron had 16 seasons during his long career in which he received 10 or more IBB, the best record of any major leaguer. Tony Oliva accomplished this nine times, for the AL record. Willie Stargell had a string of ten seasons with 10 or more IBB from 1965 to 1974, the major league mark, and Boog Powell had seven such seasons from 1968 to 1974, the best such streak in the AL.

No player has ever received more than one intentional pass in an inning. Aside from Ott’s l929game, no player has received more than three IBB in a nine-inning game in either major league. Roger Maris received four IBB in a night game on May 22, 1962, that went 12 innings. Maris only received 42 IBB in his entire career. Interestingly enough, he received none in 1961, although he did walk 94 times. This probably can be explained by the awesome Yankee lineup that season, particularly by the fact that switch hitter Mickey Mantle followed Mans in the batting order. It is also possible that, as Maris’s assault on the home run record began to attract publicity, no pitcher wanted to be criticized for deliberately depriving him of a chance to hit a homer.

McCovey and Williams hold the league records for left-handed batters for IBB received in a season. Frank Howard, with 29 in 1970, and Adolfo Phillips, with the same total in 1967, hold the AL and NL records for most IBB in a season by right-handed batters. Phillips’ total is rather remarkable. He was not a good hitter for average or power, and he played on a team with Billy Williams, Ernie Banks, and Ron Santo. He also managed 20 for the Cubs in 1968. Ted Simmons, with 25 in 1977, and Mickey Mantle, with 23 in 1957, have achieved the highest totals in the NL and AL respectively for switch hitters. The best totals achieved by rookies are 14 by Willie Montanez of the 1971 Phillies, and 13 for George Scott of the 1966 Red Sox.

Cesar Tovar had 726 plate appearances in 1967, including 46 walks, without receiving any IBB. His teammates included Killebrew, Carew, Oliva, and Bob Allison. Larry Bowa had 23 walks among his 720 plate appearances in 1974, but none was intentional. These are the league records for most plate appearances with no IBB in a season for the AL and NL respectively.

As might be expected from the distribution of IBB between the leagues, most of the leading batters in IBB are primarily identified with the National League. The first seven players on the list are also the first seven Black ball players to hit 400 home runs. Hank Aaron, the all-time home run leader, is also the IBB leader. It is not surprising that so many of the top players in IBB are also power hitters. The top AL players, Carl Yastrzemski, Harmon Killebrew, and Boog Powell, are also known for their power.

The best lifetime totals for right-handed batters have been achieved by Aaron, whose 293 include the National League record of 289, and Killebrew, who achieved his 160 in the AL. The best left-handed batters are McCovey, who achieved 257 of his 258 in the NL, and Yastrzemski, who holds the AL record of 169. Ted Simmons, who has the most IBB of any player with fewer than 200 homers, has also recorded more IBB than any other switch hitter. Mantle currently holds the AL record for switch hitters with 127. The career totals of Aaron, Banks, Mays, Kaline, Musial, Mantle, Mathews, Snider, Del Crandall, and Ted Williams do not include pre-1955 performances. Leo Cardenas, with 122 IBB and 118 HR, has the most IBB of any player with more IBB than HR. Rod Carew, with 106 IBB and 77 HR through 1979, should eventually exceed this level. Carew, of course, currently has the best lifetime batting percentage since Ted Williams.

On the right of the table is the frequency of plate appearances to intentional walks, and the ranks of the players listed. Only four American Leaguers rank in the top 20: Ted Williams, who has the best batting and slugging averages of the last 40 years, and the best on-base average of all-time; and Tony Oliva, Frank Howard, and Boog Powell among the second ten. Stan Musial was the most feared batter in the NL, based on how frequently he was purposely passed. Ted Simmons has the best rate among switch hitters, and Del Crandall, among right-handed batters. None of the top eight was a base stealing threat. Aaron has the highest frequency of any player with 200 or more SB. The top 25 players include eight catchers: Simmons, Crandall, Edwards, Haller, Roseboro, McCarver, Sanguillen, and Bench. Catchers are usually not frequent base stealing threats, and have less time to relax between innings if they should be left on base.

Since 1955, there have been ten IBB received by players who were primarily pitchers, although some were received when these men pinch hit. Only two of these occurred in the NL; Juan Pizarro (1958), and Don Newcombe (1959). In the AL, Gary Peters received three (1963, 1967, 1968), Mickey McDermott, two, both in 1957, and Tommy Byrne, (1956), Dick Donovan (1956), and Jim Kaat (1970), one each.

When it comes to not receiving IBB, the record is probably held by pitcher Bob Gibson, who had 1489 plate appearances with no IBB. Gibson was a good all-around athlete, and an aggressive baserunner (13 SB in 23 attempts), not a slow-footed hurler who could be counted on to clutter up the basepaths. Phil Niekro, who has 1391 plate appearances, including 134 in 1979, has never received an IBB, and may pass Gibson.

Among regulars, Glenn Beckert, who played with Adolfo Phillips, Billy Williams, Banks, and Santo, received only 3 IBB in his entire career, the same total as pitcher Peters. Beckert received an IBB in 1967, 1972, and 1973. He had 5572 plate appearances, a 1/1857 ratio. Johnny Temple, a second baseman, the same as Beckert, had 5 IBB in 5239 plate appearances since 1955 a 1/1048 ratio. Both men had lifetime batting averages over .280. By contrast, Dal Maxvill, a .217 hitter who kept his job with his glove, had 49 IBB. For players with very long careers we might expect American Leaguers with little power and lots of speed to have the fewest IBB. Bert Campaneris has only 15 IBB in 9149 plate appearances, a 1/610 ratio, and Luis Aparicio had 22 in 11229 p.a., a 1/5 10 ratio. Aparicio hit 83 homers; Campaneris has hit 76.

PITCHING LEADERS

A glance at the pitchers who have been most active since 1955 finds American League pitchers, as would be expected, giving up IBB far less frequently than their National counterparts. The first ten positions on the BFP/IBB table are held by pitchers who worked entirely or primarily in the AL. Jim Palmer, Luis Tiant, and Nolan Ryan have the best ratios among the righthanders, and Al Downing, Whitey Ford, and Vida Blue lead the lefties. Larry Dierker, Phil Niekro, and Bob Buhi have the best records of NL righties, and Sandy Koufax, Warren Spahn, and Ken Holtzman lead the NL lefties.

It is difficult to say how significant these figures are. Let us compare Jim Palmer and Tom Seaver, the best pitchers in their leagues during the 197 Os. Seaver has given up 2½ times as many IBB as Palmer, yet he faces only 4.00 batters each inning; Palmer faces 4.05. The extra IBB do not seem to have been very damaging.

Relievers tend to pile up high totals of IBB yielded, but they often are brought into situations not of their own making, so their totals of IBB allowed are not very meaningful. The table lists pitchers who did most of their work as starters.

CONCLUSIONS

Since 1955, there have been 29 all-star games, including two each in the years 1959-62. These games range the best talent of each major league against the other. Of those games, the NL has won 23, the AL, 5, and I ended in a tie. The NL has come out on top 82% of the time. Perhaps one reason that the IBB occurs more frequently in the NL is that the NL has had better hitters, players pitchers would be more inclined to avoid in possible intentional-walk situations. The DH, which takes the pitcher, the “automatic out,” out of the lineup, has resulted in a further reduction of IBB in the AL, but the junior circuit has never employed the IBB at the level of the National League.

RATIOS OF INTENTIONAL BASES ON BALLS TO BATSMEN FACING PITCHERS, 1955-79
(For the 50 Pitchers Recording the Most BFP Since 1955)

BATTERS RECEIVING THE MOST INTENTIONAL BASES ON BALLS, 1955-1979
*A if active in 1979

Batters Receiving Most Intentional Walks Each Season, 1955-79, and League Total Each Season

American League

Summary: Total IBB, American League, 1955-79, 11,575. AL accounted for 42% of major league total of 27,543. In the AL, 1/140 plate appearances is an IBB compared to 1/1 16 for the majors.

National League

Summary: Total IBB, National League, 1955-79, 15,968. NL accounted for 58% of major league total of 27,543. In the NL, 1/99 plate appearances is an IBB compared to 1/1 16 for the majors.

The purpose of the study reported here was to ascertain whether today’s baseball experts still believe pitching is the most important ingredient in winning baseball and how they compare it with batting, fielding, and other factors. During the winter of 1978, we sent a short, one page questionnaire to the 26 field managers and the 26 general managers and/or chief executives of all major league baseball clubs, and 26 selected sportswriters and sports broadcasters. In addition, the commissioner and presidents of both major leagues were contacted. Included with every questionnaire was a stamped self-addressed mail back envelope. Each respondent was informed in a covering letter:

“We are currently investigating the ability of various baseball statistics (batting, pitching and fielding) to predict team standing. As part of our research, we are gathering opinions of baseball experts as to their estimates of how important each of these aspects of the game is to winning.”

Then they were asked:

What percentage of winning baseball do you believe is due to:

• batting_______
• pitching_______
• fielding_______
• other factors_______ (Please specify):

*On behalf of co-author Donald Shoemaker, we express our appreciation to all the major league field managers, general managers, sportswriters and broadcasters, the office of the commissioner, and the presidents of both major leagues for their helpful cooperation in our questionnaire survey.

We received replies from 24 of the 26 general managers (92.3%), 18 of the 26 managers (69.2%), and 18 of the baseball sportswriters and sports broadcasters (69.2%). However, two of the replies from management and four each from the managers and sportswriters and sports broadcasters did not include completed questionnaires. The management of the Boston Red Sox sent a letter stating: “We believe it is unfair and inaccurate for us to state that winning baseball is due to a certain percentage for hitting, pitching, etc. All are inter-related.” The letter concluded: “. . . assigning each a definite percent is an impossibility.” The Cincinnati Reds’ letter of refusal was quite different. It stated that they were unable to fulfill our request because the questions involved “privileged information” which was not “made available to any sources.” The four managers and four sportswriters and sports broadcasters who replied, but did not complete the questionnaire, all stated that they did not believe that winning baseball could be evaluated by percentages. Nevertheless, in written remarks several of them commented on the relative value of various aspects of the game, as did the President of the American League. Their remarks will be examined later.

Of the 50 baseball experts completing the questionnaire, 44 ranked pitching the most important factor in winning baseball. One manager and two general managers stated that pitching and batting were of equal importance. However, three of the general managers at the time — Al Rosen (Yanks), Calvin Griffith (Twins) and Joe McDonald (Mets) — rated batting of more significance than pitching. A quantitative summary of the results of the questionnaire survey is presented in Table I. For the total sample, pitching, with a mean percentage of 59.5%, is considered to be the most important factor in winning baseball. Put another way, the 50 experts collectively believe that almost 60% of winning baseball may be attributed to pitching. Although not as high as Connie Mack’s estimate of 75% or others of 90%, the modern day baseball experts consider pitching to be more important than batting, fielding, and other factors combined! Consider the following comments written in on the questionnaires:

• “No other factors are important — good pitching is the key.” (Don Kessinger, former manager, White Sox).
• “Pitching and control dominate the game.” (Bob Fontaine, G.M. Padres).
• “Pitching by far is the best defense and offense.” (Bob Kennedy, G.M. Cubs).
• “Pitching is a major part and without it you are a second division club.” (Henry Peters, G.M. Orioles).
• “Pitching is #1. If your pitcher pitches a shut-out you can’t lose!” (Al Campanis, G.M. Dodgers).

Batting was listed far behind pitching as the most important factor in winning baseball, followed by fielding. Other factors were considered to play the least part. However, there was a wide range of opinion about what these other factors were. We will comment on this point shortly. Note, that even though pitching has the highest mean percentage, the range of variation is great, from a low of 15% (Joe McDonald — G.M. Mets) to a high of 80% (C.C. Johnson Spink, editor, The Sporting News; and Herman Franks, former manager of the Cubs). This is also true of batting where the range was from a low of 10% (Bob Kennedy, G.M. Cubs) to 55% (Joe McDonald, G.M. Mets). The range for fielding was from 0% (Gabe Paul, G.M. Indians) to 35% (Al Rosen, former G.M. Yanks). A number of the experts, including Tom Lasorda, manager of the Dodgers, felt other factors played no part at all. Yet, at the high end of the range, Jack Buck, broadcaster of the Cardinals, stated that other factors were 20% of winning baseball.

In examining the three categories of general manager, manager, and sportswriter/sports broadcaster, several patterns can be seen. General managers attribute the highest percentage to batting and fielding and the sportswriters and sports broadcasters, the lowest. On the other hand, the sportscasters and sportswriters attribute the highest percentage of the three categories to pitching and other factors with the general managers the lowest. For all four factors: pitching, batting, fielding and other factors, managers hold the middle position between the general managers and sportswriters and sports broadcasters.

One way of interpreting the finding would be that general managers, who are usually in charge of stocking teams with players, are likely to stress batting and fielding more than the other two groups do. Sportswriters and broadcasters, who are most likely to influence fans’ attitudes and views on baseball, emphasize pitching and other factors more than the other two groups. Managers caught in the middle between pressure from both management and media take a center-of-the-road position, being at neither extreme and perhaps vulnerable to pleasing neither.

The other factors which were thought to influence winning baseball need special comment. President MacPhail of the American League said:

“With all the pitching and hitting and fielding you could reasonably ask for, you can still lose over a major league season without a fair share of other factors.”

Although the 50 experts collectively believed they contributed just 4% to the total picture, what these factors were, how often they were mentioned, and their importance varied greatly. Table II summarizes these opinions. Player attitude and desire, player speed, and player hustle were the most frequently mentioned factors. Thus, the experts seem to believe that the player who wants to win, runs fast, and runs all the time, although not a substitute for natural ability for batting, fielding, and pitching, is nevertheless an important contributing element in winning baseball. Player intelligence and mental makeup, ability to take charge, throwing accuracy, and knowledge of fundamentals were also qualities which were mentioned by at least one of the experts.

It is interesting that only three of the experts mentioned the manager as being a factor, and not one of these three was a manager himself! One can only speculate that if managers are not generally considered to be an important factor in winning games, then their frequent hiring and firing must be due to reasons other than their ability to affect the course of team outcomes on the field. Several of the experts mentioned other factors which did not involve either players or managers. For example, Danny Ozark, former manager of the Phillies, listed umpire decisions, and Harding Peterson, G.M. of the Pirates, mentioned attendance and fan enthusiasm.

In one of the more interesting responses to our survey, NBC sportscaster Tony Kubek wrote:

“There are far too many variables (and intangibles) for me to generalize with a specific percentage in rating the importance of each aspect of baseball.

For example:

• 1) Is Sandy Koufax pitching? That day pitching might be 95% of the game!
• 2) Against whom is Sandy pitching, the 1927 or 1961 Yankees or the ‘Hitless Wonders’ White Sox? Again the percent ages would fluctuate. Defense is difficult to gauge.
• 3) Also. Are we playing on artificial surface with all good bounces or the red rock hard clay of Chavez Ravine in L.A.?
• 4) If the game is being played in Yankee Stadium at night, a monstrous park at a time when the ball does not carry — advantage pitcher. Take the same line-ups to Wrigley Field, Fenway Park, or Atlanta and you swing the percentage more to hitting.
• 5) Prevailing winds, barometric pressure, and elevation above sea level all effect these percentages along with the size of parks.
• 6) An overlooked (and important area) is where baseballs are stored. In Chicago (White Sox) in damp, cold area under stands for months. In Cincy, nice, warm, dry furnace room.”

Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from the survey. First, the vast majority of today’s experts agree that pitching is the most important component of winning baseball. Second, the collective judgment of today’s experts that pitching is almost 60% of winning baseball is considerably below the 75% figure mentioned by Connie Mack, let alone the 90% estimated by others. Third, variation in estimates of the relative importance of pitching, batting, fielding, and other factors exist. There is no consensus among the experts. Fourth, variation is best predicted by whether the expert is a general manager, manager, or sportswriter or sports broadcaster.

General managers weigh batting and fielding more than sportswriters and broadcasters and they in turn believe pitching and other factors are more important to winning baseball than general managers. On all four components, managers’ estimates fall between those of general managers and sportswriters and sports broadcasters. While other factors are considered by the experts to be only a small part of winning baseball, there is no consensus as to what these factors are and whether they involve players, managers, umpires, fans, weather conditions, size of ball park, temperature of the baseball and so on.

Estimates of the Relative Importance of Primary Factors to Winning Baseball

Estimates of the Relative Importance of Other Factors

JAMES T. SHECKARD

1878-1947

The memories have been pushed aside, buried, covered with age. The dusty years have prevailed, sheltering his accomplishments, attempting to seal the cracks of connection with the future, a future that now dotes on Bruce Sutter, Lancaster County’s latest hero.

Samuel James Tilden Sheckard was born to Pennsylvania-German parents on November 23, 1878 in Upper Chanceford Township near Shenk’s Ferry, York County. As evidenced by Jimmy’s name, his father was a staunch, independent Democrat, highly in favor of anti-corruption reform. When Jimmy was ten the family moved across the Susquehanna River to Columbia, Lancaster County, where he could finally round up enough youngsters for a real game of ball.

Sheckard’s first break as a player occurred when the Cuban Giants visited Columbia for a contest with the local nine. Due to an injury to a Columbia regular, Jimmy was asked to fill in for the hometowners. He responded with a triple, his team’s only hit, and left an indelible impression on the touring pros with his all-around play. The following year, while playing sandlot ball in the neighboring river town of Marietta, the 17-year-old was scouted and signed by Portsmouth of the Virginia League. He was reported to have been extremely fast, with an arm like a cannon, and a powerful but smooth left-handed swing. Although it was late in the season, Jim reported immediately, hitting .305 in 26 games as a starting outfielder.

The next year, 1897, while playing with Brockton, Massachusetts of the New England League, Jimmy was converted to shortstop by Mgr. Watch Burnham. The switch vexed Sheckard, a natural in the outfield, but it played an important role in his climb to the National League. Despite this minor problem in communication, Jim led the league in batting (.370) and stolen bases (52), before being sold to the Trolley Dodgers — as a shortstop!

Although Sheck could not fill the glove of aging infielder Germany Smith, he impressed Brooklyn management with his bat, hitting .327 in 13 games. In 1898, with the move of Norwegian outfielder “Honest John” Anderson to Washington, Sheckard became a major league regular at the age of 19. He joined captain Mike Griffin and youngster Fielder Jones in manager “Bald Billy” Barnie’s outfield. Sheck responded with a solid .291 average in 105 games, including four long hits — 3 doubles and a home run — in a late season contest.

The 19th century’s final year brought about a quick change of scenery for the 5′ 9″, 175 pounder. Brooklyn’s new manager, Ned Hanlon, who was also the president of the Baltimore club, brought along future Hall-of-Fame outfielders Willie Keeler and Joe Kelley. In turn, Sheckard was “loaned” to the decimated Orioles. The move, appearing bleak at first, proved to be a tremendous break for Jim as he played in all but one contest for brilliant rookie manager John McGraw and his burly, right-hand man, the fabled Wilbert Robinson.

McGraw, although troubled by the tragic death of his young wife, hit .390, scored 141 runs in only 118 games, and provided inspiring leadership. Robinson masterfully handled the pitching staff, led by 28-year-old rookie Joe McGinnity. “The Iron Man” won 28 games, leaning heavily on his bread-and-butter submarine pitch, “Old Sal”. Despite the loss of three 20-game winners and four .300-hitting regulars to the Superbas, this incredible team finished a remarkable 24 games above .500! The gutsy, McGraw-style play was a natural for Sheckard’s talents. The youngster thrived on aggressiveness, belting .295, scoring 104 runs, stealing a league-leading 77 bases, and exhibiting excellent defensive skills. He placed second in the league in assists (33) and set a National League record which still stands: 14 double plays by an outfielder. These accomplishments were minor, however, compared to the knowledge gained by playing Oriole-style baseball. And Jimmy proved during the sport’s upcoming epoch — the dead ball era — that he had learned his lessons well. He was to become one of baseball’s most intelligent and resourceful players.

Sheck returned to the defending-champion Dodgers in 1900, the league reduced from twelve to eight teams. Franchises fell in Baltimore, Cleveland, Washington and Louisville resulting in major league unemployment for approximately 80 players, and creating fierce competition for the open positions on the remaining teams. Jim played in 85 games, hitting .300, as the Brooklyn squad raced to another pennant, the first of five National League flags during Sheckard’s illustrious career.

Jimmy had his finest slugging campaign in 1901. In that first historic year of the two-league alignment, he led the senior loop in slugging average (.541) and triples (21). In addition, he was runner-up in home runs (11) and total bases (296), placed third in hits (197) and runs batted in (104), and fourth in batting average (.353). His 1902 stats might have been better had he not jumped briefly to the American League Orioles of John McGraw. After only four games he had another change of heart and jumped back to Brooklyn, where he hit only .265.

Sheck bounced back with another great campaign with the Dodgers in 1903, hitting a lusty .332. Amazingly, he lead the league in power, speed and throwing: 9 home runs, 67 stolen bases, 36 assists.

The Dodgers took a backward slide the next two seasons, settling all too comfortably into the basement in 1905. Sheckard’s hitting declined also, prompting the new manager, Patsy Donovan, to trade quality for quantity. Brooklyn’s pilot sent Sheck and his lifetime .295 average to Frank Chance’s Chicago Cubs for four players: Jack McCarthy, Doc Casey, Bill Maloney and Buttons Briggs.

The trade fulfilled Jim’s wildest boyhood fantasies. He became a starting outfielder for the best team in the National League, possibly the best team in the entire history of baseball. Sheckard remained Chance’s left fielder through the 1912 season — the duration of “The Peerless Leader’s” reign at the Chicago helm. Ole Jim, as he was affectionately called by his Cub teammates, won the hearts of the fans with his heads-up, forceful style of play. The ball was dead, the averages down, and his swift wrists were gradually slowing, but Sheckard thrived on the intense competitive survival of one-run baseball. The wily outfielder played an aggressive, devil-may-care brand of ball, blending guts, determination, and mental alertness into a team-oriented, selfless style of play. It was this style that reaped four Chicago pennants and two world championships in a five-year span.

Forty years later as Jim knocked bitterly on death’s door, Associated Press columinst Whitney Martin, an avid supporter of the Cubs in their heyday, recalled his impressions as a youngster:

“Sheckard loomed as large to us then as any of his teammates, but although he was an integral part of those great Cub teams he is virtually forgotten today.”

The immortal Grantland Rice wrote that “Jimmy deserved a place among the game’s greatest outfielders,” and Ring Lardner, an equally famous reporter, novelist and humorist, referred to Sheckard as “the greatest ballplayer in the world” in one of his columns. In his book, Baseball’s Greatest Outfielders, Ira L. Smith lauded Sheck’s defensive skills:

“He was the kind of an outfielder a manager would have if baseball dreams came true. Had the way of a master in everything he did out there on the grassy stretches of major league ballparks. He was a great student of batters . . . played them as well as anybody in the league. Whether charging in or racing back, flashing to one side or the other, was right up there with the best. Throwing arm was a marvel of power and accuracy. Anybody who got an extra base hit in his territory really earned it.”

Although Sheckard fulfilled a major role as the McGraw-style catalyst, the entire Cubs team performed as if possessed by a magical power. Scientific. They compiled the greatest single-season mark in baseball history in 1906, winning 116 games while dropping only 36 — a phenomenal .763 winning percentage! The team also set a long-term record that will never be broken: They won two-thirds (.667 pct.) of their games for a 7-year span, encompassing the entire Sheckard/Chance era (1906-1912).

Sheck led the league in fielding average and in sacrifices (40) in 1906. He led in defensive double plays, runs, walks, and assists in 1911 and repeated in the latter two departments in 1912, earning a peak salary of $4,250 in his final year as a big league regular.

His superb, unselfish play earned Sheckard a position on the All-Time Cubs team as selected by the noted baseball writer Joe Reichler in the Ronald Encyclopedia of Baseball. The selection, a major testimonial to Jim’s career, encompassed the 1 876-1 962 period. Sheckard joined Jimmy Ryan and Bill Lange in the dream-team outfield; Cap Anson, Johnny Evers, Ernie Banks and Stan Hack manned the infield positions, and Gabby Hartnett called the pitches for Mordecai Brown and his lefty counterpart, Hippo Vaughn. The manager: Frank Chance.

Sheckard split an unsuccessful campaign between St. Louis and Cincinnati in 1913; he managed and played in the outfield with Cleveland in the American Association in 1914; and had his last direct involvement in major league baseball as a coach for the Cubs in 1917. This was also Honus Wagner’s final season as a player. Wagner and Sheckard had both joined major league clubs for the first time in 1897, playing competitively against one another for 17 consecutive years. As Sheck said many times later: “Honus was undoubtedly the greatest player I ever saw.”

Jimmy returned to Lancaster County after his brief fling as Cubs’ coach. While managing semipro ball in Columbia, he discovered future Cardinal world series star Lester Bell, a Harrisburg native, and a powerful hitter. Bell, a current resident of nearby Elizabethtown, vividly related the circumstances in a recent interview:

“Jimmy was a fine man. I may not have been a major league player if not for Jimmy. He saw me play and brought me to Columbia for semipro ball. He also contacted the big league scouts to look me over. . . . And you could tell just by talking to him that he was a very smart baseball man. Very fundamental. Bunt, hit and run, stolen base, defense — the way he played the game from what I’ve been told. Even in his early 40s, when I knew him, you could see he was real fast at one time. He was still built like a speedster. As a manager he wore white socks and a white shirt and was always chewing tobacco. He’d hitch his pants at the knees, sit himself down and spit away. Funniest damn thing I ever saw by the end of a game those white socks were always a very distinctly brownish color.”

At various times in the 1930s, Sheck managed the Lancaster team in the Class D Interstate League, the All-Lancaster semipro team, and was head coach at Franklin and Marshall College. Still later he worked as a gas station attendant and a milk truck helper, tossing around 100-pound cans at the age of 60. Arthritis in his left foot, apparently stemming from an old, unmended baseball injury, hobbled him badly.

On a cold Sunday in January 1947, Jim walked to his attendant’s job at a gas station directly across from Stumpf Field, home of the Lancaster Red Roses. As he limped to within view of the ballpark, an auto struck him from behind, knocking him forcefully into the street. Three days later the long ago idol of Chicago baseball fandom, a player who garnered his laurels in the rough-and-tumble era of turn-of-the-century baseball, died of head injuries.

A ceremony was held in his honor at Stumpf Field, Hall of Fame umpire Bill Klem presiding. A monument was placed in Lancaster’s Buchanan Park. Eventually the memories turned to dust: wind-blown, irretrievably scattered images. Forgotten.

Sheckard’s records, however, can not be ignored. He ranks in the all-time top ten in major league history in three career categories:

• Fifth in double plays by an outfielder (81)
• Eighth in assists by an outfielder (307)
• Eighth in steals of home (18)

His .275 lifetime average, though somewhat low, compares rather favorably with his contemporaries. When matched against the career marks of his eight most illustrious Cub teammates, all of whom totaled more than 1000 career hits, Sheckard’s average ranks behind Chance’s .297, but ahead of all the others: Kling .27 1, Evers .270, Schulte .270, Hofman .269, Slagle .268, Steinfeldt .268 and Tinker .263.

His great eye and inimitable ability to wait for the good pitch are responsible for his rank as the National League’s premier “base on balls” man of his era. His 147 walks in 1911 set a league standard which stood for 34 years, and remains on the books as a record for lefty swingers. He also holds the all-time league mark for sacrifices in a season with 46. Defensively, Sheck is the only National League outfielder since 1900 to twice record more than 30 assists in a season. Offensively, he was the only player in baseball’s first 50 years to hit grand slam home runs in consecutive games (September 23-24, 1901).

During his career Jim led the league no fewer than 18 times in offensive and defensive categories. Attesting to his multifaceted talents, he led at one time or another in 11 different departments: stolen bases, HR’s, triples, slugging average, runs, walks, assists, double plays, putouts, sacrifices and fielding average. His on-base percentage was an excellent .370; he reached base over 3200 times on hits and walks. His 2091 hits, 1295 runs and 2121 games are all listed among the milestone rankings in Macmillan’s Encyclopedia.

The ultimate tribute to the ability of Samuel James Tilden Sheckard was written by Ring Lardner, whose reflective memories give us a clearly-mirrored account of the dead-ball era, in a note to the ailing John McGraw in 1932:

“Baseball hasn’t meant much to me since the introduction of the TNT ball that robbed the game of the features I liked best — features that gave you (McGraw) and Bill Carrigan and Fielder Jones and other really intelligent managers a deserved advantage, and smart ball players like Cobb and Jim Sheckard a chance to do things.”

It was 60 years ago, on May 1, 1920, that the Boston Braves and Brooklyn Dodgers battled 26 innings to a 1-1 tie on a cloudy Saturday afternoon at old Braves Field. Umpire Barry McCormick finally had to call the game because of darkness. Each team used only 11 players that long afternoon; two had 11 official at bats while eight others had ten.

A modern day comparison is the 25-inning game in 1974 at Shea Stadium between the New York Mets and St. Louis Cardinals. Managers Yogi Berra and Red Schoendienst employed 50 players on that occasion as against 22 for the 1920 game. The Cardinals used six pitchers and the Mets five.

One of the last survivors of that famous 1920 game is Joe Oeschger, who was the real star performer. While his rival, Cadore, who died in 1958, gave up 15 hits, Oeschger gave up only nine and held Brooklyn scoreless over the last 21 innings. For years Oeschger has been something of a legend to the sports-minded fans of northern California where he lives. I wrote him last year about an interview and he quickly accepted.

Joe and his charming wife Nancy live near Femdale in the majestic Redwood country about 100 miles south of the Oregon border. Their hillside home is on his father’s original ranch of 100 acres which is situated in a timbered valley not too far from the Pacific Ocean.

Oeschger, who turned 88 in May, is a big, handsomely-rugged gentleman who is very articulate and perceptive. His parents immigrated to America from Switzerland, and he was born in Chicago on May 24, 1892 (some sources say 1891, but that is a year too early). The family subsequently moved to California’s Santa Cruz County and in 1900 settled in Ferndale, where Joe’s father bought 100 acres for a dairy ranch. Walter, Joe’s younger brother, still operates the ranch. Joe has three brothers and two sisters.

All four brothers attended Ferndale High School and played baseball, and later all played at St. Mary’s College near Oakland. Brother George, now 78, was signed by the Pittsburgh Pirates in 1923 and pitched several years in the minors.

Upon my arrival at Joe’s home, I was immediately put at ease in the friendly atmosphere. His wife, Dr. Nancy O’Sullivan Oeschger, is also quite a person. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Madrid. Her book “Mothers of the Spanish Conquistadores” was published in Spain and circulated throughout Latin America. She showed me a stack of fan letters that Joe had received during the previous week. She also mentioned that the name plate on their rural mail box kept disappearing — no doubt stolen by autograph hounds.

When Joe was in the majors, he regularly sent home news- paper clippings of the games in which he pitched. After his retirement, his mother presented him with a scrapbook, which contains the clippings and provides a detailed summary of his baseball career.

Joe brought out the scrapbook shortly after my arrival, and soon we were discussing games, players and his teaching career. While pitching for St. Mary’s College, Joe was observed by several major league scouts. Upon graduation in 1914, he signed with Philadelphia of the National League. The Phils farmed him to Providence in the International League for most of 1915 and he responded with a 1-0 no-hitter against Toronto on July 14 and a 21-10 season record. He remained with the Phillies until 1919, pitching a 20-inning 9-9 tie game against Burleigh Grimes of the Dodgers on April 30 of that year. A short time later he was traded to the New York Giants. Still later in 1919 he was traded to Boston. He ended his baseball career in 1925 with the Brooklyn Dodgers, the team he had faced in two marathon contests.

Oeschger was in his seventh season in the majors and approaching age 28 when he pitched the longest game ever. It rained most of that May-day morning in 1920, he remembered.

“We didn’t think the game would be played, but we had to report to the park. It was a Saturday, and I didn’t think I would pitch because Manager Stallings usually pitched me on Sundays because I went to church. He always played his hunches. I was happy to get the starting job because Cadore was pitching, and he had beaten me 1-0 in 11 innings earlier in the season. I wanted to even things.”

“It had stopped raining, but the sky was still overcast with more rain predicted. The Dodgers scored first in the fourth inning, and it was my fault. I first walked Ernie Krueger. Then Cadore hit a hard grounder at me, which I momentarily fumbled trying to get Krueger at second, but I did get Cadore at first. After I got two strikes on Ivy Olson, he hit a single just over our shortstop, Rabbit Maranville, which scored Krueger. The next inning we tied the score when Walt Cruise hit a triple against the scoreboard in left. He scored on Tony Boeckel’s single.”

Oeschger then held the Dodgers scoreless for the next 21 innings! But the Braves also failed to score.

“We had a chance to win in the ninth when we filled the bases with only one out, but our second baseman, Charley Pick, hit into a double play, which sent the game into extra innings. Cadore had a good curve ball and I had a good live fast ball that day.”

“The seventeenth inning was a bad one for me. Hank Gowdy, our catcher, saved my neck. The Dodgers filled the bases with only one out. Rowdy Elliott hit one sharply to me on the ground. I threw to the plate, forcing Zack Wheat, but Gowdy’s throw to first was wide, and Walter Holke knocked it down. Holke finally recovered the ball and fired it back to Gowdy, who took the throw  and threw himself across the line in front of the plate and tagged out Konetchy as he thundered in.”

“I was getting tired by the eighteenth inning, but the players kept telling me: `Just one inning, Joe, and we’ll get a run.’ Stallings never did ask me if I wanted to come out. But the batters were griping to stop the game. I didn’t want to stop.”

“It was getting dark and there were no lights in those days. McCormick, the umpire, after talking to the two managers, finally called the game after 26 innings.”

The game started at 3 p.m. and was called at 6:50, which meant three hours and 50 minutes for 26 innings. The 25-inning game between the St. Louis Cardinals and the New York Mets took seven hours and 23 minutes.

Joe explained that he was a “little tired” after the 26 innings, “but I was more fatigued in some nine-inning games when I got into many jams. There weren’t too many tight situations, and in the seventh I retired the side on three pitched balls.”

Joe said he threw no more than 250 pitches in what was almost equivalent to three regulation games in one afternoon. The Dodgers rapped nine of those pitches for hits. Cadore gave up 15 hits, but Joe insists that pitching honors were about even.

A popular story has developed through the years that the marathon performance ruined Oeschger’s arm. “This is not true,” he maintains. He missed his next turn not because of his arm, but because he pulled a leg muscle running around the park. He returned to the mound 12 days later and was beaten by St. Louis, 9-3.

The following year — 1921 — Oeschger enjoyed his best season, winning 20 games for the Braves. He pitched four more seasons in the majors, much of the time in relief, and then decided to quit because he was experiencing arm trouble. His overall won-lost record was 83-116.

Joe had much praise for George Stallings, his manager on the 1920 Braves. Six years earlier, Stallings had led the “Miracle Braves” from last place on July 15 to the National League pennant by 101/2 games and then a World Series sweep over the Philadelphia Athletics.

“Stallings was a Southern gentleman all the way through, and he was always nice to me when I was playing. He had a tremendous estate near Macon, Ga. On our way through the South he usually invited the whole club to spend an evening there and he always put on an interesting show for us.”

“He had more ability to stimulate a young player to greater effort than anyone I know of. He could encourage you, and he had that something that young players listened to. He was never harsh to young players. His overall management of young fellows was an example for managers. John McGraw was also a great manager, but he wouldn’t develop a young player. He wanted the finished product.”

Oeschger had many interesting comments on former teammates. He was Jim Thorpe’s roommate and was told to keep his eye on the hero of the Olympic Games, who was also famous for his escapades off the playing field.

“Jim had a tendency to go over the line at times. He had a drinking problem. But he was a tremendous athlete. He looked terrible at times on curve balls, but he would beat out a lot of infield hits. It was a pleasure to watch Jim run down the line to first. He could really run. Jim was a good drawing card, and he sure packed them in.”

Another teammate about whom Joe reminisced was Rabbit Maranville, the Braves’ shortstop.

“The Rabbit was a wonderful player. He was small in stature, but had tremendous ability. He had a peculiar way of covering the ground. His throw was right from the chest, and he could throw like a bullet. He was very good with men on first and third when a double steal was attempted. Usually the second baseman handles the cutoff when the runner on third goes in. But on the Braves’ team Rabbit handled the play, which is difficult for the shortstop.”

“Only twice when I played for the Braves did he fail to make the right play.”

Joe laughed when we discussed the family name Oeschger, which has four consonants in a row and is almost always mispronounced. Sports writers and baseball announcers invariably inquire about the pronunciation when speaking of Joe. Even in Humboldt County and in Ferndale, the people say “Oscar.” Joe said the correct pronunciation is “Esh-ker.”

“I’ve been called ‘0-Sugar’ and everything else,” Joe commented. Once in Boston, where there are many people of Irish descent, he recalled the umpires going around the field before the game announcing the batteries: “For Boston, O’Shayger and O’Neil.”

After retiring from the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1925, Oeschger decided to become a physical education teacher. He said he felt his background in baseball was too valuable to ignore. A graduate engineer of St. Mary’s College, he obtained a degree in education at Stanford University. He then taught physical education for 27 years at Portola Junior High School in the Butchertown section of San Francisco, which produced Lefty O’Doul.

“I always got along well with kids, and I though it would be a good field to get into. I never regretted it. I feel that I have contributed more in my teaching than I ever did in baseball as far as the overall picture is concerned. I have had much satisfaction in helping boys to become good citizens. Every once in a while I meet some of my former students, and they have families. And it is so nice. It makes me feel so good.”

Twenty years ago Joe and Nancy came back to retire in the country of Joe’s childhood, and they have lived a quiet, relaxed life, shopping in town, visiting their many friends, and helping to promote community projects. Three years ago Joe was honored during “Humboldt County Night” at Candlestick Park in San Francisco at a game between the Giants and the Atlanta Braves. Although people may have trouble pronouncing his name, they still remember him for one of the greatest pitching performances in major league history.

The study described here is based on detailed analysis of virtually every plate appearance for Maury Wills in 1962, 1963, and 1965 with the information coming from the scorebooks of Frank Finch, the Los Angeles Times reporter who was the Dodgers’ official scorer during that time. This examination of a large number of events for one of the more significant base runners of all time allows some meaningful conclusions to be drawn concerning stolen bases.

Base running events are defined here as stolen bases (SB), caught stealing (CS), and pickoffs (P0). These are summarized for Wills in Table 1. The numbers in parentheses in this table are the numbers of events actually analyzed. The differences from the true totals arise because the Finch scorebooks are missing 4 games in 1963 and 5 games in 1965. I was able to examine 307 of Wills’ 322 base-running events for these three seasons. Times picked off is not an official statistic, and the 21 pickoffs analyzed here were those found during this study. Some readers may question the inclusion of pickoffs, but they are base running events which have much the same effect as caught stealing. In Wills’ case it must also be noted that 10 of his 21 pickoffs would have been counted as caught stealing under an addition to rule 10.08 made in the early 1970’s. This rule now says that if a runner is picked off and tries to advance, he is charged with caught stealing.

Table 1. Summary of Wills’ base running events.

Table 2 presents an analysis of Wills’ steal opportunities and events divided into games with events and games with no events. An opportunity is defined here as his being on base with an open base in front of him. This definition rules out situations in which Wills would have to have been the trailer on a double or triple steal. In the three seasons analyzed, he never was the trailer on a multiple steal. Table 2a contains the data for games in which no event (SB, CS, or PO) occurred, as well as the number of chances per game. In these games 20% of his initial opportunities were of third base or home. Table 2b presents the same data for games in which Wills had a base running event. Only 10% of these opportunities were of third and home. This table also totals the opportunities and gives the frequency with which an event occurred. For example, in 1962, he had 244 total steal chances and 1 20 total events for a frequency of occurrence of .49. In other words, something happened 49% of the time Wills had a chance in 1962.

Table 2. Wills’ steal opportunities.

1. a) Games with no event.

  Games   Chances Chances/Game

1962 87   88   1.01

1963 83   97   1.17

1965  72   42   0.58

         242 227 0.94

b) Games with event.

Chances   Total    Freq. of

       Games  Chances  /Game   Events Chances  Event

1962   78 156 2.00   120  244    .49

1963   51  92   1.80  59    189    .31

1965   86 165  1.92  128  207    .62

           215 413 1.92   307 640    .48

Several interesting points come from Table 2. Wills’ total events and event frequency were quite different for the three seasons. In 1963 he had a series of leg injuries and missed 29 games. These injuries are clearly reflected in the low values for the games in which he did play. The event frequency of .62 for 1965 is very high. He started running a lot from opening day with five steals in the first two games.

After 116 games Wills had 77 SB and 20 CS compared with 60 SB and 7 CS at the same point in 1962. Wills missed game 117 and only appeared in game 118 as a pinch hitter due to a badly bruised leg. It is likely he would have stolen more than 104 bases in 1965 without the injury. It is also interesting to note that in the games with no event (Table 2a), Wills had about one chance per game. In the games with events (Table 2b), the average is nearly two chances per game.

These observations confirm an obvious expectation: more chances lead to more base running. A final point related to event frequency can be seen in Table 3. These data show that in 1962 Wills ran more often late in the year as he approached Cobb’s season record.

Table 3. Event frequencies for Wills during 1962.

Month     Chances   Events Frequency

April   29     10   .34

May     42     21   .50

June     44     17   .39

July     38     12   .32

August 42     24   .57

Sep.-Oct. 49     36   .73

    244     120 .49

Since the object of baseball is to win games by scoring runs, it is logical to look at these two areas in some detail. Each of the 307 events was examined with respect to the play by play of the inning in which it occurred. For each steal a decision was made as to whether or not the steal allowed the Dodgers to score a run they otherwise would not have scored. Similarly each CS and PO were examined for potential lost runs. Some of these decisions were easy and some were quite difficult. A few examples may be helpful.

1) May 1, 1962, Chicago at LA, 5th inning, score tied 2-2.

Drysdale leads off with single.

Wills forces him at second.

Wills steals second.

Gilliam singles Wills home.

Moon grounds out.

Snider strikes out.

Without the steal, Wills would have gone to third (or second) on Gilliam’s single, where he would not have scored on the next two outs. Here the steal gave LA a run.

2) June 16, 1965, San Francisco at LA, 7th inning, score tied 1-1.

Ferrara grounds out.

Koufax grounds out.

Wills singles and steals second.

Gilliam singles him home.

Parker strikes out.

Again, Wills would not have gotten past third without the steal.

3) September 25, 1963, New York at LA, 3rd inning, LA ahead 1-0.

Koufax grounds out.

Wills singles and is out stealing second.

Davis singles.

Moon singles Davis to third.

Davis lines out.

Without the CS, Wills would have scored and the inning would have continued.

After all the decisions had been made, each game was analyzed with respect to the runs which were gained or lost by Wills’ running. If a Wills steal were responsible for a run in a game which Los Angeles won by one run, then he was credited with a half win, since without the run the game would have continued into extra innings, and the Dodgers might still have won. However, if the game were an extra inning game and a regulation inning steal led to a run, then Wills received a full win, since without the run they would have lost in 9 innings. Wills was credited with a half win if the Dodgers won an extra inning game by one run which only scored because of his stealing, since they still might have won in a later inning. The same logic was applied to CS and PO in reverse to determine half losses and full losses. These analyses are summarized in Table 4. It may be seen that over the three years examined, Wills’ running gained the Dodgers a net of 35 runs and was directly responsible for a net of seven wins.

These results may be compared with the predictions of Pete Palmer’s linear weight model which says that steals are worth 0.2 runs each, caught stealing (and pickoffs) are — 0.35 runs each, and the scoring of 10 additional runs over the course of a season will lead to one additional win. The model predicts 21 additional runs from Wills’ running (238 SB X 0.2- 56 CS X0.35 — 21 PO X 0.35), which should have led to two additional Dodger wins. The results in Table 4 do not fit well with these predictions. Some of this disagreement may result from the relatively small data base used: three seasons for one man. But it must also be remembered that the model was derived by considering average performances, and the Dodgers of the early 1960’s were not average teams. Not only did they win many games, but they won many close games due to their excellent pitching staff. This pattern can be seen especially in 1963 and 1965 when they were 6^th and 8th in scoring but a dominant first in ERA while winning two pennants. To such teams, each run is extremely valuable and likely to be protected. Such a contention is supported by the 1965 data in which a net of only three additional runs is related to 21/z extra wins.

Table 4. Runs and wins from Wills’ base running.

    SB   CS   PO Net Runs

  1962 +27 -2   -l +24

  1963 +13 -5    0   +8

  1965 +18 -12   -3   +3

           +58 -19   -4   +35

Wins

  1962   +3 0 0     +3

  1963   +1½ 0 0     +1½

  1965   +4     -1   ½ +2½

            +8½   -1   -½  +7

The winning of seven additional games by the scoring of only 35 extra runs through Wills’ running may mean that a run scored as a result of a steal is more valuable than a run scored directly by batting. There are two aspects to this idea. First, Wills was a leadoff hitter and likely to be on when the team’s good hitters were up; therefore his steals would be more likely to lead to runs than if he batted low in the order. As a consequence, running events could be increased in value to perhaps 0.25 runs for a steal and -0.40 runs for caught stealing (and pickoff), leading to a prediction of 29 runs from Wills’ running. Second, as seen in the score distribution data of Table 5, Wills was most likely to run when the score was tied or the Dodgers were ahead by one run (58% of all his events). Therefore, runs from stealing were more likely to be scored when they were really needed. He also stole more often with 0 and 1 outs than the model expects, so perhaps only 6 or 7 additional runs are needed for a win if the runs result from stealing, leading to a prediction of 4½ to 5 additional wins from Wills’ running. These modifications bring the model into closer agreement with Wills’ actual effect.

Table 5. Score differential for Wills’ steal opportunities and events (1962, 1963, and 1965 combined). Score differential is Dodger runs minus opponent runs at the time.

There is another obvious factor in base running which requires attention. That is, before a man can steal he must be on base. The act of getting on base is in itself an important offensive action of benefit to the team. The overall value of Wills to the Dodgers can be seen in the data of Table 6. (The values in this table do not add to the official totals for Wills for these seasons because the Finch scorebooks were incomplete and in some cases contained minor inaccuracies.) It is clear that Wills’ presence made the Dodgers a better team. Table 6 shows that the Dodgers won more games when Wills was active on the bases, even when he was caught stealing or picked off. They did much worse when he failed to run at all. Wills’ batting average and on base percentage are closely related to the Dodgers winning percentage. To a degree this correlation can be attributed to intangibles, but it cannot be denied that most teams will do well in games in which their leadoff hitter has an on base percentage of over .400.

Table 6. Wills’ batting record and Dodger winning percentage. Combined for 1962, 1963, and 1965.

It is also true that games in which Wills did well are games in which his teammates were likely to do well, perhaps because the opposing pitcher was having a bad day. Wills had a phenomenal offensive record in the five games between September 6 and September 10, 1962. During this brief interval he had 13 hits in 16 at bats including.7 straight hits at one point, and stole 12 bases. The Dodgers won three of these five games.

The effect of Wills’ running on the performance of those batting immediately behind him is addressed in Table 7. About 85% of these appearances were Jim Gilliam, with most of the rest being Wes Parker (in 1965). The most striking feature in this table is that batting average rose from .267 with no one on to .322 when Wills was on first, but dropped to .189 if he stole. A possible explanation of these changes is that the first baseman holds the runner on, creating a hole on the right side, but that he plays off the bag after the steal and covers more territory. Finch indicated the direction of hits in his scorebooks, so it is possible to estimate this point by totaling the singles to right field. Obviously not all of these singles were in the same place, but a large change should be detected. Table 7 shows that the percentage of right field singles increased with Wills on first from 18% to 24%, and declined again to 19% after a steal. This change, although consistent, is not sufficient by itself to explain the batting average change. When a base stealer is on first, pitchers tend to throw more fast balls to help the catcher’s chance of throwing out the runner. This pattern of pitching is of course also understood by the batter, whose average should be increased. This point can be extended by examining pitch-by-pitch box scores of 96 Dodger games (24 each in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965) which I recorded during those seasons. These data (in Table 7) show that the fewest pitches per appearance occurred when Wills was on first, but did not steal. This observation probably reflects the large number of fast balls in this situation as discussed above.

Table 7. Performance of men batting behind Wills, cumulative for 1962, 1963, and 1965.

*Percentage of hits which were singles to right field.

**At the time these men completed the plate appearance.

Based on analysis of 403 plate appearances in 1962,1963,1964,1965.

Further analysis reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that walks were much more frequent following a steal, causing on base percentage to be depressed only slightly in comparison to the batting average decline following a steal. The pitch data show a dramatic increase in the number of pitches per plate appearance for those following Wills after a steal of second. This can be most easily explained by noting that these batters (usually Gilliam) took an additional one or two pitches (including pitchouts) while waiting for Wills to steal. The consequences are that walks are more likely and that the average number of strikes is increased. Pete Palmer has shown that batting with two strikes leads to a greatly reduced average.

The final aspect of Wills’ base running to be considered is the effect he had on mistakes by the opposition. Table 8 summarizes the number of bases Wills advanced via balks, wild pitches, passed balls, errors on pickoff attempts, and errors following stolen bases. For the three seasons analyzed, Wills accounted for over 20% of all such extra bases the Dodgers received, even though he represented less that 13% of total Dodger base runners. It is clear that his presence on the bases increased the chance of the opposition making these mistakes. This feature and the batting performance discussed in the previous paragraphs are examples of what are often referred to as “intangibles.” Complete understanding is not possible, but it is encouraging that play-by-play analysis can give us quantitative evaluations of points which are often in the realm of guesswork and intuition.

Table 8. Bases advanced by Wills on opposition mistakes.

Wills’ base running was very important to the Dodgers of 1962, 1963, and 1965. Pete Palmer has shown that in a given season only about 10 batters in the whole league contribute as many as three wins. Wills’ running was directly responsible for 7 wins over the three seasons, 3 of them in 1962. In addition his overall contribution was increased by factors related to his base running, namely his batting ability and effect on the opposition’s concentration. Wills was highly successful in his running attempts. If his PO are omitted, then his success frequency was .791. Even if POs are considered to be CS, then he was successful .739 of the time. The major league average is usually around .60. Leonard Koppett, writing in The Sporting News (Feb. 10, 1979), has observed that Wills caused a significant change in the way major league baseball is played. He was one of the first men to be allowed to run whenever he wished, and the opposition knew it. The analysis reported here demonstrates that through direct and indirect effects, tangible and intangible, the stolen base is a valuable play, as exemplified by the record of Maury Wills.

Granted, strong or weak pitching and home-run hitting affect total home runs at stadiums. Beyond these, the three big factors are physical dimensions of the stadium, weather or ball-carry factors, and emphasis. The first two are pretty well accepted, so let’s try to tie down this emphasis factor.

Busch Memorial Stadium in St. Louis is regarded as one of the more difficult home-run parks. But here’s how it stacks up with Atlanta for physical dimensions and ball carry (all numbers in feet unless otherwise marked):

Physical Dimensions

Weather Factors

The surprising thing is that these two stadiums aren’t far apart in most comparisons. The only real significant factors are the 500-foot higher altitude and the 41/2 foot lower fence at Atlanta. Throwing everything into the hopper, we came up with Atlanta being 15% easier for physical dimensions and 16% easier for ball-carry factors, or 33% easier overall. There’s no way it can be much more; the deeper St. Louis center field doesn’t matter much.

In the baseball world, an accepted way of comparing stadiums for home runs based on all factors is in terms of home runs hit at home and away. Below are four year home-and-away figures for the Braves and their opponents plus the same for the Cardinals.

Adjusting these figures so they relate to the average National League stadium for 1976-79 (the two clubs play in different “away” stadiums), it turns out that 69% more home runs were hit at Atlanta, and 26% fewer at Busch Memorial. Now we can solve for the emphasis factor. The 33% comparison favoring Atlanta for physical dimensions and ball-carry factors breaks down to 14% above average for Atlanta and 14% below average for Busch Memorial. All we need to do for Atlanta, for example, is divide 1.69 by 1.14; this equals 1.48. The following are the results:

Atlanta Stadium Compared for Home Runs to 1976-79 National League Average Park

• All factors — 69% more home runs
• Dimensions and weather factors — 14% easier
• Emphasis (or attitude) factor — 48% positive emphasis

Busch Memorial Stadium Compared for Home Runs to 1976-79 N.L. Average Park

• All factors — 26% fewer home runs
• Dimensions and weather factors — 14% more difficult
• Emphasis (attitude) factor — 14% negative emphasis

Surely, these emphasis-factor percentages are larger than expected. Atlanta has had more home-run emphasis than any other major league team. At St. Louis, the Cardinals haven’t had much power in recent years. Consequently negative emphasis makes sense for their team in a relatively large stadium.

What does home-run emphasis really mean? It’s not easy to explain in a few words. Basically, it’s a matter of attitude, strategy, intent, priorities, etc. We’ve been describing positive emphasis as going for the long ball, thinking home run — all of which means more strikeouts and pop-ups, but more home runs, too. Negative emphasis is laying off the long ball, hitting to the opposite field, and trying to avoid striking out.

Why so much emphasis at Atlanta? A flock of reasons — “Some days the ball flies right out of here,” “If Henry could hit them out, so can I,” and a reputation as an easy home-run park. Most of the time visiting teams play the same kind of game as the home team. So visiting teams have been going for the home run the same as the Braves.

We went to spring training by way of Atlanta two years running. Could the fences be shorter than what the measurements say? “No way,” says Robert Johnson, grounds superintendent. “If you don’t believe it, you can measure them yourself.” Joe Shirley, Stadium Operations Director, said “the fences are right” and the Braves’ outlook is to go for the home run. At West Palm Beach, Paul Snyder, Minor League Administrator, said: “I think attitude is the biggest factor in home-run hitting.” It appears he couldn’t be more right.

Home-run emphasis with a specific mathematical meaning has been around awhile. We stumbled on it back in 1973 while using a bunch of mathematics to prove to the Cardinals that it wouldn’t help to shorten their center field fence. When we developed it more, Sports Illustrated introduced it in July 1973. We define it as home runs at home compared to the average of both home and away. (Away is adjusted to include one-eleventh of home-team home runs, which puts “away” on the same basis for all teams.) Since 1975, we’ve been producing and distributing home-run emphasis percentages for all major league teams. The effect of physical dimensions and ball-carry factors is removed from these emphasis figures.

To know more about the many Atlanta home runs, we tried last winter to find out if temperature and humidity had anything to do with it. Could high temperature be “triggering” the stress to hit home runs? Through the courtesy of the Elias Sports Bureau in New York and the Weather Bureau in Atlanta, we obtained home runs hit and the average temperature and humidity for each game in Atlanta in 1978.

Temperature affects home-run hitting in two ways. First is density of the air. Air expands at higher temperatures, becomes thinner or less dense, and offers less resistance to the flight of the ball. The other effect is the resiliency of the baseball. Balls that are warm, rather than cold, go farther as tests have proven. Air density effects are three to four times as great as resiliency effects in most circumstances.

Humidity also affects the resiliency of the baseball. Baseballs now are usually stored in air-conditioned areas, which keeps the cover fairly dry and the weight down. Once the ball is exposed to very moist air, the cover starts moving in the soggy direction, the ball takes on weight and it won’t go as far when hit. Ball-handling practices have a lot to do with humidity effects.

It’s a common misconception that humidity in the air slows down the ball. High humidity, short of fog, rain, etc., results in air only slightly less dense that dry air and causes practically no effect on the flight of the ball.

After many alternatives, the following table for Atlanta Stadium in 1978 gets close to the stress-temperature-humidity home-run question.

(Click image to enlarge.)

A few columns need explaining. In column I is the average relative humidity, and in column H is the absolute humidity in terms of grains per cubic foot. A grain is pretty small — 7,000 to the pound. Column C is important; the 2.65 for June-July is much higher and the 1.6 for April-May is much lower compared to the 2.15 home runs per game for the season average. The combined effect, or impact, of all the factors we are trying to tie down causes these numbers to vary from the 2.5 average.

In column E is the impact of the temperatures of column D in terms of home runs per game; similar for the humidities in Column G. At cursory glance, temperature makes quite a difference; humidity not much.

The column F numbers represent stress on home runs. We chose to use the term “stress,” a synonym of emphasis, because we don’t want to confuse the strict “home vs. away” meaning of home-run emphasis described earlier. Everything except temperature and humidity is lumped in the stress column. For example, note that for June-July the 2.65 value is 0.5 home runs above the 2.15 season average; temperature is 0.2 above and humidity is down 0.05, making a combined value of 0.15 above. Subtracting the 0.15 from the 0.5 is the 0.35 stress impact. The most significant thing in the table is that the temperature and stress values are pretty close to each other, have the same plus and minus signs, and actually correlate very well. Overall, the stress values can be seen as about 35% greater than the temperature values. Humidity values are small and very unlike the stress numbers.

In digging deeper, the same analysis was applied to the four cases of the warmest 25 percent of games played per month, likewise the coolest, driest and dampest groups. All of the groups, except the driest, came out very much like the all-season analysis but with the stress values more like 100%, rather than 35%, larger than the temperature values. For the driest group, the stress values looked more like the humidity values, surprisingly. A check revealed a cool but extremely dry spring could make the ball lighter than it is in air-conditioned areas.

The simple table that follows is a little different twist in that season-long selective groups, rather than bi-monthly, are used for the various impacts.

(Click image to enlarge.)

In the table above the percentages in column F were determined by dividing the home runs per game by the season average of 2.5; again, the stress values are obtained by taking out the temperature and humidity impacts. Note that more than four times as many home runs per game were hit in the warmest groups vs. the coolest. The dampest games were pretty warm, too; the driest among the coolest. The same general relationship occurs between temperature and stress values. The warmest and coolest show the stress values to be about 150% larger than the temperature values, but overall the group shows about 100% increase. A larger number of games considered would yield more consistency within the groups.

Clearly, humidity has little to do with this exercise. When early calculations showed poor consistency, we called Atlanta to find out just how they were handling their baseballs. Very carefully, we learned; they store the balls in air-conditioned areas, rub the surface with clay in air-conditioned areas, keep the ball bag shut, throw out any ball that gets water on it — all things that practically close out the effects of high humidity. So we adjusted our humidity impacts accordingly.

What do the tables mean? In a nutshell, two things: First, the hitters are stressing home runs in Atlanta when the temperature is up and not stressing home runs when the temperature is down. Second, the home-run stress, compared to the impact of temperature, varies from about 35% larger for the average game up to 150% larger in the more extreme temperatures.

Does this make a lot of sense? Of course it does. When the temperature is way up, it’s just like moving the fence in maybe ten feet. Now the sluggers have it a lot easier and more not-so-long hitters get in the act. When it’s real cold, it’s like moving the fence back ten feet and, except for the big hitters, it’s time to get on the base paths some other way. So temperature and home-run stress keep very close company.

We think the stress factor is mostly pure intent, or the lack of it, to hit home runs. There could be other ingredients like how the hitters feel; name your own. Whatever stress includes, it doesn’t change the values; the big thing in this article is how stress values correlate with the temperature values.

Getting back to where we started, there’s a lot of home-run emphasis at Atlanta compared to other stadiums for a flock of good reasons. But it’s the “temperature trigger” that says when to turn on or off the stress on home runs. All this about Atlanta and home runs is “how they play the game.”

    As far back as the mid-l 890’s McGraw had ventured successfully into businesses other than baseball. With Hall-of-Fame catcher Wilbert Robinson, he had opened “The Diamond” in downtown Baltimore. It was a combination saloon, bowling alley, and gymnasium and is often credited with being the birthplace of “duckpin” bowling in America. McGraw later was a part owner in Baltimore’s first American League entry in 1901 and was eventually a minority owner in the New York Giants. During the off-season he often spent time in Cuba and in fact was an owner of several successful race horses at local tracks. The Florida land boom appeared to be yet another opportunity for John McGraw to make money.

    The beginning of the beach area land boom had started shortly after World War I with resorts springing up at Palm Beach, Miami, and Coral Gables. Original purchasers now enjoyed sharply higher values for properties with vast stretches of undeveloped land still available. For example, a lot purchased for $800 in Miami sold only a few years later for $150,000. Another piece of commercial property rose from $240,000 to $4,000,000 in two years. The real frenzy began in 1924 and continued through 1925. Eventually this boom was to reach ridiculous proportions. Of the 75,000 persons living in Miami during 1925, nearly 25,000 were real estate agents. Persons living in Miami actually were forced to put signs on their front yards informing real estate agents their houses were NOT for sale! In the summer of 1925 one Miami newspaper ran a 504-page edition dedicated entirely to real estate ads. Enter John J. McGraw in January 1926.

      For several years, McGraw had been very interested in Florida,  particularly the West Coast town of Sarasota where his Giants had trained since 1924. At the insistence of John Ringling, the circus magnate, McGraw had purchased a home in Sarasota and apparently expected to spend a great deal of his off-season in Florida. Few in New York who knew him, however, were prepared for just how involved he had become in the land boom.

      During the first week of January 1926, each of the New York newspapers ran a full page advertisement with a picture of McGraw saying in bold letters: “You’ve followed me in baseball, now follow me in real estate!” To capture the fancy of the fans he had named this prospective development just north of Sarasota, Pennant Park. The development was designed to eventually include 2,000 residents. John McGraw was a partner with A. S. Skinner, a prominent Sarasota developer. Lot prices ranged from $2500 to $5000, not a tiny sum in 1926, and was to include use of a magnificent yacht club.

     As a personal whim, McGraw had asked for the main thoroughfare to be known as Mathewson Park after his favorite ballplayer, Christy Mathewson, who had died during the World Series of 1925. All the other streets were to be named after famous ballplayers – usually Giants – and Bresnahan Boulevard was cited as an example. McGraw went so far as to personally guarantee every investor’s total satisfaction and asked every investor to have complete confidence in his opinion. All this for property in which the streets existed only on blueprints and in the imagination of McGraw and Skinner.

     Offices were opened in Sarasota for persons who might venture down to see the property – what there was to see of it. The investors placed their trust in McGraw, and few individuals felt the necessity to travel to Florida despite the late stage of the boom. Checks and money orders poured into the offices at 104 West 42nd Street in New York and were quickly processed by Jack Bentley, the Giants pitcher, who was acting as local agent for the development.

     By April, amazingly, the operation went from boom to bust. A dropoff of speculation earlier in the year had turned into a mad panic to sell throughout Florida and solid, quality projects were collapsing in price, leaving developments like Pennant Park to be reclaimed by the jungle. By the spring of 1927 those who had followed him into investing were looking toward McGraw or if necessary the courts to make good on refunding their money. It seemed that in the heat of sales the agents had in fact sold more land than actually existed.

    While McGraw should have been priming his club for another pennant push in 1926 he had to spend time satisfying disgruntled investors. Probably no one knows just how much Pennant Park was to cost John McGraw. In financial cost it was plenty, including his Sarasota home. There also were intangible losses involving his reputation, his piece of mind, and the ball club with which he had long been associated.

    The Giants slipped to fifth place in 1926 and McGraw nagged team captain Frank Frisch so much the Fordham Flash jumped the club. After the season ended, Frisch was traded to St. Louis for second baseman Rogers Hornsby, who had just managed the Cards to the world championship. In 1927 McGraw placed Hornsby in charge of the Giants on those occasions – and there were several -when the Old Oriole was not with the club. Hornsby’s heavy-handedness caused quarreling and dissension among the players and the result didn’t reflect much credit on McGraw. The next year Hornsby was traded to Boston, but the marginal material the Giants got in return didn’t help the club very much.

    Back in New York, McGraw was no longer invincible and his following shrunk. His health, which had been poor for a couple of years, began to deteriorate further and he was forced to miss several road trips. Even with stars like Terry, Ott, Hubbell and Lindstrom, he could not win another pennant. He had a losing percentage when he resigned as manager on June 2, 1932. He went to Havana the following winter to try to recover his health. After watching the Giants regain the world title under Terry in 1933, he fought the gradual encroachments of cancer until February 25, 1934, when he died at age 60. He had been a Big League manager more than one-half of his life. Too bad there was no Pennant Park where he could be appropriately memorialized.

At one time Lou Gehrig was credited with an American League record of ten consecutive RBI games, which he achieved twice in 1931 and once in 1934. Then further research shoed that Babe Ruth and Al Simmons each had 1 1-game streaks in 1931. Then it was found that Red Sox playing manager Joe Cronin knocked in runs in 12 straight games in 1939 and that his star outfielder, Ted Williams, also had a 12-game string in 1942. In the National League, Mel Ott for many years was carried as the leader with an 11-game streak made in 1929, but two years ago it was discovered that Paul Waner had achieved a 12-game run in 1927.

The Elias Sports Bureau felt that it was time that this evolving run production drama be brought to a climactic conclusion. We decided to research all the official records of runs batted in since they achieved that status in 1920 to see what “great slugger” had achieved the longest string of RBI games. It took considerable checking and rechecking but we finally came up with a 13-game record-holder in the American League and a surprising 17-game streaker in the National League.

They were two Chicago players of modest reputation – Taft Wright of the 1941 White Sox, and Oscar Ray Grimes of the 1922 Cubs. They were good hitters, with lifetime records well over .300, but they didn’t have very long careers and were not regarded as Particularly good run producers. Nevertheless, they did have legitimate streaks which are of interest also because of some unusual aspects.

First the 13-game streak of Taft Wright in 1941.

The hefty White Sox outfielder was in his third season and playing his first full game of 1941 when the string was launched modestly on May 4 with an RBI single in four trips against Philadelphia. The streak became even more “modest” in the third, fourth and fifth games when Wright failed to hit in each contest, yet was credited with an RBI each day. On May 7 he hit a sacrifice fly; on May 10 11e was walked twice, once with the bases loaded; and on May 11 a run scored on his infield out. After driving in two runs with two hits on May 13, he had another hitless day on May 14 but drove in a run with an infield out. He knocked in four runs with a homer and a single on May 15 and then had two more hitless games where he moved one runner home with a sacrifice fly and another with a force out. He made up for the hitless days with four hits on May 18, producing four runs. After two more run-producing games, the 13-game streak came to a close in Philadelphia on May 21.

The remarkable achievement was magnified in that in six games he knocked in runs without any hits. In that way he edged out the great AL sluggers like Ruth, Gehrig, Foxx, Simmons, and Ted Williams of an important run production record. Wright ended the 1941 season with 97 RBIs, the most on the White Sox team, and the best of his nine-year career.

The NL record was established by Ray Grimes, who made it to the majors with the Red Sox in 1920. That was also the debut year of his twin brother Roy. Roy lasted only one year, but Ray went on to the Cubs where he played first base and had a very good season in 1922, hitting .354. That was the year of his streak, which started in the second game of a twinbill with Pittsburgh on June 27. The next day he had lumbago and did not play. He returned to the lineup on June 30 and had at least one RBI through the July 8 twinbill. Ironically, he played only one inning of the second game, but connected for an RBI single before leaving the game with a wrenched back.

The injury was serious and he did not return to first base until July 18 when he celebrated with a homer, double and two singles to lead the Cubs to a 6-3 victory over the Phils. On July 21 he doubled in the only run of the game to give Grover Alexander a 1-0 thriller over Dutch Ruether of the Dodgers. Grimes continued to hit well, driving out extra-base hits in six straight games. Finally, on July 25, in a game against Boston he failed to produce a run. His big chance came in the fourth inning with two teammates on base, but Grimes was walked to load the bases.

His spectacular 17-game RBI streak was not noted at the time, probably because he was absent from the lineup on two occasions, once for nine days. However, the RBI streak, like a consecutive game hitting streak, is based on the games the individual plays and not necessarily those that the team plays.

Ray Grimes, Cubs, 1922

Taft Wright, White Sox, 1941

This brief survey of post-playing careers deals primarily with selected former players who went into a non-sports field and established a career identity of some importance which was separate from baseball. Of course, some of those we will discuss did not have much baseball identity except for playing at least for a short time in the major leagues. Even this minimum criterion eliminated our best candidate in the literature or writing field — Zane Grey — who played in the minors but never made it to the Big Time, at least in baseball.

There follows a discussion of some of the more prominent and specialized cases by occupational category.

Politics and Government: Gibson to Mizell

The category of Politics and Government is the easiest to document because the person is measured by the position he holds. Very few high positions have been held by former players. For example, no major league player has ever made it to the President’s cabinet and only two reached the sub-cabinet level. None has ever become mayor of a large U.S. city; it is worth noting, however, that Bobby Avila served as Mayor of Vera Cruz, Mexico.

Only two served as Governors of States, and four served in the U.S. Congress — three in the House and one in the Senate. As far as we can tell, only one became a Federal judge. The latter case may be a good starting point in a survey of former players who went into politics and government.

When mention is made of ball players becoming lawyers, the two who most immediately come to mind are John Montgomery Ward, the head of the Brotherhood of Baseball Players in 1890 and Dave Fultz, who established the Baseball Players Fraternity in 1912. Both were successful New York attorneys who continued their baseball connections. Two contemporary lawyers — Robert Murray Gibson and Fred Herbert Brown gained their reputations outside of baseball.

Robert Gibson, son of a Presbyterian minister, was born in Western Pennsylvania in 1869. He attended Penn State one year and was graduated from Washington and Jefferson College in 1889. He was a good baseball pitcher in the Pittsburgh area and was signed, not by Pittsburgh, but by the Chicago team in the Spring of 1890. Then Cap Anson had the audacity to start Gibson in a game against the Pittsburgh NL club on June 4, 1890. The hometown boy beat the Innocents (Pirates) 5-1. In spite of that auspicious start, Gibson did not want to leave the Pittsburgh area so Anson let him go. The embarrassed Innocents then picked him up, but he lost all three of his starts for them. Pittsburgh had a horrendous team in 1890, winning only 23 games and losing 113.

Gibson shortly left baseball to study law and was admitted to the Washington County bar in 1894. He became Assistant U.S. Attorney for Southwestern Pennsylvania in 1903 and in 1914 he became the First Assistant District Attorney of Allegheny County (Pittsburgh area). He had gained some attention three years before when he was assigned to prosecute Alaskan boundary cases. In 1922 President Harding appointed Gibson, a recognized Republican, as U.S. District Judge for Western Pennsylvania.

In his first ten years on the Federal Bench, Gibson handled a large volume of prohibition cases. Later he established an outstanding record in bankruptcy and selective service cases. He drew national attention in 1937 when he granted an injunction which temporarily halted the Government’s anti-trust suit against the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa). President Roosevelt was very upset by this decision and said the injunction in the Alcoa case was one of the reasons for seeking reform of the Federal Court. Judge Gibson replied, “We little fellows have to take the laws they give us and interpret them to the best of our abilities.”

For 26 years Gibson’s white moustache and tall (6’3″), spare frame were a familiar sight on the Federal bench. He was 79 when he retired in January 1949 as senior judge of the U.S. District Court. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorialized: “It will be a long time before whoever gets the appointment can hope to fill in the District the particular place that Judge Gibson had won among his respectful and admiring neighbors.” The Judge passed away in Pittsburgh on December 19, 1949.

Fred Herbert Brown was born in Ossippee, New Hampshire, in 1879 and worked his way through Dartmouth College. He was an outstanding athlete there and was catcher on the baseball team. Brown was signed by the Boston Nationals upon graduation and played in Haverhill, Providence, and later in Jersey City. He was with the Braves in both 1901 and 1902, getting into a few games as an outfielder and pinch hitter before returning to the minors. In the off-season he attended the Boston University Law School, and, after passing the bar exam in 1907, gave up baseball.

Brown practiced law in Somersworth, N.H. and served as mayor from 1914 to 1922. He also served in the State legislature and advanced in the political field. A Democrat, he was elected Governor of New Hampshire in 1922, serving two years. He was defeated for re-election and served as a member of the New Hampshire Public Service Commission from 1925 to 1933.

Brown ran for the U.S. Senate in 1932 and won in the Franklin Roosevelt/Democratic landslide of that year. He served one six-year term, 1933-39, and was defeated for re-election. However, he was the only former player ever to serve in the Senate. While in Washington he watched the baseball Senators at Griffith Stadium, and, because of his past baseball association, was usually included in the Presidential party at the opening game ceremonies.

President Roosevelt appointed him Comptroller General of the U.S. in 1939. The next year he was made a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission, but resigned in 1941 because of poor health.

These were the top positions achieved by any former player in the Executive Branch of Government.

In spite of declining health, Brown remained a power in New Hampshire politics.  Democratic Presidential candidates, such as Harry Truman in 1948, consulted with him before entering the New Hampshire Presidential primary. Truman had been a Senate colleague of Brown in the late l930s. Brown died in Somersworth, N.H. February 3, 1955.

Fred Brown was not the first former player to become a State Governor or a Member of Congress. That distinction fell to John K. Tener, who served hi the House, 1909-11, a seat he gave up to become Governor of Pennsylvania, 1911-15. Ironically, Tener did not give up the Governorship in December 1913 when he began a 4½-year period as President of the National League. Such dual responsibility would not be possible today.

Tener, born in Ireland in 1863, played one game in the outfield for Baltimore in the American Association in 1885. He then pitched two years for the Chicago Colts in 1888-89, and one season for the Pittsburgh entry in the Players League in 1890. He settled in the Pittsburgh area and was a banker before he ran for Congress in 1908. Tener starred in the first Congressional Baseball Game in 1909. This popular outing, which pitted Congressional Democrats against Republicans, was played on an irregular basis until the mid-1950s when it became an annual event in Washington.

Pius Schwert, a name more suitable for a clergyman than a baseball player or a Congressman, nevertheless was a back-up catcher for the Yankees in 1914-15, and a Democratic Congressman from New York in 1939-41. Born near Buffalo in 1892, he graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1914 and was captain of the baseball team. He played in the minors in Jersey City, Newark, and Buffalo until 1917 when he served as a naval officer in World War I. He did not go back to baseball after the war, but, like Tener, went into the banking business.

From 1933 to 1938 Schwert was Erie County Clerk in Buffalo. He won election to Congress in 1938 from essentially the same district that sent pro football star Jack Kemp to Congress in 1970. Schwert won a second term in 1940. On March 11, 1941, in the middle of a speech in Washington where he announced he was going to run for Mayor of Buffalo, he collapsed and died. He was only 48.

The best known former player to serve in Congress was Wilmer “Vinegar Bend” Mizell, who served three terms as Republican Representative from North Carolina, 1969-75. He was born in Vinegar Bend, Alabama, which he described as a town so small that the city limits signs were placed back-to-back. He went to school across the state line in Mississippi and played most of his major league baseball for the St. Louis Cardinals. How did he then wind up in North Carolina? The answer is that he played minor league ball in Winston-Salem and that’s where he met Nancy McAlpine, whom he married in 1952. Ten years later when a sore arm ended his pitching career, he returned there to work for the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company.

How did he get into politics?

“Well, I was working in public relations and I made a lot of speeches around Winston-Salem. I’ll bet I made about 100 speeches a year. I always enjoyed talking to the public I used to do this with the Cardinals, talking at PTA meetings and to church groups in the St. Louis area. In 1966 I was elected Chairman of the Davidson County Board of Commissioners for a four-year term. The next year a Republican delegation came to see me and asked me to seek the Fifth District seat in Congress. I thought about it a little and said yes. It was as simple as that.”

Mizell beat his Democratic opponent by 9,000 votes, not a wide margin, but enough to send him packing to Washington. He was a striking figure, 6’3½” and weighing about 215, and wearing his dark hair in a crew cut. He was a strong “law-and-order” Representative and reflected the conservative views of his constituency. His humble beginning and his lack of education beyond high school didn’t seem to handicap him as he twice won re-election. And when he lost out in 1974, former Republican House colleague Gerald Ford, who had become President, appointed him an Assistant Secretary of Commerce. He served 1975-76 and ran again for the House seat in the Bicentennial Year. But the Democratic ticket headed by Jimmy Carter swept much of the South and Mizell again went down to defeat. Another southern casualty that year was Bobby Richardson, former Yankee second baseman, who lost his bid to become a Republican Representative from South Carolina.

Mizell says his biggest baseball thrill was playing in the 1960 World Series with the Pittsburgh Pirates. The big southpaw quickly admits that he performed poorly, being knocked out of the box by the Yankees in the first inning, but the ultimate Pirate Series win over the New Yorkers on Bill Mazeroski’s home run was more than enough to balance out his personal disappointment. He was a team player, on the ball field and in Congress.

When the Phillies defeated the Cubs 23-22 in 10 innings on May 17, 1979 in the “friendly confines” of Wrigley Field in Chicago, it prompted research as to the other unusually high scoring games in the annals of baseball. The classic irony is that the only game where a greater two-team score was ever recorded was also played at Wrigley Field, and between the same two ball clubs. On August 25, 1922, the Cubs, who had once led 25-6, held on to win 26-23 for the all-time record score of 49 runs.

In the 1979 game, the Phillies saw a 21-9 lead vanish before finally emerging the victor, on Mike Schmidt’s second home run of the game (Dave Kingman of the Cubs hit three homers) in the 10th inning off relief ace Bruce Sutter. While the 1979 game had a record-tying 11 home runs, the 1922 game had only 3 home runs, all by the winning Cubs. The 1979 game stands as the highest score for an extra-inning game, as well as the highest score for a game decided by one run. The Phillies and the Cubs had an additional marathon game in Chicago on April 17, 1976 when the Phillies blew a 12-1 lead, and wound up winning 18-16 in 10 innings on Mike Schmidt’s fourth consecutive home run of the game.

Prior to the 1979 extravaganza, the second largest scoring game of all time was played in 1890 when Brooklyn of the Players League (a one-year major league) defeated Buffalo 28-16 on July 12 at Brooklyn.

Two major league games had 43 runs scored, both coming in the 1890s, with scores of 22-21 and 36-7. Those games mark the largest score in a one-run game in nine innings and the largest score by one team in one game, respectively.

In modern times, the top one-run game score prior to 1979 had been 18-17 in 18 innings on July 10, 1932, when the Philadelphia Athletics defeated the Cleveland Indians in an American League game. In that game, the Athletics were on a one-day trip to Cleveland (no Sunday ball was permitted that year in Philadelphia) and Athletics Manager Connie Mack carried only two pitchers with him. When starter Lew Krausse (father of a later-day American League pitcher) yielded four hits and three runs in the first inning, Mack called on reliever Eddie Rommel, later an umpire, who was forced to hurl the rest of the way. He surrendered 14 runs and 29 hits, but wound up being the winning pitcher!

Rommel had hurled three innings the day before, but the Athletics were in a stretch where they had played doubleheaders on July 7, 8, and 9, with another one coming up on the 11th. Cleveland shortstop Johnny Burnett made a record nine hits in the game, Jimmie Foxx had 16 total bases, and Rommel gained his only win of 1932 and his final major league victory.

In 1890, in an American Association game when that circuit was a major league, Brooklyn defeated Syracuse by a score of 22-21 in Brooklyn — this being the largest 1-run decision in 9 innings.

The American League, which became a major league in 1901 (25 years after the National League), has never had a game where more than 36 runs were scored. The Boston Red Sox defeated the Philadelphia Athletics 22-14 on June 29, 1950 in a game which was played in Shibe Park, not the more comfortable Fenway Park in Boston. Earlier in June, the Red Sox had defeated the lowly St. Louis Browns 20-4 and 29-4 on consecutive afternoons in Boston’s Fenway Park. Boston batted .302 that year, becoming the last major league team to compile a season batting average of .300. There were seven other American League games, counting the 18-17 game earlier referred to, in which a combined total of exactly 35 runs were scored.

In terms of scoring by one team in a single game, the Chicago NL team, then known as the White Stockings, set the record with its 36-7 victory over Louisville in 1897. This was the last of eight major-league games prior to 1900 in which 30 or more runs were scored by one team. While there have been well over 150 games since 1900 where a team scored 20 or more runs in one game (including the two games where both teams turned the trick), there have been no modern games where a team scored 30 or more runs.

In only 12 games, six in each major league, did a 20th century team score 25 or more runs. The feat was most recently accomplished by the Chicago White Sox in 1955 when they defeated the Kansas City Athletics by a score of 29-6 to tie the 29-run mark set by the Boston Red Sox in their 29-4 win over the St. Louis Browns in 1950. The top NL mark since 1900 was the St. Louis Cardinals’ 28-6 win over the Philadelphia Phillies in 1929.

Here are the linescores of the two Philadelphia-Chicago NL games, played in 1922 and 1979, which are the highest scoring games in major league history for both teams combined in the same game. Also included are the linescores of the Syracuse-Brooklyn AA game in 1890, which is the highest one-run decision in nine innings in major league history, and Chicago’s 36-7 win over Louisville in 1897, which represents the most runs scored by one team in a major league game. Note that the Cubs in 1922 had innings of 10 runs and 14 runs in a very erratic offensive effort.

May 17, 1979 

August 25, 1922 

June 29, 1897

April 18, 1890

There follows a list of major league games prior to 1900 where one team scored 30 runs or both teams scored 40 runs. Asterisk indicates home team.

• July 22, 1876 (NL): *Chicago over Louisville 30-7
• July 24, 1882 (NL): *Chicago over Cleveland 35-4
• June 9, 1883 (NL): *Boston over Detroit 30-8
• July 3, 1883 (NL): *Chicago over Buffalo 31-7
• Aug. 27, 1887 (NL): *Boston over Pittsburgh 28-14
• Apr. 18, 1890 (AA): *Brooklyn over Syracuse 22-21
• June 26, 1890 (PL): Philadelphia over *Buffalo 30-12
• July 12, 1890 (PL): *Brooklyn over Buffalo 28-16
• Aug. 7, 1890 (NL): *Cincinnati over Pittsburgh 23-17
• Sep. 10, 1891 (AA): * Milwaukee over Washington 30-3
• June 18, 1893 (NL): * Cincinnati over Louisville 30-12
• June 29, 1897 (NL): *Chicago over Louisville 36-7

The major league games between 1900 and 1979 where one team scored 25 runs or both teams scored 35 runs are carried below:

National League

• Apr. 19, 1900: Philadelphia over *Boston 19-17 (opening day)
• June 9, 1901: New York over *Cincinnati 25-13 (forfeit game)
• Sept. 23, 1901: Brooklyn over *Cincinnati 25-6
• June 4, 1911: *Cincinnati over Boston 26-3
• Aug. 25, 1922: *Chicago over Philadelphia 26-23
• May 18, 1929: Brooklyn over *Philadelphia 20-16 (Game 1)
• June 15, 1929: New York over *Pittsburgh 20-15 (14 innings)
• July 6, 1929: St. Louis over *Philadelphia 28-6 (Game 2)
• Sep. 23, 1930: St. Louis over *Philadelphia 19-16
• Apr. 30, 1944: *New York over Brooklyn 26-8 (Game 1; Weintraub 11 RBI)
• Apr. 17, 1954: *Chicago over St. Louis 23-13
• Aug. 3, 1969: Cincinnati over *Philadelphia 19-17
• May 17, 1979: Philadelphia over *Chicago 23-22 (10 innings)

American League

• May 2, 1901: Boston over *Philadelphia 23-12
• Sep. 9, 1921: *Chicago over Detroit 20-15
• July 7, 1923: *Cleveland over Boston 27-3 (Game 1)
• Apr. 14, 1925: Cleveland over *St. Louis 21-14 (Opening Day)
• May 11, 1930: *Cleveland over Philadelphia 25-7
• July 10, 1932: Philadelphia over *Cleveland 18-17 (18 innings)
• May 25, 1936: New York over *Philadelphia 25-2 (Lazzeri 11 RBI)
• July 18, 1936: Chicago over *Philadelphia 21-14 (Game 2)
• Aug. 12, 1948: Cleveland over *St. Louis 26-3 (Game 2)
• June 8, 1950: *Boston over St. Louis 29-4
• June 29, 1950: Boston over *Philadelphia 22-14
• Apr. 23, 1955: Chicago over *Kansas City 29-6
• May 31, 1970: Chicago over *Boston 22-13