Introduction

The 1884 professional baseball season demonstrated the nationwide baseball boom then underway.1 It was an exciting time to be a lover of baseball. The 1883 season concluded with most professional clubs in acceptable financial condition, with plans for higher salaries and improved baseball grounds for 1884. Like 1882, the 1884 season offered new associations, new clubs, and a lot of baseball. Unlike 1882, baseball entrepreneurs overshot the amount of money available to be made selling baseball to a nation that was baseball-mad.

There were a multitude of professional baseball associations, state baseball associations, clubs, and players competing for baseball dollars. Among the leading professional associations, four were admitted into the 1884 National Agreement, the law of organized professional baseball, and the compact amending the 1883 Tripartite Agreement that ended the 1882 baseball war between the National League (NL) and American Association (AA).2 Of the four professional associations, only the National League completed the season intact, and that in itself was not a given. A third major organization, the Union Association (UA), organized to enter the 1884 professional season and sought to be the leading association by offering players large salaries. It rejected two established sections in the National Agreement: exclusive territories, and the reserved-men policy. In their competition for baseball talent and baseball dollars, many of the NL, AA, and UA clubs carried a reserve team, which played home exhibitions when the first team traveled.3

This chapter covers the business meetings of the three leading associations, NL, AA, and UA, and generally summarizes those for the Northwestern League (NWL) and the Eastern League (EL), which were parties to the new National Agreement.

National League Annual Meeting, November 21-22, 1883, Washington, D.C.

The NL Board of Directors gathered on November 20, 1883, at the Riggs House in Washington, D.C. The championship was awarded to the Boston club and Nick Young was reelected secretary.4

The convention began on November 21, 1883, presided over by A.G. Mills. The representatives first discussed the report submitted by the Arbitration Committee.5 The National Agreement between the NL and the AA amended the Tripartite Agreement, which organized the conduct of baseball associations in 1883. The National Agreement, summarized in greater detail in the 1882 chapter, welcomed all professional associations, institutionalized the reserved-man policy, enforced exclusive territories, and extended the privilege for mutual recognition of contracts by all National Association clubs.6 Importantly, it provided a framework to formally settle disputes between member associations and between clubs from different associations. W.G. Thompson sought to exclude the NWL, at one point exiting the room, but the NL adopted the National Agreement, 7 to 1, with Thompson (Detroit) opposed.7

Next, the convention amended its constitution and bylaws. The NL repealed its alliance clause, and removed the alliance from the constitution and bylaws.8 Its alliance was previously used to disrupt competing professional associations by providing affiliated clubs with privileges and the potential admission to NL membership. The NL was bound with the AA and NWL through the Tripartite Agreement which was acknowledged to serve satisfactorily as the framework for relations between professional clubs. The NL no longer had a need for its alliance.

Under section 37, a released player was eligible to play if his club continued to pay him compensation.9 However, if the NL secretary received notice of a contract but the player refused to sign the contract, then the club was required to expel the player.10

Importantly, the NL recognized territorial privileges. In 1883 the NL had moved franchises out of Troy, New York, and Worcester, Massachusetts, but it did not recognize the reserved players or contracts of those clubs. The 1884 constitution was amended so that if a member club resigned from the NL and joined an association party to the National Agreement, the NL would continue to recognize the reserved players and player contracts.11

Section 45 was amended to permit a reserved player the right to file a complaint with the NL Board of Directors if his salary was in arrears, or his club refused to extend a contract with the minimum salary. Depending upon the response of the player’s club, the Board was empowered to release the player from reserve. If the salary owed remained unpaid, the club could have its NL membership forfeited. Similarly, section 46 was amended to extend a player the right to file a complaint to the Board if he was under current contract and his salary was in arrears. The Board could release the player and forfeit the club’s membership.12

Under section 50, the NL recognized the Arbitration Committee as the sole arbiter between the NL and other baseball associations that were party to the National Agreement, and between NL clubs and member clubs in associations that recognized the National Agreement.13

Section 64 was amended to empower the NL secretary to appoint a staff of umpires. The secretary was empowered to remove umpires from their appointments for cause.14

Disagreement arose over the limits to each franchise’s exclusive territory. The exclusive territory policy provided each club with the privileges to approve exhibitions by NL clubs within five miles of the limits to the city where the home club was located. Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Providence opposed the five-mile territory when they observed that the New York club had refused their requests to play the AA Brooklyn club in Brooklyn.15 Both New York AA and NL clubs shared the Polo Grounds during 1883.16 Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia favored the five-mile limit. When A.H. Soden did not provide his support, Cleveland’s Buckley proposed that the NL accept Boston’s resignation and invite Brooklyn into the NL. The NL split its vote, 4 to 4, to remove the five-mile limit, maintaining the limit. The effect was that Brooklyn must continue to request the New York club’s consent to play exhibition games with NL clubs.

Union League (UL) representatives appeared to seek mutual recognition of their player contracts.17 The NL informed the UL that as a member of the National Agreement, the NL could not enter into any bilateral agreement with the UL.18

On November 22, 1883, the NL agreed to extend its championship season to October 15 from October 1, and increase championship games from 98 to 112. Its stated goal was to maintain interest as long as possible.19

Some important changes were made that concerned the playing rules. Pitchers were not restricted in their delivery of the ball to the batsmen. The pitcher was permitted to throw the baseball above the shoulder and overhand. Also, an automatic $5 fine was to be assessed on any player, other than the captain, who addressed the umpire regarding any decision he made.20 The first change addressed the fact that umpires did not enforce the 1883 pitching rule because they could not identify clearly when the ball was delivered from above or below the shoulder.21 The NL sought to cease the general practice of “kicking,” when a player disputed an umpire’s call, and to increase the authority and respect for the umpire’s official role.

Al Reach proposed to reduce admission fees to 25 cents, but there was no support. The NL adopted the Spalding League Ball as its official ball for 1884.22

A.G. Mills was reelected president, Nick Young secretary and treasurer. J.E. Allen (Providence), W.G. Thompson (Detroit), A.J. Reach (Philadelphia), and A.G. Spalding (Chicago) were elected to the Board of Directors.23 Committees were then appointed.24

In other business, a proposal to increase the NL president’s salary to $4,000 was put aside.25 Nick Young was instructed to invite the AA schedule committee to confer with the NL schedule committee, presumably to coordinate to prevent conflicts at New York and Philadelphia. The schedule committee slated its meeting for March 1884 at Buffalo. The uniform committee recommended that the 1883 uniform be retained. New York was selected to host the 1884 annual meeting.26

Finally, the proposed Union Association was indirectly addressed. John Day introduced a resolution to make ineligible any player who either was reserved by or had contracted with an NL club and played a game with any other club. After some discussion, the resolution was tabled to the March meeting.27

American Association Annual Meeting, December 12-13, 1883, Cincinnati, Ohio

During Tuesday evening, December 11, 1883, the AA Board of Directors met to review its report and conduct its business. The championship was awarded to Philadelphia’s Athletic Club. Both The Eclipse and St. Louis withdrew their protests of disputed games. At the request of their clubs, the directors reinstated Frank Gardner (Baltimore) and John Milligan (Anthracites). The board denied Rooney Sweeney’s request for reinstatement after he was expelled by Baltimore for drunkenness. Columbus and the Metropolitan club settled their disputed game, with the Mets awarded $225 for unfit grounds but Columbus recording a win. The board refused to consider requests to join the American Alliance, clubs that received mutual recognition of contracts from the AA, because the AA had determined to repeal its alliance. Secretary J.A. Williams outlined $7,000 in AA expenses and listed the players suspended or expelled during the 1883 season.28

Over December 12-13, 1883, in Cincinnati, Denny McKnight convened the AA convention, the third annual meeting of the association. After the delegates were recognized, the report of the board of directors was read.29 Four new clubs were admitted to membership, increasing the number of clubs in the circuit to 12. The new members were Brooklyn, Indianapolis, Toledo, and Washington. Brooklyn was the champion of the Interstate Association, recognized as an 1883 American Alliance member. Toledo was the top club from the 1883 season of the Northwestern League, party to the 1883 Tripartite Agreement.

Praise was received for the quality of the 1883 Reach official ball, and the AA awarded A.J. Reach a three-year contract to supply the official ball.30

The convention elected McKnight as president, Lew Simmons as vice president, and Wheeler C. Wyckoff as secretary and treasurer. William Barnie (Baltimore), Charles Byrne (Brooklyn), Lee Dinkelspiel (Louisville), Lew Simmons (Athletic), Chris Von der Ahe (St. Louis), and J.B. Whipple (Toledo) were elected directors.31

The AA amended rules related to contracts, releases, and expulsions, exactly as the NL had, to match the language in the National Agreement. Any player who signed two or more contracts was to be expelled. Managers of AA clubs were not required to sign written contracts.32

The salary of the secretary was increased to $800 and he was required to post a $3,000 bond.33

The AA adopted the NL’s five-mile rule. The Brooklyn club gained leverage to obtain NL exhibition games by its ability to prevent the NL New York club from playing an exhibition game with any AA club.34 Both the Metropolitan and Brooklyn clubs agreed to allow each other to arrange exhibition games with NL clubs.35 The policy expanded the physical size of monopoly control of Organized Baseball for each AA club.

The AA “declared war” on any association that opposed any part of the National Agreement. Within the AA, the AA promised to expel any club that played a game with any club that either employed an unreleased and reserved player or was located in a place where another club belonged to an association which was party to the National Agreement.36 The irony was that the AA successfully practiced such an independence policy against the NL when it was an entrant to demonstrate its strength. But when the AA was more entrenched in 1884, the AA adopted its former policy in response to the entering UA. In conference with Mills over the New Year, McKnight acknowledged that this resolution was more harmful to the AA clubs and he intended to work to rescind this policy.37

Unlike the NL, which tabled it, the AA adopted John Day’s resolution, which made ineligible any player who played in any game with any club other than the club that had reserved him.38

For 1884, the AA extended its championship season from October 1 to October 15. Each club was to play each other club 10 times, for a total of 110 games, 55 home games.39

Turning to the playing rules, the AA did not make changes that the NL made. Upon a poll, two-thirds of its clubs preferred to maintain the foul bound rule, which the NL had abolished for 1883.40 The AA also maintained the restriction on the delivery of the ball by the pitcher to the batsman, requiring that the ball be delivered from below the pitcher’s shoulder. The AA resolved that its umpires were to enforce its balk rule, giving the batter a base when the pitcher delivered the ball above the shoulder. One rule the AA changed was to award the batsman a base when “solidly and bodily hit by a pitched ball when he cannot apparently avoid it.” Another rule amended was to make the batter a baserunner after three strikes.41

Among the final business, the AA appointed six umpires for 1884, appointed members to a schedule committee, assigned the date March 5, 1884, for the spring meeting to be hosted at Baltimore, and decided on Washington, D.C., as the host of the 1884 annual meeting.42

Union Association Annual Meeting, December 18, 1883, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Union Association (UA) convention is covered in the chapter by Barney Terrell. The UL delegated Robert Ferguson to appear at the UA meeting.43 The AA and NL had refused to recognize the UL at their annual meetings, because it was not party to the National Agreement, and it proposed franchises in locations where one of their clubs existed. Ferguson noted at the meeting that the UL was not in opposition to the National Agreement, and in particular, the reserved-man rule, so it decided to affiliate with the NL and AA.44 The UL decision was important because without an ally, the UA was isolated from almost all professional clubs.

Eastern League Organization Meeting, January 3-4, 1884, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Eastern League (EL) organized at Philadelphia’s Bingham House over January 3-4, 1884, the date the UL originally called for its meeting. The EL was the combined interests of the new proposed Interstate Association with those of the Union League.45 The change in name was to reduce confusion with the UA.46 Delegates were present from Richmond (Virginia club), Baltimore (Monumentals), Wilmington (Quickstep), Reading, Allentown, Trenton, Newark (Domestic), and Harrisburg.47 The new association favored being admitted into the National Agreement.48

The delegates elected officers and directors. W.C. Seddon (Virginia) was elected president. S. Reineman (Trenton) was elected vice president, a position he also had held with the Interstate Association. Henry Diddlebock of Philadelphia, who was the UL’s secretary, was elected secretary and treasurer. Directors elected included W.S. Miller, Dr. G.W. Massamore, Felix J. Moses, and John T. West.49

Among the business conducted, a schedule committee was appointed and a meeting was scheduled for March 15, 1884, at Philadelphia’s Bingham House. The EL agreed to divide receipts as did the NL. An umpire corps was to consist of four men, each to receive a salary of $100 per month, and two substitutes, to receive $5 per game. The salary of the secretary was set at $500. The EL adopted the playing rules of the AA.50

At its special meeting held March 15, 1884, at Philadelphia, the EL appointed umpires, adopted a schedule, and appointed members to its Arbitration Committee.51

Northwestern League Annual Meeting, January 9-11, 1884, Chicago, Illinois

Six member clubs sent delegates to the annual meeting of the NWL, held at Chicago over January 9-11, 1884.52 Two clubs, neither present, resigned – Springfield and Toledo, the latter of which joined the AA. Although Toledo had the best record, the Saginaw club was awarded the championship. After finding no evidence that the Fort Wayne club was in arrears of player salaries, six clubs were admitted to membership.53 With 12 clubs, the NWL planned two circuits, East and West, each with six clubs. Officers and directors were elected. The secretary’s salary was increased from $300 to $600. Rust (Saginaw) and Stout (Peoria) were appointed to the Arbitration Committee. Clubs were permitted to play outside clubs and exhibitions on Sundays, and sell alcohol in their grounds. They increased their guarantee to visiting clubs from $65 to $75. The secretary was to hire umpires to earn $100 per month. The Spalding ball was adopted for 1884.54

The NWL schedule meeting was held at Chicago on March 11, 1884. Notably, it adopted the AA rule that restricted the pitcher to delivering the ball to the batsman from below the line of his shoulder.55

National League Meeting, March 4, 1884, Buffalo, New York

Young first recorded the delegates, then Mills had the schedule committee report. After the NL unanimously adopted the 1884 championship schedule, Mills reconvened the NL’s annual meeting.56

First, an amendment was made to the playing rules. The number of balls necessary for a walk was reduced from seven to six.57 Second, the NL returned to the Day resolution.58 The resolution made ineligible any reserved player, or player under contract, who played in a game with any other club. The resolution effectively barred employment for those players by any NL club, and by extension, any club in an association party to the National Agreement. It was unanimously adopted.59 The final NL business included adopting the contract form recommended by its contract committee. The NL appointed Mills, Young, and Day to its Arbitration Committee.60

American Association Meeting, March 5, 1884, Baltimore, Maryland

The AA met at Baltimore’s Carrollton Hotel on March 5, 1884, to continue its work from its December annual convention.

President H.D. McKnight called the meeting to order at 10:30 A.M., when he was assisted by Secretary and Treasurer Wheeler Wyckoff and ex-Secretary James A. Williams. Delegates from all 12 AA clubs were present.61

The playing rules were discussed. Williams proposed removing the restriction on overhand pitching, stating that the AA umpires had difficulty enforcing the prohibition. A majority of clubs believed that the restriction could be enforced by the umpires, and the restriction was maintained. The AA decided that a ball hit foul was dead until returned to the pitcher, to prevent tricking the baserunners. The AA decided to award a base to the batsman if he was hit by a pitch. The AA noted that the NL reduced the number of balls for a walk to six, but the AA decided to maintain the number of balls at seven.62

The umpire rules were removed from the playing rules and incorporated into the AA constitution. One notable change was that the AA schedule committee was authorized to assign umpires to AA games, rather than the AA secretary. To remove an umpire, six of 12 clubs had to make a request in writing.63

The secretary was instructed to call the AA umpires to a meeting at Columbus, Ohio, on April 1, 1884, when they were to “agree upon a regular interpretation of the rules” for the 1884 championship season. The men appointed to be AA umpires were John Kelly, Charles Daniels, George F. Seward, Brennan, John G. Valentine, and T.J. Connell. The substitutes appointed were McQuaid in the West and John Daily in the East.64

The AA changed the composition of its representation to the Arbitration Committee under the National Agreement. The AA president was appointed chairman of the AA committee. He was empowered to appoint two members, one from the East and one from the West. Kramer from Cincinnati opposed the change being directly made into the AA constitution, observing that the NL had not provided the Arbitration Committee any authority in the NL constitution. After the meeting approved the constitutional amendment, 11 to 1, McKnight appointed Barnie and J.A. Williams.65

Mutrie proposed that the Metropolitan be exempted from the five-mile rule. Byrne noted that the rule provided the Brooklyn club the right to refuse to allow NL clubs from playing exhibition games with the Metropolitans. If Brooklyn were exempted, Byrne observed, the Metropolitan Exhibition Company, which controlled both the NL New York and AA Metropolitan clubs, could continue to prohibit NL clubs from playing exhibition games at Brooklyn. The AA delegates voted 11 to 1 against exempting the Metropolitan club from the five-mile rule.66

The AA reinstated the expelled Interstate Association players J.J. Grady and B. McLaughlin of the Anthracite club, and Harry Pyle of Wilmington, and also reinstated William Welsh of the Kenton Club from Covington, Kentucky.67

In support of the National Agreement and a strike against the UA, the AA voted to admit the Keystone Association into the National Agreement. However, first the Chester club had to cancel its scheduled games with UA clubs.68

The schedule committee report prepared by O.P. Caylor was discussed for 30 minutes, then the AA adopted the 1884 schedule.69

Union Association Meeting, March 17, 1884, Cincinnati, Ohio

This UA meeting on March 17, 1884, was held at Cincinnati, Ohio, and closed to the public. Among its business conducted, it appointed umpires, increased the number of championship games played by each club, decided the win percentage would determine its champion, and adopted its ball. The UA resolved to recognize all baseball contracts, but no rights to services of players reserved by clubs.70 The collection of club locations was set by this time to the eight locations that began the professional season. The UA placed franchises in direct competition with the AA in Baltimore, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Washington. The UA directly competed with the NL in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The UA had only Altoona, Pennsylvania, to itself.

Arbitration Committee Meeting, April 19, 1884, New York City

The Arbitration Committee met on April 19, 1884, in the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City. Representatives from the NL, AA, NWL, and EL were present.71 A.G. Mills was elected chairman; H.D. McKnight, vice president; J. Rust, secretary; and W.C. Seddon, treasurer.72

The committee approved a circular specifying that any player who was reserved and played in a game with any other club was ineligible. Furthermore, any National Agreement club that employed that player lost its rights and privileges under the National Agreement.73

For a club or association to lose its rights and privileges provided by the National Agreement, a two-thirds vote of the Arbitration Committee was necessary.74

Several disputes between clubs and associations were considered. Generally, the Committee decided it lacked jurisdiction and failed to provide a decision. For instance, Trenton complained that Harkins signed two contracts, one with Trenton and one with Cleveland. In a complaint brought by the NWL, Dick Pearce was appointed an umpire of both the NWL and EL.75

The Midseason Business of the Championship Season

One common occurrence of the 1884 season was that clubs would “disband,” or shut down. The usual reason provided was insufficient home patronage to cover club expenses. Often travel expenses exceeded the road receipts. When home attendance was insufficient to cover player salaries, any surplus funds of the investors quickly ran down because salaries were reported to be higher during 1884. An association was a network of clubs, and when one club retired, the remaining clubs were weaker because the network shrank. To maintain the network, new clubs had to be recruited.

For the affected association, a club was lost, its championship schedule was thrown into disarray as clubs had open playing dates while traveling, and the standings and legitimacy of the association championship were also open to question. Clubs had completed unequal numbers of games with the disbanded club. Other clubs insisted games scheduled with the disbanded club were forfeited and counted in their records.76 An association offered a championship, and its directors had to find consensus when at midseason clubs withdrew and others were found to join.

Among the four associations party to the National Agreement, the first club to disband was the Monumental Club of Baltimore, an EL member, which enjoyed an exemption within the National Agreement, as it was permitted to play games within five miles of Baltimore.77

The UA soon suffered the loss of the Altoona club, which disbanded after a 5-3 loss to Baltimore. Lucas had spent several days at Altoona, and he refused to provide the club any financial assistance.78 Kansas City was soon admitted as a member of the UA.

The next major club to fail was Harrisburg, another EL member, on July 4, 1884.79 The EL admitted the Atlantic club of Long Island City, which played its first EL game on July 14, 1884.80 However, at its special meeting on July 16, 1884, the EL expelled the Atlantics, then admitted two clubs, a combined Lancaster club from the Lancaster and Ironsides interests, and York.81 On August 4, 1884, the Actives of Reading disbanded and released its players, and the Virginias resigned to join the UA.82

Union Association Special Meeting, July 1, 1884, Baltimore, Maryland

The UA met July 1, 1884, at Baltimore, Maryland.83 The Kansas City club was directed to play the Altoona part of the schedule through July 22, 1884, or until the UA rearranged its schedule to account for differences in location for purposes of travel and to avoid schedule conflicts.84 The schedule was altered so that four-game series changed from one game, a day off, then three successive games, to three successive games, a day to make up a game if necessary, and a game day. The financial condition of clubs was reviewed, and except for Boston, all clubs reported either breaking even or favorable prospects.85 The matter of the UA standings was addressed by removing all the Altoona games, but counting Kansas City games. The UA expelled a player from the National club and six players of the Chicago club, and extended to three others a deadline of July 10 to return $750 advance money paid them. After a lengthy discussion, the UA resolved not to recognize AA and NL contracts. UA managers were permitted to sign any player from any association under any circumstance.86 The directors decided to expel any player who signed a Union contract and then jumped to another outside club.87

The schedule committee met on July 20, 1884, at Cincinnati, Ohio. The UA schedule was adjusted to extend trips in the West to account for the admission of Kansas City.88

American Association Special Meeting, July 19, 1884, Columbus, Ohio

The AA met for a special meeting on July 19, 1884, at Columbus, Ohio. Representatives from 11 clubs were present, only St. Louis was absent. The meeting was held behind closed doors. In one report, the meeting reorganized the official umpires.89 Another report detailed that four of the six umpires and one substitute were released. Four new men received umpire appointments, and five men were appointed substitutes.90 The AA emphasized that umpires must give the batsman a base when he was solidly struck by a pitched ball.91

Almost two weeks later, the AA had to manage the midseason retirement of its Washington franchise. On August 2, 1884, Moxley informed his players that his club could not pay the $1,500 in salaries due that day and he personally lacked property in that amount. The players proposed and Moxley agreed to split the money paid by the Cincinnati club for Frank Fennelly’s release.92 The other players were released and almost all quickly entered into new contracts. The AA quickly enrolled the Virginia Club of Richmond to take the place of Washington.93

Summer Club Retirements and Special Meetings

During August 1884, the National Agreement associations managed the ongoing challenges from the rumors of and retirements by disbanded clubs, a July practice that accelerated. September brought the effective failure of both the NWL and the EL, a combination of failing clubs and clubs moving up a level to enter the UA or the AA. The season also featured considerable player movement. The papers reported regular releases, either requested by the player or because the club decided to change the composition of its team due to player availability and/or player performance. Some of the movement was the result of players “jumping,” leaving one club for another while still under contract with the initial club. Sometimes, it was not clear whether a player was under contract. For instance, the Arbitration Committee held that Indianapolis (AA) could not expel Brown and Manlove because it could not show that either player was under contract.94

The NWL had avoided the early problems of the EL. However, the Bay City club retired at the end of July. The NWL held a special meeting at Milwaukee on July 30, 1884, to rearrange the schedule. There, the NWL admitted Evansville without rights to the championship.95

The Fort Wayne club paid its players their salaries and disbanded on August 4, 1884. Although its investors broke even, a lack of funds and spectators led the directors to retire and release its players.96 Ominously, its Muskegon club sought subscriptions in the aggregate of $7,000 to cover its $3,900 debt and complete the season.97 On August 9, 1884, the NWL board of directors met at Chicago. The NWL decided to drop the Grand Rapids and Muskegon clubs. John J. Rust resigned as president and W.D. Whitmore was elected in his place.98 Although Whitmore was an officer in the Quincy club, that club disbanded on August 15, 1884, after Lucas would not admit it to the UA.99

The NWL reorganized at Milwaukee. From its initial 12 clubs, it reduced its numbers to four when it threw out Saginaw and added Winona, which was close to Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Milwaukee. It adopted its old rules, and reset the championship season to 24 games each.100 Soon, the NWL would fold.

The EL officers and directors met at Philadelphia’s Bingham House on August 5, 1884. They filled vacancies in the Board and the Arbitration Committee. At this time, the EL consisted of six clubs: Allentown, Domestics of Newark, Ironsides of Lancaster, Trenton, Quicksteps of Wilmington, and York.101 Returning on August 7, 1884, new directors were elected, and the Actives of Reading and the Virginias of Richmond were expelled for dues in arrears. By that time, the Virginia club had entered membership with the AA.102 On August 21, 1884, at Philadelphia’s Bingham House, the EL reorganized its Arbitration Committee and the schedule committee scheduled a meeting at Trenton for August 26, 1884, when it was expected that Jersey City would be admitted to replace the Quicksteps.103 Jersey was not admitted, because its grounds were insufficient.104

As August turned into September, clubs in the EL were recognized to be in financial difficulty.105 Its organization underwent so many changes, that the leader for its championship was difficult to discern.106 The EL authorized Secretary Diddlebock discretion to form an 1885 organization.107 The EL was effectively done for 1884.

On August 7, 1884, the UA Keystones of Philadelphia disbanded, paying its players in full, but suffering losses of $12,000.108 To fill this hole in its schedule, the UA gave a trial on August 14, 1884, to the NWL’s Quincy club, which apparently did not meet Lucas’s expectations.109 Instead, the UA admitted the Quicksteps, the EL leader, on August 18, 1884.110 On August 19, 1884, the Chicago club was transferred to Pittsburgh by Pittsburgh’s Exposition Park Association.111

On September 13, 1884, Pittsburgh (UA) decided to disband and transfer its best players to Baltimore (UA).112 The Quicksteps (UA) incurred losses of $4,000 and disbanded on September 15, 1884. Milwaukee from the NWL sought entry into the UA to replace them.113

The Indianapolis (AA) shareholders met August 18, 1884. It was reported that their finances were break-even at that date, but that a $3,000 deficit was anticipated for the remainder of their season. After the shareholders agreed to finish the season, each share was assessed 50 percent.114

The NL was not immune. The Cleveland club suffered from a poor record and low home attendance, and the New York Clipper reported a rumor that it would disband.115 Then a bombshell exploded. On August 8, 1884, the UA Cincinnati club signed three of Cleveland’s stars, Briody, Glasscock, and McCormick.116 Although the Cleveland directors insisted that they would finish the 1884 season, all NL clubs agreed to waive the 10-day rule if Cleveland disbanded.117 Detroit also played poorly and operated with a deficit. It, too, announced its intention to remain in the NL, but its shareholders agreed to increase the club’s capital from $5,000 to $10,000.118

Reviewing the state of the national pastime at the beginning of September 1884, the New York Clipper noted that while the AA and NL featured exciting pennant races, and the UA had a contest for second, the feature of the season was the disbanded clubs. The AA lost one club, the UA two, the NWL nine, and the EL three. The Clipper editorialized that the experiences of 1884 showed that there was room for not much more than two or three leagues, and their size should be eight or fewer clubs. It advocated several changes for Organized Baseball. If the EL reorganized for 1885, it should place a Western limit at New Jersey. The NWL should not return for 1885. Clubs should organize into state associations rather than leagues that required expensive trips. With respect to the playing rules, the AA pitching rule was unenforceable, and pitchers should be permitted to deliver the ball overhand, as in the NL.119

Union Association Special Meeting, September 19, 1884, Washington, D.C.

When the UA club representatives gathered on September 19, 1884, they reorganized again.120 Quickstep’s games were thrown out.121 Milwaukee and Omaha were substituted for Pittsburgh and the Quicksteps. As an association, it was increasingly taking a Western tilt. They agreed that Milwaukee was to follow Pittsburgh’s schedule, and Omaha the Keystone’s (then the Quickstep’s) schedule. Planning ahead to 1885, the UA committed to place clubs at Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Washington, and one other Eastern location, and pledged at least $10,000 to financially maintain that club. They resolved to change from a game fixed-sum guarantee to sharing 30 percent of the gate receipts. They agreed to reduce the 1885 salary list. The UA gave the appearance of rapprochement when they announced that any terms the NL offered they would meet at least halfway and proposed a conference committee to address a reduction in salaries and abolishing the reserved-man rule.122

Arbitration Committee Meeting, November 7, 1884, New York City

Chairman A.G. Mills convened the meeting and recognized members of the Arbitration Committee, which consisted of representatives from associations – AA, EL, NL, and NWL – party to the National Agreement.123 The NL and AA addressed the EL membership in the Arbitration Committee. They resolved that if the EL had no fewer than six active members by the Arbitration Committee’s April meeting, the EL would forfeit its privilege for representation in the committee.

Section 3 of the National Agreement was amended to require that all reserved players were to receive a minimum salary of $1,000.124 Section 5 was amended to prevent a released player from playing with any club between the date of the release and for 10 days from notice to the association secretary.125 Section 7 was amended to strengthen monopoly territories, by removing the exception at Baltimore for the Monumental Club.126

The Arbitration Committee decided that it would not reinstate a player who while under contract had left his club to play with any other club, when his former club was subject to the privileges of the National Agreement. It issued a statement to reinforce its view, which read in part, “This committee will never consent to the reinstatement of any player who has deserted, or may hereafter desert, any club identified with the National Agreement.”127

Other items of interest to the AA and NL were generally discussed. These included general dissipation of baseball players during 1884, Mills’s expected retirement as a baseball executive, and strengthening the offices of president for both the NL and AA.128

Conclusions

In reviewing the completed 1884 championship season, the New York Clipper observed that there were exciting pennant races in the NL and particularly in the AA, where seven clubs bunched together for most of the season. The UA St. Louis club led from the start, and the public lost interest for “uneven matching.” The EL and UA suffered from disbanded clubs, midseason additions, and rearranged schedules. The NWL collapsed before the season’s end. More spectators than ever paid to watch baseball played at its highest level, but with three associations, their patronage was divided in shared markets.129 Finally, the leading clubs in the AA and NL played a three-game series for the “championship of the United States,” the first regularly arranged postseason championship and proto-World Series.130

The business experiences from 1884 led to a desire for retrenchment and concentration by the AA and NL. Their conflict with the UA over exclusive territories and the reserved-man rule remained outstanding. NL, AA, and UA all endorsed the five-mile rule, but their territories overlapped, notably at St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Boston. As clubs desired to improve their rosters, the reserved-man rule as then written prevented reserving clubs from realizing the value of a player under contract. Trades were not possible. A sale of reserve rights was costly due to the uncertainty of player performance: Under the National Agreement, a club release extended to the released player an effective free-agency right. It was clear that clubs valued these rights, as several rumored sales when clubs disbanded were reported.

Other notable aspects were the growth in salaries, rosters – the number of players under contract – and the breaking of contracts by players. All of these business elements would be addressed and readdressed for the following decade. An entrant led to higher offers for player services. In general, club sizes increased from the minimal numbers of 1882 (11-12) toward several batteries and substitutes (16 or more). Under the National Agreement, clubs that could afford to stocked up on pitchers and catchers. Where Providence ran a spare operation, Boston maintained enough players to field an NL club and a Reserve team for the entire season. Where there were few conflicts over player services during 1883, a general carelessness existed in the contracting of player services as the 1884 season progressed. Reasons included competition for services due to the entry of the UA, and the opposition of National Agreement clubs, the disbandment of clubs the resulting impact on the affairs of the affected baseball association, particularly for the NWL and EL.

Sources

The author consulted Spalding’s Base Ball Guide and Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide. He relied upon the New York Clipper as his primary source of information.

Notes

1 See, for instance, “Among the Baseball Players,” New York Clipper, May 31, 1884: 162.

2 The Tripartite Agreement recognized associated clubs’ reserved players and their contracts. The NL remained unchanged at eight clubs, the AA expanded from eight to 12 clubs, the Northwestern League, also from eight to 12, and an eight-club Eastern League was organized out of the old Interstate Association and the proposed Union League.

3 The NL’s Boston Reserves consisted of those players not considered Boston’s starters. Members of the championship club played in the Reserves, although its players were generally local to Boston. The Reserves played exhibitions at home and away, and competed for the championship of the Massachusetts State Association. It was notable, since it lasted longer than any other reserve team, and it continued to compete for the Massachusetts championship as other Massachusetts State clubs disbanded. See “Boston Gossip,” New York Clipper, March 22, 1884: 2, March 29, 1884: 21, “Matters at the Hub,” April 19, 1884: 69.

4 “The League Convention,” New York Clipper, December 1, 1883: 609.

5 The delegates listed in the New York Clipper were A.H. Soden and A.J. Chase, Boston; Josiah Jewett and G.H. Hughson, Buffalo; A.G. Spalding and J.H. Brown, Chicago; C.H. Buckley and G.W. Howe, Cleveland; W.G. Thompson, Detroit; John B. Day and O.T. Dillingham, New York; A.J. Reach and J.J. Rogers, Philadelphia; and J.E. Allen and H.T. Root, Providence. “The League Convention.”

6 O.P. Caylor, member of the 1882-1883 Arbitration Committee, defended the reserve rule. It maintained players in markets where they became spectator favorites and discouraged entrants in markets served by an entrenched club. “The Reserved-Men Rule,” New York Clipper, January 12, 1884: 727.

7 “The League Convention.”

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 “Changes in the League Constitution,” New York Clipper, January 5, 1884: 714.

11 Ibid.

12 “The League Convention”; “Changes in the League Constitution.”

13 Ibid.

14 “The League Convention.”

15 The Metropolitan Exhibition Company controlled both the NL New York and AA Metropolitan clubs.

16 “The League Convention.”

17 The representatives were Dr. B.W. Massamore of Monumental, J.S. Hollingshead of Washington, D.C., and Felix Moses from Richmond, Virginia. “The League Convention.”

18The discussion occurred the next day. “The League Convention.” The UL held a special meeting on November 20, 1883, at Baltimore, where it decided to send its representative to the NL convention, because it wished to be accepted into the National Agreement. When the Arbitration Committee met in the fall, it denied membership to the Interstate Association, which was the antecedent to the UL. “Union League Base Ball,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 21, 1884: 1.

19 “The League Convention.”

20 Ibid. The Clipper also noted that the batter was no longer in play on the third strike. Previously, the batsman became a runner on the third strike and was required to run to first base. The rule sought to address the situation when a runner was at first and the catcher dropped the third strike and threw to second base for the force out and the double play. However, Rule 52 in the 1884 Spalding Guide stated that the batter becomes a runner after three strikes. It does not appear that the rule was changed from 1883.

21 The writer observed that the NL rules favored the pitcher. To improve the odds of the batsman, the writer encouraged an equal number of balls and strikes allowed, and to call a strike when the batsman failed to swing at a good pitch. “The Work of the Convention,” New York Clipper, December 15, 1883: 647. One argument for restrictions on the delivery of the ball by the pitcher to the batsman was that the umpire had difficulty observing whether the ball was delivered above or below the pitcher’s shoulder. There was one umpire in the field during the games in this era. The batsman could request a high ball or a low ball from the pitcher. The umpire often stood to the side of the batter’s box rather than directly behind the catcher, to watch the pitcher and the placement of the ball.

22 “The League Convention.”

23 Ibid.

24 The printing committee was Allen, Hughson, and Root. The uniform committee was Day, Howe, and Reach. The schedule committee was Day, Soden, and Spalding. “The League Convention,” New York Clipper, December 1, 1883: 609.

25 “Base-Ball,” Cincinnati Enquirer, November 23, 1883: 2.

26 “The League Convention.”

27 Ibid.

28 “The American Association Convention,” New York Clipper, December 22, 1883: 672.

29 The New York Clipper listed the delegates as H.D. McKnight and W.A. Nimick (Allegheny), Lew Simmons and William Sharsig (Athletic), William Barnie and A.T. Houck (Baltimore), Charles H. Byrne (Brooklyn), O.P. Caylor and Louis Kramer (Cincinnati), H.T. Crittenden and J.B.K. Connolly (Columbus), Dan O’Leary and Joseph Schwabecker (Columbus), W.L. Jackson and Lee Dinkenspiel (Louisville), W.S. Appleton and James Mutrie (Metropolitan), Chris Von der Ahe and D.L. Reid (St. Louis), J.B. Whipple and W.J. Colburn (Toledo), and L. Moxley and J.S. Hollingshead (Washington). Felix Moses from Virginia was late and the AA declined to seat him since his club would represent a 13th member. Mike Scanlon sent a telegram from Washington seeking membership for his Washington Nationals which was denied in favor of Moxley’s Washington Club. Robert Ferguson was present as a representative from the UL, but the AA offered the UL no privileges. “The American Association Convention.”

30 Ibid.

31 Von der Ahe nominated Wyckoff, O’Leary nominated Wright, and Barney nominated Moore. Through three ballots, Wyckoff, T. Moore of Baltimore, and F.B. Wright of Cincinnati could not obtain a majority of the votes. On the fourth ballot, Moore was dropped from the ballot, and Wyckoff was elected, 7 to 5. “The American Association Convention”; “Base-Ball,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 13, 1882: 2.

32 “The American Association Convention.”

33 “The American Association Convention.”

34 “Base-Ball Notes,” New York Times, December 21, 1883: 2.

35 “The American Association Convention.”

36 Ibid.

37 “What President M’Knight Says,” Cincinnati Enquirer, January 5, 1884: 2.

38 “The American Association Convention.”

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid. The reason given to maintain the rule was business. The AA’s customers preferred it and found the catch exciting to watch. “The Work of the American Convention,” New York Clipper, December 29, 1883: 694.

41 “The American Association Convention.”

42 The AA reappointed from 1883 as umpire both Charles Daniels and John Kelly. Among 30 applicants, the AA also appointed John G. Valentine from Brooklyn, George F. Seward from St. Louis, T.G. Connell from Philadelphia, and John Brennan from Indianapolis. The substitute umpires appointed were J. McQuaid from Chicago and John Daily from Brooklyn. Caylor, Hollingshead, and Williams were appointed to the schedule committee. “The American Association Convention.” Appleton was cited to express disappointment that the Mets had representation in the officers, directors, or committees. The issue was location of Decoration Day and Fourth of July games and their opponents. Holidays represented opportunities for large receipts. Sunday games mattered as well, and some of the Eastern clubs wished to receive a share of the receipts from Western Sunday games rather than the game guarantee. “Notes,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 16, 1883: 16.

43 “The Union Association Convention,” New York Clipper, December 29, 1884: 694.

44 “The League War,” New York Clipper, January 12, 1884: 726.

45 The Interstate Association met January 2, 1884, at Philadelphia’s Girard House where it elected officers, admitted six clubs, and adopted the AA playing rules. It stated it would sign the National Agreement. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, January 12, 1884: 733. The two clubs admitted to the Interstate Association on January 2 – Altoona and Lancaster – met February 1, 1884, at Philadelphia, and decided to admit at least four clubs east of Lancaster. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, February 9, 1884: 797. That the Altoona club was reported to retire its membership for entry into the UA gives us an idea today of the fluid and uncertain state of baseball affairs for that time. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, March 1, 1884: 843.

46 “The Union League Meeting,” Cincinnati Enquirer, January 5, 1884: 2. The association took the name Union League on January 3, 1884, then accepted additional members and changed its name to the Eastern League, on January 4, 1884. AA President McKnight was present and provided Organized Baseball’s support for admission into the National Agreement. “The New Baseball League,” Boston Globe, January 4, 1884: 1. “Eastern League of Professional Baseball Clubs,” Boston Globe, January 5, 1884: 4.

47 Delegates included H.J. Dehlman (Allentown), Dr. G.W. Massamore and Robert Ferguson (Monumental), Thomas Porter (Newark, and proxy for Harrisburg), W.S. Miller (Reading), W.C. Seddon and Felix I. Moses (Virginia), P.T. Powers and J.H. Klein (Trenton), and John T. West and Joseph Simmons (Wilmington). “An Eastern League,” New York Clipper, January 12, 1884: 732.

48 The 32 member clubs from the NL, AA, and NWL voted unanimously to admit the EL. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, March 1, 1884: 843.

49 “An Eastern League,” New York Clipper, January 12, 1884: 732.

50 Ibid.

51 The EL’s Arbitration Committee consisted of Seddon, Massamore, and Diddlebock. “The Eastern League,” New York Clipper, March 22, 1884: 3.

52 E.T. Bennett (Bay City), Max Neidlinger (Fort Wayne), Elias Matter (Grand Rapids), John Stone (Peoria), W.D. Whitemore (Quincy), John J. Rust (Saginaw). “The Northwestern League,” New York Clipper, January 19, 1884: 745.

53 Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Muskegon, St. Paul, Stillwater, and Terre Haute. “The Northwestern League,” New York Clipper, January 19, 1884: 745.

54 Ibid.

55 “The Northwestern League,” New York Clipper, March 22, 1884: 3.

56 The New York Clipper recorded the following representatives as present: A.H. Soden (Boston), Josiah Jewett and Spencer Clinton (Buffalo), A.G. Spalding (Chicago), George W. Howe (Cleveland), John C. Chapman (Detroit), John B. Day (New York), John J. Rogers and Harry Wright (Philadelphia), and Henry T. Root and J.E. Allen (Providence). “The National League,” New York Clipper, March 15, 1884: 877.

57 Ibid.

58 The resolution read, in part, “Resolved, That no League club shall at any time employ or enter into contract with any of its reserved players who shall, while reserved to any such club, play with an other club.” Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 The New York Clipper recorded the following club representatives: Lew Simmons and William Sharsig (Athletic), A.T. Houck and W. Barnie (Baltimore), Charles H. Byrne and J.J. Doyle (Brooklyn), O.P. Caylor and L. Kramer (Cincinnati), C.A. Miller and P.J. Sullivan (Columbus), H. Barnes (Indianapolis), M.J. Jackson (Louisville), Walter S. Appleton and James Mutrie (Metropolitan), H.D. McKnight (Pittsburgh), Chris Von der Ahe and James A. Williams (St. Louis), M.M. Epstein (Toledo), and L. Moxley and J.A. Hollingshead (Washington). “The American Association Convention,” New York Clipper, March 15, 1884: 877.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid. The umpires met on April 2, 1884. In reviewing the rules, Kelly argued that the rule that awarded a base to the batsman when the pitcher delivered a ball that hit the batsman “solidly” was too difficult to determine and enforce. Kelly changed the interpretation for the rule so that the umpire was to fine the pitcher $5 to $10 for delivering a pitch that hit the batsman. “American Association Umpires,” New York Clipper, April 12, 1884: 53. Naturally, the AA Board of Directors opposed this change to the rules. “American Umpires to be Disciplined,” April 19, 1884: 66.

65 “The American Association Convention.”

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 “The Union Association,” New York Clipper, March 22, 1884: 3.

71 The New York Clipper records A.G. Mills, N.E. Young, and John B. Day for the NL, H.D. McKnight, William Barnie, and J.A. Williams for the AA, J.J. Rust, S.G. Morton, and E.T. Bennett for the NWL, and H.H. Diddlebock and W.C. Seddon for the EL. “The Arbitration Committee,” New York Clipper, April 26, 1884: 82.

72 “The Arbitration Committee,” New York Clipper, April 26, 1884: 82. The New York Times referred to this committee as Committee on Trials. “The Base-Ball Field,” New York Times, April 20, 1884: 2.

73 “The Arbitration Committee’s Meetings,” New York Clipper, May 3, 1884: 101.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 “Base-Hits,” New York Clipper, October 18, 1884: 491.

77 “The Eastern League,” New York Clipper, May 31, 1884: 163.

78 “Altoona vs. Baltimore,” New York Clipper, June 7, 1884: 180.

79 “Eastern League,” New York Clipper, July 12, 1884: 258.

80 “Eastern League,” New York Clipper, July 19, 1884: 275. Byrne of the Brooklyn club objected to the EL. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, July 19, 1884: 277.

81 “A Special Meeting,” New York Clipper, July 26, 1884: 291.

82 “Disbandment of the Active Club,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884: 330. “The Washington Club Quit,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884: 330.

83 The New York Clipper lists the following representatives present: W.C. Henderson (Baltimore), F.E. Winston (Boston), A.H. Henderson (Chicago), Justus Thorner (Cincinnati), M.S. Porter (Kansas City), Thomas J. Pratt (Keystone Club of Philadelphia), H.V. Lucas (St. Louis), and H.B. Bennett (National Club of Washington). “A Special Meeting,” New York Clipper, July 12, 1884: 261.

84 Ibid. UA attendance at Boston was good when there was no conflicting NL game. “From the Hub,” New York Clipper, July 26, 1884: 293. The New York Times reported that the Altoona dates were to be played by Chicago and the Chicago dates to be played by the entering Kansas City. “Union Association Affairs,” New York Times, July 2, 1884: 2.

85 “Union Association Meeting,” Cincinnati Enquirer, July 3, 1884: 2.

86 Kent, McSorley, and Pinckney jumped their UA Chicago contracts to play for Peoria in the NWL. “A Special Meeting,” New York Clipper, July 12, 1884: 261.

87 “Meeting of the Directors of the Union Association,” Chicago Tribune, July 2, 1884: 7.

88 “A New Schedule,” New York Clipper, July 26, 1884: 291.

89 “A Special Meeting,” New York Clipper, July 26, 1884: 291.

90 “A Shaking Up among Umpires,” New York Clipper, August 2, 1882: 308.

91 “A Special Meeting.”

92 Baltimore and Cincinnati entered into a bidding war for the rights to the shortstop’s services. The amount reported paid for his release was $1,000. “The Washington Club Quit,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884. A later report stated the salaries in arrears were in the amount of $1,300, and that the price paid for the release may have been $600. The UA Washington club played a benefit game for the AA Washington players which raised an additional $400. “Base-Hits Everywhere,” New York Clipper, August 16, 1884: 345.

93 “The Washington Club Quit.”

94 “Base-Hits,” New York Clipper, September 6, 1884: 393.

95 “A New Schedule,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884: 331.

96 “Disbandment of the Fort Wayne Club,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884: 331.

97 “Base-Hits Everywhere,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884: 331.

98 “More Disbandments,” New York Clipper, August 16, 1884: 346. While the Grand Rapids club carried no debt, at the time of its disbandment it had an operating loss of $2,500. “Base-Hits Everywhere,” New York Clipper, August 23, 1884: 362.

99 “Base-Hits Everywhere.”

100 Each club was to play eight games against each of the other clubs, with four home games and four away games. “The Northwestern League,” New York Clipper, August 30, 1884: 379.

101 “Meetings of Directors,” New York Clipper, August 16, 1884: 346.

102 Ibid.

103 “The Eastern League,” New York Clipper, August 23, 1884: 361; “The Eastern League,” New York Clipper, August 30, 1884: 379.

104 “Baseball,” New York Clipper, September 6, 1884: 394.

105 “Short Stops,” New York Clipper, September 20, 1884: 426.

106 “The Eastern League,” New York Clipper, September 27, 1884: 444. Determining its champion was one of the primary purposes of an association.

107 The EL was reported to have applications for 1885 from Utica, Jersey City, Domestics of Newark, Trenton, Philadelphia, York, and Ironsides of Lancaster. Diddlebock was reported to have three plans, one for an organization centered on upstate New York, another for an organization in the Northeast, and a third for an organization in New England. Of the 1884 members, Domestic of Newark, Ironsides of Lancaster, Trenton, and York wanted to remain with the EL, while Allentown did not. Tom Pratt wanted an EL club for his Keystone Park, and Wilmington planned to reorganize. Baltimore was expected to request membership. “Eastern League for 1885,” New York Clipper, October 11, 1884: 475. At its October 25, 1884, meeting, after leagues were announced for New England and upstate New York, the EL gravitated toward an association consisting of Albany, Bridgeport, Hartford, Jersey City, Newark, Philadelphia, and Trenton. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, October 25, 1884: 508, and November 1, 1884: 524. Allentown, Trenton, and York were soon expelled for failure to pay 1884 dues and Diddlebock sought interest from UA clubs at Boston and Washington, D.C. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, November 15, 1884: 557, and November 22, 1884: 572.

108 The club paid salaries close to the NL level, but could not financially continue with low home receipts and an expensive coming Western trip. “The Keystones Disbanded,” New York Clipper, August 16, 1884: 344. A nine reorganized under Malone to play under the co-operative plan at the $5,000 Keystone Park. “Short Stops,” New York Clipper, August 16, 1884: 346, “Base-Hits Everywhere.”

109 “Base-Hits Everywhere.”

110 “The Eastern League,” “The Championship Record,” “National vs. Wilmington,” New York Clipper, August 23, 1884: 361-362.

111 “Base-Hits Everywhere,” New York Clipper, August 30, 1884: 377. If Chicago paid its debts, its monetary losses were rumored in the range of $20,000 to $25,000. “Base-Hits,” New York Clipper, October 4, 1884: 460.

112 “Base-Hits,” New York Clipper, September 20, 1884: 425.

113 “The Wilmington Club Disbanded,” New York Clipper, September 20, 1884: 426. The New York Clipper reported that Lucas was rumored to renege on a promise to cover Wilmington’s travel expenses on its Western trip, because Lucas wanted Milwaukee to join after Wilmington decided to quit. “Short-Stops,” New York Clipper, September 20, 1884: 426. Pittsburgh disbanded September 19, 1884, following an exhibition game with Baltimore, because its receipts were insufficient. Six of its players signed contracts with Baltimore. “The Pittsburgh Club Disbands,” New York Clipper, September 27, 1884: 444.

114 “Base-Hits Everywhere,” New York Clipper, August 30, 1884: 377. By August 28, 1884, the accounts showed a $4,000 loss, but the shareholders decided to continue their season. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, September 6, 1884: 394.

115 “Base-Hits Everywhere,” New York Clipper, August 9, 1884: 331.

116 Ibid. The race for second in the UA was wide open. The Cincinnati club strengthened its lineup. It likely needed McCormick because it was reported that G.W. Bradley broke a small bone in his right forearm in a collision at home plate on August 7, 1884. See “Short Stops,” New York Clipper, August 16, 1884: 346.

117 “From the Hub,” New York Clipper, August 23, 1884: 361. Near the end of the season, the Cleveland directors announced the club would continue to be an NL member in 1885. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, October 11, 1884: 476. At the conclusion of the season, its operating loss was reportedly $1,300, a result largely attributed to its experiment with a reserve team. “Baseball,” New York Clipper, October 25, 1884: 508.

118 “Base-Hits,” New York Clipper, October 4, 1884: 460. At its shareholders meeting on October 7, 1884, the reorganization committee presented investors who subscribed $5,000, and were willing to assume the debts if existing shareholders agreed to give up their shares. The shareholders preferred to find other investors who were willing to purchase up to $5,000 in new shares in the existing franchise. “Base-Hits,” New York Clipper, October 18, 1884: 491.

119 “The National Game,” New York Clipper, September 6, 1884: 392-393.

120 The New York Clipper listed: B.F. Mathews and H.C. Henderson (Baltimore), F.E. Winslow (Boston), J.P. Sullivan (Kansas City), H.B. Bennett and M.B. Scanlon (National of Washington), and H.V. Lucas (St. Louis and Cincinnati proxy). “A Special Meeting,” New York Clipper, September 27, 1884: 443.

121 “Indications That It Has Come to Stay – The Meeting at Washington,” Cincinnati Enquirer, September 20, 1884: 2.

122 “A Special Meeting,” New York Clipper, September 27, 1884: 443-444.

123 The New York Clipper listed the representatives present as A.G. Mills, N. Young and John B. Day (NL), H.D. McKnight and William Barnie (AA), and Henry Diddlebock (EL). Elias Matter was absent from the NWL, which had disbanded. “The Arbitration Committee Meeting,” New York Clipper, November 15, 1884: 554.

124 Ibid. For 1884, players reserved by clubs in NWL or EL were to receive $800 minimum salaries.

125 Ibid. Some clubs used released players prior to the expiration following 10 days’ notice, because of a loophole a provision in their association’s constitution permitting a club to use a player not under contract for up to five consecutive games.

126 Ibid. The shared markets of New York City and Philadelphia were grandfathered and permitted.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 “The Past Baseball Season,” New York Clipper, November 1, 1884: 522.

130 “The United States Championship,” New York Clipper, November 1, 1884: 523.

Still the American Association regular season wasn’t without drama. St. Louis Browns owner Chris Von der Ahe was at the center of in-season machinations and would dominate the postseason headlines.

By late July, Von der Ahe had become unhappy with American Association President Wheeler Wyckoff and tried to have Wyckoff removed from office.1

“The meeting was designed to oust Wyckoff as Association president, ostensibly for being a poor handler of umpires and problems in general, but really for the crime of siding against the Browns too often,” David Nemec writes. “Von der Ahe touted Joe Pritchard, a St. Louis writer who had been beating his own drum for the job, but the coup failed when [Baltimore manager Billy] Barnie [who held both the Baltimore vote and the Athletics’ vote by proxy] skipped the meeting, leaving only four of the eight clubs represented, short of the majority needed to ditch Wyckoff. Afterward, a disgruntled Von der Ahe reportedly called on New York Giants owner John Day and offered to transfer his Browns to the [National] League.”2

In mid-October, the New York Sun reported that the Brooklyn franchise had purchased the Metropolitans franchise.

“The Brooklyn Club now owns the Metropolitan Club, and the question is what will they do with them,” the Sun wrote. “[Brooklyn President] Byrne says that he has had two offers for the Metropolitan franchise so far, and if it come to it, the Association would take it off his hands. … When the directors of the Metropolitan Club found that it would take something like $25,000 to strengthen their team for the next season they threw up the sponge.”3

Nine days later, the Sun reported that a syndicate was trying to get control of the American Association. Under the headline, “Is There a Deal to Get Control of the Association Clubs?” the Sun wrote:

“The past season seems to have been a most disastrous one to the American Association, for no less than three of its clubs have been driven to the wall, and the managers of one have already retired, while the backers of the other two have thrown up their hands and cried enough. The Metropolitan Club was the first to retire by selling out to a syndicate formed by the owners of the Brooklyn Club.

“When the managers of the Athletic Club decided that they had had enough they besought President Von der Ahe to buy them out. This Chris was willing to do, but he held off, giving as a reason that he could not come to an agreement as to the price. … ‘It was asserted [by a knowledgeable source] that an agreement was reached by which Chris von der Ahe is to secure control of the Athletic franchise by the purchase of the interests held by Messrs. Simmons and Mason, and that authority was given him to transfer some of the St. Louis players to Philadelphia.’ The question therefore naturally arises: Did these gentlemen control the action of the Association, or do they form the syndicate to purchase the Athletics?”4

A month later, Von der Ahe got the attention of the American Association again when he sold several of his players, including pitcher Bob Caruthers, who had gone 106-38 the previous four seasons with the Browns.

“Certainly in November of 1887, no one could have imagined any reason other than despair or pique to cause the owner of the team that had just won its third straight pennant to suddenly begin unloading nearly half its stars,” Nemec says.5

“It was the biggest fire sale in major-league history, even more startling than the one Harry Frazee conducted some thirty years later when he peddled Babe Ruth and many more members of his championship Boston Red Sox to bankroll his theater ventures. When it ended in November of 1887, the three-time champion St. Louis Browns seemingly were decimated, and what made it all the more improbable was that the chief beneficiary was [Brooklyn president] Charlie Byrne, Chris von der Ahe’s arch adversary in the Association.”6

Brooklyn director Ferdinand Abell said Von der Ahe’s moves would benefit the entire American Association:

“Von der Ahe did the best thing possible for the interest of base-ball. No move means so much for the Association as his late transfer of players. It insures a greater contest for the pennant. Whether or not it has weakened his team can be judged next season. I have never heard of his making a losing deal.”7

Abell was prophetic. The offseason moves worked out for Von der Ahe and the Browns. The Browns won their fourth consecutive American Association pennant in 1888 with a 92-43-2 record. Brooklyn finished second at 88-52-3. In his first season with Brooklyn, Caruthers was 29-15. Brooklyn had paid $8,250 for his rights.

The annual meetings started on November 14 with the joint rules committee of the National League and American Association in session in Pittsburgh.

“A resolution was then adopted that the question of the advisability of each club having one or more extra men in uniform, in order that they may be introduced into the game at any time, be referred to the annual meetings of the two organizations for discussion, the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle reported. The object of the amendment is to prevent players from sulking on the field.”8

Among the rule changes agreed to, the newspaper said, “Rule 4 has been changed from four strikes and five balls, to three strikes and five balls. The rule allowing a base hit on five balls has been abolished, but at the suggestion of President Day five balls will still be considered a factor in earned sums. A base on balls will be credited against the pitcher in the error column. Rule 50, Section 4, has been amended allowing a runner to take the base if the ball hits the umpire. If the ball struck by the batsman hits a base runner after an attempted has been made to ‘field’ it the runner shall not be declared out.”9

Two days later, the National League went first with its annual meeting at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York. The New York Evening World described the meeting’s first day as “the calm before the storm.”10

Most of the discussions of the first day were regarding procedural matters.

“The playing rules as amended yesterday, it is thought, will give much more satisfaction than formerly,” the World wrote. “The allowing of two extra players in case of injury will expedite playing, and will be fair to both clubs. Umpires were happy, as it looked as though their salaries would be greatly increased. …”11

Also discussed on the first day was the “percentage system.”

“President Stearns, of Detroit, is making a plucky fight for the amendment to allow visiting clubs $200, with the privilege of taking in lieu thereof 30 per cent, of the gate receipts, instead of $125, as at present,” the World reported.12

Discussion about the percentage system continued into a second day. Two motions — one giving the visiting club 30 percent with the option of a $200 guarantee and the second giving 25 percent to the champion club — were both defeated by 5-to-3 votes. A third motion, for 25 percent and an option of a $150 guarantee, passed.

The League members passed a resolution regarding the sharing of gate receipts on Labor Day, which was not to be recognized as a federal holiday until 1894. In 1887 Oregon became the first state to make it an official public holiday; a public celebration of the day had been held in New York since 1882. The Washington club played in New York on Labor Day (September 5) and put in a claim for one-half of the gate receipts. The passed resolution said, “Resolved. That the sense of this league is that section 61 of the league constitution, requiring payment to visiting clubs of 50 percent on State holidays, be made so by law prior to the playing of games on such days.”13

With that business finished, the National League addressed the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had been a topic of discussion since the first week of September, when the Sun reported that “a syndicate had made an offer to the Brotherhood to form an Eastern League in opposition to the older associations. The story is denied by the President of the Brotherhood; still it is certain to cause some uneasiness among the League managers. It is said that the story was started to force the League to give in to the demands of the ball players. …”14

On September 1, National League President N.E. Young in a letter to the Brotherhood said the League would not recognize the organization and would end correspondence with the group. In early October, Brotherhood President Monte Ward responded to Young to try to clear misunderstandings about the Brotherhood’s intentions.

“From what could be learned the scene about this time was what might be called red hot. It seemed to be the unanimous sense of the delegates that they should not recognize the Brotherhood. When hunger drove the delegates out of their cage it was made known that the League would be very happy to meet the Brotherhood players, but not as an organization.”15

The Brotherhood’s committee of Ward, Ned Hanlon, and Dan Brouthers, along with their counsel arrived at the hotel at 9:15 P.M. on the second day for a meeting with League members. After a lengthy debate, which included Young, John L. Rogers of Philadelphia, and Ward, A.G. Spalding made a motion:

“I am inclined to think that we should recognize the Brotherhood. I move that a committee of three be appointed by the Chair to confer with the Brotherhood with regard to a contract, and to report such changes as they can agree upon.”16

Ward apparently swayed the League members by explaining that “the [B]rotherhood was not a secret organization in the usual acceptation of the term. …”17

On December 7 the National League and American Association held their board of arbitration meeting in Cincinnati.

The primary issue facing the board’s three National League members (Day, Rogers, and Young) and three American Association members (Byrne, Phelps, and Von der Ahe) was an application by several minor leagues — including the Ohio State League, the New England League, and the International League — for protection under the National Agreement with the right to reserve their players.

“The board then went into consultation and finally agreed to give the minor leagues the privilege of reservation upon the payment by each club in such leagues of the sum of $250,” The Sporting News reported.18

The next day, the American Association began its annual meeting in Cincinnati.

In a preview of the American Association’s meeting, The Sporting News wrote: “The meeting promises to be one of the most important in the history of that organization.”19

Two big decisions facing American Association executives were the election of a president and find a franchise to replace the Metropolitans. A week before the meeting, Joe Pritchard withdrew as a candidate for the presidency.

“The first business,” said The Sporting News, will be the election of a President who shall act as Secretary and Treasurer, a Vice President and a board of four directors of whom two shall be representatives of Eastern Clubs and two shall be representatives of Western Clubs. The candidates now that Mr. Pritchard has withdrawn, are W.C. Wikoff, of Columbus, Mr. J.A. Williams, of Cleveland and Mr. Henry Diddlebock, of Philadelphia.”20

The preview went on to say, “Mr. Joe Pritchard, of St. Louis, who was mentioned prominently in connection with the presidency of the American Association, has authorized The Sporting News to announce his withdrawal from the race in question. He will not be a candidate at the American Association meeting at Cincinnati notwithstanding the fact that no less than four votes had been actually pledged to him. Mr. Pritchard withdraws from the race, simply for business reasons.

“The Sporting News has championed Mr. Pritchard’s cause through no ill feeling towards the other candidates, but simply because the belief in general that he is the most levelheaded baseball man in these parts, and because it was thought he could heal the prevailing breaches in the American Association and make that organization the most competent as well as the most formidable in the arena.”21

After re-electing Wyckoff president and electing Von der Ahe vice president, the Association declined to adopt the two-substitute rule that had come out of the joint rules committee meeting in November. But the Association gave its consent for the National League “to adopt this rule should it see fit.”22

Choosing a team to replace the Metropolitans was the second major decision facing the Association. One possibility, according to The Sporting News, was Pittsburg, which had left the Association after the 1886 season for the National League.

“A rumor was afloat in Cincinnati to the effect that Pittsburg wanted to return to the Association. Thank heaven it was only a rumor,” the newspaper commented.23

After a discussion — which included mention of the cities of Buffalo, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Syracuse — the decision was referred to a committee. The committee was expected to make a decision before the schedule committee met in Brooklyn on the first Monday in March.

Two other issues the Association addressed were admission prices and railroad rates. The Association decided to raise admission prices and Jimmie Williams of Cleveland was appointed to lobby the Inter-State Commerce Commission to see if the teams could get better railroad rates for 1888.

Williams told the gathering, “There is no doubt but what the Inter-State law hurt base-ball a great deal, and will do so more. It has been gently murmured to us that the Commission controlling the destinies of that law intends making some changes after January 1st, and you know about the early bird and the worm, so we thought that we would be among the first comers to ask for relief. I hope we get it, for honestly our transportation costs as much as players.”24

Overall, the meeting got positive reviews.

“The meeting was a success,” exclaimed the Cincinnati Enquirer. “It was the largest base-ball gathering in point of attendance, and the most important one to the pastime, especially the Association, ever held. It was noticeable for the harmony that existed among its delegates, and for the excellent and sound horse sense displayed in its legislative enactments. The most significant action of the assemblage, the increase of the tariff, was necessitated by the wonderful augmentation in the expenses, and bespeaks a safety for the game for the future.”25

One other significant development to come out of the meeting involved the scribes who covered the Association. At the conclusion of the Association’s meetings, the writers formed the National Base Ball Reporters’ Association.

“The first local base ball writers’ organization was formed in Philadelphia in 1885,” wrote Francis Richter years later. “From this sprung the idea of the National Base Ball Reporters’ Association, which was organized at Cincinnati, O., December 12, 1887 — this being the first national organization of base ball writers in the major league circuits. The officers elected were George Munson, of St. Louis, president; Henry Chadwick, of Brooklyn, vice-president; George E. Stackhouse, of New York, secretary; John H. Mandigo, of New York, treasurer. Board of Directors: Joseph Pritchard, Ren Mulford Jr., Frank H. Bunnell, Francis C. Richter.”26

At the organizational meeting, according to Richter, the group recommended a number of changes in playing and scoring rules to the League’s and Association’s Joint Playing Rules Committee. The changes that were subsequently adopted by the Rules Committee “were definitions of ‘stolen bases,’ ‘left on bases,’ ‘earned run,’ the placing of strike-outs in the summary and the crediting of the batsman with a hit on a base runner being hit by a batted ball and declared out.”27

January Special Meeting

In mid-January of 1888, a special meeting was convened at the Grand Hotel in Cincinnati to finalize the eighth franchise. Discussion began in the afternoon of January 16 and went past midnight with no decision being reached. The discussion resumed on January 17 and ended with a decision.

“The baby has been born, and its name is Kansas City,” the New York Sun reported. “For hours did the orators of the American Association talk about that bothersome vacancy, and when the vexatious question was finally settled, the chandelier shook for very joy. It was midnight last night before the flow of eloquence was stopped, and naturally enough the delegates took a vacation all this morning. Not until this afternoon did they reconvene, and then it was to hear the response from Kansas City to the proposition made by Director James Whitfield. It was favorable. … The Kansas City’s franchise is brand new, while that of the Metropolitan Base Ball Company is still held by the Association. …”28

On March 5, 1888, the American Association held its schedule meeting in Brooklyn. In addition to the 1888 schedule the members also finalized the tariff issue.

“The Athletic Club made an effort to have their admission fee kept at the old figure of 25 cents, but the vote was seven to one against them,” the Brooklyn Eagle reported. “They were, however, granted the privilege to charge the old rate if the Philadelphia Club did not raise their admission fee. But the [National] league has insisted upon Philadelphia placing their tariff at 50 cents, so the Athletics will have to the same. This year, therefore, it is 50 cents all round in every league and American Association city.”29

The Sun disclosed that the day after that regular, one-day meeting, Association members held a secret meeting to discuss the Metropolitans.

The members passed a resolution to eliminate speculation regarding the franchise: “[T]he American Association hereby publicly avows and declares that it is their purpose and intention to continue the Metropolitan Base Ball Club in New York City and that while the said corporation shall remain located in said city, still leave is given the company to discontinue play of games temporarily until some suitable grounds can be obtained on which plays its games; that there is no purpose or intention of abandoning or relinquishing their franchise and right to play in said territory, and that said club shall be and is allowed further time to procure grounds and arrange to play, when a schedule will be so arranged as to allow them to take part in the contests for the championship.”30

One delegate to the meeting told the Sun, “This resolution was adopted to counteract the many opinions which have been expressed to the effect that the franchise of the Metropolitan Club had been forfeited. By this resolution the American Association recognized the Metropolitan Club as being fully qualified to be a member of the Association, and as long as the Association to which this club belongs recognizes it, the club’s franchise cannot be forfeited.”31

As the Sun pointed out, the resolution regarding the Metropolitans seemed to contradict the Association’s feelings about the franchise:

“This is quite a change, for only two years ago the Association tied to expel this club for no cause. Then it had a good team of players. Now the Association has made as noble a fight to keep the franchise of this same club, whose players are phantoms and whose grounds consist of a little 6 by 9 office in one of the biggest buildings in the lower part of this city.”32

John B. Day, the president of the National League’s Giants, was asked what he thought about the resolution.

” ‘I think just this,’ said he, ‘It cannot be done. The Metropolitan franchise is a thing of the past. If the American Association attempts to put a club in New York city it will violate a clause in the national agreement, and you know what that means. The League men would then turn around and put clubs in certain American Association cities. I know some League men who would be only too happy if this is done, and we would at once put clubs in two American Association cities which I could name, but won’t.’”

A little over a month later, the two leagues opened their regular seasons — the American Association on April 18 and the National League on April 20. Von der Ahe’s revamped Browns lineup went on to win its fourth consecutive title. It was his last championship team. The New York Giants won the National League title.

Sources

In addition to the sources cited in the Notes, the author also consulted Baseball-Reference.com, retrosheet.org, and sabr.org.

Notes

1 Wyckoff’s name is spelled several different ways in the publications of the day. His grave marker has “Wikoff,” as does David Nemec’s Major League Baseball Profiles, 1871-1900.

2 David Nemec, The Beer and Whiskey League (New York: Lyons & Burford, Publishers, 1994), 137.

3 “Gossip of the Ball Field,” New York Sun, October 16, 1887: 10.

4 “A Corner in Base Ball,” New York Sun, October 25, 1887: 3.

5 Nemec, 141.

6 Nemec, 145.

7 “Departed,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 11, 1887: 10.

8 “Balls, Hits and Strikes,” Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, November 15, 1887: 1.

9 Ibid.

10 “A Great Day for Deals,” New York Evening World, November 17, 1887: 1.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 “The League Meetings,” The Sporting News, November 19, 1887: 7.

14 “Gossip of the Ball Field,” New York Sun, September 4, 1887: 6.

15 Victory for the Players.”

16 Ibid.

17 “The League Meetings.”

18 “The Annual Meet.,” The Sporting News, December 10, 1887: 1.

19 “The Association Meeting,” The Sporting News, December 3, 1887: 4.

20 Ibid.

21 “Pritchard Withdraws,” The Sporting News, December 3, 1887: 4.

22 “American Association,” Minneapolis Tribune, December 9, 1887: 4.

23 “The Annual Meet.”

24 “Departed,” Cincinnati Enquirer, December 11, 1887: 10.

25 Ibid.

26 Francis C. Richter, Richter’s History and Records of Base Ball, the American Nation’s Chief Sport (Jefferson. North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc., 2005), 422-423.

27 Ibid.

28 “The Indians Turn Cowboys,” New York Sun, January 18, 1888: 5.

29 “Base Ball Men,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, March 6, 1888: 1.

30 “Base Ball Men Meet Again,” New York Sun, March 8, 1888: 5.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

For twenty-eight days after the end of the regular season, and fourteen days after the last playoff game, Brockton and Lawrence bickered publicly about a confusing welter of complaints: whether and when postponed games should be made up, who should schedule them, and which of three teams Lawrence’s star pitcher was actually under contract with. These disputes, and the heat generated by each team’s loyal newspaper, required neat diplomacy and legal tact on the part of the league’s board of directors.

In 1885 the Eastern New England League was in its inaugural season and comprised five teams: Lawrence, Brockton, Haverhill, and Newburyport, all in Massachusetts, and Portland, in Maine. The league schedule consisted of 80 games, with each team playing 20 games against each of the other four. Newburyport and Portland both played their way out of contention early in the season, and Haverhill ultimately faltered as well, leaving the way clear for the two powerhouses and bitter rivals, Brockton and Lawrence.

Brockton ended its regular season with a record of 48–31. Lawrence, with a record of 45–31, had three games remaining at the end of September: one against Portland and two against Newburyport. They needed to win all three to match Brockton.

On September 29, Lawrence defeated Portland, 9–1, on the strength of a four-hitter by John A. Flynn. After the game, Portland manager Chick Fulmer filed a protest. He claimed that the game should not count because the teams had already played each other the allotted 20 times. In response, Lawrence pointed out that one of the games, in Portland, had been agreed on as an exhibition, since it would have been the eleventh match between them in that city. For the first time, but certainly not the last, the Lawrence Daily American entered the fray:

This [protest] was undoubtedly due to the fact that Portland accidentally defeated Brockton Monday [September 28], and McGunnigle, who is a much better wire puller than ball player, laid a plan with Portland to win another game to make him safe. This seems to be the whole thing in a nutshell, the Brockton management being as brazen receivers of stolen goods as McGunnigle is a purloiner of the same. They evidently expect no difficulty in getting whatever they want in the board of directors. In this way only has Brockton gained a sight of the pennant, by fraud and downright theft, which no honest man would uphold.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 30 September 1885.[/fn]

The primary object of the paper’s scorn was Bill “Gunner” McGunnigle, the 30-year-old right-hander in his first season as Brockton manager. Born and raised near Boston, he’d made his playing debut with a junior team in Brockton and had several years of experience in and around New England, as well as 54 games, 19 of which he pitched, with Buffalo of the National League in 1879–80. The “stolen goods” referred to were the championship laurels that both clubs hoped to wear.

With this issue looming in the background, Lawrence still had two games left against Newburyport. These were played the next two days, and Lawrence came away with two clutch victories. In the first game, on September 30, they beat the hosts 11–6. They then returned to Lawrence on October 1 and beat them there, 8–3. Flynn started the second match on one day of rest but struck out seven, allowed only four singles, and hit a pair of doubles himself.

The two front-runners, Lawrence and Brockton, were tied atop the leaderboard. As luck would have it, though, a pair of games between them had been called off earlier in the season.

The first disputed game was played on August 14, when the two teams met in Manchester, New Hampshire.[fn]Sources disagree on the date of the game and on the identity of the umpires. One source gives the date as August 12. Another source gives the date as August 18 and identifies the umpire as Winslow [Sylvester?]. The Boston Globe of 15 August 1885 refers to the Lawrence–Brockton game of August 14.[/fn] The umpire did not show up, so Brockton catcher George Bignell arbitrated from behind the plate. Predictably enough, Bignell was accused of favoritism, but Lawrence managed to rack up a 6–0 lead through seven and a half innings. Brockton rallied for four runs in both the eighth and ninth innings, but three more runs for Lawrence in the top of the ninth decided the game in its favor, 9–8. The exact cause of the protest is not recorded. Presumably, Brockton claimed that the game shouldn’t have counted without the umpire. After all, they’d been deprived of their starting catcher.

The second contested outcome came on August 26, in Brockton. The Boston Globe captured what must have been the prevailing sentiment, noting that “nearly every time the Brockton and the Lawrence teams meet upon the ball field there is more or less ‘kicking’ about the decisions of the umpires.” The paper continued:

The newly appointed umpire, Mr. A. W. Stewart of Ayer, was assigned to duty here today and administered the worst “roasting” ever accorded the home team. It was evident from the beginning of the game that Mr. Stewart was not a good judge of balls and strikes and his fatal misjudgments were principally bestowed upon the home team.[fn]Boston Globe, 27 August 1885.[/fn]

Facing a three-run deficit in the bottom of the sixth inning, Brockton’s George Tanner stepped to the plate and “knocked a ball clear over the right-field fence for a home run, but the umpire decided it was only for two bases.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] Then, instead of returning the ball to the pitcher, Lawrence second baseman Timothy Brosnan tagged Tanner, who was not standing on the bag. Stewart promptly declared him out. “The audience protested against such a decision, and the umpire, thinking himself insulted, left the field and would not return until 35 minutes had passed. The game was then continued under protest.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] Lawrence ended up winning, 9–3.

The validity of these two games was debated at a league meeting in September. Apparently, they were both stricken from the record and ordered to be replayed. The way the standings stood, their outcome would determine the championship.

The actions of the two clubs after the end of the officially scheduled season are, as reported by their respective mouthpiece newspapers, muddled. First, even before Lawrence’s second game with Newburyport, the Brockton Gazette reported:

No longer ago than this week, Secretary [H. S.] Bicknell of this city wrote to Manager [Walter] Burnham of Lawrence, inquiring if the games could not be arranged, but up to the present time no reply whatever has been received, a fact which Manager Burnham cannot deny. . . . To sum up, Lawrence cannot tie us, and knows it well, but apparently would rather resort to chicanery than to lose the pennant. We would not.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 1 October 1885. Quotes from the Brockton Gazette and other regional newspapers, with the exception of the Boston Globe, come from the Lawrence Daily American, which published lengthy excerpts from competing newspapers throughout the season.[/fn]

In response, the Lawrence Daily American claimed the exact opposite, that Burnham had contacted Bicknell and received no reply. “They [Brockton] refuse to play, knowing defeat to be inevitable. They crowed over the pennant too soon and now dread having to eat their words.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

Despite the posturing, a directive came that same day, October 1, from league secretary Charles J. Wiggin, mandating the teams to play off the two remaining games, on October 3 in Lawrence and the following day in Brockton. The Brockton Gazette protested this arrangement:

All fair-minded people are convinced that Brockton has won the championship, and nothing can shake this conviction. Brockton has a postponed game with Newburyport, why doesn’t Wiggin order that to be played? Because he has nothing to say but what is in Lawrence’s favor. Brockton will not play these games which have been ordered by the secretary.[fn]Lawrence Daily American 2 October 1885.[/fn]

It is not clear why baseball men in Brockton believed they’d already won the pennant, unless it was in hopes of having the Portland protest upheld. Also, a report in the Newburyport Germ on October 4 indicated that the Brockton team had indeed agreed to play the games, contrary to the indication in the Brockton Gazette that they would defy Wiggin’s order.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 5 October 1885.[/fn] Sure enough, though, when Lawrence arrived at its field on October 3, no Brockton players were there.

Once the home team stepped onto the field, the umpire waited a specified amount of time and then declared Lawrence the winner by forfeit, 9–0. “The greatest indignation was felt by the audience,” wrote the Lawrence Daily American, “at the shabby treatment [by] the Brockton management . . . [who know] full well that if Lawrence had been given her just dues she would now hold the pennant, which Brockton is attempting by the most bare-faced methods to steal.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 3 October 1885.[/fn]

Several minutes after the forfeit was declared, however, a telegram arrived. It read: “Manager W. W. Burnham—I cannot play, as several players refuse to go [to Lawrence], as their contracts expired yesterday. W. H. McGunnigle.” The crowd soon dispersed, “thoroughly disgusted.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

In the following day’s Gazette, McGunningle elaborated, saying that “no one more than he desired to play the three postponed games [including the one against Newburyport]” but that league secretary Wiggin had overstepped his bounds in ordering the games played on October 3 and 4.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 5 October 1885.[/fn] First, McGunnigle argued, the two teams must be given the chance to arrange the dates themselves, according to the league constitution. For his part, the Brockton manager submitted that they play on October 8 and 9. That would give him time to reassemble his team.

That same day, however, a report in the Boston Journal said that “Capt. McGunnigle of the Brocktons has definitely decided to play no more games during the present season.” This apparent contradiction was seized on immediately by the Lawrence paper. “The two despatches given above,” it dutifully reported, “settle the whole question. There is now no doubt that McGunnigle does, and does not, want to play off the three games yet to be played.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

The Boston Journal article contained another piece of news potentially much more damaging for Lawrence. On October 4, Brockton’s Bicknell received a telegram from American Association commissioner Wheeler C. Wickoff. In it, Wheeler claimed that Flynn, Lawrence’s star pitcher, had signed a contract with the AA’s New York Metropolitans on September 15.[fn]Ibid.[/fn] If true, this would invalidate the six games he had played for Lawrence since then, all of them victories.

With this nineteenth-century media circus in full procession, Lawrence traveled to Brockton the following day, October 5, for the second scheduled game. The Brockton players were indeed present, but the field was soaked through. The next day’s Brockton Gazette wrote, “[Umpire] Bond looked the ground ov’r, poked the earth with his umbrella, and finally announced that he could not call [i.e., officiate] the game, as the grounds were not in fit condition.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 6 October 1885.[/fn] What followed was bizarre.

First, both towns’ papers reported that McGunnigle refused to pay Lawrence’s travel expenses on being presented with a bill, as was common practice at the time. Instead, “the men left the grounds in little groups, the Lawrence club taking a barge which was in waiting, and driving . . . to the depot, where they took the 3:20 train for Boston.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

Neither paper revealed why McGunnigle refused to pay. He may have been miffed, however, by a nifty piece of detective work, related in the Lawrence Daily American: “Some of the Lawrences went under the grand stand [after the game was called] and found a hose covered with mud and water and having every appearance of being used to flood the grounds to prevent a game.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] The Lawrence paper, loathe to miss out on a comedic opening, deadpanned that “the Brocktons probably intend to use their ball grounds this winter for a skating rink, flooding them with water and letting it freeze over. Saturday was a little early in the season to begin flooding [it], however.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

The Lawrence team officially disbanded after this debacle, presumably because their contracts had expired as well. Manager Burnham wrote a terse letter to league secretary Wiggin, requesting “an early opportunity to prove these facts [i.e., McGunnigle’s refusal to pay] to the board of directors and [argue] that the Brockton Base Ball club may be expelled from the Association.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

At the same time, Brockton leveled accusations against both Newburyport, of throwing their last two games against Lawrence, and Haverhill, “of a desire to cheat her [Brockton] out of a pennant.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] Haverhill representatives had been present at the forfeit in Lawrence and had “denounced the trickery and meanness of McGunnigle in the loudest and most emphatic terms,” according to the Lawrence Daily American.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 3 October 1885.[/fn] Haverhill’s William H. Moody also served as league president. A multitalented man, Moody soon abandoned baseball to dedicate himself to the law and politics. In 1906, after having served as secretary of the navy and U.S. attorney general, he was named to the Supreme Court by Theodore Roosevelt.

If ever a league meeting was needed, it was on October 8, when the team presidents finally got together at the Essex House in Lawrence. The Biddeford Journal, playing the role of impartial observer, had nothing but scorn for both teams involved:

The Eastern New England League is preparing for a monkey and parrot sort of a time at its next meeting. The leading clubs, more intent upon gaining legal advantages than to meet on the ball field, have exhausted the constitutional provisions in attempts to avoid a meeting. Brockton refuses to play games when not ordered by the secretary; failed to appear at the field after agreeing to play; Lawrence went to Brockton to play when the ground was flooded, and Brockton refused to pay them for so doing; and now Lawrence asks for the expulsion of Brockton, and follows this by disbandment of the club. It seems to be a clear case of one’s afraid and the other “darsn’t”—and still the championship remains unsettled.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 8 October 1885.[/fn]

Several important issues were on the docket for the meeting. First, Portland’s protested game against Lawrence on September 29, which it claimed was the twenty-first match between the two teams. Second, the contractual status of Flynn, who had been claimed not only by the Metropolitans of the AA but also by McGunnigle himself on behalf of Brockton. Third, whether or not Secretary Wiggin had overexercised his power in ordering the postponed games between Brockton and Lawrence to be played. How these disputes were resolved would go a long way toward determining the champion.

The next day, the Lawrence Daily American pronounced all problems “amicably arranged.” Concerning Flynn, there proved to have been a miscommunication among Brockton management:

Mr. Mills stated that he had protested the game because McGunnigle telegraphed him that Flynn and [Lawrence catcher George] Moolic were under contract with him [McGunnigle]. The matter of whether this was so or not was discussed and [Brockton secretary Bicknell] said they based their information on the statement of Manager [Jim] Mutrie,[fn]The manager of the Metropolitans in 1885 was James Gifford. Mutrie, who had managed them in 1883–84, moved to the New York Giants in 1885.[/fn] of the Metropolitans, and did not claim that Brockton had any hold on Flynn. McGunnigle corrected Bicknell, saying that it was under a belief that they could hold Flynn that they telegraphed Mr. Mills as before stated.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 9 October 1885.[/fn]

In light of this confusing development, Mills dropped his protest, and the men moved on to the question of whether Flynn had signed with the Metropolitans. To answer this, they summoned Flynn himself, who averred that “he had signed with no club but Lawrence, and that he had never told any person that he had.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

In the end, and at Mills’s suggestion, all of the problems were bundled into one elegant solution. Lawrence and Brockton agreed to play a three-game series for the championship—on October 10 in Brockton, October 13 in Lawrence, and October 15 in Boston, if necessary. The clubs further agreed to “waive all protests and matters at present except the eligibility of Flynn. In case Flynn was found to have played while ineligible, the Brocktons [were] to take the pennant.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] Lawrence re-signed its players, and the recalcitrant foes were finally ready to play ball.

On the field as in the newspapers, Lawrence and Brockton were very well matched. The former team was carried by the 21-year-old Flynn, who had joined the club for the stretch run after playing for Meriden earlier in the year (more on that later). He was the unquestioned ace of the staff and also the best hitter, with a .432 average in 44 at-bats. His batterymate was fellow Lawrence native George H. Moolic, a competent defensive catcher who went by the nickname Prunes. Other standouts included second baseman (and captain) Timothy Brosnan, first baseman Pat O’Connell, and center fielder John Kiley. The team did not hit for much power but was far above average defensively and outscored its opponents by 46 runs over the course of the season. The roster included John Tener, a young Irishman from County Tyrone, who didn’t make much of an impression during his time in Lawrence but did go on to serve as National League president from 1913 to 1918 and as governor of Pennsylvania from 1911 to 1915.

For Brockton, third baseman James “Jumbo” Davis was the centerpiece of a fearsome offense. He later went on to a fairly lengthy career with various teams in the American Association, and led that league with 19 triples in 1887. Ed Crane was another reliable hitter, and Jim Cudworth patrolled center field with grace. The main starting pitcher for Brockton was John Moriarty, and he faced Flynn in the first game of the series.

Brockton drew blood in the first inning of the opener, as first baseman Bill Hawes reached first on a muffed third strike by catcher Moolic, advanced to second on a wild throw by the same, and scored on a passed ball. In the second inning, however, Lawrence put up three runs of their own on hits by O’Connell, Brosnan, and Flynn. Also in that inning, Brockton’s Davis got into a heated argument with the umpire and stormed off the field.

The Lawrence nine continued to add runs incrementally throughout the game. They scored two in the third, one in the fifth on “Flynn’s terrific hit to extreme left field for three bases,”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 10 October 1885.[/fn] two in the sixth, and one in the seventh. Brockton scraped together three more runs, but it was not enough to prevent a 9–4 loss. Flynn allowed five hits, walked five, and struck out nine; Moriarty allowed ten hits, walked three, and struck out seven.

The second game of the series, in Lawrence, was scheduled for October 13, but rain pushed it back two days. Brockton’s loss had evidently not diminished its healthy swagger; in their Lawrence hotel guestbook, the players signed themselves in as “Champions of New England.” The Lawrence Daily American, noting this, dryly compared them to “lads of tender years, who delight to scribble their names on the walls of every conceivable place they enter.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 14 October 1885.[/fn]

When play finally began, Lawrence jumped out to an early lead, scoring two runs in the first on “an opportune hit by O’Connell.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 16 October 1885.[/fn] In the fourth inning, Brockton answered with three runs of its own on a double by Ed Crane and a balk by Lawrence’s Flynn. In the next two innings, though, Lawrence reclaimed the lead and extended it considerably, scoring five unanswered runs, then four more in the eighth and ninth innings. O’Connell, Bill Conway, and John Burns each recorded multiple hits, Moolic had an RBI double, and Flynn allowed only five hits. Lawrence took the game by the final score of 11–4, winning the threegame series and the pennant.

Afterward, a hastily arranged parade carried the players through the town and dropped them off at the Brunswick Hotel, where they were the object of much speechifying by local bigwigs. “There was a feeling of great gratification at the result of the game expressed in the countenance of each one present, and after the repast cigars were circulated among the guests.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] Pitcher Dick Conway was presented with a winter overcoat, “with the hope that he would accept it and continue to cherish as kindly feelings toward Lawrence people as they did towards him.” The night wore on, “songs were rendered by several present, and at a seasonable hour the party broke up with Auld Lang Syne, much pleased with the celebration in honor of securing the pennant.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

As the revelers dined, the scribes at the Lawrence Daily American must have been fairly cackling at their desks. In a swipe at Brockton’s self-styled “Champions of New England,” the next day’s delirious headline read, “HELLO, BROCKTON! What Are You Going to Sign Yourself Now?”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] Along with the recap was a lengthy column of vindictive gloating, aimed primarily at the Brockton Gazette:

Well, Gazette, take it all back and tell your readers you don’t know a little bit about base ball anyway. It is a bitter pill, but you must take it. . . . It is dreadfully hard, but you were, as usual, just a trifle previous, to say the least, and indiscreet beyond a doubt. We pity you, indeed we do. Ta-ta.[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

In fact, many different New England newspapers chimed in regularly through the dispute. After the final game, the Boston Globe opined that “the Brocktons won the championship and the Lawrences got the pennant,”[fn]Ibid.[/fn] while the Boston Post wrote:

The managers of the Brockton team may well feel heartily ashamed of themselves. . . . That they lost the pennant is entirely their own fault. Brockton, with the chances greatly in her favor, took just the one course that should have been avoided, disbanded the team and attempted to win the championship by bluff.[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

A third Boston paper, the Herald, believed that “in the opinion of a large majority of the base ball public in New England . . . the Brockton club fairly and squarely won the championship on the ball field.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American 17 October 1885.[/fn] To which the Lawrence Daily American, ever judicious, replied: “In the opinion of a large majority of the base ball public in New England, the Herald base ball man has a big head.”[fn]Ibid.[/fn]

Incredibly, though, the affair was not yet decided. In a new tactic, Brockton alleged that Flynn and his batterymate, Moolic, had been under contract not with the Metropolitans but with Meriden of the Southern New England League. Both men had indeed played for Meriden earlier that year and joined Lawrence on September 17, only after Meriden folded. According to the secretary of the SNEL, Meriden had disbanded on September 15. According to Meriden’s own secretary, however, that team never actually disbanded officially. A meeting of the Eastern New England League was called on October 28 to settle the dispute.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 20 October 1885.[/fn]

In the meantime, some further digging by the Boston Globe showed that on August 12 the Meriden club released all of its players—with the exception of Flynn and Moolic.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 26 October 1885.[/fn] At the same time, however, Flynn was owed $200 by management, which the Lawrence Daily American believed “released him from all obligations to them long before he signed in Lawrence.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 26 October 1885.[/fn] The SNEL secretary, however, admitted, “I don’t know any rule in our League by which contracts become invalid when salaries are not paid.” In the same telegram, he counted himself among the befuddled: “Lord only knows when the Meriden club disbanded.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 26 October 1885.[/fn]

As October turned toward November, the Brockton Gazette commented that “base ball talk is getting rather wearisome at the present time.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 21 October 1885.[/fn] Though Brockton had a vested interest in the conversation, many New England baseball fans likely agreed. On October 28, four weeks after the last scheduled game of the season, the league board of directors finally awarded the championship—to Lawrence. At that evening’s meeting, Lawrence’s representatives—Flynn among them—provided proof that not just Meriden but the entire SENL had disbanded by August 15, if not before. League secretary Moody concurred.[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 29 October 1885.[/fn] The long, hard season was over, on the field and in the boardroom.

Old habits die hard—the following day, Brockton promised an appeal. “It is ten to one,” the Boston Globe surmised, “that they will never carry out this threat, and a hundred to one that . . . the matter [will not] come before the arbitration committee.”[fn]Lawrence Daily American, 30 October 1885.[/fn] Indeed, no appeal was ever filed.

The weather worsened, and, though the principal parties (or, rather, their supporters in the press) continued to snipe at one another, public interest moved elsewhere. Flynn, who had found himself in the eye of a hurricane on and off the field, signed with Chicago of the National League. Lawrence’s manager, Burnham, went to head the new Meriden franchise and was replaced by former Detroit player Frank Cox.

In 1886, the two teams would again battle in the standings, but somewhat farther down the ladder— they both finished over 20 games out of first place. This was in the newly constituted New England League. The Eastern New England League had gone out of business after one season and one of the most heated pennant races in baseball history.

JUSTIN MURPHY is a reporter for The Citizen newspaper in Auburn, New York. He also contributes to the website Seamheads.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Tony Yoseloff and the Yoseloff Foundation for the Yoseloff/SABR Baseball Research Grant that helped make this article possible. Thanks also to the staff at the Lawrence History Center and Lawrence Public Library. Baseball-Reference.com was an indispensible resource for statistics.

Nonetheless, major rules changes have been implemented successfully at the major-league level before without the sky falling. Some of the seemingly most drastic have come within living memory for many fans. The mound was lowered and the strike zone shrunk significantly after the pitching domination of 1968.2 The designated hitter was finally adopted in the American League (after having been debated since the nineteenth century3) in 1973.4 Video replay review was first introduced in 2008 in a limited way, then expanded in 2014.5 But the pace of change has accelerated in the Manfred Era, leading Manfred himself to say of purists who have decried the rules changes under his watch, “Their logic, I believe, is: ‘He wants to change it, therefore he doesn’t love it.’ My logic is: ‘I love it, it needs to be consummate with today’s society in order for people to continue to love it, and therefore, I’m willing to take whatever criticism comes along in an effort to make sure the game is something Americans will continue to embrace.’”6

THE MANFRED ERA

Before Rob Manfred became commissioner in 2015, he had been working in and around Major League Baseball since 1987, including representing the owners as outside counsel in the 1994-95 labor negotiations.7 For purposes of this article, though, we’ll consider the Manfred Era as beginning on September 28, 2013, when he was named Chief Operating Officer of MLB by then-commissioner Allan “Bud” Selig, a move that cemented Manfred’s role as Selig’s heir apparent. Baseball being criticized for being “slow” is nothing new.8 But under Manfred, MLB began to beat the drum that something had to be done about the slow pace of play, lack of game action/balls in play, and over-three-hour game times, because the league was losing fans.9 Some rules tinkering got underway by 2014, when a 20-second pitch clock was imposed in the Arizona Fall League, and by 2015 had spread to the Double and Triple A levels of the minor leagues.10 In February 2015, Manfred had been in the commissioner’s chair for less than a month when MLB announced new rules intended to speed things up.11 These included a clock on the inning breaks, the ability of managers to call for a replay challenge from the dugout instead of having to come on the field, and a mandate to enforce Rule 6.02(d) which requires hitters to keep one foot in the batters box during an at-bat.

Batters were not thrilled about the sudden enforcement of a rule that they had been flouting at will for decades.12 Umpires didn’t seem particularly invested in enforcing the rule, either, and although the average time of game dropped by six minutes from 2014 to early 2015, the time began to creep right back up, lengthening from around 2:53 at the start of the season to 2:56 by the end.13 By 2016, games averaged three hours again. (See Table 1.) In 2017, the intentional walk rule was changed to allow managers to simply tell the umpire to give first base to the hitter, eliminating the need to pitch the four largely ceremonial balls to the catcher. No one expected that to save a lot of time, and it didn’t: the average time of game rose again to 3:05, so even more changes were introduced before the 2018 season, including a limit of six mound visits per nine-inning game, new time limits on inning breaks, and putting time clocks on pitching changes.

Table 1. Average Time of an MLB Game

Sources: AP, CBS Sports14

In 2019 mound visits were trimmed from six to five, and new inning break limits were introduced, with local games’ break time reduced from 2:05 to 2:00, and national games from 2:25 to 2:00 — eliminating an entire advertising slot! — and the commissioner’s office warning that for the 2020 season they “retained the right” to reduce the inning breaks to 1:55 in both local and national games.15 By far the most contentious of the changes, though, was the rule requiring relief pitchers to face a minimum of three batters, which many argued would have the opposite from the intended effect. Cliff Corcoran of The Athletic wrote that “the three-batter minimum is rife with irony — a rule intended to make games shorter will likely make them longer; a rule intended to save fans from enduring mid-inning pitching changes will only make them more desperate to see them.”16

Of course in 2020 the novel coronavirus pandemic forced MLB to renegotiate the entire existence of the season with the MLBPA, including new rules governing travel, health, and safety, as well as “emergency” rules that had on-field effects such as the universal DH in both leagues, seven-inning doubleheaders, and an extra innings rule that placed a runner at second base to start each half-inning. Somehow in 2021, seven-inning doubleheaders and the extra innings rule have remained, despite the easing of the pandemic and the derisive clap-chants from the Yankee Stadium bleachers to “Play-Real Base-Ball!” every time the extra runner on second appears.

A much bigger rule “change” in 2021, though, is MLB’s crackdown on “sticky substances.”17 Although it has been illegal to “doctor” the ball with Vaseline or any other substance since the last legal practitioner of the spitball, Burleigh Grimes, retired from the game in 1934, for years it has been an “open secret” that a majority of pitchers used some kind of substance (other than the approved rosin) at least some of the time to improve their grip. With the crackdown ongoing as this paper is being written, it remains to be seen just what rules changes might come out of it. Some have suggested that a substance be made legal for pitcher use similar to rosin. Others have suggested that all pitchers and their gloves, hats, and uniforms be inspected before every inning. History suggests that the sticky substance crackdown is akin to the steroid crackdown: a problem that was allowed to grow unchecked for more than a decade before MLB decided it had to step in. Where the sticky substance debate seems to differ is that fans seem to be less angry over sticky stuff than they were about steroids, as if cheating with performance-enhancing goop is somehow less egregious than performance-enhancing drugs.

Is part of the muted reaction to “sticky stuff” on the part of fans — especially when compared to steroids, or even the Astros recent trash-can banging cheating scandal — because fans accept “sticky stuff” as part of baseball’s status quo? When trying to project what baseball’s rules will look like in 2040, it’s one of the questions we must ask. But sometimes it’s tricky to determine what “feels like baseball” and what doesn’t.

That’s where play-testing comes in.

THE ATLANTIC LEAGUE EXPERIMENT(S)

Many of the rules changes that have been considered and/or implemented by MLB under Rob Manfred were not cooked up in the comissioner’s office; they’ve already been used somewhere. For example, the Southeastern Conference (SEC) has been using a pitch clock in college baseball since 2010.18 And then there’s the Atlantic League. This unaffiliated independent baseball league was already trying some rules innovations on their own before MLB made them an official testbed.

At the time when Rick White became president of the Atlantic League, MLB had just started investigating pace of play. In 2014, MLB created a blue ribbon Pace of Game committee.19 That same year, the Atlantic League just went ahead and began enforcing both Rule 6.02 (batters cannot step out of the box) and Rule 8.04 (pitchers have 12 seconds to deliver the ball after receiving it), limited teams to three 45-second “time outs” per game — including mound visits, reduced warmup pitches from eight to six, and started calling the rule-book strike zone (including the high strike). Reportedly, time of game immediately dropped by eight minutes.20

“We took it upon ourselves to take an initiative to reduce the time of play and the pace with which the game was played,” White said when asked. “And we openly shared our data with MLB. They never asked for it; we just did it.”21 The relationship between the Atlantic League and MLB developed over time. White and Manfred had known each other from the era when White had founded Major League Baseball Properties and Manfred had been working on MLB labor issues. When White and a group of Atlantic League owners met with then-COO Manfred in 2014, their main hope was to reach an agreement governing the transfer of players from their league to MLB. “We anticipated he was going to become the commissioner,” White explained. “We wanted to introduce the league to him, and I don’t think that he had a real conscious thought about who we were and who composed our league, especially on the playing side. But in that meeting, we talked about the quality of play in our league and we threw out — you know, as an opportunity — the idea for us to beta test initiatives. We really didn’t think that was going to go anywhere.”

But Manfred saw in the Atlantic League an ideal place to experiment with rules changes. The Atlantic League is a better test environment than the affiliated minor leagues because of its nature as a “second-chance league.” The Atlantic League is populated with experienced players — 80% with major league or Triple AAA experience, according to White — and its teams are not controlled by major league clubs. This means the competition is more analogous to major-league play than one finds on a Double A team being forced to play the 0-for-35 prospect whose multimillion dollar signing bonus needs to be justified, or the pitcher on the trading block. Because the minor league franchises must cater to the needs of their major league club, it “creates a bit of an artificial dynamic for what MLB’s trying to accomplish.”22

To increase the ability to make meaningful comparisons, the changes have mostly been A/B tested by splitting the season into two halves-one half with a rule change, one half without. In addition to the pace-of-play changes implemented in 2014, the Atlantic League has been experimenting over the past few years with ways to increase the amount of action in a game. Changes designed to boost baserunning have included banning the usual lefty pickoff move (pitcher must step off the rubber before making a move), limiting the number of pickoffs per at bat to two, increasing the width of the bases to 18 inches, and introducing the “steal of first base” — allowing a batter to run to first on any dropped strike, not just the third strike. The step-off-before-pickoff rule in particular “has led to Atlantic League games turning into track meets of sorts,” according to Baseball America’s J.J. Cooper. “Since the rule was put into place, stolen bases have nearly doubled from 0.7 steals per team per game to 1.3.”23

Defensive shifts work well — too well — so to encourage more success on balls in play, the Atlantic League has experimented with a rule that all infielders must be on the infield dirt when the ball is pitched. One rule tested to help batters at the plate looks small — you get two shots to bunt foul on the third strike instead of one — but one slated to be introduced in the latter half of 2021 looks huge: moving the pitching rubber back by a foot.

Originally the plan to move the rubber had been slated for the second half of 2019 and the move was slated to be two feet — to 62′ 6″ — but the plan was later scrapped. Instead, in 2021, the Atlantic League will try a 61′ 6″ distance. Some pitchers expressed worries the increase could lead to injuries.24 But recent studies suggest that altering the distance between the mound and the plate doesn’t change a pitcher’s mechanics and won’t lead to additional injury.25 The change of one foot of distance is expected to be the equivalent of reducing pitch speed by 1.5 mph. Is one foot enough to make a difference? “If you look at the majority of hitters today, because they are trying to get an instant more time to see a pitched baseball, they methodically stand at the very back of the box,” says White. “And if you really pay attention early in the game, most hitters at the big league level go in and start erasing the back line of the batters box.”26 With pitchers throwing 100 miles per hour with regularity now, hitters will take every inch they can get.

The Atlantic League has also experimented with a “consistent grip” baseball that “is tackier than the model used in both affiliated baseball and the Atlantic League,” and would negate the need for pitchers to use something sticky merely to improve grip and control because the ball has already been pre-treated to be tacky.27 The consistent-grip ball is also brighter white, and potentially easier to see, since it doesn’t have to be rubbed with mud before each game the way the MLB ball is. (MLB has also experimented with the “consistent grip” baseball in the Arizona Fall League, but has been largely silent on the subject throughout the recent announcements about the sticky substance crackdown.)

But we haven’t even talked yet about the Atlantic League experiment that seems the most futuristic, the so-called “robo umps.” Automated Ball-Strike (ABS) uses the TrackMan radar system (the same system MLB used for PitchF/X before it was superseded by Hawk-Eye/Statcast) to judge balls and strikes and then relay the call to the home plate umpire via an earbud. To fans in the stands, ABS “runs so smoothly that most fans don’t even know the home plate umpire isn’t in charge of determining the strike zone.”28 To get into the nitty gritty of what using ABS is like, I spoke to the umpire whose earbud was sent to the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum after being the first to use the system in a game, Fred DeJesus.

“It’s a blessing in my eyes,” DeJesus said. “[With ABS] you don’t have those Billy Martin/Earl Weaver style arguments anymore.”29 DeJesus was an umpire in the affiliated minor leagues for years before taking the gig with the Atlantic League (as well as a day job in public education). In DeJesus’s view, ABS lets the home plate umpire concentrate on other aspects of the game — which, by the way, include maintaining the pace of play. “ABS helps all of us with slowing our timing down, being more patient, and letting the game come to us,” he says. When asked whether a rules change can make the game more exciting, though, DeJesus is pragmatic: “It’s players that make the game exciting, not the rules.”30

Beta-testing systems like ABS and rules changes in the Atlantic League ultimately gives MLB what Rick White calls a “safety valve. They don’t want to change their on-field product until they’ve fully parsed the results.” MLB naturally wants to see if there are unintended consequences or bugs in the systems. Players don’t always react to a rule as intended, as shown in MLB when attempted enforcement of rule 8.04 in 2009 merely led to pitchers shrugging and paying fines rather than speeding up their game.31

Among the lessons learned so far from the Atlantic League experiments is the realization that ABS was calling the high strike more than expected not just because the rulebook strike zone is higher than the one typically used in practice in MLB — but because it calculated the height based on each player’s reported height. This meant that any player who had overstated his height (a common, if questionable, practice32) was penalized with a strike zone intended for a larger person. For the 2021 season, the ABS system is being tweaked to call a lower — and wider — strike zone, one that more closely resembles what major-league umpires call.33

Hawk-Eye high speed cameras overlooking an athletic event in 2020 (HAWK-EYE INNOVATIONS)

The other big takeaway was that ABS revealed that everyone — catchers, hitters, umpires — reacts in-game as if the strike zone is a two-dimensional window at the front of the plate rather than the as-defined prism of three-dimensional space above home plate. No one I spoke to was sure why, but one guess is that this could be a consequence of what is now two decades of television “K-Zone”-style projections being subconsciously absorbed.34 In theory, the strike zone is a column of air; in practice, it is a window, and to reflect that, the ABS system has been adjusted in 2021 to measure it like one. We’ll see what effects that has ingame as the season goes along. Meanwhile, MLB has imported several successful experiments from the Atlantic League into one or more of its own affiliated minor leagues for the 2021 season:

• Triple A: 18-inch-square bases with a less-slippery surface
• Double A: Infielders must be on the infield dirt when the pitch is delivered
• High-A: Pitchers must step off the rubber to attempt a pickoff
• Low-A: A limit of two pickoff attempts per plate appearance
• Low-A (West): A 15-second pitch clock
• Low-A (Southeast): Automatic Ball-Strike system

THE FUTURE OF THE RULES

My first prediction is an easy one: Given the nearseamless success of ABS in the Atlantic League, it seems assured that in the short term — within five years — we will see some form of ABS adopted for use in Major League Baseball. In the bigs, it will likely utilize Hawk-Eye, which MLB claims is accurate down to 1/100th of an inch.35 Although attendance figures are often quoted as the reason for taking action, there is little doubt that one of MLB’s aims is to make the game more appealing, exciting, and engaging for the broadcast audience.36 As such, it no longer makes any sense to have the viewers at home (or anyone in the stadium with the MLB At Bat App) better informed about the positions of balls and strikes than the home plate umpire. Umpires should be demanding this tool be put at their disposal as soon as possible so they can stop looking like fools every night on television. To make a small prediction based on previous reactions to change: MLB umpires won’t do anything of the sort until it is imposed on them by the commissioner’s office.

Future iterations of ABS could calculate the strike zone in real time based on the hitter’s stance. Could we see some hitters adopting a boxer’s crouch to reduce the target area? The big leagues changed the strike zone after the 1968 season to create a more hitter-friendly environment. With an ABS system, MLB could easily tweak the size and shape of the zone on a yearly basis, tipping the balance of power in either the pitcher’s or hitter’s favor, depending on which seemed to be gaining the upper hand.

Assuming ABS is a given, I asked DeJesus what’s the one call he wishes umpires had technological help to make? “Checked swings,” he said, without hesitation. Fred, I have good news: in the future, that’ll be doable. By 2040, the cutting edge of technology won’t merely be better cameras for Hawk-Eye or its successor, but more sophisticated software and data processing on what those cameras capture. These advances will allow “robo umps” to judge more than just the strike zone. Engineers at MLBAM are already working on using Hawk-Eye data to track not only the position of each player on the field, but biometric telemetry of their bodies’ posture and joints.37 Soon, processing the data will not only be able to recreate a VR simulation of actual play for entertainment purposes, it will be able to make safe/out calls that the human eye cannot: for example, plays that were obscured by a player’s body.

You might think that my next prediction would be that by 2040 we won’t have human umpires at all, but you’d be wrong. I don’t believe it will be desirable to replace a human umpire entirely, and that technology should continue to be framed as a necessary tool to help umpires perform their jobs at the highest level. It is necessary to keep the umpires at least as well informed as the viewing public, and makes no sense to have the audience in the twenty-first century and umpires in the nineteenth. The earbud of 2021 could take the form of a wearable for umpires by 2040, maybe something akin to Google Glass (or a contact lens) with a visual heads-up display. Perhaps there will be an eye-in-the-sky — which could be an umpire in the press box, or in Secaucus like MLB’s current video review crew — with access to all the tracking data, who automatically buzzes the on-field umps when their calls need to be amended.38 In that vein, expect the current use of video replay — where each manager needs to issue a challenge to a call on the field — to be long gone by 2040. If MLB’s goal is a faster-paced, more streamlined game, the manager challenge bringing the game to a halt needs to go. Incorporate technological feedback into all aspects of umpiring, and it will not only be seamless, the end result on the field will be a game that looks and feels more like “traditional” baseball than the manager challenge does.

By 2040, expect the baseball itself to have changed, as well as the rules governing the ball’s specs. Another hallmark of the Manfred Era is MLB tinkering with the ball. Rawlings has been the official manufacturer of the baseballs used in the major leagues for over forty years. After the 2017 surge in both home runs and pitcher blisters may have been caused by a small change in ball manufacturing, MLB bought Rawlings in 2018 to solidify control over that process.39 Prior to the 2021 season, MLB announced it had deliberately made changes to the ball intended to suppress the home run surge.40 Whether the change worked as intended — and it doesn’t appear that it did41 — the new status quo appears to be MLB deliberately experimenting with the ball itself. Making the ball lighter, heavier, with denser or lighter wool, with seams higher or lower, perhaps with a “consistent grip” covering as previously mentioned, each will affect the ball’s drag and Coefficient of Restitution (bounciness). With the same technology that is allowing pitchers to unlock the mechanics behind Seam-Shifted Wake, expect MLB to eventually master what each potential change to the ball itself will do.

The Atlantic League experiments presage that the distance from the plate to the pitching rubber will be increased in the future. But are we going to see field dimensions overall increase? The height of the average American has been growing for over 100 years. Why shouldn’t the field dimensions adjust to reflect that? In 1918, the average American army soldier was 5-foot-6 (while Babe Ruth was 6-foot-2).42 Nowadays, the average MLB hitter is over six feet tall, and pitchers are taller still. Increased player size alone accounted for an 11 percent jump in the annual home run rate from 1946 to 2005.43 People and players continue to get bigger, and at the major league level they tend to be the biggest. We already have the concept that field size should be appropriate to player size: the Little League field has 60-foot basepaths and a 45-foot pitching distance, while Pony League (age 13-14) has 80-foot basepaths and a 54-foot pitching distance. The main reason I don’t believe we’ll see 100-foot basepaths and 450-foot outfield fences in MLB by 2040 is that it would be too expensive to retool stadiums to change the field size that drastically, plus there’s the fact that if MLB is seeking a boost in baserunning and steals, increasing the distance between bases will hurt. (In fact, with the likelihood that larger bases will be adopted, the actual basepath will technically shrink by a few inches.) Rebuilding the entire field in major league ballparks isn’t economically feasible, but moving the mound is.

When it comes to MLB in 2040, though, nearly everyone I mentioned my predictions to while writing this article wanted to know whether I thought there would eventually be a universal DH or if the DH would eventually be phased back out of the major leagues. If I am going to be logical about my predictions, I’m going to say that the players union will eventually get the DH approved in the National League. Of course, there’s the possibility that the DH may take some other form, like the double hook rule being tested in — you guessed it — the Atlantic League in 2021. The double hook rule is intended to influence teams away from openers and extreme bullpenning because you lose the DH when you pull your starting pitcher from the game. My prediction if the double hook rule were to become standard in MLB is that the players union would only support it if it were accompanied by expanded active rosters. For those who are anti-DH, would that be better or worse than what we have now? The DH or no-DH question seems to inspire intense feelings in baseball fans. Trying to answer the question leads to existential questions about baseball itself.

WHAT IS BASEBALL, ANYWAY?

Perhaps it boils down to aesthetics. MLB would like the game to evolve in a direction that is more exciting, engaging, and appealing than the game as it is played today. (This is why I haven’t predicted any rules against bat flips or home plate celebrations.) But batting average in 2021 is on pace to be as low as in 1968.44 And balls in play are on pace to be even lower, having dropped from 133,000 balls in play in 2007 to 119,000 in 2019 and still decreasing.45 MLB firmly believes that a game dominated by the “three true outcomes” is not the most engaging version of baseball. They believe more balls in play and traffic on the bases will equate to more excitement and more fans. A noble aim, but… would that mean we need more DHs or fewer?

It seems to me that if something looks and feels like “baseball” to die-hard fans, they’ll accept it. If it feels like a gimmick or just plain weird — like the extra-innings tiebreaker rule feels to the Bleacher Creatures — then it’s not “real baseball.” And the danger is that if we have too many rules changes — or even one deal-breaker — such that the game no longer feels like the sport we love, that would drive fans away, too. What will fan reaction be to the Pioneer League’s tiebreaker plan for the 2021 season: a home run derby?46

Perhaps the five-pitch swingoff will fly in the Pioneer League because the minor leagues have greater license to be unorthodox in the name of entertainment, whereas what the major leagues do, by definition, is the orthodoxy of the game. This is why to this day some opponents of the DH call it an abomination.47 The way I see it, the schism over the DH reveals two opposing aesthetics of baseball. In the version of baseball where the DH is prized, the central conflict at the heart of the game is the confrontation between the pitcher and the batter. Everything else — including fielding and baserunning — is secondary to that one-on-one confrontation. By contrast, the aesthetic of pre-DH baseball comes in its purest form from the nineteenth century days of nine-versus-nine, when the game was not so far removed from when the “pitcher” was there to serve the ball to the batter so that it could be put into play and result in lots of running around. Looked at that way, if there’s no one on base, it’s not base ball.

By 1891 we already had the schism forming, though, between those who believed the aesthetics of the game centered around the ball in play, and those who believed it centered around the batter-pitcher confrontation. In 1890, the nine-versus-nine folks compromised to allow two additional players on the roster for substitutions, but in 1891 they stopped short of the pitcher being declared a non-batter despite the already obvious fact that most good pitchers can’t hit.48 Here we are, 130 years later — with rosters having grown to 26 players, and pitchers even worse at hitting than ever before49 — still debating the same thing. The problem with aesthetic debates, of course, is that neither side can be proven right or wrong. Ultimately the “proof” will be measured by the number of fans in seats and eyeballs on screens. My prediction for 2040 is that baseball will retain its cultural relevance, no matter how much tinkering the powers that be may do.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Stew Thornley, J.J. Cooper, Rick White, and Fred DeJesus for speaking with me at length on this topic and to Cliff Blau for being the gold standard of fact-checking.

Notes

1. At Cactus League Media Day 2018, Manfred told the media, “Pace of game is a fan issue. Our research tells us that it’s a fan issue. Our broadcast partners tell us it’s a fan issue.” (MLB’s research on the subject has not been made public, however.) Richard Justice, “Manfred talks pace of play, rebuilding clubs,” MLB.com, February 20, 2018. https:// www.mlb.com/news/commissioner-rob-manfred-talks-pace-of-play-c26681889.0; Tom Verducci, “Rob Manfred’s stern message: MLB will modernize, no matter what players want,” Sports Illustrated, February 21, 2017. https:// www.si.com/mlb/2017/02/22/rob-manfred-mlb-rules-changes-mlbpa-tony-clark.

2. Michael St. Clair, “Four stats show why the mound was lowered in 1968,” MLB.com, December 3, 2015. https://www.mlb.com/cut4/why-was-the-mound-lowered-in-1968/c-158689966.

3. “Messrs. Temple and Spalding Agree That the Pitcher Should be Exempt From Batting,” Sporting Life, December 19, 1891, 1. See also John Cronin, “The History of the Designated Hitter Rule,” Baseball Research Journal, Vol 45, No. 2, Fall 2016, Society for American Baseball Research: 5-14.

4. If one needs more evidence of the traditionalist streak in baseball fandom, I’ll note that nearly fifty years of the designated hitter in the American League still hasn’t stopped a certain stripe of traditionalist from continuing to rail against it in the twenty-first century.

5. “Instant Replay,” Baseball Reference Bullpen, Accessed June 20, 2021. https://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Instant_replay.

6. Tyler Conway, “Rob Manfred: Fans Acted Like MLB Rule Changes Were ‘Crime Against Humanity’” Bleacher Report, September 2, 2020. https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2907345-rob-manfred-fans-acted-like-mlb-rule-changes-were-crime-against-humanity.

7. “BASEBALL; Baseball Talks May Resume,” The New York Times, July 9, 1995.

8. Steve Moyer, “In America’s Pastime, Baseball Players Pass A Lot of Time,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2013. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323740804578597932341903720. From the article, “By WSJ calculations, a baseball fan will see 17 minutes and 58 seconds of action over the course of a three-hour game. This is roughly the equivalent of a TED Talk, a Broadway intermission or the missing section of the Watergate tapes. A similar WSJ study on NFL games in January 2010 found that the average action time for a football game was 11 minutes.”

9. Bob Baum, “Manfred says pace of game rules crucial to luring young fans,” AP News, February 23, 2015. Found in many places including https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/02/23/manfred-says-pace-of-game-rules-crucial-to-luring-young-fans/23911063.

10. Timothy Rapp, “MLB to Use Pitch Clock for Minor League Games,” Bleacher Report, January 15, 2015. https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2331469-mlb-to-use-pitch-clock-for-minor-league-games-latest-details-and-reation.

11. Paul Hagen, “New rules to speed up pace, replay,” MLB.com, February 20, 2015. https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-announces-new-pace-of-game-initiatives-changes-to-instant-replay/c-109822622.

12. Some notable examples included Mike Hargrove, who earned the nickname “The Human Rain Delay,” and Chuck Knoblauch, whose 11-step between-pitches routine grew legendary as leadoff hitter for the turn-of-the-millennium Yankees. See Bob Sudyk, “Pokey Hargrove Streaks to Hot Start For Tribe,” The Sporting News, May 31, 1980: 33; and Buster Olney, “BASEBALL; Between Pitches (Twist, Tap), a Game Within the Game,” The New York Times, August 22, 1999. “Before every pitch, Knoblauch steps out of the batter’s box to go through this elaborate preening, the pitcher waiting all the while.” https://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/22/sports/baseball-between-pitches-twist-tap-a-game-within-the-game.html.

13. Jayson Stark, “MLB Commissioner Ron Manfred unhappy with length of games.” ESPN.com, May 17, 2016. https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/15575004/mlb-commissioner-rob-manfred-unhappy-increased-length-games.

14. Mike Axisa, “Commissioner Rob Manfred confirms new pace of play rules coming to MLB in 2018,” CBSSports.com, November, 16, 2017. https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/commissioner-rob-manfred-confirms-new-pace-of-play-rules-coming-to-mlb-in-2018.

15. “2019 MLB Rule Changes Unveiled,” Ballpark Digest, March 14, 2019. https://ballparkdigest.com/2019/03/14/2019-mlb-rule-changes-unveiled.

16. Cliff Corcoran, “The new 3-batter minimum rule won’t speed up games but will have negative unintended consequences,” The Athletic, January 23, 2020. https://theathletic.com/1555626/2020/01/23/the-new-3-batter-minimum-rule-wont-speed-up-games-but-will-have-negative-unintended-consequences.

17. Alden Gonzalez and Jesse Rogers, “Sticky Stuff 101: Everything you need to know as MLB’s foreign substance crackdown begins,” ESPN.com, June 22, 2021. https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/31660574/sticky-stuff-101-everything-need-know-mlb-foreign-substance-crackdown-begins.

18. Teddy Cahill, “NCAA Commitee Approves Pitch Clock for College Baseball in 2020,” Baseball America, August 14, 2019. https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/ncaa-committee-approves-pitch-clock-for-college-baseball-in-2020.

19. Craig Calcaterra, “Major League Baseball Creates a Pace of Game Committee,” NBCSports.com, September 22, 2014. https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2014/09/22/major-league-baseball-creates-a-pace-of-game-committee.

20. Tom Verducci, “How MLB could learn from Atlantic League in speeding up the game,” Sports Illustrated, August 5, 2014. https://www.si.com/mlb/2014/08/05/atlantic-league-pace-of-play-mlb.

21. Rick White, personal interview, May 17, 2021.

22. Rick White, personal interview, May 17, 2021.

23. J.J. Cooper, “Cooper: Atlantic League Rule Changes Aren’t As Noticeable As You’d Expect,” Baseball America, August 21, 2019. https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/cooper-atlantic-league-rule-changes-aren-t-as-noticeable-as-you-d-expect.

24. J.J. Cooper, “New Mound Distance, Modified DH Among Atlantic League Rule Changes For 2021,” Baseball America, April 14, 2021. https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/new-mound-distance-modified-dh-among-atlantic-league-rule-changes-for-2021.

25. Alek Z. Diffendaffer, Jonathan S. Slowik, Karen Hart, James R. Andrews, Jeffrey R. Dugas, E. Lyle Cain Jr, Glenn S. Fleisig, “The influence of baseball pitching distance on pitching biomechanics, pitch velocity, and ball movement,” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport, February 8, 2020. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32063509.

26. Rick White, personal interview, May 17, 2021.

27. Jacob Bogage, “National Baseball Hall of Fame accepts Atlantic League ‘robo ump’ items,” Washington Post, July 25, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/07/25/national-baseball-hall-fame-accepts-atlantic-league-robo-ump-items.

28. Cooper, “Atlantic League Rule Changes Aren’t As Noticeable As You’d Expect.”

29. Fred DeJesus, personal interview, May 20, 2021.

30. Fred DeJesus, personal interview, May 20, 2021.

31. Just one example: “Boston closer Papelbon again fined for slow play,” Reuters, September 4, 2009. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-baseball-redsox-papelbon/boston-closer-papelbon-again-fined-for-slow-play-idUSTRE58364W20090904.

32. David Fleming, “Tall tales: Getting an athlete’s real measurements is rarely easy,” ESPN: The Magazine, June 27, 2018. https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/23913544/the-body-issue-getting-athlete-real-measurements-rarely-easy.

33. Mike Gross, “The Atlantic League, the changeable strike zone, and the quest to revive baseball,” Lancaster Online, May 29, 2021. https://lancasteronline.com/sports/local_sports/the-atlantic-league-the-changeable-strike-zone-and-the-quest-to-revive-baseball-column/article_1f1dbc74-c0c1-11eb-b8d1-07c763d7c466.html.

34. Andre Gueziec, “Tracking Pitches for Broadcast Television,” Computer, March 2002. http://baseball.physics.illinois.edu/TrackingBaseballs.pdf.

35. Press Release, Sony Electronics, “Hawk-Eye Innovations and MLB Introduce Next-Gen Baseball Tracking and Analytics Platform,” August 20, 2020. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/hawk-eye-innovations-and-mlb-introduce-next-gen-baseball-tracking-and-analytics-platform-301115828.html.

36. Dayn Perry, “MLB seems to think its broadcast audience is more important than fans at the ballpark,” CBSSports.com, February 21, 2018. https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/mlb-seems-to-think-its-broadcast-audience-is-more-important-than-fans-at-the-ballpark.

37. Graham Goldbeck, Marc Squire, Sid Sethupathi, “MLB Statcast Player Pose Tracking and Visualization,” SABR Virtual Analytics Conference, March 14, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLbzUkNi7oU.

38. When I mentioned this vision of the future to Atlantic League umpire Fred DeJesus, his comment was, “I agree: that signal should come out of Secaucus and you could have a buzzer at the plate guy’s hip. But you’ll have guys who say ‘the buzzer didn’t work’ or ‘we didn’t get to it.’ You think Joe West is going to say he felt the buzzer? Absolutely not. Angel Hernandez is going to say he felt the buzzer? No way!” It’ll take a new generation of umpires who have benefited from technological feedback to accept these changes. As it is, studies have shown that younger umpires — who came up in an era when they’ve always had some form of pitch tracking, be it QuesTec, Pitch F/x, or Statcast — call balls and strikes more accurately than older, more experienced ones, likely because of the beneficial effect of that feedback. See Mark T. Williams, “MLB Umpires Missed 34,294 Ball-Strike Calls in 2018. Bring on Robo-umps?” BU Today, April 8, 2019.

39. Dr. Meredith Wills, “How One Tiny Change to the Baseball May Have Led to Both the Home Run Surge and the Rise in Pitcher Blisters,” The Athletic, June 6, 2018. https://theathletic.com/381544/2018/06/06/how-one-tiny-change-to-the-baseball-may-have-led-to-both-the-home-run-surge-and-the-rise-in-pitcher-blisters; Maria Armental, “MLB Buys Rawlings from Newell Brands for $395 Million,” Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/newell-brands-to-sell-rawlings-brands-for-395-million-1528203488.

40. Mark Feinsand, “MLB to Alter Baseballs for 2021,” MLB.com, February 8, 2021. https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-to-alter-baseballs-for-2021.

41. Thus far in 2021 homers are down slightly, from 1.39 per team game in 2019 to 1.17 now, but the season is not over yet and offense tends to heat up with the weather. As noted by J.J. Cooper, though, the trend of more homers, walks, and strikeouts and fewer balls in play and lower batting averages is not just being seen in MLB, but in college baseball, too, where the ball was not changed. J.J. Cooper, “Home Runs, Strikeouts and Low Averages Are Trending Throughout Baseball,” Baseball America, May 26, 2021. https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/home-runs-strikeouts-and-low-averages-are-trending-throughout-baseball.

42. Milicent L. Hathaway, “Trends in Heights and Weights,” Yearbook of Agriculture, 1959, 181. https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/IND43861419/PDF.

43. Nate Silver, “Does Size Matter?” Baseball Prospectus, April 27, 2005. https://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/article/3979/lies-damned-lies-does-size-matter.

44. Chelsea Janes, “MLB’s offensive woes are complicated, and they don’t appear to be going away,” Washington Post, May 17, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/05/17/mlb-offense-complicated.

45. Stew Thornley, Personal Interview, May 17, 2021, follow-up email June 23.

46. Associated Press, “Home Run Derby, not extra innings will decide Pioneer League games this season,” Salt Lake Tribune, April 27, 2021. https://www.sltrib.com/sports/2021/04/27/home-run-derby-not-extra.

47. Stew Thornley, the official scorer for the Minnesota Twins and longtime SABR member and rules historian, spoke to me for this article. His words: “Using terms like ‘abomination’ for the designated hitter is just overblown.” But people do.

48. “Messrs. Temple and Spalding Agree That the Pitcher Should be Exempt From Batting,” Sporting Life, December 19, 1891, 1.

49. Ryan Romano, “Pitchers are Hitting Even Worse,” Beyond the Boxscore, April 20, 2015. https://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2015/4/20/8448085/pitchers-are-hitting-worse-mlb.

Baseball in 1887: On and Off the Field

The fans of 1887 witnessed a different game than seen in previous seasons.3 The many rule changes created conditions that enabled numerous batsmen to have career-best performances at the plate and many teams to score an unprecedented number of runs. While players enjoyed greater success on the field, they continued to struggle off the field with limited contractual or professional rights, concerns that were taken up more vigorously in 1887 by the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players.

In 1887 the National League and the American Association implemented a number of rule changes that significantly altered the way the game was played. These changes were designed to enable the umpire to perform his duties more effectively by clarifying rules that were previously difficult to enforce, by eliminating rules that often led to disputes, and by reassigning certain responsibilities to others. In addition, pitching and batting rules were revised to equalize “the powers of the attacking and defensive forces in the game.”4 While a number of rule changes affected the balance of power between pitcher and batter, three in particular shifted the advantage to the batsman, specifically the number of fair balls before he was declared out on strikes, the number of unfair balls before he was given his base on balls, and the scoring of a base on balls as a hit. These pro-batsman changes had a significant impact on the “attacking” numbers of most NL and AA teams in 1887.5

When compared to 1886 and 1888, in 1887 both leagues had higher numbers in runs, hits, and bases on ball per game and in the overall batting averages.6 Pitchers also recorded fewer strikeouts in 1887 than in 1886 or 1888. In tables 1 and 2, the 1887 figures are based on the rules of the day, that is, a base on balls is counted as a hit in the line on hits per game. For comparative purposes, bases on balls per game in 1887 are also shown separately.7

Table 1: Batting Statistics in the National League, 1886 to 1888

Table 2: Batting Statistics in the American Association, 1886 to 1888

This offensive power surge was even more evident in the records of the leading teams and leading batters in both leagues. After a close race for most of the season, the Detroit Wolverines won the championship of the NL by 3½ games. They led the NL in runs (969 runs or 7.6 per game), hits (1756 hits or 13.8 per game), doubles, triples, and batting average (.348). In the AA, the St. Louis Browns moved into first place at the beginning of May, never to relinquish the lead; they finished 14 games ahead of second-place Cincinnati. St. Louis was the first major-league team to score more than 1,000 runs in a season (1131 runs or 8.2 per game). The Browns also led the AA in hits (1992 hits or 14.4 per game), doubles, home runs, stolen bases, and batting average (.363).

Cap Anson (Chicago) won the NL batting championship with an average of .421.8 Tip O’Neill was the leading batsman in the AA with an average of .485. He also led the league in runs (167), hits (275, tied with Pete Browning), doubles (52), triples (19, tied with five others), home runs (14), and runs batted in (123).9 The fans flocked to the games. The AA attendance rose to an all-time high. The number of cranks through the NL turnstiles bested one million, a mark that for the first time exceeded the totals of the AA.10

As the players adapted to the new rules on the field, off the field they continued to cope with how the owners thoroughly framed and regulated their professional lives and careers. The players were concerned with restrictions on their freedom of movement (e.g., reserve clause, trades and sales of players), various contractual conditions (e.g., wanted the inclusion of their full salary in the contract), limitations on salary levels, and arbitrary discipline (through fines and sometimes suspension or blacklisting) issued by owners and the league for alleged misbehavior.11 Throughout 1887, John Ward, the president of the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players, repeatedly raised questions about players’ rights, in particular when teams folded, moved from one league to another or joined the NL or AA as a new member, and traded or sold players based on alleged misbehavior.12 Whether a player was moved by sale, trade, or reassignment, the Brotherhood argued that the player had a right to be heard, and not simply shuttled from one place to another as if he were a slave.13

Meetings

The work of the two leagues shaped the direction and conditions that defined baseball in 1887 on and off the field. Though each league had its own constitution and operated independently, they were bound by the National Agreement. Accordingly, the NL and AA worked together on the Arbitration Committee, the Joint Schedule Committee, and, for the first time in 1887, the Joint Committee on Rules. (Previously each league developed its own playing rules.) The major meetings (location shown in parentheses) in the NL and AA from November 1, 1886, to October 31, 1887, were as follows:14

• November 15-16: Joint Committee on Rules, NL & AA (Chicago)
• November 17-18: Annual Meeting, NL (Chicago)
• November 22-23: Special Meeting to Admit Cleveland, AA (Cincinnati)
• December 13, 14: Arbitration Committee, NL & AA (New York)
• December 15-16: Annual Meeting, AA (New York)
• March 4: Joint Schedule Committee, NL & AA (Columbus)
• March 7: Schedule Meeting, NL (New York)
• March 7: Schedule Meeting, AA (Cleveland)
• May 14: Special Meeting to Discuss Recent Rule Changes, AA (Cincinnati)
• September 5: Special Meeting to Consider the Percentage System, AA (New York)
• September 6: Arbitration Committee, NL & AA (New York)

Annual Meetings

Most of the key issues and themes of 1887 were first noted and, in some cases, addressed at the annual meetings.15 Most issues or themes considered at the annual meetings were subsequently followed up by various committees or at special meetings. Table 3 outlines the major decisions made at the NL and AA annual meetings. The section that follows on “Key Issues and Themes” describes how the most prominent decisions from the annual meetings were further examined, confirmed, or revised in other forums.

Table 3. Annual Meetings: Major Decisions by NL & AA

KEY ISSUES AND THEMES

Many of the decisions made at the two annual meetings became issues or themes that continued throughout 1887.

Rule Changes: For the first time, the NL and AA worked together to develop one set of playing rules that would govern both leagues, as well as those minor-league associations that had co-signed the National Agreement. In another “first,” the joint committee sought the counsel of an advisory group of captains.18

The changes were far-reaching, with minor (e.g., rewording) and often major revisions to over half of the 1886 “Playing Rules.” A number of changes clarified and strengthened the role of the umpire especially in those areas where disputes arise. For example, the new rules: repositioned the first- and third-base bags so that they were entirely in fair territory (to make it easier for the umpire to call a ball fair or foul); no longer allowed the batsman to call for a high or low pitch, as well as redefined a fair ball or strike as a pitch over the plate between the knee and shoulder (to reduce previous problems that the umpire had in determining whether a pitch was a fair ball);19 restricted the comments of a coach to advice directed to his own baserunners; and permitted only the captain to challenge the umpire and only then on questions about a possible incorrect application of a rule (last two changes intended to limit the intimidating tactics of coaches and captains, and to reinforce the powers of the umpire to make final and uncontested decisions).20 Arguably the most significant changes were those that affected the pitcher and the batsman.21

New rules changed what the pitcher could do within the pitchers’ lines or box in ways that tipped the balance in the batsman’s favor. The box was reduced to 4 feet wide and 5½ feet long, with the front line 50 feet from the middle of the home base. Prior to each pitch, a right-handed pitcher had to keep “both feet squarely on the ground, the right foot on the rear line of the box, his left foot in advance of the right, and to the left of an imaginary line from his right foot to the center of the Home Base.”22 He was further restricted to one step in his delivery from the point at which he began (rear line of box). Against those pitchers who had previously relied on more than one step or jumped across the box to generate velocity, and on movements within and across the box to deceive the hitter, the 1887 batsman likely faced slower pitches with fewer distractions.23

The pitching rules also stipulated that before each delivery the pitcher had to hold the ball “in front of his body and in sight of the Umpire,”24 which would also put the ball in full view of the batsman. The pitcher had to return to his stance on the back line with the ball positioned in front of him after each pitch and after each throw or feigned throw to a base in an attempt to pick off a baserunner. A pitcher could no longer hide the ball behind his back, begin with his back to the batsman, quick-pitch a batsman, or turn as if to throw to a base and then wheel and throw to the plate all in one motion. The 1887 batsman thus had fewer deceptions to confront. He also was able to pick up and follow the ball sooner, especially from those pitchers who had depended on these tricks in 1886.

The one change that clearly favored the pitcher was the omission of the rule that allowed the batsman to call for a high (between waist and shoulder) or low (between waist and knees) pitch. This change doubled the strike zone to a fair ball delivered “over the home base, not lower than the batsman’s knee, nor higher than his shoulder.”25 The strategic advantage gained for the pitcher by the larger strike zone was offset by reducing the number of unfair balls required for a base on balls to five and increasing the number of fair balls required before a batsman was called out on strikes to four.26 In addition, a base on balls was scored as a base hit and a time at bat. Though the 1887 batsman now had to cope with both low and high balls, he was less likely to get called out on strikes and more likely to be awarded a hit for a called base on balls secured through skillful batting.27 He had more opportunity to work the count, to size up pitches, and to wait for a pitch he preferred.

As indicated above, the cumulative advantages that these rule changes afforded to the batsman contributed to the significant improvement in the productivity of the players, teams, and leagues. Though fans seemed to enjoy this offensive surge, there was also continued opposition to two of the changes, namely the rule that credited a base on balls with a base hit and the rule that required four strikes before a batsman is called out.28 Barely one month into the season, the AA met on May 14 in Cincinnati and drafted a resolution asking NL President Nicholas Young to confer with NL members of the Joint Committee on Rules about the advisability of revoking these two rules effective immediately.29 Young responded that the NL was in favor of these two changes but not until the end of the season.30 The two rules were revoked at the 1887 annual meetings of the NL and AA.

Changes in Membership: In the 10 years in which the NL and AA co-existed (1882-1891), there were frequent changes in the composition of clubs in each league.31 Though the two leagues lived with the worry and threat of defection, the move of Pittsburgh from the AA to the NL for the 1887 season was the first time a team chose to leave one league for the other. The NL-AA tension created by this departure lingered until the demise of the AA.32

In comparison to the AA, the NL engaged in a more complicated and prolonged process to determine which clubs would form the eight-team roster for 1887. Capitalizing on Pittsburgh’s disillusionment with the AA,33 the NL moved quickly and persuasively to secure the membership of the competitive Pittsburgh club (it finished second in the AA in 1886). It formally admitted Pittsburgh to the League at its annual meeting in November 1886. With one club too many, the NL devoted the next three months to sorting out its eight-team membership for 1887.

The NL had doubts about the continued viability of two of its teams (Kansas City, St. Louis) while a third, more established club (Detroit) no longer believed it was in its best interests to stay in the League. In its first year (1886), Kansas City proved to be both a poor competitor (won 30 of 121 games) and a poor draw (attendance of 55,000, the lowest in both leagues). Furthermore, the other NL teams objected to the extra travel time and costs incurred to play in Kansas City. During the annual meeting in November, NL representatives urged Kansas City to withdraw so that Pittsburgh could take its place at the table. Menges, the Kansas City director, responded strongly: “We will not be forced out of the League. We will stay in if we want and we will go out if it suits us to, and we won’t be driven out inch by inch by those fellows that are trying to manipulate things to suit themselves.”34 The NL also worried about the financial viability of the St. Louis Maroons after the departure of its owner in August 1886. Complicating matters further, Detroit threatened to jump to the AA after the league decided against the percentage system for splitting gate receipts with the visiting team. Neither Kansas City nor St. Louis would drop out of the NL voluntarily, while Detroit was poised to leave willingly, or so it seemed.

As a further “incentive” for those clubs that were reluctant to withdraw their membership, at the annual meeting the NL passed a motion “that any club persistently refusing to tender its resignation when called on for it will forfeit its deposit of $5000.”35 The League had the option of voting out a club that did not resign after being encouraged to do so (two-thirds majority required) but was hesitant to invoke this option for fear of a legal challenge. Instead the NL set up a committee of three36 (N.E. Young, A.G. Spalding, J.B. Day) to manage what turned out to be a prolonged process. The committee’s remit was as follows:

… to consider and determine all questions relating to the release and employment of players of any club in danger of probable disbandment, their decision to be final. Such committee to have power, in case of the club’s withdrawing from the League, or in case of its expulsion, to provide for the apportionment of its players among the remaining League clubs, as in the opinion of such committee the best interest of the League may require. They may, if they deem it right, continue the club, playing it in the same city or another city which the interest of the League may demand. The power and duties of such committee to continue until further action of the League. Their successors to be elected at the next annual meeting. The action of the committee to be unanimous.37

Given what transpired, the above statement, “They may, if they deem it right, continue the club, playing it in the same city or another city,” was prophetic. Shortly after the committee’s formation, representatives from Indianapolis made it known that it was interested in NL membership. For the next three months, there was considerable press coverage, swirling rumors, and much debate about which of the three cities, St. Louis, Kansas City, or Indianapolis, would become the eighth member. On February 21, 1887, the committee of three met with representatives of all three teams to review their respective proposals. The committee could not agree on a recommendation and so referred the final decision to the March 7 schedule meeting of the NL in New York.

The final resolution gave the committee of three responsibility for the purchase and subsequent distribution of players. Indianapolis was accepted as the eighth member of the NL. Kansas City and St. Louis withdrew their membership. The NL paid $6,000 to Kansas City for its players and $12,000 to St. Louis for its players. In turn, Indianapolis paid $12,000 to the NL for all of the St. Louis players and $1,000 for two Kansas City players (Bassett, Hackett). The NL sold three Kansas City players (Whitney, Myers, Donnelly) and one St. Louis player (O’Brien) to Washington for $2,500 and one Kansas City player (Radford) to the New York Metropolitans (AA) for $500. To forestall possible confusion or disputes that might arise with some “star” players from St. Louis, Indianapolis was not permitted to sell or release Glasscock, Myers, Denny, and Boyle for one year.38 The committee of three exerted its muscle, and got the changes it wanted.39 Or as the Boston Globe summarized: “That sounds pretty strong; but it’s the way they do things in the League. The rule is: ‘You can do as we want you to with good grace or not, just as you see fit, but you will have to do it.’”40

After the annual meeting of the NL, the AA, still upset by both the League’s aggressiveness and secrecy, focused on the task at hand, namely to determine a replacement for Pittsburgh. It called a special two-day meeting of all members for November 22, 1886, in Cincinnati. After due consideration of proposals from Kansas City and Cleveland and an expression of interest from Detroit (NL), the delegates voted to admit Cleveland “contingent on their being able to show a solid financial basis and deposit a bond.”41 An Association committee of three consisting of Chris Von der Ahe, A.S. Stern, and C.H. Byrne was appointed to make a site visit to Cleveland and report the results of this visit at the American Association’s annual meeting. Cleveland was formally admitted as a member of the AA at the annual meeting on December 15 in New York.

At a special meeting in November, the AA was prepared to negotiate favorable terms with Detroit, but not before Detroit submitted a formal application for membership. By the second day, Detroit clearly did not want to leave the NL, and admitted as much, in that it had used the threat of defection as leverage to gain concessions from many of the NL clubs on the amount they would pay Detroit when it was the visiting team.42 Kansas City had the strongest submission but was not seriously considered, in part because of the extra travel costs and time that would be required to play in that city. But the primary reasons were anger and pride. The AA could not be seen as accepting a club rejected by the NL.

Guarantee System vs. Percentage System: In both leagues, nothing was so contentious as the debate about which of two competing systems would be used to divide gate receipts between home and visiting clubs. The guarantee system required the home team to pay the visiting club a set amount for each championship game. The percentage system based the allocation to the visiting team for each championship game on a predetermined percentage of the gate receipts. The overall income of the team in the guarantee system was primarily based on the ability of a club to promote a high attendance at home. The financial success of a team in the percentage system was dependent on a club’s capacity to draw well at both home and away games.

Though some owners changed sides in this ongoing debate about the best system, they tended to support one system over the other according to their location (East or West), success (most or least wins), or size of city (big market or small market). Most of the NL and AA teams in the East initially favored the guarantee system while most teams in the West (except for Cincinnati in the AA and Chicago in the NL) initially preferred the percentage system. At the annual meeting of the NL in November 1886, two of the three least successful and small-market teams (St. Louis and Kansas City, not Washington) supported the percentage system. Among the top three teams, only Detroit (also a small-market team) wanted to retain the percentage system (not Chicago or New York, which also were big-market teams). Prior to the September AA meeting on the percentage plan, St. Louis, the first-place team (also a big-market team), two of the three small-market teams (Louisville and Cleveland, not Cincinnati), and the two teams with the worst record (New York and Cleveland), endorsed the percentage system. Of the four teams that maintained a commitment to the guarantee system, Cincinnati and Baltimore were two of the top three teams in the AA in wins, and Brooklyn and Philadelphia were two of the three big-market teams.43

The two leagues appeared to be going in different directions. At its annual meeting, the NL changed from the percentage system used in 1886 (the visiting team received 12.5 cents for each person admitted or 30 percent for each championship game) to a guarantee system for 1887 (the visiting team received $125 for each championship game and 50 percent of the gate receipts for games on national or state holidays). In the AA, a guarantee system was in place for 1887 (the visiting team received $65 for each championship game and 50 percent of the gate receipts for games on national or state holidays). Once the season began, St. Louis embarked on a public and behind-the-scenes lobby against the guarantee system, a strategy that also included a threat from St. Louis to defect to the NL if a percentage system was not adopted.44 At a special meeting in September, the AA approved the change to a modified percentage system for 1888 (visiting team received 7.5 cents for each person admitted, roughly 30 percent of receipts for each championship game including those games played on national or state holidays, but not less than $130). As the 1887 season progressed, the ongoing debate about the two systems, the respective threats of defection of Detroit to the AA45 and the St. Louis Browns to the NL, and the decision of the AA to change to the percentage plan had swung the pendulum in favor of the percentage plan in both leagues.46 At its annual meeting in November, the NL also switched to a modified percentage system (the visiting team received 12.5 cents for each person admitted or 25 percent for each championship game including those games played on national or state holidays, but not less than $150).47

Regulation of Players’ Lives and Careers: Both leagues clarified and strengthened their control over players’ lives and careers through changes in the National Agreement or in their respective constitutions, many of which are noted in Table 3 above.

As teams added more pitchers and catchers to their rosters, they needed a larger reserve list to retain these batteries. Accordingly, the reserve list for 1887 was increased to 14. Section IV of the National Agreement also stated that the list of players “reserved in any prior annual reserve list who have refused to contract with said club members and such players together with all others thereafter to be regularly contracted with by such members, are and shall be ineligible to contract with any club member of the other association.”48 The changes to Section IV thus required each club to submit two lists on October 10 each year, one for the reserved 14 players under contract and the second for reserved players who had not signed a contract in previous seasons. A player on the reserved-but-refused-to-sign list could be on this second list indefinitely, effectively denying him a chance to play baseball until he was either signed or released.49

Some changes in the National Agreement further defined when and under what conditions minor-league players could sign with their clubs or with the NL or AA. The minor-league associations that had qualified admission to the National Agreement increasingly were frustrated by the terms that governed their affiliation with the NL and AA.50 Revisions to Section II of the National Agreement significantly curtailed the use of personal contracts through the stipulation that no player could sign or negotiate a contract before October 20, a restriction that particularly affected those clubs in the NL or AA that sometimes tried to sign minor-league players before this date.51 A revision to Section II of the “Articles of Qualified Admission to the National Agreement of Professional Base Ball Associations” moved the date when minor-league clubs could first sign their players from November 1 to October 20. The NL and AA could no longer use the 10 days between October 20 and November 1 to “steal away the minor league’s players.”52

Other changes to the National Agreement or to the NL or AA constitutions identified and clarified those offenses that would invoke the use of suspensions or blacklisting. Suspensions could be given for unacceptable conduct (drunkenness, insubordination, etc.) in the NL (constitutional change); for any breach of contract including signing or negotiating a personal contract prior to October 20 (changes in National Agreement); and with reserved players, for those who failed to sign a contract (suspended from play for the following season or until he was released or signed: changes in National Agreement). A few owners in the AA who were especially vexed by players who refused to sign their contracts struck back by amending Section 37 of the AA constitution to read as follows:

And in case any player under reserve shall willfully hold off and refuse to sign a regular contract with the club which has him reserved, for the purpose of harassing the club or compelling it to increase his salary, or shall by any means, directly or indirectly, endeavor to attempt willful extortion from the club which has him reserved, he shall upon complaint and satisfactory evidence be placed upon the blacklist by the president and the secretary and notices issued to all clubs as provided by this constitution and the national agreement.53

Finally, an amendment to Section III of “Articles of Qualified Admission to the National Agreement of Professional Base Ball Associations” restricted clubs to the use of suspensions for any breach of contract or rules. Previously, a club could suspend, blacklist, or expel a player for such offenses.54 In the amendment to Section III, the relevant league or association had sole responsibility for making a decision to blacklist a player or terminate the period of his suspension.55

Conclusion

As the owners prepared for the 1887 annual meetings (NL in November and AA in December), many were pleased with the profits of the season just completed and guardedly optimistic about the prospects for continued financial gain in 1888. The increase in attendance in 1887 across both leagues suggested that fans enjoyed the product on the field. With few rule changes anticipated for 1888, most owners were confident that the fans would return in large numbers. Furthermore, with the change to a percentage system already approved by the AA and on the agenda of the 1887 NL annual meeting, teams in both leagues would likely receive a more equitable share of the gate receipts in the coming season. The popularity of the game and the new business model would ensure a profitable year once again, or so many thought.

A few owners, however, were more cautious about the prospects for the 1888 season. They had concerns about the competitiveness of their respective leagues, the emerging unrest among players, and the possible threat to the profitability of their clubs that these two concerns posed. Getting fans out to the games depended on the level of competition and the expectation of a hard-fought contest with most if not all of the other seven teams in the League or Association. Of the three new teams, Pittsburgh (NL) fared the best (sixth in final standings, fifth-highest in attendance). Indianapolis (NL) and Cleveland (AA) each finished last in its respective league.56 While there were spirited rivalries between some teams, in 1887 only the NL had a tight race to the end, with three teams vying for the championship in the final weeks of the season.

For the most part, the numerous changes outlined above under “Regulation of Players’ Lives and Careers” most affected how clubs managed player contracts, movement (e.g., sale, trade, release), or behavior (e.g., through fines, suspensions, blacklist). The changes did not address the rights of players in any of these actions or transactions, an omission that was repeatedly criticized by the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players. Though aware of some signs of labor strife, the NL and AA remained resolute that they had the sole responsibility for determining what is expected of players on and off the field. They would not allow player unrest to threaten all that they had done to enhance the popularity and profits of Organized Baseball. The NL and AA were determined to make a success of 1888.

Notes

1 In 1887, the newspapers, two baseball weeklies (The Sporting News, Sporting Life), and two annual guides — Spalding’s Base Ball Guide and Official League Book and Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide — used the label “annual meetings” to denote the winter meeting of the League and Association.

2 In 1886, Reach’s Guide proudly declared: “In the American Association not one of the eight clubs played to a losing treasury — a state of affairs that had not been known during the previous four years of the organization’s existence.” “1886,” Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide 1887 (1887; Reprinted New York: Horton Publishing Company, 1989), 5. Spalding’s Guide stated that five of the eight NL clubs made a profit. On the other three clubs, it added: “The clubs of St. Louis, Kansas City and Washington, however, failed to realize expectations, all three being on the wrong side of the column in profit and loss.” “The League Season of 1886,” Spalding’s Base Ball Guide and Official League Book for 1887. (1887; Reprinted New York: Horton Publishing Company, 1989), 14.

3 David Nemec’s The Great Encyclopedia of Nineteenth Century Major League Baseball. Second Edition (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 409, states: “Never before and never again did the game undergo as many changes as occurred in 1887.”

4 Henry Chadwick, “The New Rules of Base-Ball,” Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine, May 1887: 836.

5 I discuss the new rules in greater detail in a later subsection entitled “Rule Changes.”

6 The figures in Tables 1 and 2 are based on those provided on the Baseball Reference website. See Baseball-Reference.com. For the 1887 figures, I also referred to John Thorn, Phil Birnbaum & Bill Deane, Total Baseball. The Ultimate Baseball Encyclopedia. 8th Edition (Wilmington, North Carolina: SPORT Media Publishing, Inc., 2004), 2485-2486. For 1887, the seventh and eighth editions of Total Baseball include bases on balls as hits in its statistics for players, teams, and the NL and AA.

7 Most databases normalize the 1887 statistics, specifically by not counting a base on balls as a hit. The adjusted hits per game and league averages that appear in Baseball-Reference.com are shown in the following table:

8 When bases on balls are not counted as a hit, Sam Thompson (Detroit) had the highest batting average (.371) in the NL in 1887. He also had the highest number of hits (203) and the most runs batted in (166).

9 In 1887 Tip O’Neill’s official average was reported as .492, which was changed to .485 many years later when it was discovered that there had been an error in the calculation. When the AA averages are normalized (bases on balls not counted as a hit), O’Neill still headed the list of AA batters with an average of .435.

10 Gary Gillette & Pete Palmer, eds., The ESPN Baseball Encyclopedia. Fifth Edition (New York: Sterling Publishing, 2008), 243.

11 Robert Burk, Never Just a Game. Players, Owners, and American Baseball to 1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 94-99; Harold Seymour, Baseball: The Early Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 221-225; David Voigt, American Baseball. Volume 1: From Gentleman’s Sport to the Commissioner System (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1983), 154-160.

12 After the 1886 season, Chicago sold George Gore, Abner Dalrymple, and King Kelly in part because of their drinking and Jim McCormick for his failure to sign a contract. In November, the St. Louis Browns moved five players — Bill Gleason, Curt Welch, Doc Bushong, Dave Foutz, and Bob Caruthers — some of whom had contract disputes with the owner, while others had problems with drinking, inconsistent performance, or insubordination. Chicago sold Kelly to Boston for $10,000, a sum that The Sporting News claimed was the “largest amount ever paid for the release of a ball player.” “The Only Mike Kelly. Boston Pays Chicago Ten Thousand Dollars for His Release,” The Sporting News, February 19, 1887: 1.

13 A number of the early articles on the rule changes were based on interviews with Ward (e.g., “The New Rules for 1887,” New York Clipper, December 18, 1886: 632). He also wrote, “The New Rules,” Sporting Life, February 9, 1887: 4. Ward condemned the reserve clause in an article entitled, “Is the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” Lippincott’s Magazine, Volume XL, August 1887: 310-19.

14 The two leagues had other committee meetings as needed or as opportunity permitted. For example, on August 15, the NL Board of Directors met in Asbury, New Jersey, to adjudicate the protest submitted by the New York Club against the umpire’s decision to forfeit their game of June 27 to Detroit. “Current Topics. Results of the League Director’s Meeting,” Sporting Life, August 24, 1887: 1.

15 The delegates to the NL annual meeting were A.H. Soden and W.H. Conant (Boston); President Hewitt and Manager Gaffney (Washington); President Stromberg and Thomas Russell (St. Louis Maroons); Manager Dave Rowe, President Helm, and Director E.E. Menges (Kansas City); John I. Rogers and Al Reach (Philadelphia (Quakers); President Fred K. Stearns (Detroit); John B. Day (New York Giants); and Al Spalding and W.I. Culver (Chicago), with Nicholas E. Young as the NL president and secretary. The delegates to the AA annual meeting were Will Sharsig and C.E. Mason (Philadelphia Athletics); Wm. Barnie and H.R. Von der Horst (Baltimore); C.H. Byrne, F.A. Abell, and J.J. Doyle (Brooklyn); A.S. Stern (Cincinnati); F.D.H. Robison, Geo. W. Howe, and J.A. Williams (Cleveland); Z. Phelps and J.R. Botto (Louisville); E. Wiman and W.W. Watrous (New York Metropolitans); and C. Von der Ahe and H.M. Weldon (St. Louis Browns), with Wheeler Wikoff as AA president and secretary.

16 “The National Playing Rules,” Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide 1887 (1887; Reprinted New York: Horton Publishing Company, 1989), 166. Note in Reach’s Guide, the rule is incorrectly numbered. Rule 66 is on page 65. The amendment rule on page 166 should be numbered Rule 67.

17 At the March 7 schedule meeting, the AA withdrew its amendments, and supported the revised wording of section 67 initially proposed by the Joint Committee on Rules.

18 The members of the Joint Committee on Rules were: A.G. Spalding (Chicago, chairman), John Day (New York), and John Rogers (Philadelphia) for the NL and Zach Phelps (Louisville), William Barnie (Baltimore), and J.A. Williams (Cleveland) for the AA. The advisory group consisted of Cap Anson (Chicago), John Morrill (Boston), and John Ward (New York) from the NL and Charles Comiskey (St. Louis), Harry Stovey (Philadelphia), and Ed Swartwood (Brooklyn) from the AA.

19 Previously there had been numerous disputes over whether a waist-high pitch was high or low. For example, a batsman who called for a high pitch and then had a pitch he perceived as below his waist — and thus low — called a fair ball often argued against or kicked about this ruling by the umpire.

20 The AA was especially concerned with violations of the coaching rules (e.g., continued and illegal use of intimidation tactics and kicking). At the special meeting of the AA on May 14-15, they passed a motion that reinforced the expectation that the umpire would enforce the coaching rules and that each club would support the umpire in this enforcement. St. Louis and Cincinnati, the two teams most criticized for violating the coaching rules, opposed the motion. “Secret CONFAB: A Special Meeting of the Association,” Sporting Life, May 18, 1887: 1.

21 The changes also addressed such areas as the home plate (to be made of white rubber, no longer stone); the ball (must use the standard ball made by A.G. Spalding & Brothers or A.J. Reach & Company); the balk (any motion that tries to deceive the baserunner); a foul hit (if intentional, will be called a strike); etc.

22 Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide. 1887 (Philadelphia: A.J. Reach & Co., 1887), 149, 150, 153, 154.

23 While the requirement that a pitcher start from the back line set the pitching distance at 55½ feet, the release point of most pitchers was between 51 and 53 feet depending on the stride of the pitcher and the timing of his release. A pitcher who in 1886 used two or three steps timed his delivery so he could release the ball just before the front line of the box. This same pitcher in 1887 would then release the ball between one and two feet farther back than in 1886 and without the leverage gained by a two- or three-step run up, and so likely as a result experienced a slight reduction in the speed of his pitch.

24 Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide, 1887, 149.

25 Ibid., 153.

26 See Ward; also O.P. Caylor, “New Rules: Radical Changes by the Joint Committee. The Game to Be almost Revolutionized in Pitching and Batting,” Sporting Life, November 24, 1886, 1.

27 In addition to getting on base through a fair hit and a base on balls, under the new rules a batsman became a baserunner when he was hit by a pitch and when a pitcher delivered an illegal pitch — one that violated one of the rules governing the pitcher’s position and movements in the pitcher’s box.

28 On the 1887 rules governing when a batsman was out on strikes, Eric Miklich explained: “The batsman is out on strikes the moment the Umpire calls ‘four strikes,’ whenever first base is occupied and only one man is out, without regard to the catch of the ball from the fourth strike or not. In all other cases of four strikes being called, the ball on the fourth strike must be caught on the fly, or the batsman — then becoming a base runner — must be thrown out at first.” Eric Miklich, The Rules of the Game. A Compilation of the Rules of Baseball 1845-1900. 19C Base Ball, 19CBASEBALL.COM, 2005, 63.

29 “Secret CONFAB: A Special Meeting of the Association,” Sporting Life, May 18, 1887: 1. Barnie (Baltimore) and Byrne (Brooklyn) lobbied hard for these two rule changes. The delegates voted unanimously to rescind the base-on-balls-as-a-hit rule. A majority of the delegates supported the suspension of the four-strike rule and a return to three fair balls for a strikeout.

30 “The League Agrees, and the New Rules Will be Changed Next Season,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 16, 1887: 5; “National League: Notes,” New York Clipper, July 2, 1887: 250.

31 In this NL-AA period (1882-1886), the NL dropped Troy and Worcester and added New York (Gothams) and Philadelphia (Quakers) in 1883, made no changes in 1884, dropped Cleveland and added St. Louis Maroons in 1885, and dropped Buffalo and Providence and added Kansas City and Washington in 1886. In this same period, the AA added New York (Metropolitans) and Columbus in 1883, added Toledo, Washington (replaced by Richmond in August), Brooklyn, and Indianapolis in 1884, dropped Toledo, Washington, Richmond, Columbus, and Indianapolis in 1885, and had no changes in 1886.

32 Three “defections” by AA clubs to the NL occurred: Cleveland in 1889 and Brooklyn and Cincinnati in 1890.

33 Pittsburgh did not like the “circus-like” and often chaotic way the AA conducted its affairs, especially in its handling of the Barkley case. It also did not like to play on Sundays. The club preferred the more businesslike approach of the NL. For a further discussion of the Pittsburgh move to the NL, see Jon Cash, Before They Were Cardinals. Major League Baseball in Nineteenth-Century St. Louis (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 151-153. Also see Seymour, 216-220.

34 “A Sensation: Kansas City in Fighting Mood,” Sporting Life, November 24, 1886: 1.

35 “The National League,” New York Clipper, November 27, 1886: 586.

36 Here I refer to it as the committee of three. It was formally recognized as the League Committee on Apportionment, though some newspapers had other labels (e.g., “Committee on Take,” in Cincinnati Enquirer, February 20, 1887: 10).

37 “The League Committee,” Sporting Life, December 1, 1886: 1.

38 “The Hoosiers Selected as the Eighth Club,” Sporting Life, March 16, 1887:1.

39 The prescient editorial group of Sporting Life surmised most elements of the committee’s strategy. They saw the scheme as “to freeze St. Louis out, induce Kansas City to sell its franchise to Indianapolis, combine the best players of the two teams into one strong aggregation and admit Indianapolis as the eighth city,” “The Ninth Club: Kansas City Maintains its Organization,” Sporting Life, December 22, 1886: 1.

40 “Nearing the End,” Boston Globe, March 9, 1887: 8.

41 “Cleveland Got There,” The Sporting News, November 27, 1886: 1.

42 Two clubs, Chicago and New York, promised to give the visiting Detroit club a percentage of the gate receipts and not just the recently approved guarantee of $125. See “Detroit’s Game of Bluff,” New York Clipper, December 4, 1886: 601. Boston decided not to make any concessions, while others were not forthcoming about their plans. “No Concessions Made by the Boston Club to the Detroits,” Boston Herald, November 28, 1886: 2. In the AA through much of the 1887 season, the St. Louis Browns adopted a similar tactic to that of Detroit, suggesting or failing to deny rumors that they might switch to the NL. The St. Louis strategy was likely based on Chris Von der Ahe’s desire for the AA to adopt a percentage system for distributing gate receipts to visiting clubs. See Cash, 153, 160-163.

43 F.H. Brunell, “Well Made Points,” Sporting Life, August 10, 1887: 3.

44 A motion to change to a percentage system was on the agenda of the schedule meeting in March but was not considered because no one seconded the motion. New York Clipper, March 12, 1887: 828.

45 Spalding noted that as a visiting team, Detroit could receive between $300 and $1,500 on the 30 percent percentage system, but in the guarantee system approved for 1887, would get only $125 per game. “Will Detroit Leave the League?” Chicago Herald, November 21, 1886. See Brunell as well as “Chadwick’s Chat,” Sporting Life, August 10, 1887: 3.

46 In an interview with Henry Chadwick, A.G. Spalding predicted that the NL would return to a percentage system. “Chadwick’s Chat,” Sporting Life, August 17, 1887: 3.

47 Seymour, 209.

48 Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide, 1887, 126.

49 “The Blacklisting of Burns,” Boston Herald, December 15, 1886: 3; “The Arbitration Committee,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, December 15, 1886: 8.

50 The International League sought equal status with the NL and AA through a motion to have the right to reserve players. The Arbitration Committee voted against the motion. See “Arbitration. Results of the Joint Committee’s Council,” Sporting Life, December 22, 1886: 4.

51 The ruling by the Arbitration Committee on the Burns case prompted new restrictions on personal contracts. Failure to adhere to the October 20 date could result in a fine to the club of $500 and a disqualification of the player for the ensuing season. In addition to “Arbitration. Result of the Joint Committee’s Council,” Sporting Life, December 22, 1886: 4, see “The Baseball Bosses. The Arbitration Committee Get in Their Fine Work,” The Sporting News, December 18, 1886: 1, and “The Arbitration Committee,” New York Clipper, December 18, 1886: 635.

52 For the revised wording of Section II see Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide, 1887, 127. For a comment on the signing of minor-league players, see “The Arbitration Committee,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, December 15, 1886: 8.

53 Chris Von der Ahe (St. Louis) and Zach Phelps (Louisville) were dealing with players who refused to sign contracts. See Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide, 1887, 137-138, 147.

54 “The New National Agreement,” Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide 1886 (1886; Reprinted New York: Horton Publishing Company, 1989), 26.

55 See Section III of “Articles of Qualified Admission to the National Agreement of Professional Base Ball Associations” in Reach’s Official American Association Base Ball Guide, 1887,127. For further comments on this amendment, see “Arbitration. Result of the Joint Committee’s Council,” Sporting Life, December 22, 1886: 4; “The Baseball Bosses. The Arbitration Committee Get in Their Fine Work,” The Sporting News, December 18, 1886: 1; and “The Arbitration Committee,” New York Clipper, December 18, 1886: 635.

56 Indianapolis also had the second lowest attendance in the NL (84,000), more than 180,000 fewer than the club with the highest attendance (New York: 270,945). Cleveland had the lowest attendance in the majors (72,000), more than 200,000 fewer than the leading club in the AA (Brooklyn: 273,000). Nemec, 415, 429.

Jackie Robinson playing in a spring training game vs. Havana Cubans. (AUTHOR’S COLLECTION)

Separated by fewer than three miles, the Hotel Los Angeles near la Habana Vieja (Old Havana) and the Hotel Nacional in the city’s Vedado district were worlds apart.

Sitting on a bluff overlooking El Malecón, Havana’s famed coastal roadway, the Nacional exuded opulence with its Andalusian-Moorish architecture, elegant bars and splendid swimming pool. And in March of 1947, the Havana landmark housed the Brooklyn Dodgers as they held spring training in Cuba. The Los Angeles was – in the words of Herbert Goren of the New York Sun – a “musty, third-rate hotel” that “looked like a movie version of a waterfront hostelry in Singapore.”1 That was where Jackie Robinson – along with Montreal Royals teammates Roy Campanella, Don Newcombe, and Roy Partlow – was staying.

And Robinson was not happy.

“I thought,” Robinson protested, “we left Florida to train in Cuba to get away from Jim Crow.”2

As part of Branch Rickey’s grand plan for integrating major-league baseball, the Dodgers president had opted to move the organization’s spring-training headquarters from Daytona Beach to Havana. He wanted Robinson’s audition for breaking baseball’s color barrier to take place far from fields of Jim Crow Florida. And Havana seemed like the perfect choice.

Cuba’s professional winter league had been integrated since 1900, and the Dodgers were well familiar with the Cuban capital, having held spring training there in 1941 and 1942. Several days after arriving in Havana in 1947, players from the Dodgers and Royals attended the decisive game of the Cuban League season between Almendares and Havana at El Gran Stadium. After Robinson was introduced over the public-address system, “he took bows to the wild shouting of 38,000 jabbering fans,” wrote Baltimore Afro-American columnist Sam Lacy.3 Despite Cuba’s more tolerant racial climate, Robinson and the Royals’ three other African-American players found themselves in separate and unequal accommodations from the Dodgers.

“That damn hotel,” Newcombe said of the Los Angeles years later. “It was full of cockroaches. It was so hot, you couldn’t sleep.” Robinson “hated it with a passion, as did all of us,” Newcombe added. “Jackie was more outspoken about it, but he knew there wasn’t anything he could do about it. He was trying to get to the big club. He had to keep his cool and be quiet.”4

Lacy and Pittsburgh Courier columnist Wendell Smith were two members of the Black press who were embedded with Robinson during spring training, chronicling what they hoped would be his eventual ascension to the majors. Lacy described the Los Angeles as “a fleabag hotel where we slept on heavy spreads that we used for mattresses. The springs were coming up – pressing into our bodies – which shows you just the type of hotel we were in. That was where we had to stay during that period. … The conditions were actually miserable.”5

And Cuba’s relative racial tolerance wasn’t enough to prevent Newcombe from being removed from the lobby of the Nacional one day as he tried to meet with Rickey. “I had to get permission from the bellhop,” he said. “In fact, one [white] bellhop put me out of the lobby. I told him I had to see Mr. Rickey with the Dodgers. I was allowed to go to the house telephone and call Mr. Rickey to get permission to go up to his room to see him.”6

Newcombe, Robinson, Campanella, and Partlow were even segregated from their white teammates on the Royals, the Dodgers’ Triple-A affiliate. While the Dodgers stayed at the Nacional and trained at Havana’s El Gran Stadium, the Royals lived and trained at the Havana Military Academy, a fancy school for the sons of rich Cubans located about 15 miles outside the capital. Every day, Robinson and the other Black players had to be shuttled to that campus before returning to the Los Angeles after each day’s workouts.

Wanting to avoid even the possibility of any disruptive racial incidents in the Royals’ camp, Rickey chose to house Robinson, Campanella, Newcombe, and Partlow separately from the Royals.7 Rickey’s abundance of caution was probably unnecessary. After all, Robinson had spent the entire 1946 season at Montreal, where he led the league in batting with a .349 average.

Montreal was a progressive city, and Robinson normally encountered resistance only when the Royals traveled around the International League, most notably when a riot broke out during an August series in Baltimore as fans swarmed the field after a disputed play at home plate during one game.8

There would be no such problems in Cuba, especially at the Royals’ camp, where Robinson received a surprise visit one day from heavyweight boxing champion Joe Louis. Robinson’s teammates, Black and White, looked on like giddy teenagers as Robinson and the Brown Bomber compared golf swings and talked about Robinson’s prospects for making the big club. Before leaving, Louis told Robinson: “See you opening day at Ebbets Field with the Dodgers.”9 The visit was a much-needed morale boost for Robinson, who had to deal with several issues during spring training that made his impending historic breakthrough into the majors appear unlikely:

• Minor foot surgery early in spring training.
• Learning a new position at first base.
• An injury late in camp.
• Resistance among Dodgers players.
• The periodic absence of Dodgers manager Leo Durocher.

Robinson missed only a few days after Dr. July Sanguily, a renowned Cuban physician who was one of the owners of the Almendares team in the Cuban League, removed an irritating callus on Robinson’s toe. His new position, however, caused more stress. Robinson had played shortstop with the Kansas City Monarchs before switching to second base with Montreal after Brooklyn signed him in 1945. The Dodgers were set at three-fourths of the infield with second baseman Eddie Stanky, shortstop Pee Wee Reese, and third baseman Spider Jorgensen. Ed Stevens and Howie Schultz had shared time at first base for Brooklyn in 1946. So Robinson’s most likely path to the majors would be through first base.

Robinson started learning the new position from Hall of Famer George Sisler, who was in camp as a coach. Handed a first baseman’s mitt, Robinson was asked how the new glove felt. “I honestly don’t know,” he responded. “I never had one on before.”10 But Robinson said he was willing to try another position switch: “I’ll play where they want me to play. I never played first, but I’ll try anything.”11 Privately, however, Robinson wasn’t nearly as open to the change. “He didn’t like it at all, but Rickey convinced him that this was his way of getting up to the majors,” Lacy recalled years later. “It was just a case where he had enough problems. He had enough things to be concerned about [than] to give him this additional concern of changing positions and possibly doing poorly.”12

Brooklyn Dodgers manager Leo Durocher and Jackie Robinson at El Gran Stadium. (SABR-RUCKER ARCHIVE)

In the past year many baseball writers have remarked that “defense is the new on-base percentage,” meaning that it’s an undervalued asset—as the ability merely to get on base was about a decade ago, when driving in runs was thought to be the ticket, or so said Michael Lewis in Moneyball. You would think that, if here and there online and now in the pages of The Baseball Research Journal you’re reading that defense is undervalued in the market, surely it no longer is. Wouldn’t the market have already corrected itself? “We were concerned several years ago that the advantage of the things that we knew could play itself out when you reach the point that everybody knew those things,” Bill James told a gathering of the Boston chapter of the Baseball Writers Association of America earlier this year.[fn]Peter Abraham, “Calling James’s Number: Stat Guru Senses New Defensive Focus,” Boston Globe, 15 January 2010.[/fn] Haven’t all the front offices caught on by now, so that there are no more bargains for them to sift through in the glovework department? 

But knowing where to shop is not the same as knowing what to look for once you get there. If some position players whose good glove more than offsets their weak bat still have a market value below their actual value, how would you know how to identify them? “The reason there are still more inefficiencies on the defensive side is that defense remains hard to quantify,” Jeff Kingston, assistant general manager of the Seattle Mariners, told Sports Illustrated earlier this year. “The metrics have come a long way in the last few years, and clubs go to great lengths to quantify defense, but they simply don’t have the same confidence level as they do in quantifying offense.”[fn]Albert Chen, “Feel the Glove,” Sports Illustrated, 1 March 2010.[/fn] 

James agrees with Kingston that a major limitation of the effectiveness of defensive metrics is that our “confidence” in them is shaky. Referring to the quantification of defense, he comments that “we haven’t been doing it all our lives. We’ve had pretty good methods now for five or six years. I’ve been doing the [offensive] stuff all my life. I know what’s a normal gap between two seasons [offensively] and what isn’t. I don’t know the same [defensively].’’ Even so, he thinks that defense “can be evaluated with the same degree of precision and the same degree of agreement among different methods as [can] offense.”[fn]Peter Abraham, “Calling James’s Number: Stat Guru Senses New Defensive Focus,” Boston Globe, 15 January 2010.[/fn]

It’s true that the business of quantifying offense has undergone profound development in the past thirty years, after decades of relative stasis. To the familiar categories of batting average, RBIs, runs scored, and so forth, baseball analysts have proposed countless new metrics, some of which—OPS+, wOBA, linear weights—have stuck. Although Major League Baseball doesn’t recognize them as official statistical categories, they’re computed from the actual statistics in the official record and have proven to be reasonably reliable instruments for evaluating and predicting a player’s offensive performance. 

Most of the effort to quantify run prevention, or defense, has been focused on pitching, at least since the late nineteenth century. Sabermetric scrutiny in general has been so abundant, however, that, whether or not fielding has been scrutinized less than pitching, it’s still been scrutinized a lot—more than a lot of people who take a professional interest in the subject can easily keep up with. 

The earliest baseball writers used the terms offense and defense in a precise manner that doesn’t match up entirely with twenty-first-century usage. Defense for them was the entire project of preventing runs, and that includes pitching as well as fielding. In this article we use the term defense mostly in the twenty-first-century sense, to mean fielding as distinct from pitching. 

Below we’ll look at some of the new, and not so new, defensive metrics that Jeff Kingston alludes to and then at some of the major-league clubs that are mining them for information that might give them insight and an advantage over their competition. First, though, let’s look back at the handful of defensive statistical categories that are familiar and traditional. A brief inquiry into their history might give us a new perspective on defense and on the report that defense is the new OBA.

EARLY FIELDING STATISTICS: REWARD RANGE OR PENALIZE ERROR? 

Recent buzz about defense may strike you as a fad that will soon pass, but in some respect it reflects a return to the earliest days of organized baseball. “It’s almost impossible,” writes Alan Schwarz in The Numbers Game, “for the modern baseball fan, conditioned to focus on the battle between pitcher and batter, to appreciate how important fielding was in the early game. . . . As baseball historian John Thorn notes, ‘Fielding skill was still the most highly sought after attribute of a ball player.’”[fn]Alan Schwarz, The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 9.[/fn] 

Already by 1876, putouts, assists, and errors were added together to determine chances, and fielding percentage was calculated as it is now. In 1887, the practice of counting wild pitches and passed balls as errors, or “battery errors,” was discontinued. Double plays by individual fielders were added as an official stat in 1922. This was among statistical categories that weren’t included in official records in the early days but that nonetheless were recorded in box scores, from which later researchers have reconstructed season totals. Stolen bases against individual pitchers and catchers began to be recorded more reliably, and catchers began to be credited for “caught stealing.” Otherwise the system of measuring defense remained fairly static until Bill James began to publish his groundbreaking work in the late 1970s. 

As for fielding percentage, Henry Chadwick was not alone in thinking that range was more important than sure-handedness. In his Beadle guide following the 1872 season, fielding statistics did not include errors.[fn]Ibid., 10.[/fn] In 1875, Al Wright, following a similar philosophy, took the sum of putouts and assists and divided that by games—a metric that rewarded players for how often they got to a batted ball. Errors didn’t figure into it at all. This method of quantifying fielding didn’t catch on—not, that is, until about a hundred years later, when James introduced Range Factor. Wright had called it “fielding average.”[fn]Total Baseball: The Official Encyclopedia of Major League Baseball, ed. John Thorn, Pete Palmer, and Michael Gershman, with Matthew Silverman, Sean Lahman, and Greg Spira, 7th ed. (Kingston: Total Sports, 2001), 519.[/fn] 

What is the primary criterion by which the performance of a fielder ought to be evaluated? Chadwick represented the school of thought, which perhaps was more traditional, that fielders should be rewarded for range, but the opposing school of thought, that the emphasis should be on penalizing them for errors, was winning the day. The debate was captured, and the case for the reward-range doctrine nicely made, in a poem in a New York newspaper in 1917.[fn]William F. Kirk, “Strolls Through Sportsville,” New York Evening Journal. 9 March 1917.[/fn] 

Chances 

When the fielder loves his record
More than victory for his team
Doubtful chances miss his glances
For his caution is extreme.
Going after every grounder
Means a slip-up here and there,
And in terror of an error
He will choose the chances fair.
Spotless records are enticing
In a ball game as in life,
And the cunning pick their running
To avoid the stony strife.
Many a mortal swaggers slowly
Down the years in proud parade,
Boasting to the meek and lowly
Of the slips he never made.
Well it is that wise commanders,
When they call for sterling men,
Place the workers o’er the shirkers
Though they err and err again.
Men who try and fall when trying
Try again and win at last,
Never brooding, never sighing
O’er the errors of the past.
— William F. Kirk 

Kirk went on to say that managers prefer that their players go after everything even if it means they make more errors, as long as they’re not mental errors.

We often hear that 90 percent of baseball is pitching. Addie Joss first said that, in 1906, according to Bill James, who adds that, when Joss was criticized for it, he tried to explain that he meant that pitching was 90 percent of defense. John McGraw divided it up this way—batting is half of baseball, pitching is one-third, and fielding is one-sixth.[fn]Bill James, interview with C. Trent Rosecrans, “Talking with Bill James: Part 1,” 19 March 2010, Cincinnati Sports Journalism, cnati.com.[/fn]

Hugh Fullerton, a baseball writer, came up with a different formula in 1921. He gave more weight to offense and fielding than McGraw did and less to pitching. First he divided the game into offense and defense (fielding plus pitching) and gave roughly twice as much weight to the former—his exact ratio was 64 to 36. Then he subdivided defense into each of the nine positions. Of that 36 percent of the total, it was 36 percent for the pitcher, 14 percent for the catcher, 6.5 percent for the second baseman, 6 percent for the first baseman, and less than 6 percent for each of the remaining positions.[fn]Hugh Fullerton, “Defensive Strength Complicated,” New York Evening Mail, 23 October 1921.[/fn] All this, of course, was pure conjecture—as is the assumption that fielding counts for less now than it did back then. That assumption, however speculative, is hardly groundless, though: There are more strikeouts and home runs now and consequently fewer balls put into play. 

In 1954, Allan Roth and Branch Rickey, at that time general manager of the Pittsburgh Pirates, developed an “efficiency formula” for quantifying run-creation and run-prevention performance. Unable to figure out how to measure fielding, they set their metric for it at 0—that is, they threw up their hands and just assumed that its overall effect on the game’s outcome was neither positive nor negative. Rickey was resigned to the idea that “there is nothing on earth anyone can do with fielding.”[fn]John Thorn, Pete Palmer, and Michael Gershman, eds., Total Baseball, 7th ed. (Kingston, N.Y.: Total Sports, 2001), 536.[/fn] 

GOLD GLOVE AWARD 

In 1957, Rawlings, the baseball-glove manufacturer, established the Gold Glove Award for the player who would be voted the best fielder at his position. The inaugural All-Star Fielding Team, as it was called, was voted on by a committee of sportswriters and was drawn from players in both leagues. Since 1958, the Gold Glove has been given to nine players in each league. From 1958 through 1964, they were voted on by players. In 1965 the vote came instead from managers and coaches (they could not vote for players on their own team), and this practice has continued to the present day.[fn]Stephen Day, “Deconstructing the Midas Touch: Gold Glove Award Voting, 1965–2004,” 1 January 2005, Allbusiness.com.[/fn]

Everyone understands that the basis for selection is ultimately subjective. It depends on the judgment of voters, whose impressions will be influenced by a given player’s reputation and will vary according to how much of his performance, and which moments of it, they’ve witnessed, either live or on TV. The dearth of familiar statistical categories that can serve as a common criterion that all voters can take into account makes the Gold Glove Award even more susceptible to being discounted by skeptics than are, for example, the Cy Young and Most Valuable Player awards. 

Moreover, no minimum number of games or innings at each position is stipulated, making it possible for Rafael Palmeiro in 1999 to become the “first DH to win the Gold Glove,” which he was awarded for his work at first base, where he’d played a grand total of 28 games.[fn]John Dewan, The Fielding Bible (Skokie: ACTA Sports, 2006), 149.[/fn] It’s true that a given Gold Glove winner is likely to have already been more high-profile than the average player—to play for a winning team, to have been selected to the All-Star Game, to have won the Gold Glove previously—and this raises the question whether voting is biased against the player who arguably was the better fielder but lacks marquee status.[fn]Day, “Deconstructing the Midas Touch.”[/fn]

As a data point, then, that we can use when plotting the fielding quotient of a player who has won it, the Gold Glove Award is of limited value, but neither should it be ignored or outright dismissed. Judgment calls based on seeing, on empirical evidence, do count for something, as any scout will tell you, and when joined to statistical analysis the two modes of evaluation taken together may produce a higher confidence level than either of them taken only by themselves. Still, the usefulness of the Gold Glove Award in evaluating defensive talent across MLB would be greater if the details of the vote were made public—only the winner is announced, so we don’t know by how much he won or who else was in the running. 

SABERMETRIC STATISTICS 

The statistical measurement of defensive performance has undergone profound development in the past forty years. Most innovations in defensive metrics during this period fall into one of two flavors—metrics that can be derived from the established statistical categories (putouts, assists, errors, total chances) and metrics that require batted ball information, including hit locations. One metric, Total Zone, incorporates the best of both approaches. 

Statistics Based on Box-Score Statistics 

The first proposals to reassess fielding statistics involved adjustments to the defensive statistical categories that have existed since 1876. The newer metrics—Range Factor, Relative Range Factor, Adjusted Range Factor, Defense Efficiency Record, Fielding Runs, and Fielding Wins—are generated from calculations based on these simple box-score statistics. A big advantage of these metrics is that they can be calculated for any year from 1876 to the present. 

Range Factor (RF) and Relative Range Factor (RRF). In 1976, Baseball Digest ran “Fielding Statistics Do Make Sense!” an article wherein the author, one Bill James, introduced Range Factor, a reincarnation of Al Wright’s fielding average (putouts added to assists and divided by games). Later James acknowledged that Range Factor could not adequately capture the fielding performance of pitchers, catchers, and first basemen. Moreover, he explained, it was liable to be skewed by the following: 

The number of a player’s defensive innings is not necessarily the number of games he played in multiplied by the number (in most cases, nine) of innings in that game. (James would later propose that defensive innings be recorded. They would have to be estimated for games before 1952.) 

A player is likely to get more opportunities if he plays on a team whose pitchers have a low strikeout rate. 

A pitching staff with a high ratio of groundballs to fly balls is likely to increase the number of chances for infielders and to decrease the number of chances for outfielders. 

A pitching staff that is more left- or right-handed than average will affect the number of fielding opportunities for the various position players, with a left-handed pitcher, for example, likely to increase the number of opportunities for the left fielder, third baseman, and shortstop and to decrease the number of opportunities for the right fielder and first and second basemen. 

It does not adjust for team defense. “Every team makes 27 outs,” James explained in The Fielding Bible (2006), “whether they field like a team of Adam Everetts or a team of Jason Giambis. The overall range factor of a bad team is the same as the overall range factor of a good team.”[fn]Dewan, The Fielding Bible, 199.[/fn]

James adjusted for these wrinkles in Relative Range Factor (RRF), which he introduced in a chapter in The Fielding Bible, twenty years after his original article on plain Range Factor.[fn]Ibid., 199–209.[/fn] Using Defense Efficiency Record (see below), he also adjusted for team defense to compensate for the fewer opportunities that a given fielder is likely to have if he plays on a team with good defense. 

An important advantage of RRF is that can it be used for seasons as far back as 1876. A practical advantage that plain Range Factor has over Relative Range Factor is that it can be generated entirely from the data in box scores (you don’t consider, for example, whether the pitchers the fielders are playing behind are groundball or fly-ball pitchers), although the reliability of plain Range Factor is inferior to that of RRF.

Adjusted Range Factor. In the 1980s, Tom Tippett developed Adjusted Range Factor.[fn]Tom Tippett, “Evaluating Defense,” 5 December 2002, DiamondMind.com.[/fn] A variation on Range Factor, it’s based on the number of balls in play (other than home runs) while each fielder is at his position. It’s adjusted for the strikeout and groundball rates of the pitching staff and for the handedness of batters. It tracks only meaningful putouts and assists—for example, when a second baseman fields a groundball and throws to first to retire the runner, the assist is considered meaningful, whereas the putout executed by a first baseman catching the thrown ball is not. However, like Range Factor, Adjusted Range Factor yields an estimate, not an exact measure of the opportunities presented to a fielder. For historical data, this provides a better estimate than does plain Range Factor, although it’s still an estimate. 

Defense Efficiency Record (DER). James went on to develop DER (defense efficiency record), a defensive metric applicable to teams. DER is a measure of the percentage of batted balls that become outs. For example, a team that records outs on 72 of 100 balls put into play has a DER of .720. DER can be applied to historical data. Roughly, it’s an inverse of batting average (roughly in that neither strikeouts nor home runs affect DER). It varies from era to era, so that it fails to measure a team’s defense relative to the league average at the time, and it does not do a great job of distinguishing pitching effectiveness from fielding.[fn]Scott Gray, The Mind of Bill James: How a Complete Outsider Changed Baseball (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 36.[/fn] Still, DER is highly correlated with winning. From 2008 to 2009, for example, the Tampa Bay Rays went from worst to first in DER and from worst to first in the American League East standings.[fn]Albert Chen, “Feel the Glove,” Sports Illustrated, 1 March 2010[/fn]

Fielding Runs and Fielding Wins. Pete Palmer in Total Baseball introduced Fielding Runs, a formula for estimating how many runs a fielder saves.[fn]Total Baseball, 7th ed., 2494.[/fn] A player’s Fielding Runs number is either positive or negative, unless it’s zero; an average fielder at any position would save zero runs. For double plays, additional credit is given beyond the putouts and assists the fielders are credited with. For first basemen, assists are counted but not putouts, which are considered to be not meaningful in most cases, resulting in the anomaly that the first baseman fielding the ball and throwing it to the pitcher covering first is rated more highly than the first baseman who fields the ball and runs to the bag himself. 

James in Win Shares concurs that fielding statistics don’t easily lend themselves to the evaluation of first basemen.[fn]Bill James and Jim Henzler, Win Shares (Morton Grove: STATS Publishing, 2002). 80–85.[/fn] In his initial attempt to arrive at a single number for the defensive value of a player to his team, James used a complex formula. The match between James’s Win Shares defensive values and Pete Palmer’s Fielding Runs was only about 50 to 60 percent, whereas their different methods for arriving at runs created “gets essentially the same answers,” according to James, about 99 percent of the time.[fn]Dewan, Fielding Bible, 199.[/fn] 

Like Range Factor, Fielding Runs does not take into account the handedness of batters or how a pitching staff’s strikeout and groundball rates affects how many opportunities a fielder gets. 

A player’s Fielding Runs number is used to estimate his Fielding Wins, an estimate of the number of games a team won above or below what it would have won with an average fielder (with zero Fielding Runs) at the player’s position. 

Statistics That Require the Tracking of Batted Balls Metrics 

In contrast to the set of newer defensive metrics discussed up to this point are defensive metrics that involve zone charts and require the tracking of batted balls to the precise points where they land on the field. These metrics are beyond the ability of the typical fan or researcher to calculate on his own; he must simply trust the work of private data-gathering services—for the most part, STATS, LLC (formerly STATS, Inc.) and Baseball Info Solutions (BIS)—and rely on the numbers they report. Another limitation of zone-based defensive metrics is that they can’t be used for seasons before 1989. For the seasons for which they can be used, however, these metrics have proven to be more reliable indicators of a player’s fielding ability than are the box-scorebased metrics. How do we know the numbers are more reliable? The numbers correlate better year to year. Many of these metrics measure very specific observations (ability to field balls to his right, ability to handle bunts, etc.). These metrics give results that conform well to our impression. They also give us insight into abilities of players who through conventional scouting methods may have been overlooked. 

Tracking by Eyeballing. In the late 1970s, James proposed that the location of every batted ball be tracked for the purpose of evaluating defensive performance. From the beginning, this project involved dividing up the field into zones. Below is an example of a STATS zone chart. 

Zone Rating (ZR). In 1989, STATS, Inc., developed Zone Rating (ZR). How is ZR calculated? They divide the field into zones. Each fielder is responsible for one or more of them. Some zones, representing “gaps,” are not assigned to any defensive position. STATS “reporters” sit in the press box and, “eyeballing” the course of batted balls, record which zone every ball put into play falls into. If it falls into a zone for which the shortstop, for example, is responsible, he’s credited with an opportunity. If he makes a play on the ball, he’s credited with the opportunity plus the play. His zone rating is simply plays divided by opportunities; in this way, zone-rating numbers are numerically similar to fielding percentage. 

If a fielder makes a play on a ball in a zone he’s not responsible for, he’s credited, but the form of credit varies according to the system of Zone Rating, that of STATS or that of BIS. In the original Zone Rating from STATS, players get extra credit for fielding a ball out of their zone. In Revised Zone Rating (described below), no extra credit is given for them, they’re merely tallied separately.[fn]Tom Tippett, “Evaluating Defense”; Chris Dial, “What Is Zone Rating?” 5 November 2005, Baseball Think Factory; Colin Wyers, “Introducing WAR for Hitters,” 10 May 2008, Goatriders of the Apocalypse (www.goatriders.org).[/fn] 

Defensive Average (DA). In the 1990s, Pete DeCoursey and Sherri Nichols used play-by-play data from Project Scoresheet and The Baseball Workshop, a research company that produced baseball databases, in their development of Defensive Average. The concept is the same as that of Zone Rating. The field is divided into zones that are assigned to positions. The number of plays a given fielder makes is compared to the number of balls into the zones he’s responsible for. Some baseball analysts have found DA to be useful, but it has not been adopted across the industry to the degree that the various flavors of ZR have. 

Significant differences between DA and ZR mean that a given fielder may look better in ZR than in DA or vice versa. In DA, every zone is assigned to at least one fielder—no gaps in the outfield, for example, are recognized, as they are in ZR, and every ball put into play is deemed to be at least possibly fieldable. In ZR, a ball that drops in for a hit in a zone that no fielder is considered responsible for is not counted as an opportunity for anyone, whereas in DA, if the ball is hit into the gap between short and second, for example, each infielder is charged with half an opportunity. This tends to penalize a fielder who plays next to a fielder with poor range.[fn]Tom Tippett, “Evaluating Defense.”[/fn]

Tracking by Pixel. “But none of these [defensive metrics],” Alan Schwarz wrote back in 2004, “have gained any real currency, because they all basically derive from the same specious input: putouts, assists, and errors. To really assess the skill of a fielder, many more factors must be considered: How hard was the ball hit? Where was the fielder stationed at the moment of contact? How quickly was he able to close the gap between his glove and the ball? Would a stronger throw have beaten the runner, and how fast was the runner moving?”[fn]Alan Schwarz, The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 240.[/fn] 

The first item, at least, in Schwarz’s list of questions is addressed with the help of Baseball Info Solutions and the availability of new kinds of data, which are used for Revised Zone Rating, Plus/Minus, Ultimate Zone Rating, and Probabilistic Model of Range (all described later). BIS tracks the direction, speed, type, and distance of every batted ball. Speeds of batted balls are classified as soft, medium, or hard. Types are classified as groundball, liner, fly ball, “fliner” (balls considered halfway between a fly ball and line drive), or bunt.[fn]Dewan, Fielding Bible, 1.[/fn] High infield pop-ups are grouped with fly balls. After this breakdown, there are two specific splits: distance (in feet) and direction (indicated by a vector). 

For direction and distance, the manner in which the batted balls are tracked by BIS video scouts is entirely different from how balls are tracked by STATS for Zone Rating. BIS video scouts do not determine which zone a batted ball falls into. Rather, they plot a hit location on a field diagram for the given ballpark. BIS software enables the video scouts to simply click on the computer image of the field to plot the hit location. This displays a one-pixel-by-one-pixel hit location where a ball lands or is fielded. In contrast to the tracking method of ZR, this method does not involve the assignation of zones to specific fielders. Video scouts’ opinions of the degree of difficulty are never considered; the video scouts simply watch game film and plot the data points. Each hit location is plotted by at least 2 video scouts to ensure accuracy.

Revised Zone Rating (RZR). In The Fielding Bible, John Dewan expands on the original Zone Rating system he developed at STATS, his former company. Revised Zone Rating (RZR) involves two major improvements over plain Zone Rating. 

First, in RZR, the hit locations by pixel, described above, are used to plot batted balls; balls hit in specific directions and at specific distances are predetermined to fall in a player’s zone or “out of zone.” BIS video scouts plot hit locations, and then an automated code determines whether the ball landed (or was caught) in a particular RZR zone. 

Second, Baseball Info Solutions, in using RZR, tallies separately the number of plays made outside a player’s zone. These are designated Plays Out of Zone, or OOZ. Revised Zone Rating is simply a percentage of the balls fielded successfully in a player’s zone; it lists Out of Zone plays separately. This is slightly different from the original Zone Rating, where balls fielded out of a player’s zone as well as in it counted toward a player’s Zone Rating. 

In RZR for outfielders, different zones are used depending on batted-ball type. For example, the zone for line drives is much smaller than that for fliners or fly balls. This is an improvement on Zone Rating in that a 6-second fly ball, for example, is treated differently from a 3-second line drive or a 4.5 second fliner. 

When viewed simultaneously, Plays Out of Zone (OOZ) and percentage of plays in zone (RZR) prove to be a significant measure of a player’s fielding performance, as they indicate whether a player is a standout fielder at routine plays, difficult plays, both, or neither.[fn]Ibid., 227–28.[/fn]

Plus/Minus. Plus/Minus, another metric that John Dewan developed using BIS data, is designed to answer the question “How many plays did this player make above or below what an average player at his position would make?”[fn]Ibid., 1.[/fn] Adam Everett, for example, had a Plus/Minus of +33 at shortstop in 2005. That is, he made 33 more plays than the average shortstop. Conversely, in 2005, Derek Jeter had a Plus/Minus of –34, despite his Gold Gloves and his reputation for making web-gem plays.[fn]Ibid., 168.[/fn]

Plus/Minus offers more nuance than other defensive-rating systems—the harder the play that is made, the greater the credit to the fielder. Conversely, the fielder is penalized more harshly for missing a routine play than for missing a hard one. But this begs the question: What exactly is a hard play, what is an easy play, and what are the various shades of difficulty between the two ends of the spectrum? This is determined from BIS data on the direction, speed, type, and distance of every batted ball. All plotted hit locations that match these four criteria are compared to each other. 

For example, each hard fliner hit 350 feet at vector 180 (the vector representing straightaway center field) is compared only to other hard fliners hit 350 feet at vector 180. So if only two out of 25 fielders caught hard fliners hit 350 feet at vector 180, those two would be rewarded significantly; the players who missed the play would be penalized, but not much. Conversely, if 23 out of 25 fielders caught hard fliners hit 350 feet at vector 180, the 23 fielders would receive a small credit to their Plus/Minus score, and the two fielders who missed the play would be penalized harshly. 

Plus/Minus values are calculated purely on the fielders’ success at all exactly unique plotted hit locations. This effectively minimizes subjectivity. Credits and debits are assigned to the fielders according to the difficulty of a play made or not made. 

Infielders are rated on their ability to handle balls hit straight at them and, to determine if they’re weaker or stronger on one side, they’re rated on their ability to handle balls hit to their right and then to their left. In The Fielding Bible, team defense for the thirty MLB clubs is rated in 19 different locations on the field where balls enter play.[fn]Ibid., 39.[/fn] 

Defensive Runs Saved. In The Fielding Bible, Volume II, John Dewan takes the defensive metrics in the first volume and translates them into runs—into runs saved, that is, or Defensive Runs Saved.[fn]John Dewan, The Fielding Bible, Volume II (Skokie, Ill.: ACTA Sports, 2009), 11–4.[/fn] They’re the mirror image of Runs Created, the metric Bill James developed to estimate how many runs that are scored a hitter can be credited for. 

The most important ingredient in Defensive Runs Saved is the Plus/Minus system. A fielder’s Plus/Minus number reflects how often a play is made for a batted ball with a given trajectory and hit location. For the outfielders and corner infielders, it is adjusted to reflect the number of bases saved (on plays that could be or were extra base hits)—the result is an Enhanced Plus/Minus number. A constant multiplier is applied for all players at a given position, but it varies by position. At the high end are the infielders and the pitcher. Each one saves .73 to .76 runs per Plus/Minus point. At the low end are the three outfielders, whose numbers are .56 to .58. For second basemen, shortstops, and pitchers, their positional value is multiplied by their Plus/Minus, and the result is their Plus/Minus Runs Saved. For outfielders and corner infielders, their Plus/Minus Runs Saved number is calculated by taking their positional value and multiplying that by their Enhanced Plus/Minus. Plus/Minus Runs Saved is the largest component of Defensive Runs Saved for all positions except catcher.

DEFENSIVE MISPLAYS AND GOOD FIELDING PLAYS

The category Defensive Misplays was introduced in The Fielding Bible, Volume II.[fn]John Dewan, The Fielding Bible, Volume II, (Skokie, Ill.: ACTA Sports, 2009), 27–29.[/fn] The official scorer’s decision to charge a fielder with an error is broadly based on his judgment that the play could have been made with ordinary effort, whereas the decision to charge a fielder with a Defensive Misplay is based on a long list of criteria—54 of them—that are spelled out with some specificity. Here are some examples:

• Outfielder fails to anticipate the wall when making a catch.
• Infielder makes a poor throw.
• Infielder lets the ball roll under his glove.
• Players attempt to catch a fly ball or popup and it drops between them.
• Outfielder takes a bad route to a ball.
• Outfielder misses the cutoff man, allowing the runner to advance.

Conversely, fielders are credited for plays they’re not expected to make. These are appropriately named Good Fielding Plays. There are 27 criteria. Some examples:

• Outfielder steals a home run from a batter.
• Catcher picks off a runner.
• Fielder holds a runner to a single on a ball that was a likely double or a triple.
• First baseman handles a difficult throw.
• Middle infielder turns a double play despite an aggressive slide by the baserunner.

Both the Defensive Misplays and Good Fielding Plays can be tracked per Touch. A Touch is counted if a fielder touches the ball with his hand or his glove at any point during a play or if he is the first fielder to handle a ball that falls in for a hit. He can’t get more than one Touch per play.[fn]Ibid., 33.[/fn]

First Base and Third Base 

The main ingredients in the Defensive Runs for first and third baseman are Plus/Minus Runs Saved and runs saved on bunts.[fn]Ibid., 11–13.[/fn] The Plus/Minus numbers for the infielders at the corners are adjusted to create an Enhanced Plus/Minus, which reflects the value of bases saved on balls hit down the line. (Some of those balls would have turned into doubles.)[fn]Dewan, Fielding Bible, 11.[/fn] From 2003 through 2008, Albert Pujols and Mark Teixeira had the best Enhanced Plus/ Minus at first; Mike Jacobs and Richie Sexson had the worst. Adrian Beltre and Scott Rolen led among third basemen.[fn]Dewan, Fielding Bible, Volume II, 86.[/fn] 

Second Base and Shortstop

For middle infielders, the main ingredients are Plus/Minus Runs Saved and runs saved on double plays.[fn]Ibid., 11–13.[/fn] Double plays and double-play opportunities are tracked, as are pivots and pivot opportunities, where, for example, the second baseman would get credit for a pivot in a 6-4-3 or 5-4-3 double play.[fn]Dewan, Fielding Bible, 217.[/fn] At shortstop, Adam Everett is the leader in Runs Saved from 2006 through 2008 by a wide margin, 48 to Jimmy Rollins’s 33; Derek Jeter has the lowest Runs Saved, –50. Chase Utley and Mark Ellis lead among second basemen for this period, and Jeff Kent ranks last.[fn]Fielding Bible, Volume II, 86.[/fn] 

Outfielders 

For outfielders, Defensive Runs involve three main metrics—Plus/Minus Runs Saved, runs saved by the outfielder’s arm, and runs saved by robbing hitters of home runs. For Plus/ Minus Runs Saved, the Enhanced Plus/Minus version is used, because outfielders can take a hit that would have been a double and keep it to a single. Rather than just account for the number of plays made, the Enhanced Plus/ Minus number indicates the number of bases saved.[fn]Ibid., 11–13.[/fn] In The Fielding Bible, Volume II, separate Plus/Minus values are given for the three categories of distance (shallow, medium, deep).[fn]Ibid., 161–65.[/fn]

Also factored into the formula for Defensive Runs for outfielders is opposition baserunning. The number of bases that runners advance when an outfielder gets the ball is tracked, as it’s a good measurement of how intimidated (if at all) runners are by an outfielder’s arm.

Outfielders are rated on how often runners advance, stay put, or are thrown out in extrabase advancement situations. Baserunner kills are a more direct measurement of an outfielder’s arm than are assists, which include relay throws to an infielder whose own throw may have had more to do with the eventual putout than did the outfielder’s relay.[fn]Ibid., 375–76. [/fn]

Pitchers 

Defensive Runs for pitchers is a measurement, of course, of the runs they save with their glove, not with their arm, except when they throw to a base after a ball is hit into play. Because of the location of the mound, the calculation of Plus/Minus for pitchers is similar to that of Plus/Minus for the middle infielders. 

The running game does not show up in Plus/Minus Runs Saved, which is combined with Stolen Bases Runs Saved to yield his Defensive Runs. The caught-stealing percentage is tracked for pitchers as it is for catchers. The pitcher’s ability to curb the running game has been shown to impact the running game more than the catcher’s ability to do the same. Attempted steals, caught stealing, and pickoffs factor into a pitcher’s Stolen Bases Runs Saved. Kenny Rogers led major-league pitchers in Defensive Runs in the period 2006–8, when he had 27.[fn]Ibid., 63–67.[/fn]

Catchers 

Catchers do not have any Plus/Minus value; their Defensive Runs Saved consists of Stolen Bases Runs Saved and Adjusted Earned Runs Saved.We start with Stolen Bases Saved. How many does a catcher have? From his caughtstealing total, pitcher pickoffs are subtracted. Let’s say the official record is that in 100 attempts the catcher has been credited with throwing out 40 runners but that in ten cases the runner was caught by the pitcher initiating the throw to one of the bases to pick the runner off. That leaves the catcher throwing out 30 runners in 90 attempts.

Each Stolen Base Saved is worth .62 Defensive Runs for Stolen Bases Runs Saved. In The Fielding Bible, Volume II, Dewan also calculates Adjusted Earned Runs Saved. Based on Catcher ERA, Dewan takes the ERA of each catcher with each pitcher and compares that to the ERA of other catchers who caught the same pitchers that year. After adjusting for home ballparks, Dewan applies a “credibility factor,” which, in essence, regresses the total to account for the volume of noise remaining in the data.[fn]Ibid., 75–82.[/fn]

Total Runs 

Total Runs is a comprehensive metric based on a variety of other metrics and used to compare position players for their overall contribution in all aspects of the game. (Total Runs does not apply to pitchers.) 

Total Runs consists of four components: 

• Runs Created 
• Baserunning Runs 
• Defensive Runs Saved 
• A positional adjustment that allows for comparison among different positions (more weight is given to playing the more difficult defensive positions) 

Runs Created is an estimation of how many runs a player generates on offense with his bat and basestealing ability. Baserunning Runs, an estimation of how many runs a player generates through extra-base advancements on batted balls (it does not include basestealing). 

What is the positional adjustment? It is well known that some positions are widely considered offensive positions or defensive positions. In The Fielding Bible, Volume II, Bill James assumes that 72 percent of Runs Saved are by pitchers and 28 percent by fielders (other than pitchers). He uses the average Runs Created (RC) values for 2005–7 at each of the eight positions (DHs and pitchers are excluded). First base has the highest average RC value, 99, and catcher has the lowest, 70. James also assumes that all positions contribute equally to a baseball game—that the players who contribute more offensively contribute less defensively, and vice versa. So James sets the Runs Saved value of each position equal to a value such that the sum of Runs Created and Runs Saved is equal for each position. After making some minor adjustments for the value of different outs, catchers have the highest Runs Saved component (42), with shortstops (36) and second basemen (32) not far behind. First basemen have the lowest (13), and left field (19) and right field (20) are not much higher. 

To determine the weight given to each position, the Runs Saved number is then multiplied by the percentage of possible innings played at that position. For an example, consider John Dewan’s discussion of Chase Utley in The Fielding Bible, Volume II. Dewan explains: “Chase Utley played 96.7 percent of a full season of innings at second base and 0.97 percent at first. Applying the Positional Averages, we get .967*32 + .0097*13 = 30.9 + 0.1 = 31.” 

In 2008, Chase Utley of the Philadelphia Phillies led MLB with 192 Total Runs, reflecting not only his good hitting but also his 34 Defensive Runs Saved and his high percentage of innings played at second base. Apparently most of the baseball writers voting on the NL MVP that year didn’t recognize the strength of Utley’s season—he finished only fourteenth in the voting. Utley’s teammate Ryan Howard finished second to Albert Pujols (a worthy choice, as his 171 Total Runs were the highest in MLB after Utley’s 192). But Howard ranked only fiftieth in the major leagues in Total Runs; in fact, three teammates, Utley, Jimmy Rollins, and Shane Victorino, all had more Total Runs than Howard did.[fn]Ibid., 385–94.[/fn] 

Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR). While at STATS, Dewan began plans to improve on Zone Rating, introducing what he called Ultimate Zone Rating in STATS 2001 Baseball Scoreboard.[fn]Don Zminda, Tony Nistler, and STATS, Inc, STATS 2001 Baseball Scoreboard., 10 th ed. (Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS Publishing, March 2001).[/fn] Soon thereafter, Dewan left STATS and eventually developed Revised Zone Rating, Plus/Minus, and Defensive Runs Saved. 

Meanwhile, Mitchel Lichtman independently began efforts of his own to improve on the basic Zone Rating metric. Lichtman’s creation, Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR), was introduced in 2003 in a series of primers on the Baseball Think Factory website. 

Mitchel Lichtman took Zone Rating one step further, using a different approach from that in The Fielding Bible. UZR is a measure of the actual number of runs a player saves because of his defense. Like Defensive Runs Saved, UZR is relative to the league average for a player at a given position. And, as with Defensive Runs Saved, the data for UZR is based on video replays available from Baseball Info Solutions (BIS). And UZR is like Defensive Runs Saved in that it’s based on locations of batted balls and not on an observer’s judgment whether a fielder should be able to reach a ball in a given zone.

UZR enables clubs to compare, for any given player, his runs created and his runs prevented. The data collection is imperfect, as Lichtman explains: 

First and third base get less than half the opportunities of second base and shortstop. But after a year, most positions get regressed somewhere around 50 percent, so we treat a +10 for a season worth of data as a +5, for example. There is no magic number for the amount of data on a player to be reliable, but after, say, three years, I consider a player’s UZR to be pretty darn reliable. Of course, there are still going to be a small percentage of players that UZR gets “wrong” after three years or even after ten years for that matter. It is just that, the larger the sample, the less the percentage of plays that UZR get wrong.[fn]Mitchel Lichtman, interview with Jeff Zimmerman, 25 March 2010. [/fn]

For example, in 2009, Franklin Gutierrez generated about four more runs (wRAA from Fangraphs.com) than did the average hitter. He ranked eighteenth among center fielders. Franklin had a UZR value of 29, indicating that, in theory, he saved 29 runs.[fn]Major League Leaderboards, 2009, All Positions, Fielding Statistics | FanGraphs Baseball (Fangraphs.com).[/fn] It was by far the league’s best for center fielders and probably can’t be sustained on an annual basis. When his offensive and defensive numbers are combined, he actually becomes the most valuable center fielder in the game last season. 

Probabilistic Model of Range. David Pinto of Baseballmusings.com further expanded on Lichtman’s UZR with the BIS data and developed the Probabilistic Model of Range (PMR).[fn]Probabilistic Model of Range Archives (last updated 9 December 2009), Baseballmusings.com. [/fn] On his website, he provides breakouts and individual graphs showing specifically where a player fields balls relative to the average player at his position. For example, the graph for second basemen would show how good a second baseman is at fielding balls relative to the second-base bag and also relative to the average major-league second baseman. 

PMR adjusts for the direction of the hit, the type of hit, the speed of the batted ball, pitcher handedness, batter handedness, and park factors. All these items are taken into account to arrive at the probability that a batted ball will become an out. From that probability, a value for expected outs is obtained. What makes PMR different from the other metrics is that it builds on team DER, as an expected team DER is calculated and compared to a team’s actual DER. This provides insight into to how much a team’s defense is helping its pitching staff turn batted balls into outs.[fn]Doug, Miller, “Four New Defensive Stats Explained,” 11 January 2010, MLB.mlb.com.[/fn] 

Total Zone 

The biggest problem with both the box-score category of metrics and the zone/tracking category of metrics is that they’re not useful for comparing contemporary and more-recent players to players before 1989. The box-score metrics are available back to 1876, but they’re a less precise measure of defensive performance than the zone-based metrics are. The zone-based metrics are more precise, but they don’t exist for seasons before 1989. Between this rock and a hard place there is, however, a defensive metric that can be used to compared the defensive performance of players across the centuries. Welcome to Total Zone. 

Total Zone Total Fielding Runs. Sean Smith of BaseballProjection.com developed Total Zone Total Fielding Runs, which is “the number of runs above or below average the player was worth based on the number of plays made.”[fn]Sean Smith, “Total Zone Defense on Baseball Reference,” 5 May 2008, HardballTimes.com.[/fn] At Baseball-Reference.com, Total Zone Total Fielding Runs is regarded as the best all-inclusive defensive statistic for historical data and more recent data alike. Smith uses different methods to analyze defense depending on the data available. 

Limited Play-by-Play Data Available. Data are generally available for determining who made an out in the field. For seasons before 2003, however, data on where balls landed does not exist, and the information is roughly estimated, resulting in a fraction of each hit being assigned to each position player. Smith explains: “Without information on the hits, I have to make an estimate. I look at each batter’s career rates of outs by position. For example, if 30% of a batter’s outs are hit to shortstop, then every time that batter gets a hit the shortstop is charged 0.3 hits. Repeat for every position.”[fn]“Total Zone Data,” Baseball-Reference.com / About / Total Zone.[/fn] 

Adjustments are made for pitcher handedness. Fractional hits, plays made, and errors are added together to get a Total Zone rating. If there are no play-by-play data (before 1956), the values are similar to an Adjusted Range Factor or a Relative Range Factor. 

Extensive Play-by-Play Data Available. In 2003, Retrosheet began recording more-specific play-by-play data. As with Baseball Info Solutions data, hits are classified by batted-ball type (groundballs, flies, line drives, popups), and the fielder who made the out or attempted to make it specified. The data also reflect pitcher handedness and when a runner on first must be held. 

A raw Total Zone value is park-adjusted and converted to a value, positive or negative. As with Plus/Minus, the player evaluated by Total Zone is compared to the average player at his position in his league. Since the Total Zone rating is simply a measure of fielding range, additional components must be added, depending on the position. Outfielders get a separate score for their throwing arms. Infielders are scored for their ability to turn double plays, and catchers for their success at controlling the running game and prevent passed balls and wild pitches. The sum of these values produces the Total Zone Total Fielding Runs Above Average, which is similar to Runs Saved in The Fielding Bible. 

Some players who have won Gold Gloves and have a reputation for good defense do have high ratings in Total Zone for their career: 1B Keith Hernandez, 2B Frank White and Bill Mazeroski, SS Mark Belanger and Ozzie Smith, 3B Brooks Robinson, LF Carl Yastrzemski, CF Willie Mays, and RF Roberto Clemente. And some players with a reputation for bad defense have some of the worst Total Zone ratings at their defensive positions: 1B Mo Vaughn, 2B Juan Samuel, SS Derek Jeter, 3B Dean Palmer, LF Pat Burrell and Adam Dunn, and RF Danny Tartabull.[fn]Sean Smith, “Measuring Defense for Players Back to 1956,” 25 March 2008, HardballTimes.com. [/fn]

Of all the advanced defensive metrics, only Total Zone has been consistently recorded for minor leaguers, since 2005. Sean Forman at Baseball-Reference.com has begun to update Total Zone for major leaguers daily during the season.[fn]Sean Smith, “Total Zone Defense on Baseball Reference.”[/fn]

LIMITATIONS 

The data available for new players to the major leagues are limited. They come to the major leagues with a track record, in high school, college, and the minors, full of offensive data, on-base percentage and the like, but for the most part the sabermetric statistical information that a club will have on how many runs they save defensively is limited to Total Zone numbers from the minors since 2005. 

Defensive Runs Saved, UZR, and Total Zone have begun to be updated regularly during the season. Their significance over a small number of games is still uncertain and may not be great. A player who gets ten hits in 25 at-bats is having a better week than the one who goes 5-for-25. But is a player who scores +5 in Plus/Minus in the course of a single week really having a better defensive week than the player who scores –5? At this point, it’s hard to say. We do know that, like most statistics, Defensive Runs Saved, UZR, and Total Zone give a more accurate picture of player performance over the course of an entire season or, better, multiple consecutive seasons.[fn]“John Dewan (and Research Assiistant) Speak!” 20 July 2009, The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball (www.insidethebook.com).[/fn]

Another major limitation of advanced defensive metrics is their inaccessibility to the general public, or average fan, and in some cases even to decision makers in front offices. Sitting and watching or scoring a game, any casual fan can deduce that a batter who gets 1 hit in 4 at-bats in a game is batting .250 for the game. However, the average fan attending a game can’t do the equivalent with advanced fielding statistics. If the ball goes between the first baseman and second baseman for a hit, does this count as a missed opportunity for the first baseman, the second baseman, both, or neither? If it’s considered a miss, how significant is the miss? A casual fan (or even the fan who understands sabermetrics, for that matter) would not be able to figure this out simply from watching a live game. After the average fan leaves the ballpark at the end of the game, he wouldn’t be able to say for certain whether a player’s UZR increased or decreased as he would know, for example, if the batting average of a player who got one hit in four at-bats rose or fell. 

Clubs rely on their scouting and data-collection agencies to help fill voids that statistics cannot measure and to verify that the statistics are truly showing us the best fielders. One fan-generated scouting source on defensive performance is the Fan Scouting Report collected by Tom Tango. Fans who have seen players in person vote on those players’ abilities.[fn]www.tangotiger.net/scout[/fn] It’s a reasonable way to double-check a player’s defensive ability as indicated by the metrics. Steve Sommers has actually gone as far as combining both UZR numbers and the Fan Scout Report to come up with a combined value.[fn]Steve Somer, “Defensive Projections, Take 2,” Play a Hard Nine, 21 November 1009, http://playahardnine.wordpress.com. [/fn] 

Even the statisticians and analysts who develop and work with the advanced defensive metrics are constantly referring back to the empirical evidence, what they see a fielder do, as well as to his reputation (how many Gold Gloves has he won?), to check the reliability of their statistical analysis. (See “Fielding Bible Awards: An Alternative to the Gold Glove” on page 96.) 

FRONT OFFICES USE DEFENSIVE METRICS—OR DON’T USE THEM 

Clubs that are using these or similar defensive metrics have good reason not to divulge the details of their search for undervalued fielding talent, but, at least around the edges of this discussion, a few are fairly forthcoming. Jack Zduriencik, the Mariners’ general manager, is one of them. He was studying the defensive numbers available at Fangraphs and Hardball Times when the line for Franklin Gutierrez jumped out at him.[fn]Albert Chen, “Feel the Glove,” Sports Illustrated, 1 March 2010.[/fn] Gutierrez’s exceptional range couldn’t be fully leveraged at Progressive Field, which has one of the smallest outfields in MLB. Safeco Field has one of the biggest.[fn]Personal communication with Vince Gennaro.[/fn] Zduriencik traded for Gutierrez after the 2008 season, as part of his larger plan to tighten Seattle’s defense. The Mariners, ranked twentieth in MLB in UZR (–1) in 2008, led all of MLB in that category (+85) in 2009. Their record in 2008 was dismal—they won all of 61 games. In 2009 they won 87, scoring 31 fewer runs than the year before, but the runs they allowed were 119 fewer. 

The Red Sox are another club not shy about admitting their attention to statistical analysis. That they’ve been paying special attention to defensive stats is suggested by their offseason acquisition of outfielder Mike Cameron and infielders Adrian Beltre and Marco Scutaro and by the departure of Jason Bay, a defensive liability in the outfield. 

“What I’m most curious about in 2010 is how much better we’re going to be defensively,’’ Bill James, who works as special advisor on baseball operations for the Red Sox, said earlier this year, during the offseason. “I don’t think anyone questions that we’re going to have a better defensive team. But are we going to be as much better defensively as we want to believe we are, and is that going to have as much impact on [the pitching staff] as we hope it does?’’(For more on how good defense helps pitching, see “The Hidden Value of Glovework” by Vince Gennaro at page 98.)[fn]Peter Abraham, “Calling James’s Number: Stat Guru Senses New Defensive Focus,” Boston Globe, 15 January 2010.[/fn] 

Mitchel Lichtman, who worked for the Cardinals for a few years, 2004 through 2006, says they used UZR back then. He guesses that, in some form or other, it’s still a part of their statistical-analysis toolkit.[fn]Mitchel Lichtman, interview with Jeff Zimmerman, 25 March 2010.[/fn] The Tigers, Rays, and Yankees have all been rumored to use defensive stats. 

Other clubs let out that they value defense but not necessarily the state-of-the-art statistical instruments for measuring it. On several occasions Royals general manager Dayton Moore has indicated that, when it comes to evaluating defense, he trusts his scouts more than he trusts the numbers. “The defensive statistics,” he said, “I still really don’t understand how some of those statistics are evaluated, I really don’t. When you watch baseball games every single day, it’s very apparent who can play defensively and who can’t.”[fn]Dayton Moore, interview on AM 810 WHB, Kansas City, www.royalsreview.com/2009/7/13/947719/the-defensive-statistics-i-still.[/fn] 

Cubs general manager Jim Hendry agrees. David Laurila of Baseball Prospectus asked him whether “ defensive metrics [are] an important part of your evaluation process or do you rely primarily on scouting?” Hendry replied: “It’s scouting for me. People scout players and they rate their defense, and that’s what I go by—and the personnel that we have in our own dugout.”[fn]Jim Hendry, interview with David Laurila, Prospectus Q&A, 12 July 2009 BaseballProspectus.com.[/fn]

Just as a front office’s attentiveness to the statistical analysis of defense doesn’t guarantee success (the Mariners, for example, have gotten off to a woeful start this year), neither does willful neglect of it necessarily mean a team is doomed to flail around near the bottom of the standings. The Phillies have won the National League pennant the past two years and, despite having great defensive statistics on a team and individual level, apparently have not crunched those numbers much. “I think defensive statistics are the most unpredictable stats out there,” said Charley Kerfeld, special assistant to Phillies general manager Ruben Amaro Jr. “Since I’ve been here, we don’t have an in-house stats guy and I kind of feel we never will.”[fn]Doug Miller, “New Defensive Stats Starting to Catch On,” 11 January 2010, MLB.mlb.com.[/fn]

Will any of the high-end defensive metrics ever be embraced by the average fan, for whom quantification of defense means mostly that he looks at errors and occasionally casts a skeptical glance at fielding percentage? The metrics that are available now and that we outlined above may prove useful for evaluating players in a career context or, depending on the metric, over a shorter span, one to three seasons. For the metrics to be routinely tracked and updated on a daily basis for the benefit of the general public, however, the conventions of scorekeeping would have to undergo radical revision. A hit would have to be recorded not only as a hit for the batter and against the pitcher but also as a missed opportunity for the fielder(s).

So it’s unlikely that UZR and its kin will start appearing on scoreboards alongside batting average, home runs, and RBIs any time soon. As for the resistance from some front offices, are they allergic to innovation, or is it that they have a healthy aversion to busyness? About that you can be the judge. Some of us are wired such that we find maps helpful, and some of us not so much. In any case, the maps that the sabermetric effort to quantify defense gives us may never be as subtly delineated as the four-dimensional terrain they represent. The trick is to know not only how to read the maps for what they are, a set of honest if not infallible data points, but how to read them with one eye while keeping the other one on the ball in flight as Franklin Gutierrez takes off to run it down. 

DAN BASCO is a graduate student and teaching assistant in the statistics department at the University of Akron.

JEFF ZIMMERMAN writes for Fangraphs, Royals Review, and Beyond the Boxscore.

FIELDING BIBLE AWARDS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GOLD GLOVE

Since 2006, a committee of baseball experts and close observers have been voting for the best player at each position for that season. This is the Fielding Bible Award. Voters have included Bill James, Peter Gammons, Rob Neyer, Hal Richman (of Strat-O-Matic), and fans who vote in a poll conducted by Tom Tango. Many voters have a strong statistical background; others do not. All voting is based on a combination of defensive statistics and visual observation. The ballot is similar to that of the MVP selection: Ten players receive votes; the player who gets the first-place vote gets 10 points, second place is good for 9, and so on. In contrast to the rules governing voting for the Gold Glove Award, the list of eligible players is restricted to players who played a minimum number of innings at a given position. One player at each position receives the award. There is not a separate award to the best in the AL and the best in the NL—it’s only for the best in all of MLB. The three outfield positions are assessed separately. Also in contrast to the Gold Glove Awards, The Fielding Bible Awards are accompanied by publication of the results of the voting—they appear annually in The Bill James Handbook—and so we can see who came close (or not so close) to winning.[fn]Baseball Info Solutions and Bill James, The Bill James Handbook 2010. (Skokie: ACTA Sports, 2006), 15–16[/fn] Here is a list of the winners.[fn]Fielding Bible, www.fieldingbible.com.[/fn]

One of baseball’s highest-regarded feats is the cycle: “A single, double, triple, and home run (not necessarily in that order) hit by a player in the same game.”1 In the history of major league baseball (1876–2023) there have been 351 documented regular-season cycles, including seven in the Negro Leagues.2 The distribution of the starting defensive positions of the players who achieved these cycles is provided in Table 1.

No starting pitcher has ever achieved the feat.3 With the notable exception of Shohei Ohtani, pitchers have rarely batted since 1973 in the AL and since 2022 in the NL. Thus, the feat of achieving a cycle is limited to non-pitchers, and the cycle has become a de facto “Batter’s Cycle” (BC). What about pitchers? How about a cycle exclusively for pitchers?

The three principal goals of the research described in this article are:

1. Devise a viable definition for a Pitcher’s Cycle that is equivalent to the Batter’s Cycle.
2. Compile a list of all Pitcher’s Cycles from 1893 forward.
3. Highlight the special features and characteristics of the various Pitcher’s Cycles.

To pursue the first objective, I looked up various definitions for the word “cycle.” I wanted to adhere to the basic definition of a cycle, “a sequence of a recurring succession of events or phenomena,” and create an equivalent to the batter’s cycle: a series of pitching achievements commensurate to a batter collecting the series of types of safe hit.4 A batter’s primary objective is to get on base, which he can achieve entirely by himself by getting a safe hit, of which there are the four types. A pitcher’s primary objective is to retire the batter, which he can do entirely by himself by striking out the batter, who occupies one of the nine positions in the batting order.5

Since a regulation baseball game consists of nine innings, a seemingly reasonable cycle would require the pitcher to strike out at least one batter in each inning. However, this definition has a couple issues. First, not all games last nine innings. Some are shortened due to weather, some go into extra innings, and some forego the bottom of the ninth because the home team is ahead. This variability would lead to different categories of Pitcher’s Cycles, such as a six-inning PC or a seven-inning PC. Second, a player could achieve a PC by striking out a few players multiple times. While striking out at least one batter in each inning of a regulation nine-inning game is a noteworthy accomplishment, it doesn’t merit the same level of regard accorded to the BC.

Since there are nine different players in the batting lineup, a reasonable cycle would be for the pitcher to strike out each of the opposing batters at least once in a game. One difficulty with this idea is that a player could be replaced before the pitcher had a chance to face him. To address this circumstance, the concept can be modified slightly: the pitcher must strike out at least one batter from each of the nine recurring batting slots. This would still require the hurler to fan at least nine different batters in the same game. And since, in a regulation nine-inning game, the batting order recurs at least three times, adherence to the basic definition of a cycle is achieved. Furthermore, in striking out at least one player from each of the nine batting slots, the pitcher achieves a complete set (series) of strikeout victims.

Thus, my definition of a Pitcher’s Cycle: “The series of at least one player from each of the nine repeating batting slots (not necessarily in order) struck out by one pitcher in the same game.”

My definition of a Pitcher’s Cycle essentially paraphrases The Dickson Baseball Dictionary definition of a Batter’s Cycle.6 Similarly, while a batter hits for his cycle, a pitcher hurls for his cycle. A batter collects specific hits for his cycle while a pitcher collects specific strikeouts for his cycle. While the Pitcher’s Cycle requires a player to pitch at least three innings, it does not require the player to be a starting pitcher. Moreover, just like there is no limit to the number of plate appearances it takes a player to achieve the Batter’s Cycle, there is no limit to the number of innings it takes a player to achieve the Pitcher’s Cycle.7

With a viable definition of a Pitcher’s Cycle in place, the next step was identifying the players who accomplished the feat. The 1893 season was chosen as the starting point because that was the first year for the current 60’ 6″ distance between the pitcher’s rubber and home plate.

RESEARCH PROCEDURE

Since a player needs a minimum of nine strikeouts to accomplish the Pitcher’s Cycle, I started by generating a list of pitchers who amassed at least 9 strikeouts in an “ML” game. “ML” is enclosed in quotation marks to indicate that only the National, American, and Federal Leagues were considered for the research described in this article. My research on Pitcher’s Cycles achieved in the Negro Leagues has been initiated and the results will be disseminated as soon as possible.

For the 1893–1900 period, I utilized the game-by-game pitching statistics provided in the ICI (Information Concepts Incorporated) sheets, digitized versions of which were graciously provided to me by Retrosheet’s Dave Smith. For the 1901–2023 period, I used Baseball Reference’s indispensable Stathead search engine. I queried for pitchers with nine or more strikeouts, then examined the box score and play-by-play to ascertain the batting order of the victims.

There are 87 games from the 1901–1915 period for which the box scores omit strikeout information about the batters. Fortunately, Jonathan Frankel has done some phenomenal research on strikeouts for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He graciously provided information that filled many of the gaps.8 Nonetheless, 54 games remain for which it has not yet been determined whether the pitcher achieved a Pitcher’s Cycle. See Supplement A below for pertinent information for these 54 games. Finally, John Rickert graciously wrote a computer program using the Retrosheet database to confirm the validity of my methodology for the 1901–2023 seasons.9

RESULTS

From 1893 to 2023, there were (at least) 483 Pitcher’s Cycles by 276 different players, along with 316 Batter’s Cycles by 279 different players.10 Despite a difference of 167, the two sums are in the same ballpark and have the same order of magnitude. Table 2 provides a decade-by-decade comparison and Figure 1 provides a graphical comparison of the corresponding cumulative numbers.

Table 2 shows that the bulk of the 167-cycle difference has occurred in the last few decades; starting in 1990 and picking up speed in 2010. Thus, while the number of Batter’s Cycles was greater than the number of Pitcher’s Cycles for nearly every decade up to the 1940s, the situation has been reversed since the 1950s. The total number of Pitcher’s Cycles surpassed the total number of Batter’s Cycles during the 1990s. From 1949 to 2019, home runs increased by 81.3% while strikeouts increased by 139.9%.11 Pitchers are throwing harder and batters are focused on exit velocity and launch angles. These changes unavoidably lead to more strikeouts and more Pitcher’s Cycles.

(Click image to enlarge)

Because the Pitcher’s Cycle is a new concept, it features several aspects that merit exposition, such as a team-by-team summary of PCs, the chronology of the career leaders, and postseason PCs. These topics and others are covered in the Appendix and Supplement below.12 The remainder of this article will focus on these four topics:

1. Relief Pitcher’s Cycles
2. Perfect Pitcher’s Cycles
3. Super Pitcher’s Cycles
4. The only major-league player with both a Batter’s Cycle and a Pitcher’s Cycle

1. RELIEF PITCHER’S CYCLES

As seen in Table 3, Six of the players who achieved a Pitcher’s Cycle did so in relief. Also, as described in Appendix G, Jesse Barnes earned a relief PC in the 1921 World Series.

Rube Marquard took over for Christy Mathewson after the first inning. Big Six pitched an uneventful first inning, but in the bottom of the frame, the Giants scored 13 runs. “Having the game on ice, [manager John] McGraw made several changes in his lineup. He took Mathewson out of the box, so as to save him for another game and he put Marquard in the box.”13 Marquard carved out his Pitcher’s Cycle as the Giants emerged victorious, 19–5. Mathewson was credited with the win and Marquard was retroactively credited with a save.14

Gene Conley essentially pitched a complete game that he did not start. Starter Seth Morehead got rocked by the Cubs in the first frame, allowing a single to leadoff batter Tony Taylor, hitting the next batter, George Altman, walking the third batter, Lee Walls, and surrendering a bases-clearing double to clean-up hitter Ernie Banks. Conley came in from the bullpen at this point. The fireman got next batter, Bobby Thomson, to fly out, but then yielded an RBI triple to John Goryl before striking out Alvin Dark and Cal Neeman. Conley pitched rest of game, striking out 11 and blanking the Cubs for nine innings (a full-route pseudo-shutout).15 Unfortunately, the Phillies were unable to overcome the first-inning deficit, losing 4–3. Morehead was charged with the loss. “Gene Conley pitched nine shutout innings for the Philadelphia Phillies today,” wrote the Associated Press, “but had nothing to show for his efforts except self-satisfaction. In all, he fanned 11, two shy of the club record held by Ray Benge, Robin Roberts, and Jack Sanford, and whiffed every Cub in the starting lineup at least once. Conley, now figured to move into the Phils starting rotation, was obviously pleased with his performance. ‘I’m ready now,’ he said after the game. ‘This is just what I needed. I’m ready for whatever the skipper (Eddie Sawyer) wants me to do, starting or relieving.’”16

Dave Hillman, who started for the Cubs in Conley’s relief Pitcher’s Cycle, achieved his own relief PC just a few weeks later. In an “It’s-déjà-vu-all-over-again” twist, Seth Morehead, who had been traded from the Phillies to the Cubs on May 12, was once again the starting pitcher. Morehead walked Dodgers leadoff batter Junior Gilliam and gave up a single to Charlie Neal before he struck out Don Demeter. He then intentionally walked Gil Hodges immediately before Rip Repulski smashed a bases-clearing double. After walking Dick Gray, he was replaced by Hillman. Hillman threw a wild pitch to Johnny Roseboro, then walked him intentionally. Hillman then got things under control by striking out pinch hitter Duke Snider and opposing pitcher Stan Williams. Hillman pitched brilliantly for 72⁄3 innings to complete the bottom of the eighth. In the top of the ninth, the Cubs rallied for a pair of runs to take a 7–5 lead. In the bottom of the ninth, Hillman walked Snider to lead off the inning. Don Elston was then summoned from the bullpen and retired the next three batters to secure the triumph for Chicago. Elston was rewarded (retroactively) with a save and Hillman was awarded the W, a nice complement to his second Pitcher’s Cycle. He earned the first as a starting pitcher in 1958.

Dick Radatz earned his Pitcher’s Cycle in an ideal payback manner. Radatz, nicknamed “The Monster,” achieved his PC in a duel of relief pitchers at Tiger Stadium on June 11, 1963. Going into the bottom of the seventh, the BoSox clung to a 3–2 lead. Southpaw Wilbur Wood was on the hump for the Red Sox. Don Wert led off with a single and Dick McAuliffe sacrificed him to second. With Tigers starter Jim Bunning due up, Detroit manager Bob Scheffing called on the right-handed Bill Freehan to pinch hit. Boston Manager Johnny Pesky countered by calling on the Monster, a right-hander. Scheffing went to his bench again, summoning left-swinging Whitey Herzog to bat for Freehan. Radatz proceeded to strike out Herzog before passing Jake Wood. That brought up Bubba Phillips, a right-handed batter, and more managerial chess. Scheffing called on the left-handed batting Bill Bruton to pinch-hit for Phillips. Pesky stood pat with Radatz. Bruton delivered a single to knock in Wert with the tying run, which was officially charged to Wood. Radatz induced a groundout from Al Kaline to end the inning. While Radatz was not charged with Wert’s run, he was retroactively charged with a blown save. The game remained knotted going into the top of the 15th inning, at which point the Red Sox took a 7–3 lead. In the last of the 15th, the Monster struck out pinch-hitter Frank Kostro and got Jake Wood to pop out, bringing up Bill Bruton. As it had happened, Bruton’s number-two spot was the only strikeout Radatz needed. He simultaneously secured the victory and the PC: a Walk-off Strikeout Pitcher’s Cycle.

Randy Johnson got his record-breaking eighth NL Pitcher’s Cycle in a bizarre relief role against the Padres on July 19, 2001. The night before, Arizona’s starting pitcher, Curt Schilling, had set down the first six batters in order. The D-backs had pushed across a run to provide a 1–0 lead going into the top of the third. With the bases empty and nobody out, Schilling was in the batter’s box. The count was 0-and-2. “Transformer Explosion Suspends Padres Game” was the headline in the next day’s newspaper story.17 After a delay of over an hour, the backup lighting was deemed inadequate and the game was suspended, to be completed the next day as the first game of a “doubleheader.” Upon resumption the next day, Brian Anderson replaced Schilling in the batter’s box; he struck out looking and the strikeout was charged to Schilling. Johnson replaced Anderson in the Arizona lineup and nearly tossed a perfect game. He walked just one batter and gave up one hit, a harmless single. He struck out 16. After the game, Johnson said, “By no means do I go out and try to strike people out. It’s probably one of the hardest things to do, especially against major league hitters. But I got in a groove. [Catcher] Damian [Miller] made some big blocks when I threw my breaking ball in the dirt.”18 Diamondbacks manager Bob Brenly jokingly added, “He may be the best long man, huh.”

Tyler Alexander established an amazing relief-pitcher record in the first game of a doubleheader at Comerica Park. With each game scheduled for seven innings because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Alexander entered in the top of third with the Reds leading his Tigers, 3–0. Nick Castellanos had just hit a homer off starting pitcher Rony Garcia. Alexander struck out the next three batters in succession: Mike Moustakas (five pitches, swinging), Eugenio Suarez (three pitches, looking), and Jesse Winker (three pitches, swinging). In the top of the fourth, Alexander struck out the side: Nick Senzel (four pitches, swinging), Josh VanMeter (three pitches, looking), and Freddy Galvis (eight pitches, swinging). Alexander did it again in the fifth: Tucker Barnhart (four pitches, looking), Shogo Akiyama (four pitches, looking), and Castellanos (five pitches, swinging). The Detroit Free Press wrote, “Nine men up. Nine men down [via strikeouts]. It tied an American League record, set by the Tigers’ Doug Fister against the Royals on September 27, 2012. Alexander’s reaction—somewhere between ‘meh’ and ‘whatever’—was perhaps as bewildering as his pitches. ‘I don’t know about special,’ he said. ‘I normally don’t try to strike people out. But I would say that after about the fifth strikeout I was trying to strike people out. I don’t know about special. We were just trying to get outs and keep us in it. It’s surprising, I guess,’ he said. ‘I normally do throw a lot of strikes, and when I miss, I miss over the plate. I made a big focus on missing down. I didn’t have very many bad misses and the mistakes I made were in the dirt so it gave me a chance for them to swing at it.’ Alexander wasn’t aware of the record until it was announced in the [virtually empty] stadium after he struck out Castellanos to end the fifth inning.”19 In the top of the sixth, Alexander terminated his string of strikeouts by hitting Moustakas.

2. PERFECT PITCHER’S CYCLES

When a pitcher strikes out nine batters in succession, he automatically achieves a Pitcher’s Cycle, as just described. Such a feat is herewith dubbed a Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle.20 Table 4 shows the 13 documented Perfect Pitcher’s Cycles. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw one each. So far there have been 11 in the twenty-first century. Nice snippets about each of the Perfect Pitcher’s Cycles are available in an article on MLB.com.21 For four (or five) of the players, the Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle was the only PC they achieved in their big-league careers. Mickey Welch and Pablo López achieved their Perfect Pitcher Cycles at the beginning of the game, while Tom Seaver ended the game with his. For Welch’s 1884 Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle, the distance from the front of the pitcher’s box to home plate was only 50 feet.

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3. SUPER PITCHER’S CYCLES

As mentioned previously, striking out at least one batter in each inning of a nine-inning game is a noteworthy accomplishment, though it doesn’t quite measure up to the Batter’s Cycle. However, combining that achievement with a Pitcher’s Cycle affords an impressive feat herewith termed a “Super Pitcher’s Cycle.”22 To earn credit for a Super Pitcher’s Cycle, the player must strike out at least one batter in each of nine consecutive innings and at least one batter from each of the nine batting slots. A complete game is not required, so he could be removed after striking out a batter in the ninth inning or enter with an out already recorded in the first. The Super Pitcher’s Cycle has been achieved 31 times by 23 players. Tables 5a and 5b present the pertinent details for the players who achieved a Super Pitcher’s Cycle.

Four of those pitchers did not hurl complete games: Johnny Allen (1934), Mike Flanagan (1978), Nolan Ryan (1986), and Randy Johnson (2001). Allen struck out Eric McNair for the second out in the ninth inning, but injured his arm in the process and had to leave the game. Flanagan was replaced by Don Stanhouse to start the 10th inning with the score tied, 2–2. Ryan was relieved in the 10th inning with two runners on and one out in a scoreless game. Johnson was replaced to begin the 10th inning with the score tied, 1–1. Five players achieved multiple Super Pitcher’s Cycles: Sandy Koufax (2), Tom Seaver (2), Ryan (4), Roger Clemens (3), and Pedro Martinez (2). Bill Hallahan achieved the first Super PC (1931). It was the only PC in his career. Vince Velasquez earned the most recent Super PC in 2015. Perhaps the most phenomenal Super PC was accomplished by Nolan Ryan. The Express struck out at least one batter in each of the 11 innings he pitched en route to a 19-K Super PC performance. In spite of this stellar complete-game effort, he lost the game, 1–0. Finally, as described in Appendix G, Bob Gibson accomplished a Super Pitcher’s Cycle in Game 1 of the 1968 World Series.

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4. THE ONLY PLAYER WITH BOTH A BATTER’S CYCLE AND A PITCHER’S CYCLE: SHOHEI OHTANI

Shohei Ohtani has achieved one Batter’s Cycle (thus far) in his major-league career, on June 13, 2019, at Tropicana Field versus the Tampa Bay Rays. Batting third as the Angels’ designated hitter, Ohtani slugged a three-run homer off Ryan Yarborough in the first inning, doubled off him in the third, and tripled off him in the fifth. He singled off Hunter Wood in the seventh. Fittingly, the Angels won the game, 5–3, thanks in part to the four runs Ohtani produced. In the batting cage before his final at bat, Ohtani expressed to infielder David Fletcher that more than anything he wanted to increase the Angels’ tenuous two-run lead. “I went and saw him in the cage and said, ‘all you need is a single,’” Fletcher said. “He was like, ‘No, I want another homer.’ I don’t think he was trying to hit a single. He was definitely trying to hit another homer if you watch the at bat. But I’m glad he got the single.”23

After the game Ohtani said through a translator, “You need some power to hit the home run, some speed to accomplish a triple. To be able to do that at the major league level is going to lead to a lot of confidence. The important thing now is to try to continue this tomorrow.” He then added, “I wasn’t necessarily trying to hit a single. I was just trying to get on base, whether it was a base on balls or any other way because it was still a close game.”24 Responding to a postgame question about being the first Japanese player to hit for the cycle, Ohtani said, “Simply very happy to accomplish this. There’s been so many great Japanese players that have come before me. Being the first one to accomplish it [makes me] really happy and makes for a lot of confidence down the road.”25

Ohtani has achieved two Pitcher’s Cycles (thus far) in his major-league career. The first came on April 20, 2022, at Minute Maid Park against the Houston Astros. Ohtani struck out a dozen over six innings. In the first, he fanned leadoff batter Jeremy Pena (slot one) and Michael Brantley (two). In the second he whiffed clean-up hitter Yordan Alvarez (four). He struck out the side in the third and fourth: Niko Goodrum (seven), Jason Castro (eight), and Jose Siri (nine), Pena, Brantley, and Alex Bregman (three). Alvarez flied out in the fifth, snapping Ohtani’s string of six consecutive strikeouts. Ohtani then resumed his strikeout clinic by fanning Kyle Tucker (five) and Yuri Gurriel (six), giving him the Pitcher’s Cycle. Also of significance, Ohtani had retired each of the first 15 batters; he was hurling a perfect game. In the sixth, he fanned leadoff batter Goodrum for his 12th strikeout, but Castro lined a single to center, breaking up the perfecto. Ohtani closed out the frame with a popout, a walk, and a groundout. “Ohtani threw 81 pitches [55 strikes] on a night [Angels manager Joe] Maddon had said he would be limited to 85. But, Maddon said after the game that he would not have pulled him with a perfect game intact regardless of the pitch count. ‘There’s no number,’ Maddon said. ‘He was going to pitch a perfect game. I’m not going to get in the way of a player’s greatness—ever.’ Ohtani was asked if he was thinking about the perfect game. ‘I was aware of it, but I knew the pitch count was getting up there, and I was thinking I wouldn’t be able to finish it,’ he said. Ohtani was also the designated hitter, batting leadoff for the Angels. Facing Jake Odorizzi, he started the game by drawing a base on balls, and, as the Angels proceeded to bat around, he also clouted a two-RBI double off Blake Taylor. In the third, facing Cristian Javier, he lined out to third base. In the top of the sixth, again squaring off against Javier, he bunted for a single. After leaving the mound, Ohtani flied out to left in the bottom of the eighth. The final result was a 6–0 triumph for the Angels, with Ohtani as the winning pitcher. “Ohtani was asked if it was his top performance in the majors. ‘It could be,’ he said with a smile in Japanese through a translator.” He had achieved the Pitcher’s Cycle and was halfway to a Batter’s Cycle.

Ohtani’s second PC came on May 3, 2023, at Busch Stadium. He hurled the first five innings, striking out 13 Cardinals. In the bottom of the first, he fanned leadoff batter Lars Nootbaar (slot one), Paul Goldschmidt (two), and Wilson Contreras (five). He also gave up a homer to Nolan Gorman. Ohtani whiffed three batters in the second: Dylan Carlson (seven), Brendan Donovan (eight), and Tommy Edman (nine). In the third inning he atoned for the homer he yielded by striking out Gorman (three) and Nootbaar. In the fourth, Ohtani struck out Alec Burleson (six) and Donovan, but he was touched for three runs on two doubles and another home run (by Carlson). In the fifth, he struck out three: Nootbaar (for the third time), Goldschmidt (for the second time), and Nolan Arenado (four), giving him the Pitcher’s Cycle. At the end of five innings, the Angels trailed, 4–3. Ohtani had thrown 97 pitches while striking out 13 batters. His 13th strikeout was the 500th of his career, putting him in select company: in major-league history, only he and Babe Ruth have accumulated 500 strikeouts and 100 home runs.27

Wrote Rhett Bollinger, “Ohtani had a strange start outside of his strikeout total, however, as he allowed four extra-base hits, walked a batter, hit another and threw two wild pitches. So while it was special for Ohtani to reach yet another milestone, he was frustrated he only made it through five frames. ‘I gave up a couple homers and I wanted to get through six or seven innings, minimum,’ Ohtani said through interpreter Ippei Mizuhara. ‘So more than the strikeouts, I’m just disappointed I couldn’t pitch deeper in the game.’”28 Ohtani made three plate appearances as the pitcher. He singled in the first, then again in the third, driving in a run to give the Angels a 2–1 lead. He popped out in the fifth. Ohtani had two plate appearances as the DH. He grounded out in the seventh and doubled in the ninth, eventually coming around to score the go-ahead run.

SUMMARY

A viable definition of a Pitcher’s Cycle has been devised to characterize a feat commensurate with the Batter’s Cycle. From 1893 to 2023, there were 483 Pitcher’s Cycles, achieved by 276 different pitchers. At present, Randy Johnson holds the career records for the most Pitcher’s Cycles in the major leagues (21) and the National League (11). He shares the American League record (10) with Chris Sale. Because of the huge increase in strikeouts during the past few decades, Pitcher’s Cycles have become more frequent than Batter’s Cycles, perhaps dimming the luster of the PC. From 1893 to 1949 (57 seasons), there were 113 BCs and 41 PCs, a difference of negative 72. From 1950 to 1999 (50 seasons), the corresponding numbers were 105 and 185, a difference of positive 80. From 2000 to 2023 (only 24 seasons), the corresponding numbers are 98 and 257, a difference of positive 159. Of the 13 Perfect Pitcher’s Cycles, 11 were achieved since 2007. Super Pitcher’s Cycles have been accomplished 31 times by 23 pitchers; Nolan Ryan holds the record with four Super PCs. Shohei Ohtani is the only player in history with both a Batter’s Cycle and a Pitcher’s Cycle.

DISCUSSION

The most important question is whether the Pitcher’s Cycle, as defined here, is as noteworthy a feat as the Batter’s Cycle. Table 6 lists some typical single-game batter’s feats, along with (in my opinion) commensurate feats for pitchers.29

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Based on the information provided in Table 6, I contend that the answer is a resounding yes! The Pitcher’s Cycle is a noteworthy feat, just as the Batter’s Cycle is. Significantly, the Pitcher’s Cycle and the Batter’s Cycle are accomplishments achieved—entirely by the player himself—via skill. However, it would be fair to describe both the Pitcher’s Cycle and the Batter’s Cycle as quirky or fluky.

With regard to skill, achieving the Batter’s Cycle requires the batter to employ each of the three keystone skills of offense: collecting four hits in a game requires hitting for average, collecting three extra-base hits requires hitting for power, and hitting a double and a triple requires speed. However, the requirement of collecting each of the four types of hits in one game imparts quirkiness and/or flukiness to the Batter’s Cycle. A player can use expertise to specifically try for a single by bunting or employing the Willie Keeler approach of hitting ’em where they ain’t. Similarly, a player can swing for the fences to purposely try for a home run. However, doubles and especially triples are not likely to be achieved by a player trying to specifically hit them on purpose. Thus, while each individual type of base hit requires skill, assembling the complete series involves some luck. To wit, when Rod Carew achieved his Batter’s Cycle on May 20, 1970, he told reporters, “Lots of luck. That’s it, lots of luck.”30 At least two players, Kelly Gruber and Jeff Frye, eschewed a sure extra-base hit by “skillfully” stopping at first base complete the Batter’s Cycle with a single.31

Achieving the Pitcher’s Cycle also requires skill. Strikeouts are valued especially because they preclude balls in play that could result in an error or an out that allows an existing base runner to advance. There are different types of hitters, such as free swingers, go-with-the-pitch hitters, high-ball hitters, and so on. As with the Batter’s Cycle, while skill is needed to strike out any one batter, striking out at least one batter from each batting slot requires some luck. To illustrate this, let’s consider these two games:

• September 21, 1954, (2nd) at Fenway Park: Frank Sullivan of the Boston Red Sox emerged with a 4–3 victory over the Philadelphia Athletics. He surrendered eight hits and issued three walks in 81⁄3 innings before being relieved. He allowed two earned runs on solo homers by Jim Finigan and Bill Renna. He struck out nine batters, one from each slot, earning the Pitcher’s Cycle. After the game, Sullivan said, “I wasn’t pitching right. My back is killing me. I hope I didn’t hurt myself.”
• May 11, 2016, at Nationals Park: Max Scherzer of the Washington Nationals emerged with a 3–2 victory over the Detroit Tigers. He threw a complete game, walking none and scattering six hits. Both runs were earned, coming on solo homers by Jose Iglesias and J.D. Martinez. Scherzer struck out 20 batters, at least one in each inning, but, he did not earn the Pitcher’s Cycle. He failed to strike out Victor Martinez, the clean-up hitter, who went 3-for-4 with three singles and a groundout. After the game Scherzer said, “There’s something [special] about 20. Tonight was an emotional game, facing a former team and all those guys I have so much respect for. And so to have a game like this against that caliber of hitter on their side, it really puts a feather in my cap.” Going into the ninth inning, Scherzer had already set down 18 batters on strikes, giving him the chance to tie Tom Cheney’s single-game record of 21 strikeouts. “It crossed my mind,” said Scherzer. “I was thinking of all the different scenarios in an 0–2 count that I could do to be able to get that last strikeout.” Instead, James McCann ended the game by grounding into a 5–4 force out. Nonetheless, Scherzer’s 20 K’s equaled the record for strikeouts in a nine-inning game, shared by Roger Clemens (1986 and 1996), Kerry Wood (1998), and Randy Johnson (2001). “That’s some serious company,” said Scherzer. “It won’t sink in right now, but it’s an amazing accomplishment. Had to go through some tough, tough hitters there with Miggy [Miguel Cabrera], J.D., and Victor, and all those guys over there. Those guys are unbelievable and they gave me a heck of time tonight.”33

While Scherzer turned in a phenomenally skillful performance, he was not fortunate enough to achieve the Pitcher’s Cycle. It would have marked the fourth PC of his career (he currently has eight). Sullivan turned in an acceptably skillful performance while fortunately accomplishing his first and only PC.

The first use of the word “cycle” to describe a player collecting a single, double, triple, and home run in one game was in 1921; after 70 cycles had already been achieved: “George Sisler on August 13 [1921] hit the cycle by getting on [via] a single, double, triple, and home run, and by getting an extra double in the same game.”34 Furthermore, as Mike Huber and Allison Davidson subsequently reported, the term did not again appear in print over the next 10 years, during which time another 22 cycles were achieved. According to Huber and Davidson, “By 1938, it seems that the phrase [“hitting for the cycle”] to describe this rare event was indeed commonplace.”35 So while nowadays regarded as a prestigious feat, the Batter’s Cycle had an induction period of roughly 60 years. The Pitcher’s Cycle, if also eventually deemed a prestigious feat by baseball fans, might follow a similar course. 

HERM KRABBENHOFT is a retired chemist (PhD, University of Michigan, 1974) and author of Leadoff Batters of Major League Baseball (McFarland, 2001). Among various baseball research topics he has pioneered are: Ultimate Grand Slam Homers, Consecutive Games On Base Safely (CGOBS) Streaks, Quasi-Cycles, Imperfect Perfectos, Downtown Golden Sombreros, Pitcher’s Cycles. Krabbenhoft has received three SABR Research Awards (1992, 1996, 2013).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

With grateful appreciation, I heartily thank all the people who have contributed to Baseball Reference and Retrosheet, thereby making their websites phenomenal baseball-research-enabling vehicles. Special thanks are gratefully extended to John Rickert for graciously writing a computer program using the Retrosheet database to generate a complete list of players who achieved the Pitcher’s Cycle during the 1901–2023 period, thereby confirming my hands-on research and ensuring that the players who achieved the Pitcher’s Cycle were identified. It is a pleasure to again thank Jonathan Frankel for providing his superb strikeout research to me. I thank Dave Smith (Retrosheet) for kindly providing digitized versions of the ICI sheets for the 1893–1900 seasons. I also thank Rick Schabowski for providing game accounts in the Milwaukee Journal and the Milwaukee Sentinel for the Milwaukee-vs-Detroit game on July 03, 1901. I thank Cliff Blau for providing me with “batters struck out” details from the New York Evening Telegram for two 1899 games. I thank Matt Spitz for coining the term “Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle.” I thank Patrick Todgham for dubbing the term “Super Pitcher’s Cycle.” I thank Pete Palmer for his guidance on strikeouts statistics and the “large lead rule” (note 14). I thank Kevin Johnson and Tom Thress for providing the pertinent information the seven players from the Negro Leagues who achieved Batter’s Cycles. I thank Steve Hirdt, Jeff Robbins, and Gary Stone, for especially helpful discussions.

DEDICATION

I enthusiastically and appreciatively dedicate this article to Dixie Tourangeau, my friend and baseball research colleague. Thanks so much for all the superb research help you’ve provided to me over the past so-many years and for all of the good times we’ve enjoyed at Fenway and the various SABR Convention ballparks.

NOTES

1 Paul Dickson, The Dickson Baseball Dictionary (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 237.

2 (a) “Hit for the Cycle,” Baseball Almanac, accessed October 3, 2023, https://www.baseball-almanac.com/hitting/Major_League_Baseball_Players_to_hit_for_the_cycle.shtml. (b) According Retrosheet’s list of cycles, https://www.retrosheet.org/cycles_chron.htm, George Hall hit for the cycle on June 19, 1876. (c) Baseball Almanac’s list includes a postseason cycle by Brock Holt, on October 8, 2018, which gives the grand total of 344 cycles. (d) According to information provided by Tom Thress of Retrosheet and Kevin Johnson of Seamheads, seven verified cycles were achieved in the Negro Leagues. According to Johnson, another 12 “known” Negro League cycles are awaiting corroboration by balanced box scores. Email exchanges with Kevin Johnson and Tom Thress, July 04-07, 2024; discussion with Kevin Johnson, August 10, 2024.

3 Jimmy Ryan of the White Stockings completed his July 28, 1888, cycle as a pitcher after having started the game as Chicago’s center fielder. Ryan, who was the leadoff hitter for the White Stockings, singled to open the game in the first inning. He followed with a triple in the top of the second inning. In the bottom of the second, with the Wolverines leading, 7–4, Ryan switched positions with Chicago’s starting hurler, Mark Baldwin; the bases were loaded with two outs. Ryan struck out the first batter he faced, Count Campau, to retire the side. Ryan remained on the mound for the rest of the game. In the fourth inning, Ryan walloped a 2-run homer. In the fifth frame he added another triple to his batting line. In the seventh, he reached on a fielding error by the left fielder (“a rattling liner that was too hot for Twitchell’s hands”). In what turned out to be his final plate appearance, in the eighth, Ryan clouted a double, giving him the cycle. Thus, for the entire game, Ryan collected a single and a triple while he was Chicago’s center fielder, and a homer, triple, and double while he was a relief pitcher. His pitching line was 7.1 innings, 10 runs allowed on 9 hits (including one homer), four strikeouts, two walks, one hit batter, and two wild pitches. The White Stockings emerged victorious, 21–17. Complete details of Ryan’s accomplishments are given in the following newspaper accounts: (a) “Home Runs All Around,” Chicago Tribune, July 29, 1888, 14; (b) “They Hit the Ball Hard,” The (Chicago) Inter Ocean, July 29, 1888, 2; (c) “Sluggers Outslugged,” Detroit Free Press, July 29, 1888, 4; (d) “Was Waterloo Thus?,” Detroit News, July 29, 1888, 8.

4 “Cycle Definition & Meaning,” Merriam-Webster, accessed August 26, 2024, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cycle.

5 Although the catcher must hold on to the third strike to actually retire the batter, the pitcher alone is credited with a strikeout.

6 Dickson, 237.

7 Thus, accomplishing the Pitcher’s Cycle by hurling in extra innings is fully acceptable. For example, two of the players who have hit for the Batter’s Cycle since 1893 achieved their cycle-clinching hit in the 14th inning. George Brett (double in his seventh plate appearance on May 28, 1979) and Jay Buhner (triple in his seventh plate appearance on June 23, 1993).

8 Jonathan Frankel, email exchanges, September 4–October 5, 2023, and January 2–4, 2024.

9 John Rickert, email exchanges, October 12–November 21, 2023.

10 A chronological register of the 483 Pitcher’s Cycles is provided on a decade-by-decade basis in Supplement B.

11 Herm Krabbenhoft, “Going Downtown with a Golden Sombrero— Combining Baseball’s Best and Worst True Outcomes,” Baseball Research Journal, Fall 2023, Volume 52, Number 2, 55.

12 See appendices and supplements below.

13 (a) “Did Anyone See Bresnahan’s Goat?,” The (New York) World, Evening Edition, May 13, 1911, 1. (b) “Giants In Run Cataclysm,” The (New York) Sun, May 14, 1911, 13. (c) “Bang! Slam! Went Giants,” New York Daily Tribune, May 14, 1911, 10.

14 That Mathewson is credited with being the winning pitcher is a consequence of “the large lead rule.” Pete Palmer, email correspondence, November 2, 2023: “If you leave the game with a large lead, you can get the win because the manager is saving you for the next game. I don’t know when that practice was in effect. There were no [official] rules for ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ pitchers until 1950.” See also: (a) Frank Vacarro, “Origin of the Modern Pitching Win,” Baseball Research Journal (Volume 42, Number 1, Spring 2013) 50; (b) Frank J. Williams, “All the Record Books Are Wrong,” The National Pastime, 1982, 50; (c) Joe Wayman, “The Matty-Alex Tie,” Baseball Research Journal (Number 24, 1995), 25.

15 Allen Lewis, “Cubs’ 4 in 1st Defeat Phils Despite Relief by Conley,” Philadelphia Inquirer , May 03, 1959, S1.

16 “Gene Conley Ready To Take Over As Starter For Phils,” Danville (Virginia) Register , D1.

17 “Transformer explosion suspends Padres game,” The (Palm Springs, California) Desert Sun, July 19, 2001, D4.

18 Richard Obert, “Big Unit K’s 16 to finish suspended game,” Arizona Republic, July 20, 2001, D1.

19 Carlos Monarrez, “Swift Wiffs,” Detroit Free Press, August 03, 2020, B1.

20 The origin of “Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle” is as follows: I attended the September 10, 2023, Giants-Rockies game at Oracle Park with three friends. I cheered for every Colorado batter Keaton Winn struck out. While I was scoring the game, I explained my Pitcher’s Cycle research to my friends and was carefully charting each K that Winn achieved. When Winn struck out Austin Wynns to end the fifth inning, I enthusiastically exclaimed that Winn just needed to K two more batting slots, two and six, to accomplish the Pitcher’s Cycle. A couple of Giants fans seated in front of me asked what I was talking about. I gave a brief account of my research project and, to provide some perspective, I mentioned that Nolan Ryan had 12 Pitcher’s Cycles and that Randy Johnson had 18 through the 2001 season, the most recent season I had completed at the time. I also mentioned that there were 13 pitchers who had struck out at least 9 batters in a row and that, therefore, they had automatically achieved the Pitcher’s Cycle. One of them responded matter-of-factly, “So they had perfect cycles.” I replied, “Yeah! That’s cool! A Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle! What a neat way to express that! I got his name—Matt Spitz— and said I would give him credit for coming up with the term. Thanks, Matt! As it turned out, Winn did not strike out the second-slot batter, Ezequiel Tovar),in the sixth. Similarly, Winn did not have the opportunity to strike out the sixth-slot batter, Hunter Goodman, as the Giants brought in a relief pitcher in the seventh inning.

21 Matt Kelly and Sarah Langs, “Most Consecutive Strikeouts by a Pitcher,” MLB.com, April 10, 2023, accessed October 30, 2023, https://www.mlb.com/news/most-consecutive-strikeouts-by-pitcher-in-game. For additional information about Mickey Welch’s Perfect Pitcher’s Cycle, see: (a) Harry Simmons, “An Overlooked Feat,” The Sporting News, October 23, 1941, 6; (b) George Buckley, “Why Did Mickey Smile?” Baseball Research Journal (Volume 11, 1982), 127.

22 The origin of the “Super Pitcher’s Cycle” is as follows: At a hot stove league discussion on December 3, 2023, at the Cambridge Common & Lizard Lounge in Cambridge, MA, the topic of Pitcher’s Cycles came up, along with the feat of a pitcher striking out at least one batter in each inning of a nine-inning game. I mentioned that while there were nearly 500 PCs, there were only 30-some instances where the PC player also struck out at least one batter in each inning (of a nine-inning game). Patrick Todgham then said, “Those should be called ‘Super Pitcher’s Cycles.’” I agreed and said I would give him credit for the term. Thanks, Patrick!

23 Maria Torres, “A night to remember for Ohtani,” Los Angeles Times, June 14, 2019, D1.

24 “Angels’ Ohtani first Japanese player to hit for cycle,” Associated Press, June 13, 2019, accessed November 5, 2023, https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nc/triad/ap-top-news/2019/06/14/angels-ohtani-first-japanese-player-to-hit-for-cycle0.

25 J. Scott Shaffer, “June 13, 2019: Shohei Ohtani becomes first Japanese player to hit for cycle,” SABR Games Project, accessed November 5, 2023, https://sabr.org/gamesproj/game/june-13-2019-shohei-ohtani-becomes-first-japanese-player-to-hit-for-the-cycle/.

26 Kristie Rieken, “‘Virtuoso’ Ohtani Mows Down Astros,” Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2022, B10.

27 Lynn Worthy, “Gallegos coughs up late lead, Cards lose,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 4, 2023, page B1.

28 Rhett Bollinger, “Make room for Shohei! Ohtani joins Babe in another club,” MLB.com, May 3, 2023, accessed October 23, 2023, https://www.mlb.com/news/shohei-ohtani-joins-babe-ruth-in-500-strikeout-100-home-run-club?game_pk=718320.

29 Stathead.com. Other sources consulted: (a) Seymour Siwoff, The Elias Book of Baseball Records (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 237; (b) The Major League Baseball Ultimate Book of Baseball Records (Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Fenn/McClelland & Stewart, 2013), 132; (c) Lyle Spatz, Editor, The SABR Baseball List & Record Book (New York: Scribner, 2007), 191; (d) Joseph Dittmar, Baseball Records Registry (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1997); (e) Joseph L. Reichler, Revised by Ken Samelson, The Great All-Time Baseball Record Book (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), 181; (f) David Nemec, Great Baseball Feats, Facts, & Firsts (New York: NAL Penguin,Inc., 1987), 237.

30 (a) “Royals’ Metro in Awe as Carew Keeps Hitting,” (Saint Cloud, Minnesota) Daily Times, May 21, 1970, 29; (b) Tom Briere, “Twins Win 7th Straight,” (Minneapolis) Star-Tribune, May 21, 1970, 31. See also: Herm Krabbenhoft, “From Kralick to Lopez and Carew to Polanco— Interesting Aspects of the Pitcher’s Cycles and Batter’s Cycles Achieved by Minnesota Twins Players,” The National Pastime, 2024, 60.

31 Herm Krabbenhoft, “When You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It,” Baseball Research Journal (Volume 47, Number 1, Spring 2018) 72.

32 Hy Hurwitz, “Hy and Inside,” Boston Globe, September 22, 1954, 8.

33 Ian Quillen, “Nats top Tigers 3-2,” The Park City Daily News (Bowling Green, KY), May 12, 2016, C8.

34 (a) Herm Krabbenhoft, “Quasi-Cycles—Better Than Cycles?,” Baseball Research Journal (Volume 46, Number 2, Fall 2017) 107; (b) Chuck McGill, email correspondence, June 1, 2017; (c) From the Tennessean (Nashville, Tennessee, August 21,1921, 12) was the following news item: “George Sisler on August 13 hit the cycle by getting on a single, double, triple, and home run, and by getting an extra double in the same game.” (d) The Dickson Baseball Dictionary cites a 1933 Washington Post article as the first to use the term “cycle”: Paul Dickson, The Dickson Baseball Dictionary (New York: W,W, Norton & Company, New York, 2009) 237. (e) In this issue, John Racanelli reports an earlier date: June 10, 1920. John Racanelli, “Desperately Seeking Singles,” Baseball Research Journal 53, no. 2, (Fall 2024) 46.

35 Michael Huber and Allison Davidson, “Origin of the Phrase ‘Hitting for the Cycle’ and An Approach to How Cycles Occur,” Baseball Research Journal (Volume 47, Number 1, Spring 2018) 112.

APPENDICES

Coming soon!

• Appendix A: Each Franchise’s First and Most-Recent Pitcher’s Cycle
• Appendix B: Franchise-Record Holders
• Appendix C: The Chronology of the Career Leaders
• Appendix D: The All-Time Top-10
• Appendix E: Extra-Inning Pitcher’s Cycles
• Appendix F: Pitcher’s Cycles in Consecutive Games
• Appendix G: Postseason Pitcher’s Cycles

SUPPLEMENTS 

The Supplements for this article provide the following (click on a link below to scroll down to that section):

• Supplement A: Pitchers With Nine or More Strikeouts in a Game and Incomplete “Batters Struck Out” Statistics
• Supplement B: Chronological Register of Players Who Achieved a Pitcher’s Cycle (1893–2023)
• Supplement C: Alphabetical Register of Players Who Achieved a Pitcher’s Cycle (1893–2023)
• Supplement D: Team-by-Team Registers of Players Who Achieved Pitcher’s Cycles

Supplement A — Pitchers with Nine or More Strikeouts and Incomplete Statistics

Table SA-1. NL and AL Pitchers (1894–1903)

Table SA-2. NL and AL Pitchers (1904–1905)

Table SA-3. NL and AL Pitchers (1905–1907)

Table SA-4. NL and AL Pitchers (1907–1911)

Table SA-5. Federal League Pitchers with Nine or More Strikeouts and Incomplete Statistics

Supplement B — Chronological Register of Players With a Pitcher’s Cycle (1893–2023)

Table SB-1. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1893–1909)

Notes: (1) Entries in the OPP column with an asterisk indicate the game was played at the opponent’s ballpark. (2) The Batters column gives the number of different batters the pitcher struck out. (3) The parenthetical entries in the Batters column give the batters in the starting lineup who were not struck out by the pitcher. Thus, for Bob Ewing, the entry “9 (X: 9-2)” indicates that Ewing struck out 9 different batters and that one batter in the starting lineup was not struck out; that batter occupied the #9 slot in the batting order and had 2 plate appearances against the pitcher. (4) Entries in the IP column bracketed with asterisks indicates the pitcher pitched a complete game.

Table SB-2. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1910–1919)

Table SB-3. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1920–1929)

Table SB-4. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1930–1939)

Table SB-5. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1940–1949)

Table SB-6. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1950–1959)

Table SB-7a. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1960–1966)

Table SB-7b. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1967–1969)

Table SB-8a. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1970–1972)

Table SB-8b. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1973–1979)

Table SB-9a. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1980–1986)

Table SB-9b. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1987–1989)

Table SB-10a. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1990–1994)

Table SB-10b. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1995–1997)

Table SB-10c. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (1998–1999)

Table SB-11a. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (2000–2002)

Table SB-11b. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (2003–2005)

Table SB-11c. Players Who Accomplished a Pitcher’s Cycle (2006–2009)