The title of this book, Time for Expansion Baseball, was adapted from Vin Scully’s signature expression that began each of his broadcasts, “It’s time for Dodgers baseball.” Writers and analysts alike have argued that expansion was the natural conclusion to Scully’s Dodgers moving west from Brooklyn to Los Angeles.

The major-league geographical atlas of 1951 was a virtual carbon copy of a map printed one half-century earlier. Apart from the St. Louis Browns, who relocated from Milwaukee, and the New York Yankees, who moved from Baltimore, none of the franchises had shifted locations as far back as 1903. The same way America underwent significant changes in the 1950s, so too did baseball. Inside a span of three years beginning in 1953, the Braves left Boston for Milwaukee, the Browns departed St. Louis for Baltimore, and the Athletics moved west from Philadelphia to Kansas City. Even so, Gordon Cobbledick of the Cleveland Plain Dealer had validity to describe baseball as a “sectional game” rather than a national one.1 As seven of the 16 franchises were located within a 225-mile radius along the Eastern Seaboard, baseball left little appeal for fans outside the northeast and midwest.

In 1952, the Pacific Coast League (PCL) was given an “Open” classification above the AAA level. The move restricted American and National League teams from drafting PCL players and was considered a step towards becoming a third major league.2 Any such plans ended in 1957 when the Brooklyn Dodgers and the New York Giants relocated to the Golden State. In 1959, Branch Rickey developed a plan to introduce the Continental League as a third major league but this idea, too, had short circuited before coming to fruition. How would major-league baseball respond to the American population moving south and west in increasing numbers? The solution was expansion. Hence the title, Time for Expansion Baseball.

The American League was the first to expand, adding the Los Angeles Angels and a new Washington Senators franchise in 1960. A year later, the National League welcomed the Houston Colt .45s and the New York Mets. Ten additional franchises were awarded before the expansion process concluded in 1998 with the Arizona Diamondbacks and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays. The full list is illustrated as follows:

• Los Angeles Angels: 1961, American League
• Washington Senators: 1961, American League
• Houston Colt .45s: 1962, National League
• New York Mets: 1962, National League
• Kansas City Royals: 1969, American League
• Montreal Expos: 1969, National League
• San Diego Padres: 1969, National League
• Seattle Pilots: 1969, American League
• Seattle Mariners: 1977, American League
• Toronto Blue Jays: 1977, American League
• Colorado Rockies: 1993, National League
• Florida Marlins: 1993, National League
• Arizona Diamondbacks: 1998, National League
• Tampa Bay Devil Rays: 1998, American League

MAXWELL KATES is a CPA who lives and works in Toronto. He has worked in commercial radio and he writes a monthly column for the Houston-based Pecan Park Eagle. Maxwell’s articles and essays have appeared in The National Pastime along with several SABR BioProjects. He served as Director of Marketing for the Hanlan’s Point Chapter for 12 years and has spoken at SABR meetings and conventions in Seattle, Montreal, and Houston. His baseball highlights include to have witnessed Magglio Ordonez’s home run to win the 2006 American League Championship Series for the Detroit Tigers, along with the final out of the 2017 World Series. This is his first SABR project in an editorial capacity.

 

Notes

1 Gaylon H. White, The Bilko Athletic Club: The Story of the 1956 Los Angeles Angels (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 44.

2 “Pacific Coast Year-by-Year Standings” in 2017 Pacific Coast League Sketch and Record Book (Round Rock, Texas: The Pacific Coast League, 2017), 141.

JULY 2, 2018 — While I was somewhat oblivious to it at the time, my baseball career began to change in the summer of 1960. I was in my third year working as an administrative assistant for the Cincinnati Reds, in what was then a three-person farm department.

My contact with Gabe Paul was somewhat limited. The Reds’ general manager and the person who had listened to my pleas had eventually given me an opportunity to realize my dream of working in baseball. Even though the Reds’ front office, like many teams in those days, consisted of only a dozen or so employees, most of my dealings with Mr. Paul consisted of running down the hall to provide him with the latest scouting reports on players in whom he was interested.

This particular day though when I answered a summons from Miss [Frances] Levy to see Mr. Paul, I wasn’t asked to bring any scouting reports. There were two gentlemen in his office whom Gabe introduced as Craig Cullinan and George Kirksey. Gabe explained that they were from Houston and had a franchise in the newly created Continental League which was seeking major-league status. I was asked to acquaint them with the operation of our eight-team farm system and to answer any questions they might have about scouting and player development. I did as asked but then turned my attention back to the daily tasks, giving little thought to my meeting with the Houston delegation.

 

 

Soon thereafter though, there was another surprising development that piqued my curiosity. It was July and the Reds were on the road. I was enjoying an evening at home with my wife, Jonnie, and our 2-year-old daughter, Valerie, when the phone rang. It was Mr. Paul. He was in Chicago for a National League meeting. This was the first time he had ever called me at home. There was really little substance to the call. When finished, I told Jonnie, “That was strange. I don’t know why he called.” As we subsequently learned, that was the day the National League owners voted to expand. I suspect it is also the day that Gabe emotionally considered going to Houston if it got an expansion franchise. Subconsciously perhaps, he was lining up those he might be able to take with him to help launch the expansion franchise. But, expansion was an exclusive issue for owners, or their representatives. I was more concerned with how Tony Perez and Pete Rose were doing in their rookie seasons at Geneva in the NYP and Johnny Vander Meer’s need for another pitcher at Topeka.

The baseball season is long and the days are full. Time away from the daily grind is something most welcome. The baseball calendar was far different in my early years in the game prior to free agency. The one long break in the schedule was between the filing of reserve lists on October 16 and the winter meetings which usually began right after Thanksgiving. With this in mind, Jonnie and I began to plan a vacation trip to Durham, North Carolina where her mother and my parents both lived. Phil Seghi was the farm director for the Reds and my boss. I told Phil of our plans a couple weeks in advance. All was fine with Phil until one day he returned from his customary lunch with Gabe. Phil went on to say he had mentioned our vacation plans to Gabe, who seemed to take objection to my going at that time. I was somewhat chagrined by Mr. Paul’s reaction and indicated such to Phil. We were anxious for the grandparents to see Valerie and proceeded with our plans with what I assume was the reluctant approval of Phil and Gabe.

We drove from Cincinnati to Durham in my 1955 Chevy which did not have a radio. Upon arrival my mother rushed out to greet us and quickly related that Gabe, Phil, and others in the Reds office had called. Now I understand why Gabe was reluctant for us to go on vacation. The day we arrived in Durham, October 25, 1960, was the day Gabe stunned many by announcing he was leaving the Reds after some 25 years of service, the last nine as general manager. He was appointed general manager of the new Houston franchise in the first expansion of the major leagues since the formation of the American League in 1901.

The phone kept ringing as callers checked to see if we had arrived. Phil was the first one I spoke to, and he said Gabe wanted me to go to Houston with him and would be calling back shortly. I realized what an opportunity this might be and quickly accepted Gabe’s offer to serve as his assistant and help develop the new organization. Jonnie, Valerie, and I had a very brief visit in Durham and turned the Chevy around the next day to head back to Cincinnati, pack up there and embark on our new journey in Texas.

And what a ride it turned out to be!

We arrived in Houston and went to work for the new major-league team on November 1, 1960. We found Houston to be a very friendly and lively environment. It had the aura of the southwest – oil, cattle, cowboy boots, and 10-gallon hats. We have continued to make our home ever since with the exception of an interesting 21-month tour of duty in 1974-75 with George Steinbrenner’s New York Yankees where we were reunited with Gabe Paul. Today Houston has become more cosmopolitan and developed into the fourth-largest city in the country while maintaining energy and spirit that is undaunted.

I am so thankful that I had the opportunity to be part of a new major-league franchise. It was an exciting and unique experience to help form the Colt .45s and to see the team develop. Upon moving into the Astrodome and being renamed the Astros in 1965, we continued to serve the club in many capacities over the years – a total of 35 years over three different time periods. There were many bumps in the road, but the memories of the wins, on and off the field, far outweigh the losses. Many of those great moments in the club’s history are recounted in this book by Bill Nowlin and Maxwell Kates.

Pat Gillick once observed that it should take 10 years for an expansion team to emerge into a contender.1 The Hall of Fame executive would know; he oversaw the burgeoning of two of the 14 expansion teams. On one hand, his Astros were still a few years away from contending when he left Houston for the New York Yankees in 1973. On the other, after joining the Toronto Blue Jays on the ground floor in 1976, he watched their first pennant race in Year 7, winning the American League East two years later.

Each of the 14 expansion teams channeled their inner Pygmalion at different waves and speeds. In hockey, yes, it is possible to clinch a Stanley Cup berth in a team’s first season, as evidenced by the St. Louis Blues and the Vegas Golden Knights. In baseball, however, the odds are stacked against the expansion teams. All 14 emerged from humble beginnings and rose to contend in their respective league or division, before retreating yet again to mediocrity. This essay will address the question of which expansion draft yielded the most successful team in its first decade of play. To illustrate the premise, the following three statistical metrics shall be used:

How well did the teams perform on the field in their first 10 years? This question will be answered by analyzing the different won-lost records and winning percentages.

For how long did the players selected in the expansion drafts contribute effectively to their teams? This question will be answered by examining the length of time expansion players remained on their teams as active players.

Within the realm of expansion players, it is important to note “drafted players” and “regeneration players.” Drafted players were, quite simply, the players selected in each expansion draft. Regeneration players were the players received in trades for the drafted players. Both drafted and regeneration players are taken into account for the longevity analysis.

For example, the Montreal Expos selected Jesus Alou, Jack Billingham, and Skip Guinn in the 1968 expansion draft. Before the 1969 season, all three were traded to the Houston Astros for Rusty Staub. Three years later, in 1972, Staub was traded to the New York Mets for Tim Foli, Mike Jorgensen, and Ken Singleton. Alou, Billingham, and Guinn were “drafted” players. Staub was a “regeneration” player and so were the three Mets.

Of course, this part of the analysis assumes that a player on the roster after 10 years continues to display significant positive value. There is the argument that remaining on his team for 10 years may prove that he was not of significant enough value to be traded. The value of the drafted and regeneration players will be addressed by analyzing the statistical output of the players using wins above replacement (WAR).

It is the author’s hypothesis that, given their relatively quick rise to contend and the length of time that they remained competitive, the Kansas City Royals shall score most points for their expansion draft, with the Toronto Blue Jays finishing second.

 

 

PART I: WON-LOST ANALYSIS

One of the objectives used to analyze the success of each expansion draft was the won-lost records for the first 10 years of each franchise. Both the American and National Leagues adopted 162-game seasons prior to their first expansion drafts and the length of their seasons has not changed. Therefore, it should have been easy to assign point values for won-lost records. But what about strike seasons? Due to labor stoppages, complete seasons were not played in 1972, 1981, 1985, 1994, or 1995. What is the most accurate method to account for won-lost records in the incomplete seasons? The solution was to assign points based on winning percentages rather than wins whether the season was played to completion or not:

• .500 record: 1 point per season
• .550 record: 2 points per season
• .600 record: 3 points per season

The big winner here was the Arizona Diamondbacks with 12. Posting a record of 100-62 in 1999, only their second season, the Snakes capitalized on their success by defeating the Yankees in the World Series two years later. However, most of the key players on the 2001 Diamondbacks, including Randy Johnson, Mark Grace, and Steve Finley, were free agents, posing zero correlation with the expansion draft held four years earlier. The Kansas City Royals finished a close second with 11 points. The Royals, in an era that predated free agency, first broke the .500 barrier in 1971 in only their third season. From 1972 to 1978, the Royals posted only two losing seasons.

At the other end of the spectrum, three teams scored no points. The Seattle Mariners did not post a winning season until 1991, their 15th year of existence, nor did the Montreal Expos until 1979, their 11th. As for the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, they perpetuated their role as the doormat of the American League East for their entire first decade, failing to register even a .440 winning percentage.

 

 

PART II: EXPANSION PLAYERS

As defined earlier in this essay, expansion players consist of the following two components:

• Drafted Players: Players selected in the expansion draft
  
  
• Regeneration Players: Players received in trades for players selected in the expansion draft

Points were awarded to expansion players on the basis of five-year increments. If a drafted or regeneration player remains on his team’s roster five years into the franchise history, he is awarded two points. Any player drafted or generated by the expansion draft who remained on the roster after 10 years is awarded five points.

Leading the way here were the Kansas City Royals with 53 points. The expansion draft generated trades for Hal McRae, Amos Otis, Fred Patek, Marty Pattin, and Kansas City native Steve Mingori. All remained active and productive on the Royals’ roster in 1978 as they won their third consecutive American League West title. The Toronto Blue Jays were not far behind with 50 points. Expansion draft picks Jim Clancy, Ernie Whitt, and Garth Iorg all contributed to the Blue Jays’ in their “Drive of ‘85,” as did regeneration players Damaso Garcia and Rance Mulliniks.

On the other end of the scale, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays and Arizona Diamondbacks registered only 10 and 15 points, respectively. Only one expansion player, Brandon Lyon, remained in an Arizona uniform 10 years after the Diamondbacks joined the major leagues. No Devil Rays player can make the same claim.

PART III: INDIVIDUAL STATISTICS

The third and perhaps most crucial metric to understand the effectiveness of the 14 expansion drafts is to analyze the statistical output of the players. Several problems arose with this particular analysis. Which statistics should be analyzed and how best to weight these statistics? Are runs batted in more important than home runs? Since most expansion teams posted poor aggregate records, would won-lost be of any significance at all? And how do you compare players across eras? In the 1960s, the mound was higher, fences were wider, and the ball did not travel as far. Every team played on natural grass surfaces during the first round of expansion. By 1977, when the Mariners and the Blue Jays were admitted into the American League, 10 of the 26 teams played on artificial turf.

To solve the problem, the home run, runs batted in, won-lost, and earned-run average were all shelved in favor of one all-encompassing statistic: wins above replacement (WAR). Unveiled by Bill James at the SABR convention in Milwaukee on July 13, 2001, WAR is defined as “the number of wins [a player is] responsible for beyond the replacement level at the player’s position.”2 In other words, WAR is a statistical measure used to analyze the number of additional wins a player’s presence is expected to contribute over that of a player of average capabilities. WAR encompasses pitching, fielding, and baserunning statistics as well as batting.

For the purpose of writing this essay, WAR is the simplest and most direct way to assess the collective output of the expansion players. This essay will adopt the Baseball Reference calculation of WAR. If a player’s WAR is valued at 1, that is equal to one point in the expansion players’ analysis. Suppose players selected in an expansion draft and others generated in trades for those players yielded 17 wins above replacement after subtracting negative from positive scores. That would be equal to 17 points in this analysis.

Among first year teams, the 1969 Kansas City Royals scored the highest WAR with 26.6. At the other end of the scale, the 1993 Colorado Rockies as a team score a WAR of only 6.1. The Royals continued to lead their expansion brethren with an aggregate WAR of 184.8 in their first decade of American League baseball. Hal McRae (15.7), Amos Otis (37.2), Fred Patek (21.5) and Al Fitzmorris (15.5) all contributed to the Royals and their strong finish between 1969 and 1978.

The Seattle Pilots-Milwaukee Brewers franchise also generated a high WAR of 151.1. Most of the output was the work of regeneration players. As general manager of the Brewers from 1970 to 1972, Frank Lane traded most of the roster he inherited. In return, Lane received players like Don Money (23.9 WAR with the Brewers through 1978) and Johnny Briggs (14.4) from the Phillies, George “Boomer” Scott (22.6) from the Red Sox, and Jim Colborn (12.5) from the Cubs. The Tampa Bay Devil Rays, meanwhile, posted an aggregate WAR of only 36.9 among their expansion players. The New York Mets were not much better with 41.8.

 

 

THE ENVELOPE, PLEASE …

Now for the results of the expansion draft analysis:

14. Tampa Bay Devil Rays, 1998 to 2007, 47 pts

Not surprisingly, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays generated the lowest overall score. During their first decade in the major leagues, the Rays finished in last place every year, winning as many as 70 games only once, in 2004. Five expansion players remained on their roster in 2003, combining for a WAR of -0.1. One positive spin about the draft is that at least it yielded one good season from each of Miguel Cairo (3.2 WAR), Quinton McCracken (2.1), and Tony Saunders (3.1) in 1998.

Aggregate WAR: 36.9

13. New York Mets, 1962 to 1971, 66 pts

A great miracle happened at Flushing Meadows when, in 1969, the New York Mets won the World Series in only their eighth season. However, most of the team’s success in 1969 was attributed to the farm system and scouting department rather than the expansion draft. Only four players (Tommie Agee, Don Cardwell, J.C. Martin, Al Weis) were generated by trades from the expansion draft. Of the four, only Agee’s WAR (5.2) was of any significance. In the seven intermediate seasons, the Mets averaged only 56 wins while producing a total WAR of 27.5 from its expansion players

Aggregate WAR: 41.8

12. Seattle Mariners, 1977 to 1986, 115 pts

Like the Devil Rays, the Mariners did not post one winning season among their first 10 in the American League. Their record was slightly better than Tampa Bay’s; they finished in last place five times as opposed to 10. The Mariners did generate quality players, both through the expansion draft and through trades. The problem that the Mariners encountered under the ownership of Lester Smith and Danny Kaye, and, later, George Argyros, is that they could scarcely afford to keep players like Ruppert Jones, Rick Honeycutt, Floyd Bannister, and Richie Zisk. Only in 1987 did the luck of the Mariners’ trident begin to point upward when they selected Ken Griffey Jr. as the first overall pick in the June amateur draft.

Aggregate WAR: 87.6

11. Arizona Diamondbacks, 1998 to 2007, 116 pts

The Diamondbacks rose meteorically to win 100 games in 1999, 92 games and the World Series in 2001, and 98 games in 2002. As was discussed earlier, the rapid ascent of the Diamondbacks is attributed more to their free-agent signings than the players they selected in the expansion draft. It should be emphasized that two key players in their playoff run, Luis Gonzalez (30.2 WAR) and Curt Schilling (25.9 WAR), were acquired in trades generated by the expansion draft. The Diamondbacks’ reign atop the National League West was short, as the team plummeted to a record of 51-111 in 2004.

Aggregate WAR: 89.4

10. Houston Colt .45s-Astros, 1962 to 1971, 120 pts

In their first decade in the National League, the Houston franchise reached the break-even level only once, and that was exactly .500 (81-81) in 1969. The Colt .45s reaped immediate benefits from drafting pitchers Dick Farrell (16.7) and Bob Bruce (11.1). In addition, the draft generated a 1965 trade to the St. Louis Cardinals for Mike Cuellar (13.4). After yielding an aggregate WAR of 23.0 in 1962, expansion players yielded 16.2 wins above replacement to the Colt .45s in 1963 and 16.3 in 1964. Their contributions to the Astros after moving to the Astrodome were modest.

Aggregate WAR: 71.5

9. Colorado Rockies, 1993 to 2002, 126 points

The Rockies and their expansion players struggled in their first two seasons, posting a WAR of 6.1 in 1993 and 6.9 in 1994. Then in 1995, after moving from Mile High Stadium to Coors Field, the Rockies won a wild-card title with a record of 77-67. Two of the most prominent “Blake Street Bombers,” Larry Walker and Ellis Burks, were free-agent signings. However, unlike the Arizona Diamondbacks, the Rockies’ expansion players did contribute to their quick ascent. Dante Bichette, Vinny Castilla, Darren Holmes, Curtis Leskanic, Steve Reed, Kevin Ritz, and Eric Young Jr. were responsible for 21.2 wins above replacement for the 1995 Rockies. However, the early success of the Rockies was short-lived: Colorado contended again in 1996 and 1997 before retreating to mediocrity.

Aggregate WAR: 87.5

8. Montreal Expos, 1969 to 1984, 127 pts

The Expos were the third team who failed to reach the .500 barrier in its first decade in the major leagues, contending only in 1979 with a record of 95-65. Entering the National League with a record of 52-110 in 1969, the Expos fielded an above-average representation of quality players acquired through the expansion draft and trades. Players like Rusty Staub, Bill Stoneman, Ron Hunt, and Ron Fairly led the Expos to win an improbable “70 in ‘70” before appearing on the verge of contending as early as 1973. A global energy crisis, compounded by political uncertainty in Quebec, prompted the Expos to implement “Phase Two” in 1974. The most harmful trade in this austerity program sent Ken Singleton and Mike Torrez to the Baltimore Orioles for Rich Coggins and Dave McNally. Singleton and Torrez contributed a combined WAR of 48.3 before both players retired in 1984. Coggins and McNally, meanwhile, combined for a WAR of -1.0. Of the four teams celebrating their 10th anniversary in 1978, the Expos were the only one to post a losing record.

Aggregate WAR: 96.7

7. San Diego Padres, 1969 to 1978, 128 pts

Like their expansion brethren in Montreal, the Padres posted a record of 52-110 in 1969. The Padres, however, could not escape the basement of the National League West for another six years. Most of the players drafted by the Padres were prospects and therefore, remained on the roster longer than usual for an expansion team. The prize of the expansion draft was Nate Colbert, who was responsible for 17.2 wins above replacement in six years with San Diego. Although the Padres breached the .500 barrier in 1978 with a record of 84-78, their success was short-lived; they returned to last place in 1980.

Aggregate WAR: 89.1

6. Florida Marlins, 1993 to 2002, 137 pts

The Florida Marlins posted only one winning season in their first 10 years, a 92-70 record in 1997 on their way to winning the World Series. Many of the expansion players had already been replaced on the roster by free agents. However, the 1997 Marlins still included Jeff Conine (11.1 WAR), who was selected in the expansion draft, along with Gary Sheffield (13.0 WAR, who was acquired in a 1993 trade for Trevor Hoffman. Sheffield was traded to the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1998 for Mike Piazza, a Wayne Huizenga “blockbuster” that generated deals for Preston Wilson and Mike Lowell. Sheffield notwithstanding, expansion players were generally unaffected by the scorched-earth policy that dismantled the Marlins after the 1997 World Series. The 1998 Marlins plummeted in the standings to finish 54-108 and would not contend again until 2003, when they won another World Series.

Aggregate WAR: 87.8

5. LA-California Angels, 1961 to 1970, 152 pts

As one of the two initial expansion teams, the Los Angeles Angels were not even expected to win 50 games in 1961. Instead they won 70, setting a record among first-year expansion teams that still stands. A year later, they breached the .500 barrier with a record of 86-76. The Angels were inconsistent in their first decade, posting four winning records but never two consecutively. What helped the Angels in this analysis were the wins above replacement contributed by two players. Jim Fregosi, selected in the expansion draft from Boston, provided a WAR of 45.2 between 1961 and 1970. Meanwhile, an expansion-day trade landed Dean Chance from the Washington Senators. In six seasons with the Halos, Chance posted a WAR of 20.5. The selection of Fregosi continued to pay dividends for the Angels in the 1970s. A 1971 trade sending him to the New York Mets brought Nolan Ryan to Orange County for eight seasons, from 1972 to 1979.

Aggregate WAR: 129.3

4. Toronto Blue Jays, 1977 to 1986, 167 pts

The Blue Jays started slowly in the American League East, averaging 58 wins a season between 1977 and 1980. By 1983, they entered their first pennant race and soon became the most consistent team in baseball, averaging 91 wins through 1993. As stated earlier, expansion draft picks Jim Clancy, Garth Iorg, and Ernie Whitt all remained Blue Jays in 1986, combining for 31.8 wins above replacement for the decade. The Blue Jays under Pat Gillick became adept in the trading department, generating Roy Howell, Damaso Garcia, and Alfredo Griffin in deals for expansion draft selections. The Blue Jays probably would have ranked higher were it not for the contributions of the farm system and the Rule 5 draft that augmented the team’s success in the 1980s.

Aggregate WAR: 116.4

 

 

3. Seattle Pilots-Milwaukee Brewers, 1969 to 1978, 188 pts

Ironically, two of the more successful drafts belonged to teams that posted only one winning season in their first 10 years. The expansion Senators perpetuated Washington’s legacy as “first in war, first in peace, and last in the American League” until a sudden 86-win season in 1969 under new manager Ted Williams. The Milwaukee Brewers, having moved from Seattle in 1970, remained in their divisional doldrums until 1978. That is the year general manager Harry Dalton and manager George Bamberger imported “the Oriole Way” from Baltimore to reinvigorate “Bambi’s Bombers” into a contender.

As stated earlier, when Frank Lane was appointed general manager of the Milwaukee Brewers in 1970, he inherited a franchise in disarray. True to his reputation, Lane concocted a series of mammoth trades to overhaul the roster by 1972. The deals brought a number of talented players to “Suds City,” even if the Brewers’ success as a team was not felt immediately. After five years of hitting “taters” over the fence at County Stadium, the Brewers traded George Scott back to Boston in 1976 for Cecil Cooper. “Coop” starred at first base for Milwaukee well into the 1980s, rapping 44 doubles in 1979 and batting .352 in 1980. The Brewers remained contenders in the American League East through 1983, winning the pennant in 1982.

Aggregate WAR: 151.1

2. Washington Senators, 1961 to 1970, 190 points

Both Milwaukee and Washington scored high points largely because of the acumen of their general managers in assessing the expansion players in trades. Late in the 1961 season, the Senators traded Dave Sisler to the Cincinnati Reds for Claude Osteen. The left-handed Osteen contributed nine wins above replacement before he was packaged to the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1964. Washington was able to negotiate for Frank Howard, Ken McMullen, Dick Nen, Phil Ortega, and Pete Richert in exchange for Osteen. The quintet of ex-Angelenos combined for 54.2 wins above replacement between 1965 and 1970. The Claude Osteen trade continued to generate quality players for the franchise long after it moved to Texas in 1971.

Aggregate WAR: 149.4

1. Kansas City Royals, 1969 to 1978, 249 points

True to hypothesis, the most successful expansion draft belonged to the Kansas City Royals. It was not even close, as they finished 59 points ahead of their nearest competitor. The explanation for the Royals’ successful draft has already been analyzed. They contended as early as 1971, remained competitive for the remainder of the 1970s and all of the 1980s, while generating talented players from their draft choices who made positive contributions to the team.

No account on the early success of the Kansas City Royals would be complete without acknowledging Ewing M. Kauffman. Mr. K was not even a baseball fan, just a billionaire pharmaceutical magnate with fierce pride in his adopted hometown of Kansas City. He knew the psychological malaise associated with the Athletics moving to Oakland in 1967. The threat of an antitrust lawsuit followed and when the Royals came to town in 1969, Mr. K was happy to finance whatever was required to build a winner for Kansas City and keep them competitive.

Aggregate WAR: 184.8

CONCLUSION

Using the criteria of won-lost analysis, the longevity of the careers of the expansion players, and the wins above replacement contributed by these players, it was determined that the Kansas City Royals conducted the most successful expansion draft of any team. While the Toronto Blue Jays and Milwaukee Brewers also became perennial contenders, the Senators slipped back to last place in 1970 before abandoning Washington a year later. Economic misfortunes were a main hindrance for many of the other teams. Some were underfunded while others were tight on money. Others still had the funds but spent profligately. Even the Brewers, despite their later successes, were born out of the bankruptcy of the Seattle Pilots in 1970.

Expansion has demonstrated to be a successful experiment for the National and American Leagues. As the nexus of gravity of American commerce and industry has shifted from the American Northeast to the Sun Belt, the Pacific Coast, and across the 49th Parallel, the population has migrated, bringing with its interest in baseball. No doubt Gordon Cobbledick would have marveled at how baseball has evolved as a truly national pastime with 30 franchises from coast to coast. It was time for expansion baseball.

MAXWELL KATES is a CPA who lives and works in Toronto. He has worked in commercial radio and he writes a monthly column for the Houston-based Pecan Park Eagle. Maxwell’s articles and essays have appeared in The National Pastime along with several SABR BioProjects. He served as Director of Marketing for the Hanlan’s Point Chapter for 12 years and has spoken at SABR meetings and conventions in Seattle, Montreal, and Houston. His baseball highlights include to have witnessed Magglio Ordonez’s home run to win the 2006 American League Championship Series for the Detroit Tigers, along with the final out of the 2017 World Series. This is his first SABR project in an editorial capacity.

 

Disclaimer

All figures for wins above replacement (WAR) are based on the statistics per Baseball-Reference. These figures have been rounded for presentation purposes. The reader should be aware that if one were to look up these wins-above-replacement figures on Baseball-Reference, the actual results may vary slightly.

 

Acknowledgements

Scott Crawford, Pat Gillick, Jim Kreuz, Len Levin, Barbara Mantegani, Bill Nowlin, Jacob Pomrenke, David Raglin, and Carl Riechers.

In addition to the undernoted source, the author relied on Retrosheet.org and Baseball-Reference.com to access information for this paper.

 

Notes

1 Interview with Pat Gillick, January 20, 2018

2 Paul Dickson and Skip McAfee, The Dickson Baseball Dictionary, 3rd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 938.

Cover of the Arizona Diamondbacks expansion draft program on November 18, 1998. (Photo courtesy of Joel Zolondek)

 

In the first two decades since major-league baseball granted an expansion bid to Arizona Baseball, Inc., the Arizona Diamondbacks franchise has been characterized by the stability of its leadership. The franchise has had two managing general partners, the term it uses for its chief executive officer: Jerry Colangelo (1995-2004) and Ken Kendrick (2004-).

The actual ownership of the club has been far more divided. Dozens of investors backed Phoenix Suns executive Jerry Colangelo’s original ownership group, Arizona Baseball, Inc., in 1995. Ken Kendrick leads a four-man ownership group that also includes Jeffrey Royer, Michael Chipman, and Dale Jensen, all of whom have owned at least a portion of the club since its inception.

In contrast, the Diamondbacks’ on-the-field performance has been consistently inconsistent ever since those heady early years. The team was a near-immediate contender for a world championship. Despite the Diamondbacks’ more recent struggles in the standings, the steadiness of its leadership transformed the franchise into one of the National League’s most respected almost immediately.

Metropolitan Phoenix’s Path to the Major Leagues

The arrival of major-league baseball in metropolitan Phoenix in 1998 was preceded by a half-century of close ties between the Valley of the Sun, as Phoenix and 9,200-square-mile Maricopa County are widely known, and the big leagues. The Arizona State University baseball program has been a national collegiate power since the mid-1960s. As of 2016 the Sun Devils have won five NCAA championships, appeared in 22 College World Series, and produced numerous major-league stars, including Reggie Jackson, Barry Bonds, Dustin Pedroia, and Bob Horner. Since 1992, metropolitan Phoenix has hosted the six-team Arizona Fall League, which provides outstanding minor-league prospects with the opportunity to play in a highly competitive atmosphere once their Double-A and Triple-A seasons have concluded.

Metropolitan Phoenix’s most significant historical connection to the majors has been as the primary host of the Cactus League. Arizona has been home to major-league spring training since the immediate aftermath of World War II. In 1947, the Cleveland Indians began taking up preseason residence 120 miles southeast of Phoenix in Tucson, the winter home of the club’s new owner, Bill Veeck.

Veeck persuaded New York Giants owner Horace Stoneham to join the Indians in Arizona. Stoneham placed his club’s spring-training camp in Phoenix. In 1952 the Chicago Cubs, who had previously trained on owner Phil Wrigley’s Catalina Island (California) estate, began training in Mesa, just to the east of Phoenix. The arrival of the Cubs and the off-and-on presence of other clubs helped to formalize the existence of the Cactus League, the Grand Canyon State’s spring-training counterpart to Florida’s Grapefruit League.1

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Cactus League remained a small yet stable operation, growing slowly to an eight-team league as major-league baseball expanded rapidly from 16 to 26 teams. Several of the Midwestern clubs in the Cactus League, particularly the Cubs, turned their spring-training homes into popular winter tourist destinations for their fan bases as well as homes away from home for seasonal residents or permanent transplants to Arizona.2

In 1989 the eight-team Cactus League was in danger of losing one of its founding members. The Cleveland Indians announced plans to move their spring-training headquarters from Tucson to Homestead, Florida. The impending departure, which threatened the existence of the Cactus League, provoked immediate action from local political leaders, including US Senator John McCain, Governor Rose Mofford, and Maricopa County Supervisor Jim Bruner, who later played a major role in the arrival of the Diamondbacks in Arizona.

In 1990 the Arizona Legislature passed legislation that created a Maricopa County stadium district governed by the county Board of Supervisors. The measure authorized the county to collect a $2.50 car-rental tax. The revenue from the tax helped revitalize existing spring-training facilities and build several new complexes, including one for the Indians, who chose to stay in Arizona, moving to the Phoenix suburb of Goodyear in 1993.

Four of the publicly financed facilities created by the legislation are each shared by two major-league clubs, including the Indians’ facility in Goodyear, which they share with the Cincinnati Reds. Arizona’s significant public investment in spring-training baseball helped lure a number of franchises to the Cactus League. As of 2016, 15 of the 30 major-league teams belonged to the geographically compact (every team but one is in Maricopa County) and virtually rainout-free Cactus League.3

The Maricopa County Stadium Authority, which was created to save the Cactus League, played a similarly decisive role several years later in the arrival of the Diamondbacks by providing the region with a public institution capable of financing a ballpark costing several hundred million dollars.

Making Phoenix Major League (1985-1995)

The first concerted civic effort to secure a major-league franchise began as metropolitan Phoenix, with almost 2 million residents, became the nation’s 14th largest metropolitan area in the late 1980s. Martin Stone, the owner of the Phoenix Firebirds, the San Francisco Giants Triple-A affiliate, was the driving force behind the push. Beginning in the mid-1980s, he sought either an expansion team or a relocated franchise.

It was no secret that Bill Bidwill, owner of the NFL’s St. Louis Cardinals, intended to move to Phoenix. Stone persuaded Bidwill to join him in building a stadium in the downtown area. In April 1987 the city agreed to secure $150 million in bonding to build a 70,000-seat domed stadium on a 66-acre parcel of land in the southern section of downtown Phoenix.

The stadium was to serve as the springboard to a $500 million downtown redevelopment plan that would include public and private investments in commercial and retail space, hotels, and housing. To pay off the construction bonds, Stone or any other prospective tenant agreed to turn over to the city the proceeds from the sale of 212 luxury skyboxes and 10,800 club seats. All of these plans would be executed once a major professional sports franchise signed a lease to play in the stadium.4

In January 1988 Bidwill won approval from the NFL to move his franchise to Arizona. But instead of becoming a tenant of Stone and the city in the planned domed stadium, Bidwill signed a long-term lease with Arizona State University to play the Cardinals’ games at the football-only Sun Devil Stadium in Tempe, just east of Phoenix. That brought Stone’s plans for a domed stadium to an end.

In May 1988 Stone backed out of his deal with Phoenix, arguing that he could no longer negotiate the terms of a stadium lease from a position of strength as he had neither a franchise in hand nor another tenant with whom to share the burden of selling premium seats to the public.5

Without Stone’s backing for the deal, stadium plans languished. In October 1989, nearly 60 percent of Phoenix voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have allowed the issuance of $100 million of the previously authorized bonds for a domed ballpark. Big-league insiders had made it clear to Arizona leaders that public support for a stadium was a prerequisite for serious consideration for a franchise.

After the initiative failed, the Legislature passed a law allowing the city to bypass a referendum in their push for big-league baseball. The Legislature also authorized the county Board of Supervisors to impose a 0.25 percent sales tax to help finance construction of a baseball stadium if one of the county’s municipalities was awarded a franchise.6

Stone continued to pursue a major-league team for Phoenix into the early 1990s. Then in 1991, he abandoned his Arizona plans to become a partner in what turned out to be an unsuccessful effort to purchase the Montreal Expos. (There was little indication that Stone pursued a stake in the Expos to move the franchise. Montreal was less than a two-hour drive from his home in Lake Placid, New York.) Stone’s decision to withdraw his Arizona bid brought a de-facto end to Phoenix’s chances to get a team during that expansion cycle, when franchises were awarded to Denver and Miami.7

While Martin Stone spent a half-decade in single-minded pursuit of big-league baseball for the Phoenix area, the bid that actually brought a major-league team to Arizona came together more serendipitously. In early 1993, Maricopa County Supervisor and longtime baseball supporter Jim Bruner began discussing the idea of putting together a bid for a forthcoming new round of expansion with a friend, Phoenix sports attorney Joe Garagiola Jr., the son of the baseball personality, player, and commentator. Later in 1993, Bruner and Garagiola set up a meeting with Phoenix Suns owner Jerry Colangelo, one of the region’s most popular public figures and fervent boosters, to discuss their idea.

Colangelo’s Suns had engendered unprecedented enthusiasm in the region for professional sports with an exciting run to the NBA playoff finals that year. Bruner and Garagiola persuaded Colangelo to spearhead the effort to bring in a baseball team. Taking on this role required Colangelo to manage a $125 million fundraising drive to pay the anticipated franchise fee for the 1994 expansion. Moreover, Colangelo took on the responsibility of negotiating a public financing deal for a downtown baseball stadium.

Several years earlier, the Suns owner had experienced this process while seeking public funds in support of a new venue for the Suns. Colangelo later said that taking the lead in the baseball expansion effort fulfilled his desire to play a more prominent role in increasing the national profile of the Valley of the Sun. He was also playing a central role in negotiating the deal that led to the relocation of the National Hockey League’s Winnipeg Jets to Phoenix’s America West Arena, where they were rechristened the Phoenix Coyotes in 1996.8

Colangelo’s rags-to-riches story was well known to Arizonans with even a passing knowledge of professional sports. Born the son of Italian immigrants in a hardscrabble section of Chicago Heights, Illinois, Colangelo Colangelo made use of his athletic and intellectual abilities as well as his unparalleled work ethic to become a great success. A high-school basketball star, Colangelo gained an athletic scholarship to the University of Illinois, where he captained the basketball team and earned All Big-Ten status. After graduating in 1962 he eventually found work with the NBA’s Chicago Bulls and rose quickly through front-office positions. By the time he left the Bulls six years later, Colangelo was the franchise’s director of marketing and its chief scout.

In 1968, the expansion Phoenix Suns basketball franchise hired the 29-year-old Colangelo as their first general manager, making him the youngest in major professional sports. Colangelo transformed the Suns into one of professional basketball’s best-managed and most consistently successful franchises. During his 35 years as a Suns executive, the team was a fixture in the Western Conference playoffs and played to large, boisterous crowds, first at the Arizona Veterans Memorial Coliseum on the State Fairgrounds and then at the downtown America West Arena. Despite never winning the championship, Colangelo earned numerous NBA Executive of the Year Awards, acknowledging both his franchise’s success and his status as a mover and shaker in league circles.9

In 1987 Colangelo headed a 10-member limited partnership called JDM Partners LLC that purchased the Suns for $44.5 million. The move came soon after a drug scandal that threatened the franchise’s squeaky-clean image. Colangelo cleaned house quickly and soon restored the Suns to on-court success; they put together a franchise-record streak of seven consecutive 50-win seasons between 1988-1989 and 1994-1995.

Colangelo also negotiated a financing deal for a new arena to be built primarily with private money raised through JDM’s limited partners and corporate sponsorship deals. America West Arena, the Suns’ new downtown home, opened in June 1992. Bearing the name of a Phoenix-based airline, it was one of the earliest examples of stadium naming rights being sold to a corporation.10

 

Arizona Diamondbacks owner Jerry Colangelo, right, is interviewed by broadcaster Thom Brennaman before the MLB expansion draft on November 18, 1997, at the Phoenix Civic Center in Phoenix, Arizona. (Photo courtesy of Joel Zolondek)

 

In September 1993 Colangelo announced the formation of Arizona Baseball Inc., whose purpose was to bring a major-league baseball team to Phoenix. Colangelo’s insider status made Arizona’s bid an immediate frontrunner in the expansion chase. As an NBA executive, he ran in similar circles with major-league baseball executives.

More than just a known commodity, Colangelo had the added advantage of being close personal friends with Chicago White Sox and Chicago Bulls owner Jerry Reinsdorf, who actively championed Arizona’s bid. More than two dozen limited partners bought into Arizona Baseball Inc., including executives at Bank of America, Circle K, and Phoenix radio station KTAR, trucking magnate and future Phoenix Coyotes owner Jerry Moyes, comedian Billy Crystal, and Phoenix Suns All-Star Danny Manning.11

Colangelo set to work negotiating a financing deal for a downtown ballpark. His opposite number was Jim Bruner, a member of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, who also constituted the Maricopa County Stadium Authority. Despite his enthusiasm for bringing big-league baseball to the region, the fiscally conservative Bruner drove a hard bargain. He made it clear to Colangelo that there would be no increase in the 0.25 percent sales tax unless Maricopa County residents received a good deal on the facility. Colangelo agreed to a set of terms that saved Maricopa County taxpayers more than $40 million on the facility.12

The stadium financing deal Bruner and Colangelo worked out capped Maricopa County’s sales tax contribution at $238 million. It gave ownership of the ballpark to the county and guaranteed the county one-third of the annual earnings from naming rights. (In 1998 Bank One acquired the naming rights for 10 years at a cost of $70 million.) The financing deal provided the county with an escalating annual revenue guarantee based on ticket sales while requiring the Diamondbacks to pay for the maintenance of the ballpark.

In return, the county granted the baseball team a 30-year lease and primary-tenant status. Despite some misgivings, Colangelo agreed to the deal. He realized that if he alienated an ally like Bruner, the political pressure that other county supervisors would face from a public that less than five years earlier had turned down a stadium financing referendum would likely push their votes into the “no” column.13

Maricopa County tax assessors projected that revenue from the 0.25 percent sales tax would reach its $238 million target in approximately 2½ years, and the tax would end around the time the ballpark was slated to open in March 1998. In fact, the target was reached four months earlier than expected, in November 1997, two years after construction began on the 48,500-seat domed stadium and four months before the first pitch.14

But even with the taxpayer-friendly amendments to the deal, widespread opposition emerged almost immediately to the public financing of a ballpark without voter input. Many opponents decried what they perceived as collusion between the city’s political and business elite. More than 800 residents, split roughly evenly between supporters and opponents, attended the February 1994 meeting at which the Board of Supervisors voted amid a heavy police presence on the stadium deal.15

After a contentious six-hour meeting, the Supervisors voted 3 to 1 with one recusal to impose the sales tax. Colangelo, the public face of the stadium project, skipped the meeting. His presence would likely have galvanized the already stinging criticism that he and pro-stadium legislators had already faced as a result of the deal. Long the darling of the Phoenix media, Colangelo had never experienced citizens referring to him in letters to the editor or public meetings as a “thief” or claiming that he was trying to “rape” the taxpayers. Jim Bruner, who both helped to develop the plan to pursue a baseball team and negotiated the terms of the financing deal with Colangelo, cast the deciding vote for the measure.16

The three supervisors who supported the tax faced serious consequences. After the vote, Bruner, as he had planned, resigned from the board to run for an open congressional seat. He lost in the Republican primary to attorney John Shadegg, who transformed the campaign into a virtual referendum on Bruner’s support for the stadium tax. Pro-sales-tax Supervisor Ed King lost his bid for re-election in 1996 in a campaign that focused heavily on his support for the tax.17

More than three years after the vote, in August 1997, Supervisor Mary Rose Wilcox, the lone Democrat on the Board of Supervisors, who voted to impose the tax, was shot in the lower back after a Supervisors meeting by a man described as mentally deranged. The attacker told the press, “I shot Supervisor Mary Rose Wilcox to try to put a stop to the political dictatorship of Jerry Colangelo in pushing the baseball stadium tax.” Wilcox survived the attack, which she blamed on the harsh opposition to the tax that remained a fixture of Phoenix talk radio.18

Ballpark deal in hand, Colangelo made his expansion pitch to major-league owners in February 1994. He emphasized the booming population of metropolitan Phoenix, the region’s history of enthusiastic support for collegiate, spring-training, and Fall League baseball, and his history of managerial success with the Suns.19 A few days later the owners awarded Arizona Baseball Inc. an expansion franchise. (They also awarded a franchise to a Tampa-St. Petersburg-based ownership group led by businessman Vincent J. Naimoli.) They were to begin playing in the 1998 season.

After a 1995 “name the team” contest conducted by the Arizona Republic in 1995, the nickname Diamondbacks was chosen for the team. The Diamondbacks adopted a quintessentially late 1990s palette of team colors: purple, turquoise, black, and copper. The colors were marketed as evocative of the region’s cultural heritage. Collectively, the color scheme adopted by the Diamondbacks, or “DBacks,” as they were soon dubbed by the local media, looked similar to the colors of Colangelo’s other team, the Suns, whose stature in the region was then at its peak.

Colangelo persuaded the other partners in Arizona Baseball Inc. to call the team the Arizona Diamondbacks rather than the Phoenix Diamondbacks to cultivate a statewide sense of pride and ownership. Moreover, the “Arizona” branding of the Diamondbacks was in keeping with the previous round of baseball expansion, which brought the Florida Marlins and Colorado Rockies into existence.20

As general manager the Diamondbacks in June 1995 hired Joe Garagiola Jr., one of the founding fathers of big-league baseball in Phoenix. Later that year, Colangelo and Garagiola hired Buck Showalter as the club’s first manager. Showalter came aboard just days after the New York Yankees fired him in the wake of the team’s playoff loss in its first postseason appearance in 14 years.

Like many of his predecessors in New York, the intense Showalter butted heads frequently with the club’s domineering owner, George Steinbrenner. The Diamondbacks gave Showalter the additional responsibility to oversee the development of its minor-league system. The Diamondbacks fielded their first affiliated minor-league teams in 1996. In subsequent seasons Showalter clashed with Garagiola over the direction of the club. Showalter preferred a steady player-development program through a farm system while Garagiola adopted the “win-now” (meaning sign free agents) approach favored by Colangelo. As a result, Showalter was fired after the 2000 season.21

The “win-now” approach was clearly the governing ideology of the Diamondbacks by the time of the November 18, 1997, expansion draft. Colangelo believed that taxpayers deserved an immediately competitive club in return for the investment they had made in Bank One Ballpark. Moreover, he believed that unless the Diamondbacks fielded an immediately competitive team, they would not gain a foothold in the increasingly tight market for Arizona sports fans’ dollars.

By the time the Diamondbacks played their first game at Bank One Ballpark, metropolitan Phoenix was home to teams in all four major professional leagues. In the expansion draft, the Diamondbacks scooped up veteran starting pitchers Brian Anderson and Jeff Suppan with their first two picks. After the draft they traded several of the prospects they had selected for veterans like Detroit Tigers third baseman Travis Fryman and Florida Marlins center fielder Devon White. During the 1997-1998 baseball offseason, the Diamondbacks acquired two of the most high-profile and high-priced players available, shortstop Jay Bell via free agency and third baseman Matt Williams via trade with the Indians.22

The Diamondbacks doubled down on the “win-now” approach in their early years, signing pitching aces Randy Johnson in 1999 and Curt Schilling in 2000 to long-term deals that deferred the big payments until the latter years of their contracts. The Diamondbacks’ willingness to invest heavily in elite starting pitching put them on the fast track to the postseason. They finished first in the NL West in 1999, their second season in the major leagues. Never before had an expansion team reached the playoffs so quickly. Two years later, Johnson and Schilling anchored the team that won the 2001 World Series against the Yankees.23

 

Pitcher Andy Benes throws out the first pitch in the history of the Arizona Diamondbacks franchise on Opening Day, March 31, 1998, at Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix, Arizona. (Photo courtesy of Joel Zolondek)

 

The Diamondbacks’ success helped them draw large crowds even after the honeymoon of their first season. More than 2.5 million people attended games at the Bank One Ballpark (nicknamed the BOB) in each of the franchise’s first seven seasons. Initially, the BOB proved to be its own draw with an unprecedented array of amenities that appealed to spectators who were not especially interested in baseball: several playgrounds, a picnic pavilion, a day spa, and a swimming-pool party area (which could be rented for a group of up to 30 for $4,000 per game) were among the most popular attractions. The ballpark’s retractable roof allowed fans to enjoy the sun while sitting in air-conditioned comfort. Additionally, the BOB offered some of the most affordable prices in baseball. In the late 1990s, a family of four could attend a game for well under $50, including tickets, parking, and refreshments.24

On game days, thousands of suburbanites who would likely not have otherwise patronized downtown Phoenix brought their discretionary dollars to the BOB and its environs. The presence of the Diamondbacks hardly transformed commercial or residential patterns in Maricopa County. According to a 2015 study commissioned by the Diamondbacks, the franchise generated $8.2 billion in economic activity since it began in March 1998. This is less than 0.5 percent of the total economic activity in Maricopa County in that same time period.

Nevertheless, Bank One Ballpark has contributed to the revitalization of downtown Phoenix. During the 1960s suburban shopping centers replaced downtown Phoenix as the region’s retail center. But the downtown area slowly emerged from its doldrums, becoming a destination to visitors outside of banker’s hours. The creation of a number of new institutions and attractions in downtown Phoenix added vibrancy to the once moribund area. In addition to the BOB, Maricopa County taxpayers subsidized municipal bonds that financed the construction of a number of other downtown attractions during the 1990s, including a new library, a science center, an art museum, and a museum of Arizona history.25

The success the Diamondbacks enjoyed during their early years came at a high price. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the franchise signed high-priced free agents to large contracts that deferred large amounts of salary. Between 1998 and 2000, the Diamondbacks more than doubled their payroll from $32 million to $80 million. The 2001 World Series-winning team had an $84 million payroll, of which $46 million was deferred.

To pay off the deferred salaries, the Diamondbacks raised ticket prices sharply in the early 2000s and eventually traded Schilling to the Boston Red Sox in November 2003 and Johnson to the New York Yankees in December 2004 for prospects and cash. By the end of the 2004 season, the club owed more than a quarter of a billion dollars in deferred salaries.26

 

Randy Johnson, top, leaps onto the dogpile at home plate to celebrate the Arizona Diamondbacks’ 3-2 win over the New York Yankees in Game 7 of the 2001 World Series on November 4, 2001, at Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix, Arizona. (Photo courtesy of Joel Zolondek)

 

Displeasure with the direction of the franchise led to Colangelo’s ouster as managing general partner by the other four general partners in Arizona Baseball Inc. in August 2004. Garagiola followed Colangelo out the door in 2005. Ken Kendrick, who had been a managing partner since the franchise’s origins, took over as managing general partner. As of 2016 Jeffrey Royer, Michael Chipman, and Dale Jensen remained the other general partners.

A native of West Virginia, Kendrick made his fortune in the software business as the founder of Datatel Inc., a Virginia-based company that provided high-tech services and software to colleges and universities. He and his wife, Randy, have long been conservative political activists. In recent years, they have worked closely with the Koch political organization. During the 2016 Republican presidential primaries, the Kendricks made headlines in Arizona for their strident opposition to Donald Trump’s bid for the nomination. Like Kendrick, Jensen and Chipman earned their fortunes in the software industry. Jensen is the co-founder of Information Technology, which develops software for the banking industry. Chipman was the creator and original owner of TurboTax. Royer was an executive in the cable television industry.27

Since Kendrick became managing general partner, the Diamondbacks have moved into a new spring-training facility, the architecturally striking Salt River Fields at Talking Stick, an 11,000-seat facility in Scottsdale that they share with the Colorado Rockies. Opened in 2011, the facility is on land owned by the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. Like Scottsdale itself, Talking Stick evokes the Old Southwest with its homages to mission revival architecture, sagebrush surroundings, and views of Camelback Mountain. Like other new spring-training facilities in Arizona, Talking Stick was subsidized in large part by the $2.50 rental-car tax that was put in place back in 1990 to revitalize the ballparks of the Cactus League.29

In 2005 Bank One merged with J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank One Ballpark was renamed Chase Field. In 2016 Kendrick and the Diamondbacks organization were engaged in contentious negotiations with the Maricopa County Stadium Authority over the future of Chase Field. The Diamondbacks assert that Chase Field needs significant upgrades or replacement after nearly two decades of use.

In March 2016 Kendrick made public his belief that the Diamondbacks needed a new ballpark, and presented a preliminary proposal to county officials. But the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors made it evident that they had no interest in supporting any such municipal investments, particularly when Major League Baseball deemed Chase Field acceptable to host its All-Star Game as recently as 2011. In the summer of 2016 the Diamondbacks asked Maricopa County for help in subsidizing $65 million worth of renovations to Chase Field, which county officials have also rejected.30

 

Notes

1  Rick Thompson, “A History of the Cactus League,” Spring Training Magazine, March 1989. Accessed on June 17, 2016: springtrainingmagazine.com/history4.html#cactus; Gary Rausch, “The Cactus League Is a Major League Tourist Attraction in Arizona,” Chicago Tribune, February 26, 1989, M23.

2 Ibid. Thompson, “A History of the Cactus League.”

3 Rick Hummel, “Cactus League Is Coming on Strong,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 7, 2010, C1; Ron Fimrite, “The Selling of Spring,” Sports Illustrated, March 27, 1989, 58-61.

4 Raymond Schultze, “Stadium Developer Quits Deal,” Phoenix Gazette, May 27, 1988, A1, A11; David Schwartz, “Martin Stone Quits Pact for ‘Dome’; Plan in Peril,” Arizona Republic, May 27, 1988, A1, A8; Christopher Broderick, “Agreement Reached on Stadium,” Arizona Republic, April 10, 1987, A1.

5 Martin Van Der Werf, “Martin Stone,” Arizona Republic, March 12, 1995, BB2; “Stadium Developer Quits Deal”; “Martin Stone Quits Pact for ‘Dome’; Plan in Peril”; “Agreement Reached on Stadium.”

6 Robert Barrett, “Stadium Fails, Goddard Wins,” Arizona Republic, October 4, 1989, A1.

7 “Martin Stone”; Bob Cohn, “Race for Big Leagues Begins,” Arizona Republic, June 15, 1990, A1; Eric Miller, “Valley Strikes Out,” Arizona Republic, December 19, 1990, A1.

8 John Walters, “Brazen Arizona,” Sports Illustrated, January 29, 1996, 190-194.

9 Robert Logan, “Colangelo Quits Bulls to Take Phoenix Post,” Chicago Tribune, February 29, 1968, C1; Bob Logan, “Colangelo Has Suns Climbing for Summit,” Chicago Tribune, May 23, 1976, B3; Lee Shappell, “Jerry Colangelo,” Arizona Republic, March 12, 1995, BB2; “Colangelo Took Bait All the Way to Finals”; Kevin Simpson, “The Place to Be,” The Sporting News, November 7, 1994, S3; Jack McCallum, “Desert Heat,” Sports Illustrated, May 28, 1990, 50-51; Joe Gilmartin, “Suns’ Colangelo NBA Executive of the Year,” The Sporting News, May 16, 1981, 46.

10 “NBA Notebook: Pacific,” The Sporting News, October 26, 1987, 47; Steve Wilson, “When You’re Colangelo, You Gotta Believe,” Arizona Republic, January 16, 1994, 10; Norm Frauenheim, “Colangelo-Led Group Buys Phoenix Suns,” Arizona Republic, October 13, 1987, A1, A2.

11 “Baseball Panel Backs Phoenix, Tampa Bay,” Arizona Republic, March 8, 1995, A1, A16; “DBacks Ownership a Mixed Bag,” Arizona Republic, March 30, 1998, C33; Richard Obert, “Floating on Air, Colangelo Readies Big Party Today,” Arizona Republic, March 11, 1995, C1.

12 Mike Padgett, “Decision Cost Jim Bruner His Dream of Serving as U.S. Congressman,” Phoenix Business Journal, March 26, 2008. Accessed June 10, 2016: bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2008/03/31/story7.html.

13 David Schwartz and Eric Miller, “County Close to Deal on Ballpark,” Arizona Republic, January 9, 1994, A1; Frank Fitzpatrick, “Stadium Issues Can Explode: Take Phoenix,” Philadelphia Inquirer, January 13, 1999, E1; “Decision Cost Jim Bruner His Dream of Serving as U.S. Congressman”;

14 “Decision Cost Jim Bruner His Dream of Serving as U.S. Congressman.”

15 “County Close to Deal on Ballpark.” “Decision Cost Jim Bruner His Dream of Serving as U.S. Congressman.”

16 David Fritze, David Schwartz, and Eric Miller, “Play Ball: Stadium Tax Wins OK,” Arizona Republic, February 18, 1994; “Jerry Colangelo”; Bob McManaman, “Tax Foes’ Name-Calling ‘Hurt Deeply,’” Arizona Republic, February 19, 1994, A20.

17 “County Close to Deal on Ballpark”; Arizona Republic, January 9, 1994, A1; David Schwartz and Eric Miller, “Negotiators Strike Deal on Big-League Ballpark,” Arizona Republic, January 15, 1994, A1; “Decision Cost Jim Bruner His Dream of Serving as U.S. Congressman.”

18 Mike McCloy, “Supervisor Is Shot,” Arizona Republic, August 14, 1997, A1, A12; William Hermann, Susie Steckner, and Mike McCloy, “Suspect: Tax Spurred Shooting,” Arizona Republic, August 14, 1997, A1, A12; Mike McCloy, “Wilcox Snags 50 Tickets for Opening,” Arizona Republic, March 31, 1998, A1; Mike McCloy, “‘Guy has a Gun’: Guard Acted Fast,” Arizona Republic, August 15, 1997, A1; Frank Fitzpatrick, “Stadium Issues Can Explode: Take Phoenix,” Philadelphia Inquirer, January 13, 1999, E1.

19 Bob McManaman, “Colangelo Winds Up to Make Big Pitch,” Arizona Republic, February 19, 1994, A1, A20.

20 “Brazen Arizona.”

21 Murray Chass, “Arizona Gets Set to Hire Showalter,” New York Times, November 12, 1995, 42; Howard Fendrich, “Diamondbacks, Yankees Found Success After Showalter Left,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 25, 2001. Accessed June 10, 2016: seattlepi.com/sports/baseball/article/Diamondbacks-Yankees-found-success-after-1069899.php

22 Ken Rosenthal, “All Arizona Has to Do Now, Right Now, Is Win,” The Sporting News, March 12, 2001, 49; Peter Schmuck, “In Hurry, a Trading Flurry After Draft,” Baltimore Sun, November 19, 1997. Accessed June 10, 2016: articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-11-19/sports/1997323118_1_red-sox-pedro-martinez-rosters.

23 “Floating on Air, Colangelo Readies Big Party Today”; Pedro Gomez, “Tickled to Be in Arizona,” The Sporting News, December 14, 1998, 80; “All Arizona Has to Do Now, Right Now, Is Win.”

24 Mike McCloy, “Ballpark Looks Like a Million,” Arizona Republic, October 13, 1996, B1; Don Ketchum, “In the Ballpark,” Arizona Republic, November 16, 1995, D4; “Come Along on a BOB Tour,” Arizona Republic, March 22, 1998, A1; Martin Van Der Wert, “1st Year Is a Tryout for Cooling System,” Arizona Republic, March 22, 1998, BP6; “Family-Style Attractions Cover All the Bases,” Arizona Republic, March 22, 1998, BP10; Bill Muller, Mark Shaffer, and Richard Ruelas, “BOB Takes a Bow,” Arizona Republic, March 30, 1998, A1; Linda Helser, “Diamondbacks May Be Best Pro Sports Bargain in Valley,” Arizona Republic, March 29, 1998, C37; Pedro Gomez and Mark Topkin, “Scouting the Expansion Cities,” The Sporting News, March 30, 1998, 26; “Fans Guide: Ticket Prices,” March 30, 1998, Arizona Republic, C41

25 “Arizona Diamondbacks Letter to Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, January 12, 2016,” BallparkDigest.com, March 30, 2016. Accessed August 3, 2016: ballparkdigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/OriginalDbacksletterforChairmanSupervisors03242016.pdf ; “Maricopa County Stadium District: Comprehensive Annual Financial Report,” Maricopa.gov, June 30, 2013. Accessed August 3, 2016: maricopa.gov/StadiumDistrict/pdf/MCStadiumDistFY12AFR.pdf; David Fritze, “Boom! Downtown May Fully Awaken,” Arizona Republic, March 12, 1995, BB7.

26 “All Arizona Has to Do Now, Right Now, Is Win”; Nick Piecoro, “Jerry Colangelo’s Shadow Remains Prominent Over Diamondbacks,” azcentral.com, September 27, 2014. Accessed June 3, 2016: azcentral.com/story/sports/mlb/diamondbacks/2014/09/27/jerry-colangelos-shadow-remains-prominent-diamondbacks/16344607/.

27 “Jerry Colangelo’s Shadow Remains Prominent Over Diamondbacks.”

28 Ibid.

29 “Cactus League Stadium Guide: Salt River Fields at Talking Stick,” FoxSports.com, February 24, 2016. Accessed June 3, 2016: foxsports.com/arizona/story/cactus-league-stadium-guide-salt-river-fields-arizona-diamondbacks-colorado-rockies-022416; “Cactus League: Salt River Fields,” azcentral.com, February 24, 2016. Accessed June 3, 2016: azcentral.com/story/entertainment/events/2015/02/25/cactus-league-stadium-guide-salt-river-fields-at-talking-stick/24009267/.

30 Rebekah L. Sanders, “Maricopa County Rejects Most of Arizona Diamondbacks’ Requested $65M for Upgrades,” azcentral.com, August 8, 2016. Accessed August 14, 2016: azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2016/08/08/maricopa-county-rejects-most-diamondbacks-request-65-million-chase-field-upgrades/88279408/.

Joe Robbie Stadium on Opening Day, April 5, 1993. (Courtesy of the Miami Marlins)

 

The National League expansion of 1993 was a long time coming. The 1991 decision to add the Colorado Rockies and the Florida Marlins to the major leagues was the end of “the road that began six years, three commissioners, and three league presidents ago.”1

This road began in January of 1984, when Major League Baseball announced an eight-member committee to study the possibility another expansion after 1977. In the fall of 1985, twelve groups presented expansion proposals to a 14-owner committee. At that year’s winter meetings, Commissioner Peter Ueberroth mentioned expansion in his “state of the game” speech

Over the next few years, the owners tabled expansion talks, focusing instead on clubs claiming to be in financial trouble and on fighting claims of collusion by the players union.

By 1987, the US Senate had formed a Task Force on Expansion. This bipartisan group was led by Senator Tim Wirth (D) of Colorado, and included senators from several states with cities that had expressed interest in a baseball franchise. These included Arizona (Phoenix), Tennessee (Nashville), Indiana (Indianapolis), Ohio (Columbus), Colorado (Denver), Florida (Miami, St. Petersburg), and the delegate from Washington, D.C.

As other congressional groups had done in the past, this task force told MLB to either expand to more cities or lose its antitrust exemption, which protected it from being sued or broken up as an illegal monopoly. The owners agreed to expand, at one point planning to increase each league to 16 teams, for a total of 32.

But the owners continued to stall. They conducted studies and held various rounds of presentations by competing cities and ownership groups. Some owners wanted to stall until a new collective-bargaining agreement was negotiated with the players union in 1990, in order to use expansion to win other concessions. The threat of losing their monopoly was made slightly more real when a group calling itself the Professional Baseball Federation announced plans to start a new league with 8 to 10 teams and to lure current major-league stars away.

Having faced threats to its monopoly profits from upstart leagues and Congress several times before, the owners again relented. In June of 1990, the National League announced that it would expand by two teams. The cities would be selected by September 1991 with play to begin in 1993. In December 1990 the six finalists for expansion were announced: Buffalo, Denver, Orlando, St. Petersburg/Tampa, Washington, and Miami.

On June 10, 1991, the ownership groups from Denver and Miami were announced as the winners of the two new franchises. The additions still had to be approved by a vote of all the owners, which required approval of three-quarters (9 of 12) of the National League owners and a majority (8 of 14) American League owners. The decision became official on July 5, 1991, when the owners from both leagues unanimously approved the two new franchises.

But the four rejected cities still wanted baseball. They wanted an ownership group to purchase an existing team and move it to town. The Houston Astros, the Cleveland Indians, and especially the Seattle Mariners were seen as potential buy-and-move targets. This also failed, but at the time there was reason to hope. The Buffalo group – the Rich family – already owned the city’s Triple-A Bisons and had tried the buy-and-move tactic with the Montreal Expos in 1990. Washington Mayor Sharon Pratt-Kelly told the Associated Press that she would “work with investors and other baseball boosters to pursue teams for sale in order to bring baseball to Washington.”2

The Tampa-St. Petersburg area was especially desperate to lure an existing team, since the city of St. Petersburg had just finished building a $110 million domed stadium. Since construction on what is today Tropicana Field began in the 1980s when the notion of baseball expansion was first being batted around, missing out on the 1993 expansion was particularly painful. However, the city would get a team in the next round of expansion.

The Miami franchise chose the name Florida Marlins. Marlins was chosen as an homage to a line of several minor-league baseball teams that had previously called Miami home. Major League Baseball hoped the ownership group would choose the alliterative Miami Marlins, which it thought was better for marketing and kept open the door for the next round of expansion to include another Florida city. But the ownership group wanted to appeal to as many potential customers in the state as possible, and thus decided on the Florida Marlins.

This homage came with its own complications. The original Miami Marlins were a minor-league team that began play in 1956 in the International League. Its first game ever saw an almost 50-year-old Satchel Paige come out of a helicopter that landed on the field, only to go straight to the bullpen and not pitch at all that day – although he did pitch that season. The team moved to San Juan, Puerto Rico, after the 1960 season.3

Another team called the Miami Marlins began play in the 1960s. This team – with a family tree going back to the 1920s – was not affiliated with the original Marlins, but adopted the mascot as an homage. As affiliations changed, this team went from the Miami Marlins to the Miami Orioles and back again, before becoming the Miami Miracle of the Florida State League, which was the name it played under when the Florida Marlins became a team. It was this team – the Miracle – that sued the new Florida Marlins in October of 1992. The Miracle argued that the Florida Marlins had refused to negotiate with the Miracle about the rights to the team name and the exclusive territorial rights for the Miami territory.

The Miracle held exclusive rights to everything within 35 miles of their home plate – an expanse that encompassed the new home of the Marlins, Joe Robbie Stadium – and under the master agreement between the major and minor leagues, the new Florida Marlins were supposed to compensate the Miracle for the loss of those rights. At the time, the compensation for these rights was estimated to be between $1 million and $14 million.

Once the search for expansion cities became serious, Miami had been all but counted out. The rain, the heat, and the lack of fans turned off many baseball observers. The Miami Miracle had drawn fewer than 125 spectators per game in 1989.4 But Miami became a frontrunner after the South Florida Big League Baseball bidding group was chosen to represent the city’s bid. What brought on this change? The deep, deep pockets of the group’s owner, H. Wayne Huizenga.

Huizenga agreed to pay the entire $95 million franchise fee himself. After that, everyone found reasons to support Miami’s bid. The prospect of professional baseball seemed to excite the city, at least a little – the Miracle’s attendance increased to 700 per game (still well below any measure of success) and 114,000 fans went out to Joe Robbie Stadium over two nights in March of 1991 to watch the Yankees and the Orioles play.

Suddenly, the fact that Miami was one of the nation’s 20 largest television markets was a major factor. And of course, if Huizenga built it, the city’s “Latin and Caribbean population” would come, and “provide a wellspring of fans.”5 But there is little doubt that at least part of the allure of Miami’s bid to the other owners was Huizenga’s wealth – his net worth in the summer of 1991 was estimated to be between $500 million and $800 million.

In all, it was estimated that it would cost Huizenga between $131 million and $142 million before the Marlins could begin play, not including his partial purchase of Joe Robbie Stadium. This included the $95 million franchise fee, about $30 million or $40 million more in start-up costs (including salaries and equipment), and about $6 million or $7 million for renovations to Joe Robbie Stadium to make it baseball-friendly. Huizenga ended up spending $10 million to get the ballpark baseball-ready. Compared with these numbers, the $500,000 Huizenga spent promoting his bid to the other owners seemed paltry.

 

Marlins manager Rene Lachemann (l.) on Opening Day 1993 as he is besieged by autograph seekers. (Courtesy of the Miami Marlins)

 

Huizenga was born in 1937 in Chicago, where his Dutch-born grandfather had founded a garbage-hauling company in 1894. His father was a cabinetmaker and homebuilder. The family moved to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, when Huizenga was 15. After dropping out of college in Michigan, Huizenga ended up managing a family friend’s three-truck garbage-hauling company. Huizenga eventually started his own trash-hauling service with just one truck, which he drove. In a few years, his Southern Sanitation Service was a 20-truck operation with routes in several major South Florida cities.

After starting and growing his own small business, Huizenga made his real money by buying out small businesses and aggregating them into progressively bigger conglomerates. He bought dozens of small garbage haulers and added them to his own company to create his first billion-dollar company, Waste Management.

Under Huizenga’s leadership, Waste Management was accused of everything from price fixing to violating environmental laws to making improper political contributions. Huizenga stepped down as vice chairman in 1984, and planned to retire. Instead, however, he began growing his fortune by buying up “mom-and-pop” companies and consolidating them into larger entities.

At the time of the Marlins’ expansion, Huizenga was best known for owning Blockbuster Video. Huizenga and other Waste Management executives had bought shares in the nascent enterprise in 1987. Once the original founder left the company, Huizenga’s experience in consolidating small local businesses like those that comprised most of the video rental industry of the time really paid off.

During his ownership of the Marlins, Huizenga sold Blockbuster to Viacom for $8.4 billion and – again using his buy-small-and-consolidate model – created AutoNation, a Fortune 500 network of car dealerships. In 2017, Huizenga was ranked the 288th wealthiest American, with a net worth of $2.8 billion. He died on March 22, 2018, at the age of 80 in his Fort Lauderdale home.

Huizenga started building his front-office staff before the other owners had cast their final votes of approval. The first person Huizenga brought on board was Carl Barger as president. Formerly the president of the Pittsburgh Pirates and a longtime friend of Huizenga’s, Barger was a member of the board of directors of Huizenga’s Blockbuster Video.6 Barger technically resigned from the Pirates on July 8, 1991. But while major-league rules barred one person from working for two clubs at once, Barger was allowed to begin staffing the front office of the Marlins while also running the Pirates until the owners selected a new president.

As it turned out, Barger would never see his new team play a single game. On December 9, 1992, during the annual Winter Meetings in Louisville, he collapsed from a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm. He was taken to a hospital in an ambulance but died before surgery could be performed. Barger’s position remained vacant through the Marlins’ first season. Today, Carl F. Barger Boulevard sits just outside what is now Hard Rock Stadium (formerly Joe Robbie Stadium, among other names), the first home of the Marlins.

 

 

The next move for the Marlins was to appoint a general manager In September of 1991, the Marlins hired Dave Dombrowski away from the Montreal Expos. Dombrowski in turn “lured virtually all the Expos’ front-office executives to the expansion Marlins.”7 As Murray Chass of the New York Times put it:

Dombrowski was not bashful about raiding his former employer’s cupboard. At last count, 12 other former Expo employees had migrated, including the scouting director, the assistant scouting director, the player development director, the senior consultant on player personnel, the special consultant to the vice president for player personnel, three scouts, three minor league coaches and a secretary.8

But one position that was not filled by a former Expo was manager. The job of managing an expansion team had never been easy. Out of 34 seasons coached by the 10 previous managers of major-league expansion teams, only three seasons, all from the same manager (Bill Rigney of the Angels), were winning seasons. For this daunting task, the Marlins chose Rene Lachemann. In 1992, when Lachemann was hired, he had not managed a baseball team for eight years. His last stop had been with the Milwaukee Brewers in 1984.

And if expansion dilutes the talent level of the major-league player pool by promoting previously unqualified or unsuccessful players, the same could be said of the managerial pool. Despite being liked by his players, particularly in Seattle, Lachemann had only three winning records in 13 minor- and major-league seasons9 – once in Class A, once in Double A, and once in Triple A, when his Spokane Indians were 11-9 in the Pacific Coast League before Lachemann was promoted to manage the Seattle Mariners for the rest of the season. Lachemann never had a winning season with the Marlins, and his only managing job after that was one game as interim manager of the Chicago Cubs.

The Marlins even had a television broadcast team lined up before any players had been drafted. For play-by-play, they hired Jay Randolph. For analysis, they hired future-Hall of Fame catcher Gary Carter. Carter was an 11-time All-Star, with three Gold Gloves and five Silver Slugger Awards, who had also won the 1986 World Series with the Mets. Carter had spent most of his career, including his final season, with – no surprise – the Montreal Expos.

The next step for the new Marlins franchise was to stock its roster. To do this, the major leagues held an expansion draft. This draft was unique among expansion drafts; all major-league teams had been required by Commissioner Fay Vincent to make players available to the two new National League franchises, the Florida Marlins and the Colorado Rockies. (By the time of the draft, Vincent was a former commissioner.)

Each team was allowed to protect 15 players before the draft started, and could lose up to three players in the draft. This also meant that it was the first time teams from both leagues split the expansion fees. Each new franchise paid a fee of $95 million to join, for a total of $190 million. Of this total, 22 percent ($42 million) went to the American League, $3 million per team. The remaining $148 million was divided among the National League teams, for $12.33 million each.

American League officials were understandably upset that they had to provide just as many players to the draft but received less than a quarter of the amount of the franchise fees that the National League teams received. Oakland Athletics general manager Sandy Alderson said that the American League teams would rather have received no money and not have to provide players, because three players were potentially more valuable than the $3 million.10

Chicago White Sox owner Jerry Reinsdorf, one of the most vocal opponents of the plan, said the same. However, when asked if he would have taken $3 million for the three players the White Sox had actually lost in the 1976 expansion draft, when the Toronto Blue Jays and Seattle Mariners were added to the American League, he said he happily would.11 Another American League owner who complained about the deal said that he would “be thrilled” to have gotten $3 million in exchange for the five players his club lost in the 1976 expansion draft.12

Still, the owners knew there was nothing they could do but try to change Commissioner Vincent’s mind. As a compromise to the American League owners, Vincent decided that all 12 National League teams would lose three players, and that only eight American League teams would lose three players, with the other six teams losing only two players. He also allowed each National League team to protect three additional players each time they lost a player to the draft, but allowed each American League team to protect four more players each time.

 

 

The day finally came on November 17, 1992. All current major-league teams had to deliver their list of 15 protected players by November 9. Both expansion teams focused on pitching and youth, particularly the Marlins. Of the Marlins’ 36 draft picks, 21 were pitchers – the Rockies drafted 20. The Marlins’ first pick was Nigel Wilson, a top young outfield prospect in the Blue Jays’ system. Many in baseball were surprised that Toronto had left him unprotected. The average age of the Marlins’ 13 first-round picks was 24.6, against 26.5 for the Rockies, and only two of the Marlins’ picks had more than two years of major-league experience, compared with seven for the Rockies.

Several of the veterans the Marlins chose were used as trade bait. They drafted veterans Greg Hibbard and Bryan Harvey in the first round, and traded Hibbard to the Cubs for Gary Scott, a young but struggling third baseman, and shortstop Alex Arias. They also drafted veteran left-hander Danny Jackson from the Pirates, just to turn him around to the Phillies for two young pitchers, Joel Adamson and Matt Whisenant. Both of these deals had been all but made before the draft, and were contingent upon how the draft went. In another fascinating swap, the Marlins drafted Eric Helfand, a young catcher the Athletics had left unprotected, and traded him right back to Oakland for veteran shortstop Walt Weiss, whom the Athletics had protected.

By far the most notable player drafted by the Marlins was Jeff Conine, their 11th pick in the first round. Then 26, Conine would become the only player to play for both of the Marlins’ World Series-winning teams. Conine was nicknamed “Mr. Marlin” for his role as both an inaugural member of, and two-time champion with, the team.

Now that the Marlins finally had players, they needed a place to play. That place was Joe Robbie Stadium, the home of the NFL’s Miami Dolphins, named after their owner. After several failed attempts at getting a publicly financed stadium, Robbie used loan money to build the $115 million stadium, which opened in 1987. After Robbie died in 1990, Huizenga bought 50 percent of the stadium for a reported $40 million from the Robbie family. Huizenga also bought 15 percent of the Dolphins.

In 1994 Huizenga purchased the other half of the stadium’s ownership rights, and would continue to own the stadium (and the Dolphins), collecting rent, concessions money, and luxury and club-seat revenues until long after he sold the Marlins in 1998.

Major-league Opening Day finally came to Miami on April 5, 1993. Opening Day souvenirs were sold out an hour before game time. Clearly the excitement was there. The team honored its late president, Carl Barger, in a pregame ceremony. The first pitch was thrown out by 78-year-old Joe DiMaggio, who had lent his name to the Children’s Hospital in neighboring Hollywood.

The Marlins’ Opening Day pitcher, 45-year-old knuckleballer Charlie Hough, joked that DiMaggio threw harder than he could. Despite fielding a team ESPN later described as “your usual array of expansion team washouts and hopefuls,”13 the Marlins won the franchise’s first game, 6-3, over the Dodgers. Hough outpitched Orel Hershiser, throwing to batterymate Benito Santiago, who had played for the minor-league Miami Marlins 10 years earlier as an 18-year-old. Mr. Marlin, Jeff Conine, went 4-for-4. The opening three-game series drew 126,575 spectators. Everything was off to a good start for the fans and the owner.

The rest of that first season ended the way most expansion seasons do. The Marlins finished next to last in the National League East (above the Mets), but avoided the 100-loss fate suffered by half of the previous expansion teams, ending the season at 64-98 (.395). Center fielder Chuck Carr led the National League with 58 stolen bases. Attendance remained strong that first season. A total of 3,064,847 attended home games, an average of 37,838, making the Marlins one of only seven major-league teams to draw over 3 million fans in 1993.

 

 

In the first years after expansion, the Marlins seemed to have a clear plan: to draft and develop young players, with just enough veterans to help the development along. Of the 10 expansion teams between 1961 and 1991, the average team started out with a winning percentage of .365, building up to .491 by year eight. The Marlins were ahead of the curve, winning .395 of games the first year and .494 by year four. The process seemed to be working.

But the process was not working quickly enough for Huizenga. By 1997 he owned the Marlins, the Dolphins, and the NHL expansion Florida Panthers. The Panthers had lost the 1996 Stanley Cup finals to the Colorado Avalanche. After being so close, Huizenga wanted a championship. As the Marlins’ steady improvement showed, they already had a promising young core, which included players like Edgar Renteria, Charles Johnson, Al Leiter, and Gary Sheffield.

However, in the offseason after the Panthers’ runner-up finish, Huizenga and Dombrowski shocked the baseball world by spending a record-breaking $89 million on free agents. To the already promising core, the Marlins added pitcher Alex Fernandez, and boosted the offense with third baseman Bobby Bonilla and outfielder Moises Alou, who alone cost $25 million. They also added depth through a series of smaller but solid moves. The payroll for the 1996 season was $31 million, and by 1997 it was $52 million.

The spending spree paid off. The Marlins finished the 1996 season 80-82, almost reaching .500. They finished the 1997 season 92-70 – their first winning season. They went on to beat the Atlanta Braves in the NLCS and the Indians in the World Series.

The World Series championship was the peak before a deep valley for the Marlins under Huizenga. Championship in hand, he began the first Marlins fire sale, a process one writer dubbed “a textbook case in how to alienate a fan base.”14 The Marlins sold off big-money free agents from a year earlier – Bonilla, and Alou15 – as well as some of its promising core, including Gary Sheffield and Robb Nen, who had both been with the Marlins since their first season. Fans and sportswriters across the country skewered Huizenga, some saying he was just throwing a “hissy fit”16 over his failure to get a new taxpayer-funded, baseball-only ballpark.

Huizenga also complained that he was losing money. He said the Marlins had lost $34 million during the 1997 World Series season. While they may well have lost $34 million on paper, paper losses in professional sports – as with many large companies – are largely due to accounting practices. The former president of the Toronto Blue Jays, Paul Beeston, said, “Under current generally accepted accounting principles, I can turn a $4 million profit into a $2 million loss, and I can get every national accounting firm to agree with me.”17

Using a tax benefit known in the sports context as the roster depreciation allowance – whose benefits Huizenga had already exhausted – and other paper-only accounting maneuvers, teams often claimed large financial losses while also raking in huge profits.

And such claims of massive losses were nothing new in baseball. As former Players Association executive director Donald Fehr once told Sports Illustrated, “You go through The Sporting News for the last 100 years, and you will find two things are always true. You never have enough pitching, and nobody ever made money.”18

Another thing that made Huizenga’s claim more dubious was the way he structured the various entities he owned that were connected to the Marlins. Huizenga owned Joe Robbie Stadium – by now called Pro Player Stadium – and the team’s cable broadcaster, Sportschannel Florida. Between owning these two entities and giving the Marlins favorable deals with them, Huizenga made about $40.1 million in revenue off the Marlins that were counted under those other entities instead of the Marlins.

Championship in hand and tax shelter exhausted, Huizenga tried to sell the Marlins. He may have been trying to sell the team as early as April 1997. If so, part of the impetus for the free-agent splash may have been the thought that a successful team would fetch a higher sale price.

Whether the goal of Huizenga’s spending spree was the personal goal of a winning a championship or the financial goal of making a higher profit by selling the team, what is certain is that, despite claiming that the team’s finances were suffering, Huizenga almost sold the team to longtime business associate and then team President Don Smiley. Surely, if the finances were so bad, Smiley would have known, and would not have tried to buy the team for $169 million. Smiley’s bid fell apart when his group of investors came up $50 million short of the sale price.

Huizenga eventually did sell the team, to another South Florida multimillionaire, John Henry. After long, contentious, and very public negotiations, Henry agreed to buy the team for $150 million and to pay $8 million for renovations at Pro Player (formerly Joe Robbie, in 2018 Hard Rock) Stadium.

But Huizenga still owned the ballpark and the cable channel. He was able to negotiate a 10-year contract for his cable channel to broadcast the Marlins’ games before selling the team, and by owning the ballpark he kept all the luxury-box and club-seat revenue, as well as a majority (62.5 percent) of the parking revenue and a portion (30 percent) of the concession profit from Marlins games.

So even after selling the team, Huizenga continued to profit off the Marlins until at least 2012, when they moved to Marlins Park and changed their name to the Miami Marlins.

STEPHEN R. KEENEY is a lifelong Reds fan and joined SABR in early 2015. He graduated from Miami University in 2010 with degrees in History and International Studies, and from Northern Kentucky University’s Chase College of Law in 2013. After passing the bar exam he moved from his hometown of Cincinnati to Dayton, Ohio, where he works as a union staff representative and lives with his wife, Christine, and newborn son, Leo.

 

Sources

In addition to the sources cited in the Notes, the author also consulted Baseball-Reference.com and the following:

“6 Cities Named Finalists for 2 NL Expansion Teams,” Wilmington (North Carolina) Morning Star, December 18, 1990: C1.

“And Batting Second…,” Palm Beach Post, January 24, 1994.

Berardino, Mike. “Lloyd’s Balks at Marlins’ Claim on Fernandez’s Injury.” Sun-Sentinel.com, April 26, 2001, available at articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-04-26/sports/0104260199_1_marlins-alex-fernandez-fernandez-s-case.

Blum, Ronald. “Owners Approve Rockies, Marlins,” Kentucky New Era (Hopkinsville, Kentucky), July 6, 1991: 1B.

Chass, Murray. “A Busy Day of Drafting and Dealing,” New York Times, November 18, 1992.

Chass, Murray. “Baseball Destined to Grow, but Not Any Time Soon,” New York Times, June 26, 1988.

Chass, Murray. “Barger Leaves Pirates,” New York Times, July 9, 1991.

Chass, Murray. “Expansion Losers Turn to Unlikely Plan 2,” New York Times, June 12, 1991.

Chass, Murray. “For the Rockies and Marlins: At Last, the Envelopes Please,” New York Times, November 9, 1992.

Chass, Murray. “Lawsuit from Minors Seeks to Derail Marlin Expansion Draft,” New York Times, October 20, 1992.

Chass, Murray. “Marlins Have Old Business to Finish,” New York Times, October 29, 1992.

Chass, Murray. “No Party for Expansion Managers,” New York Times, November 1, 1992.

Chass, Murray. “Vincent Splits Expansion Booty,” New York Times, June 6, 1991.

Clarke, Norm. “Expansion Cities Play Hardball,” Chicago Tribune, November 15, 1987. articles.chicagotribune.com/1987-11-15/sports/8703260355_1_antitrust-protection-major-league-baseball-antitrust-lawsuit.

Clary, Mike, Marcia Heroux Pounds, and Craig Davis. “H. Wayne Huizenga, South Florida Business Titan, Dead at 80,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, March 23, 2018. sun-sentinel.com/news/obituaries/fl-reg-h-wayne-huizenga-obituary-20180118-story.html.

“Dave Dombrowski,” Baseball-Reference.com. baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Dave_Dombrowski#Record_as_a_General_Manager.

Donnelly, H. “High Stakes of Sports Economics,” Editorial Research Reports, 1988. Washington, DC: CQ Press. library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1988040800.

“Expansion of 1993 – BR Bullpen,” Baseball-Reference.com. baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Expansion_of_1993.

“Fifteen U.S. Senators, Many Representing States Seeking Big-League Franchises…” UPI.com, November 3, 1987. upi.com/Archives/1987/11/03/Fifteen-US-senators-many-representing-states-seeking-big-league-franchises/8050562914000/.

Fisaro, Joe. “New Name, but Deep-Rooted Tradition in Miami,” Marlins.mlb.com. web.archive.org/web/20141204133053/http://m.marlins.mlb.com/news/article/25948494/.

Hyde, Dave. “M’s Would Be Great Consolation Prize.” Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, republished in The Spokesman-Review and Spokane Chronicle, July 6, 1991: B2.

Keeney, Stephen. “The Roster Depreciation Allowance: How Major League Baseball Teams Turn Profits Into Losses,” The Baseball Research Journal 45, 1 (Spring 2016): 88-95.

Keri, Jonah. “Is Wayne Huizenga a Genius?” In Jonah Keri, ed., Baseball Between the Numbers: Why Everything You Know About the Game is Wrong. (New York: Basic Books (for Baseball Prospectus), 2006).

“Marlins to Rest Alex Fernandez.” UPI.com., September 5, 1999. Available at upi.com/Archives/1999/09/05/Marlins-to-rest-Alex-Fernandez/6922936504000/ph.

Olney, Buster. “Marlins Lose Fernandez to Bad Shoulder Injury,” New York Times. October 10, 1997.

Peterson, Iver. “Cities Spending Big for Shot at Baseball,” Lawrence (Kansas) Journal-World, January 8, 1984, 4B.

Rader, Benjamin. “The Resurgence of America’s Game,” In Baseball: A History of America’s Game (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2008).

“Rene Lachemann,” Baseball-Reference.com. Available at baseball-reference.com/register/player.fcgi?id=lachem001ren.

“Rene Lachemann – BR Bullpen,” Baseball-Reference.com. Available at baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Rene_Lachemann.

Sandomir, Richard. “New Teams Need Players and Patience,” New York Times, June 16, 1991.

Sandomir, Richard. “Wayne Huizenga’s Growth Complex,” New York Times, July 9, 1991.

Smith, Claire. “National League Expansion Vote Delayed,” New York Times, June 6, 1991.

“Sold! John Henry Buys Marlins.” CBS News.com. November 6, 1998. cbsnews.com/news/sold-john-henry-buys-marlins/.

Sullivan, Paul. “Huizenga’s Big Splash Engulfs All of Baseball,” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1997. articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-06-29/sports/9706290424_1_florida-marlins-wayne-huizenga-million-by-financial-world.

“Transactions,” New York Times, September 20, 1991.

Weingarden, Steve, and Bill Nowlin, eds., Baseball’s Business: The Winter Meetings, Volume 2 – 1956-2016 (Phoenix: Society for American Baseball Research, Inc., 2017).

Zimbalist, Andrew. “The Capitalist: A Miami Fish Story,” New York Times Magazine, October 8, 1998.

 

Notes

1 Murray Chass, “The Marlins? The Rockies? Get Used to It. It’s Official,” New York Times, July 6, 1991.

2 Murray Chass, “Baseball Ready to Add Miami and Denver Teams,” New York Times, June 11, 1991: A1.

3 The team then moved several times, changing names, cities, and league affiliations.

4 Different sources have put the number of spectators per game as 40 (Tim Golden, supra, Endnote 4) and 112 (Lloyd Johnson and Miles Wolff, The Encyclopedia of Minor League Baseball, 2nd Edition, Baseball America: April 1997).

5 Tim Golden, “Miami Still Has Heat and Rain, but Now It Has a Team,” New York Times, June 11, 1991.

6 There was talk of a potential conflict of interest regarding Barger, largely because Pittsburgh’s chairman, Douglas Danforth, was chairman of the National League Expansion Committee, which had made the decision to award the new franchises to Denver and Miami. See Murray Chass, “New Teams Expect Approval Today,” New York Times, July 4, 1991.

7 Murray Chass, “Youthful Executive Rebuilding the Expos in Old-Fashioned Way,” New York Times, March 4, 1992.

8 Ibid.

9 This count includes 12 seasons with one team only, and one season (1981) that was split between two teams, the Seattle Mariners and their Triple-A affiliate.

10 “Denver and Miami a Step Closer to Obtaining Expansion Teams,” New York Times, June 13, 1991.

11 Murray Chass, “New Teams, Not Some Owners, May Be Getting the Raw Deal,” New York Times, June 23, 1991.”

12 Ibid.

13 David Schoenfield, “Marlins, Rockies Still Seeking Answers,” ESPN.com, April 5, 2013. espn.com/blog/sweetspot/post/_/id/34431/marlins-rockies-still-seeking-answers.

14 Frank Jackson, “It Was Twenty Years Ago Today,” The Hardball Times, Fangraphs.com, April 9, 2013. fangraphs.com/tht/it-was-20-years-ago-today/.

15 Alex Fernandez survived the fire sale, as he was injured in the 1997 NLCS, and was essentially untradeable. He missed the entire 1998 season. However, the Marlins did avoid paying most of Fernandez’s 1998 salary. About 75 percent of it was covered by an insurance policy. See Buster Olney, “Marlins Lose Fernandez to Bad Shoulder Injury,” New York Times, October 10, 1997, and Mike Berardino, “Lloyd’s Balks at Marlins’ Claim on Fernandez’s Injury,” Sun-Sentinel.com, April 26, 2001, available at articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-04-26/sports/0104260199_1_marlins-alex-fernandez-fernandez-s-case.

16 Tom Verducci, “The Faux Classic,” Sports Illustrated, October 27, 1997: 42.

17 Dan Alexander, “Can Houston Astros Really Be Losing Money Despite Rock-Bottom Payroll?” Forbes.com. August 29, 2013. forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2013/08/29/can-houston-astros-really-be-losing-money-despite-rock-bottom-payroll/.

18 Richard Hoffer, “The Bucks Stop Here,” Sports Illustrated, July 29, 1991. si.com/vault/1991/07/29/124615/the-bucks-stop-here-spiraling-salaries-and-a-potential-loss-of-tv-loot-imperil-baseballs-prosperity.

 

The year 1959 was a good one– a very important year for baseball in Colorado. It was the first time a formidable, well-assembled plan was presented for bringing major-league baseball to Denver.

During the late ’50s, the Denver Bears were the Triple-A farm team of the New York Yankees. The team was loaded with future major-league stars including Bobby Richardson, Tony Kubek, Ryne Duren, Mark Freeman, and Marv Throneberry. Ralph Houk was the manager. Denver fans loved their baseball and they supported the team with record attendance among minor-league cities.

Denver was emerging as a major transportation hub as well as a leading financial center in the Rocky Mountain area. Enthusiastic fans in the Denver area were eager to welcome and support major-league professional sports. The Denver Broncos began play in the American Football League in 1960 and the fans hoped a major-league baseball team would soon follow.

Bob Howsam, president of Rocky Mountain Sports, and US Senator Edwin “Big Ed” Johnson, his father-in-law, created a plan to bring major-league baseball to Colorado. Actually, they began to formulate the plan in the early ’50s while the Howsam family was building a successful leadership team, both on and off the field. They met with Branch Rickey, who agreed that there was a need throughout the country for more major-league teams. While Howsam discussed plans with representatives of other major- and minor-league cities, Senator Johnson met with colleagues and friends in Congress. They made lasting friendships and paved the way for future alliances.

In 1958, the city of New York lost the Dodgers and Giants when they moved to California. New York Mayor Robert Wagner and Bill Shea formed a committee to attract another team for the city. They were unable to attract an existing franchise to move to New York. Once they considered an expansion team, they joined forces with Howsam and potential candidates from seven other cities for gaining major-league status. Thereafter, with extensive study and faced with rejection from the existing major-league teams, the eight cities gave their support to the formation of a new major league.

The Continental League was officially organized on July 27, 1959.1 The original members of the league were: Denver, Houston, New York, Buffalo, Dallas-Fort Worth, Toronto, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Atlanta. The new league appeared to be formidable, especially with some wealthy and determined owners and the abundance of talented players in the minor leagues who were capable of playing at the major-league level. But the announcement of the new league was met with strong opposition from the existing major-league teams. National League and American League owners united in opposition and directed Commissioner Ford Frick to appeal to Congress for support. With a negative vote from the Senate, the new league was derailed and eventually terminated. However, with the threat of the new league, the existing major-league teams responded with a promise that eventually all of the cities from the Continental League would someday have major-league baseball.2

Denver’s presentation was important because it set the stage. From then on, Denver became a player in the ongoing game whenever a new city was considered for a major-league franchise. Although it took 33 years, Denver became the seventh city of the original Continental League to have major-league baseball when the Colorado Rockies began play in 1993. What happened during those 33 years of knocking on the door and waiting for a team is a fascinating story, filled with great expectations, some sad and disappointing setbacks, and wild jubilation when the team finally arrived.

The Early Years

The first recorded game of “base ball” in Denver was played on April 26, 1862, when the McNeils Side defeated the Hulls Side, 20-7.3 After the Civil War, as settlers moved west, baseball grew in popularity throughout the mining towns, the farming communities, and Denver, the Queen City of the Plains. Common rivalries grew in popularity as baseball outings became the social and family entertainment throughout the summer. George “Patsy” Tebeau (December 26, 1861- February 4, 1923) and David Rowe (October 9, 1854 – December 9, 1930), who both played major-league baseball, are referred to as the “fathers of Colorado baseball.”4 They were instrumental in developing amateur teams and bringing barnstorming teams to play in Denver. The first professional team was the Denver Browns in 1879 and the first team to play in the Western Baseball League was the Denvers in 1886.5

As Denver’s population increased and the economy grew stronger, youth baseball programs flourished throughout the state. As baseball grew in popularity, there were many sandlot fields and ballparks where the games were played. In Denver, Merchants Park was built in 1922 and provided the site for Denver Post Tournaments and exhibition games involving barnstorming teams. Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig played in Denver in 1927 on a barnstorming tour. Baseball in Denver gradually developed a strong grass-roots following and a reputation as a good baseball town as local players developed and the visiting players, who had favorable experiences in Denver, traveled about the country.

 

When Don Baylor was selected to be the Colorado Rockies’ first manager, Rachel Robinson came to Denver to celebrate the inaugural season for the Rockies. Here she is shown with Rockies president Jerry McMorris and Don Baylor. (Courtesy of Roger Kinney)

 

Professional Baseball

After World War II, the Western League was reorganized and began play with eight teams: Denver (farm team of the New York Yankees), Pueblo (Brooklyn Dodgers), Omaha (St. Louis Cardinals), Des Moines (Chicago Cubs), Sioux City (New York Giants), and Lincoln (Philadelphia A’s). The country was in a rebuilding period; the success and the fortunes of all the professional baseball teams rested heavily with the ownership of the local minor-league teams.

The owner of the Denver Bears was a group headed by former Mayor Will Nicholson, his brother Eddie Nicholson, and Colorado financial magnate Charles Boettcher.6 In 1948, Bob Howsam and his family purchased the Bears and moved to a new location in central Denver where they built Bears Stadium.7 Howsam proved to be a knowledgeable baseball entrepreneur as well as a popular and successful businessman. He made friends and loyal supporters throughout the country, and he never lost his zeal or support for Denver’s bid for a major-league team. After the demise of the Continental League, on May 26, 1961, Howsam sold the Denver Bears to Rocky Mountain Sports, Inc., headed by Gerald and Allan Phipps. Shortly thereafter, Howsam moved to St. Louis and later, to Cincinnati, where he was the general manager of the Cardinals and then the Reds. His teams won four World Series before he returned with his family to Colorado.

Gerald “Jerry” Phipps, a legend in his own right, had a genuine love for baseball, the Denver Bears, the Denver Broncos, and his beloved state of Colorado. He hired Jim Burris, former general secretary of the American Association, to be the general manager of the Bears. Burris, a baseball loyalist, became the leader of Denver’s ongoing campaign to attain a major-league team. Whenever an opportunity occurred, he would trumpet the favorable attributes of Colorado for a big-league team. Burris attended major-league baseball meetings every year. While other prospective cities were often represented with elaborate displays and well-organized promotional teams, Denver’s presence was sometimes a lonely affair. Burris, who had a charming sense of humor, used to tell friends that he held the meetings for the Denver delegation in a telephone booth.

Over time, Denver’s presence began to change, and in 1974, the Denver Chamber of Commerce sent four members, Jim Burris, Larry Varnell, Rex Jennings, and Dale Mitchell (a former player with the Cleveland Indians), to New Orleans with a model of Mile High Stadium (formerly Bears Stadium) and a presentation promoting the attractions of Denver.8 For 21 years, Burris continued to “carry the torch” for Denver at the major-league meetings, often escorting supporting members of the Denver delegation.

Destination Denver

In the early 1970s, a formal bid was made to hold the Winter Olympics in Colorado. The International Olympic Committee approved the bid and the Winter Olympics were scheduled to be held in Colorado in 1976. But there was strong opposition to the organizers’ plan. After a heated campaign, the voters rejected the plan and the Colorado Olympics were canceled. (The 1976 Winter Games were instead held in Innsbruck, Austria .)

The Colorado sports scene was shaken for several years. Some people called it a black eye for the state. Promoters were hesitant to submit bids to attract other sporting events. Some hostelries said tourism suffered with Denver becoming known as an airport city on the way to the mountains. In time, the city rebounded and its desire to attract major sporting events was renewed. Denver Convention and Visitors Bureau president Roger Smith vowed to attract major events, including national conventions and sporting events. This eventually led to a successful vote to finance a new Denver Convention Center. Presidents Rex Jennings and Shelby Harper of the Denver Chamber of Commerce created the Denver Metro Sports Committee. This eventually led to support for the Denver Nuggets of the NBA and for the NBA All-Star Game, which was held in Denver in 1984. This in turn led to the NCAA Final Four basketball tournament. held in Denver in 1990. With these successes and the improving economy, sports fans again set their sights on a major-league baseball franchise.

High Hopes – Disappointing Results

When Marvin Davis, a wealthy oil investor, expressed an interest in owning a big-league team and bringing it to Denver, the fans were hopeful for success. There were reports that Davis tried to purchase the Chicago White Sox in 1976 and the Baltimore Orioles in 1977.9 Larry Varnell, past president of the Colorado Sports Hall of Fame, became the public spokesman for Davis as he made numerous attempts to purchase a team. Varnell said, “One year when I went to the winter (baseball) meetings, Davis said, you find the team, I’ll write the check.”10 In 1985, there were reports that the San Francisco Giants might make a temporary move to Denver to facilitate the construction of a new stadium in San Francisco. There were other rumors involving the Pittsburgh Pirates, the Cleveland Indians, and the Minnesota Twins.

Perhaps the closest possibility for a sale came in two stages. First, in 1977-78 when Marvin Davis was negotiating with Charlie Finley to move the Oakland A’s to Denver, Varnell reported that the American League owners were agreeable to a sale to Davis if a settlement could be made with the Oakland Coliseum Authority. After extensive negotiations, the parties could not reach a settlement and the sale was canceled. The second proposal come in 1979-80 when “an official of the Oakland Coliseum made a public disclosure that the Oakland Coliseum would consider a cash offer to allow Finley to break his lease and sell the team to Davis.”11 Rumors circulated that a deal was close to completion. But Marvin Davis denied the rumors and a sale was never completed.

The Denver Baseball Commission, created by Mayor Federico Pena and led by executive director Steve Katich and City Attorney Steve Kaplan, worked in support of Marvin Davis. To gain fans’ support, the commission held a Baseball Symposium and sponsored exhibition games played by visiting major-league teams. In 1984, the commission hosted a display booth at the winter baseball meetings and distributed a daily newspaper extolling Denver’s worthiness for a major-league team.

Marvin Davis eventually lost interest in bringing a team to Denver, and the Denver Baseball Commission shifted support to John Dikeou and his family. The Dikeous had purchased the Denver Bears from Gerald and Allan Phipps in 1984 and renamed the team the Zephyrs. A popular Denver native and a successful businessman, Dikeou assembled a strong management team led by Robert Howsam Jr. and Tom Maloney. The team won the Triple-A championship in 1991. The fans responded, and as the Zephyrs prospered, the momentum for a major-league team gained strength. John Dikeou became the likely and assumed new owner of an expansion team.

 

 

Congress and the Commissioner

In 1985, Peter Ueberroth became commissioner of baseball, succeeding Bowie Kuhn. At that time, baseball owners were dealing with a wide range of financial problems involving the players’ salaries, free agency, and the wide disparity of economic interests among the owners. In l986 Tim Wirth of Colorado was elected to the US Senate. In the spring of 1987, Wirth suggested to Ueberroth that, “Major League Baseball and the Senate could talk to each other about expansion.”12 Extolling the attractions of Denver for a new franchise, Wirth continued to attempt to convince Ueberroth that expansion would be good for baseball and the country. Wirth gained support from other members of Congress, and on November 4, 1987, they formed a Senate Task Force on Expansion of Major League Baseball. Their goal was to have six new major-league teams by 2000.13

For the next two years, Wirth and his colleagues made a persistent campaign for expansion. Commissioner Ueberroth resisted any public commitments to expansion and continued to deal primarily with the financial concerns of the major-league owners, the players, and their union. But in the summer of 1988, while announcing that he planned to step down, he indicated that “expansion was coming in the not too distant future.”14

A. Bartlett Giamatti was selected to succeed Ueberroth in the spring of 1989. Giamatti was popular, dedicated, and a forceful advocate for the traditional values associated with the national pastime. In the summer of 1989, at the owners’ quarterly meeting, they agreed to expand by two teams in the National League.15 Giamatti died of a heart attack on September 1, 1989, just five months after becoming commissioner. Fay Vincent succeeded him.

The Invitation

Shortly after a contract agreement was signed with the Players Association on June 16, 1990, Vincent presented a timeline for all prospective new owners.16 The owners’ Expansion Committee would receive presentations from the applicants by September 30, and the finalists would be announced by the end of the year. The committee would make its recommendation to the major-league owners and the final selection would be made by September 30, 1991.

It soon became apparent that the application would have four major requirements. First, the owners of a new franchise (preferably local people) must be acceptable to the current owners. “This is the fundamental thing to remember in expansion. Cities are never awarded franchises. Owners are rewarded franchises.”17 Second, there must be a new, baseball-only stadium that is first class in all respects. Third, there must be sufficient support from the fans and general public. This meant a support base of at least 20,000 season-ticket holders. Fourth, the entry fee would be $95 million. The applicants needed to agree to all the accompanying conditions regarding the expansion process, including the draft of eligible players, the finance schedule, and the nonparticipation in television revenue for the initial season.

Colorado’s Response – House Bill 1351

In 1988, Pat Grant, a Colorado legislator, had been instrumental in creating a successful district taxing authority to support the cultural arts in the Denver area. Faced with a stalemate over the financing of a new ballpark, Neil Macey, a Denver real-estate entrepreneur and avid baseball fan, envisioned a similar plan as a practical way to finance the planning and construction. Macey envisioned the creation of a five-county authority that would expand the tax base, oversee the project, and impose a 0.01 percent sales tax. Macey took his plan to John Dikeou and Kathi Williams, a member of the Colorado House of Representatives from Adams County. They took the plan to Governor Roy Romer, and after considerable negotiating, they presented Colorado House Bill 1351. With an appeal to all the state legislators who supported major-league baseball, the bill passed the Colorado legislature and sent the measure to the electorate in August 1990.18

The bill created a Colorado Baseball Stadium Authority with a seven-member board responsible for site selection, financial planning, construction, and the ongoing operation of the ballpark. The bill also created an 18-member Colorado Baseball Commission tasked to conduct the election campaign and any activities necessary to support the prospective owners and meet the requirements set by the major leagues’ expansion committee. The commission would go out of existence once its mission was completed.

The Colorado Baseball Stadium Authority

After House Bill 1351 was passed, Governor Romer, with input from Neil Macey and Kathi Williams, began to make appointments to the Stadium Authority and the Baseball Commission.19 All appointments were subject to approval by a committee of the Colorado Senate. Senator Claire Taylor conducted many of the appointment hearings and passed along the recommendations to the governor. Once the seven members were selected and approved, the Stadium Authority began meeting on a regular basis.

At the first meeting, John McHale Jr. was elected chairman. Shortly thereafter, Jack Sperling and Craig Umbaugh of the legal firm Fairfield and Woods were named legal counsel. Lee White, an investment banker, was chosen to be the financial adviser. Since there were minimal funds available for the operations of the authority, in-kind contributions were solicited. Many supporters responded, including Dave Herlinger, president of the Colorado Housing Authority, who provided office and meeting space for the authority.

Under McHale and Ray Baker (who succeeded McHale as chairman), the board began seeking a site for the new stadium. Many sites were considered. With recognition of the large amount of land along the Amtrak rail lines, the site at 20th and Blake was selected on March 13, 1991.20 In addition to the availability of the land for parking, the site had other attractive features: The site was above the flood plain, which would facilitate building the playing field at the lower level, and it was within walking distance of the downtown area and Union Station, the transportation center for the metropolitan area. Shortly thereafter, HOK Sports was selected to be the architectural firm for the stadium.

Once the site was selected and the election neared, the Stadium Authority created an ambitious schedule, making public presentations to all five of the counties in the voting district. The presentations included a display of the plans for the stadium, followed by a “no holds barred” question-and-answer session with the board members. The response throughout the five-county area from those attending was positive and they were asked to seek the support of their neighbors and friends, especially those who would vote in the election slated for August 1990.

As the time neared for the National League expansion committee to visit Denver, the Stadium Authority Board turned its attention to the lease of the new stadium to the owners. John McHale, as chairman of the MLB Stadium District and Steve Ehrhart, then president of the Colorado Baseball Partnership, signed a memorandum of agreement for the lease of the new stadium on March 14, 1991.21 The lease caught the immediate attention of major-league owners and the expansion committee. Carl Barger, president of the Florida Marlins, said, “It’s a great lease. I gotta hand it to those people who negotiated it.”22 With the site and the lease in place, the Stadium Authority prepared to meet with the expansion committee, who were planning to be in Denver in March 1991.

 

 

The Colorado Baseball Commission

The Colorado Baseball Commission was created with 15 members representing all of the five counties in the district. John Dikeou was named chairman and Neil Macey was the executive director. After a difficult start to raise money for its operational needs, cable magnate Bill Daniels and the Greater Denver Chamber of Commerce made substantial contributions to set the campaign on a winning track. United Airlines made a generous contribution to facilitate goodwill visits to six National League teams, the Dodgers, Padres, Giants, Cardinals, Reds, and Cubs. Many supporting companies and loyal fans made monetary and in-kind contributions. A record number of volunteers donated their time and talents to the campaign.

The commission had a wide range of projects to address. One of the first was to create a plan for the sale of season tickets. With help from the accounting firm of Deloitte Touche and the legal firm of Holme, Roberts and Owen, who donated office space and telephone service, they began the season-ticket drive in early May 1990. The conditions for a commitment were well publicized by the media, including a deposit for obtaining a priority number on a first-come (via a telephone call), first-served basis. Priority would be given to season-ticket holders of the Denver Zephyrs, the Triple-A farm team. A team of volunteers would man the telephones, ready to take orders. When the switchboard opened, the telephone calls (including those for the law firm) overwhelmed the system. Callers were desperate in their attempts to make a deposit and obtain a low priority number. Carolyn “Skinny” Writer, a supervisor for the event, said, “It was the most frantic, and the most gratifying experience I could possibly imagine.”23 It took several days to properly record the initial ticket requests and return the telephone system to normal operation. The season-ticket campaign was off to a great start.

At that time, the Denver Broncos had a huge following in the area and dominated the sports pages. Some avid baseball fans were concerned that the Broncos not support the drive for a baseball team. Just the opposite was true. The Broncos were very supportive, and when the season-ticket drive was close to reaching its goal, Rod Buscher, president of John Elway Motors, committed to purchase enough season tickets to surpass the goal of 20,000, putting the drive over the top. Eventually, the sale of season tickets reached 28,250. The success of the drive had a positive impact as the election for the stadium bond issue approached.

The vote was scheduled for August 14, 1990. The campaign theme was simple: The cost of the ballpark would be “a penny on a purchase of ten dollars.” The bonds would be paid off within 20 years. (Actually they were paid off in about eight years.) With the leadership of co-chairmen Larry Varnell and Sam Suplizio, the Colorado Baseball Commission campaigned with public appearances, media coverage, and personal calls to sports fans in the area. The early polls were discouraging because they predicted defeat. Since the election would be held as a primary, not a general election, a smaller than average turnout was expected. Rick Reiter, the campaign adviser, developed a selective plan to target key areas.

As the voting results came in, the celebration party at the downtown Radisson Hotel grew with optimism and excitement as it became apparent that the bond issue would pass. The votes in favor were 187,539, about 54 percent, and the opposing votes were 157,954, about 46 percent.

The votes in Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties were so overwhelmingly favorable that they overshadowed the negative votes in Denver and Adams County. The election was a big step forward. It meant that if Colorado were awarded a franchise, the plan was in place, approved by the electorate, to build a new, first-class ballpark.

The next step was to solidify the ownership and support their presentation to the expansion committee. When John Dikeou withdrew his ownership interest, there was widespread uncertainty about finding a new owner. Several potential ownership groups expressed an interest. The Colorado Baseball Commission informed Governor Romer of the potential problems. He quickly responded, drawing on business leaders, involving Dick Robinson, Jim Baldwin, and Tryg Myhren, to conduct a search and identify the best qualified ownership group. Romer identified the “Ehrhart-Nicklaus” group as the local ownership official leaders on August 23, 1990.24

Paul Jacobs, a Denver lawyer and sports enthusiast, became the driving force to assemble the new ownership group. As potential owners moved in and out of the picture, Jacobs worked night and day to assemble an ownership group with sufficient investment to pay the franchise fee of $95 million and the initial startup costs. The ownership group gained strength and momentum when Peter Coors, representing the Coors Brewery, made a major commitment of $25 million, part of which would be allocated to the naming rights of the new stadium. Several very important commitments followed, including those from Cary Teraji, Linda Alvarado, Bill Fletcher, representing the Rocky Mountain News, Lee Larson, representing radio station KOA, and the Beverage Distributing Company.

Jacobs established a good relationship with National League President Bill White and members of the expansion committee, Doug Danforth, Fred Wilpon, and Bill Giles. Jacobs later became executive vice president and general counsel of the Rockies, instrumental in creating the partnership agreements, the leases, and other initial legal documents.

The Visit

The National League expansion committee visited Denver on March 26, 1991.25 It was billed as “the biggest day in Denver’s baseball history.”26 Before making the trip, the committee had requested that there be no elaborate displays, wining, or dining. They simply wanted it to be a business trip. But the CBC, with the agreement of business leaders, disagreed. This was Denver’s biggest chance and they were going to make the most of it.

Shortly after the arrival at Stapleton Airport, the eight members of the expansion committee were taken on a helicopter tour of the Denver area with a landing on the outfield grass at Mile High Stadium. It was anticipated that the new team would play one or two years at Mile High while the new ballpark was being built. Next the committee went to the governor’s mansion for a festive lunch and a visit with the governor and other dignitaries. As the committee traveled throughout the city, baseball fans, all volunteers, lined the streets with welcome signs and a mile-long petition supporting the campaign for a big-league team.

After lunch, the committee went to the United Bank Center, where about 5,000 baseball fans had gathered to welcome them. As scheduled by Don Hinchey, director of the event, when the committee arrived, the crowd sang “Take Me Out to the Ball Game,” followed by cheers and applause for the visitors. Sportscaster Norm Jones gave a short welcoming address, several of the guests responded, and the crowd continued to sing and cheer for the distinguished visitors. The committee was visibly moved by the enthusiastic reception. “That visit, highlighted by the forbidden rally, sealed the deal.”27 On the way to the business meeting, Doug Danforth of the Pittsburgh Pirates said, “I never get an ovation like this back in Pittsburgh.”28

While the warm reception set a positive stage, the committee still wanted to know the financial condition of the owners. Jerry McMorris, Steve Ehrhart, and Paul Jacobs led their presentations, providing updated information about the ownership and their ability to meet the required financial investment. The meeting lasted about 2½ hours. At the press conference after the meeting, the mood was upbeat with favorable comments from the committee about the owners’ presentation. The expansion committee would continue to evaluate the applicants and a decision would be anticipated later in the spring.

The Announcement

Bill White, president of the National League, came to Denver on July 5, 1991. A crowd of fans, dignitaries and the media gathered at the Denver Hyatt Hotel. White spoke directly: “I am here to tell you that at 10:40 A.M., you officially became a member of the National League.”29 The audience reacted with a boisterous standing ovation. When the celebration calmed, White continued his remarks, indicating that Miami and Denver would be the new franchises, and that he anticipated both teams would be competitive much sooner than expansion teams in the past. Players from the National and American Leagues would be available to the expansion teams and both leagues would participate in the distribution of the funds from the expansion fees. White spoke with confidence that Denver and Miami had the potential to be very successful franchises for the long term.

Shortly after the announcement, John Antonucci, the chairman of the new team, and Steve Ehrhart, the president, set up offices in the United Bank Center and began to hire key personnel for the business operations. Michael Kent, formerly with the Philadelphia Phillies, and Sue Ann McClaren, formerly with the St. Louis Cardinals, joined the organization. Paul Egins, from the Atlanta Braves, was named assistant director of scouting and player development. They announced that purple would be one of the colors for the team, with reference to “the purple mountain majesties” as written by Katharine Lee Bates in the song “America the Beautiful.”

With an effort to reach out to the entire state and the Rocky Mountain areas, they introduced the logo and announced that the team would be called the Colorado Rockies.30 Governor Romer gave special recognition to the governors of Wyoming, New Mexico, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Kansas for their support in bringing major-league baseball to the region, at that time America’s only time zone without a team.

The first Rockies banquet, billed as “Colorado Welcomes Major League Baseball,” was held on September 25, 1991, at the Denver Marriott Hotel.31 Jim Wilkins was the general chairman and Commissioner Fay Vincent and Bill White were the honored guests.

In September, Bob Gebhard was selected to be the general manager for the Rockies. At the time, Gebhard was working for the soon-to-be American League champion Minnesota Twins, and it was agreed that he would not come to Denver until after the World Series. The Twins won the World Series and Gebhard arrived one day later, ready to begin a new career in Denver. It did not take long for everyone in the organization to recognize his devotion and commitment to building a championship organization.

New Leadership

Jerry McMorris became the chairman, president, and CEO of the Colorado Rockies on January 26, 1992.32 He assumed the leadership position after he, Oren Benton, and Charlie Monfort purchased the stock in a buyout agreement from Steven Kurtz and Paul Jacobs. Confronted with extensive legal problems, Michael “Mickey” Monus and Antonucci left the team after Monus was charged with embezzlement and fraud at Phar Mor. Kurtz and Jacobs purchased the stock from Monus and Antonucci, and held it during the interim period.

As the transition of ownership moved forward, McMorris set his sights on selecting key personnel, commencing business operations, and making preparations for the selection of coaches and players. General manager Bob Gebhard hired Pat Daugherty to head the scouting department and veterans Larry Bearnarth and Dick Balderson joined the staff.

Gebhard drew up elaborate plans for himself and his scouting staff to cover the entire country in preparation for the draft of players and the formation of the Rockies’ farm teams. It was reported that “Pat Daugherty’s 15 scouts traveled 198,105 miles by car and watched 2,250 high school and college games in the continental 48 states and Puerto Rico.”33

In February, KOA Radio was selected to be the flagship station for the Rockies. Jeff Kingery and Wayne Hagin would cover the play-by play. KWGN Channel 2 was chosen to be the television station with veteran announcer Charley Jones. Alan Roach was selected to be the public-address announcer. Frank Haraway, with over 50 years’ experience, was selected to be the official scorer.

In March, the Rockies announced that they would hold spring training in Tucson, Arizona. Their home field there would be Hi Corbett Field, former home of the Cleveland Indians. The Pima County Sports Authority agreed to make major improvements to the field and the supporting facilities.

In the June major-league draft, the Rockies chose John Burke, a Colorado native and pitcher for the University of Florida, to be their number-one draft selection.34 He would eventually join the other Rockies rookies to play for the Bend Rockies in the first organized game, June 16, against the Boise Hawks in the Class-A Northwest League. The Bend Rockies won the game, 6-4, with a grand slam by catcher Will Scalzitti.

In June, the Rockies held a tryout camp at the University of Denver. With the Rockies coaches and staff participating, the tryout camp was very popular with the local fans and participants. On July 4 the Rockies introduced their home and away uniforms. With purple pinstripes, the home uniforms were distinctive. The away uniforms were gray and black.

On October 27, Gebhard named Don Baylor to be the Rockies’ first manager. Baylor was quickly put to work preparing for the expansion draft. The draft was held on November 17. Denver’s Currigan Hall, site of many conventions and public events, was packed with an estimated 10,000 fans who came to watch the event, taking place in New York, Miami, and Denver. Alan Bossart of the Rockies staff created an elaborate venue, complete with a stage, numerous TV screens, and Rockies decorations throughout the hall. Secrecy and security surrounded the preparations before the announcement of the player selections.

Denver won the coin-flip and would select first. General manager Bob Gebhard selected David Nied, pitcher from the Atlanta Braves.35 Marlins general manager Dave Dombrowski selected Nigel Wilson from the Toronto Blue Jays. Gebhard also announced the signing of Andres Galarraga as a free agent. In a surprise announcement, Galarraga and Nied, who were kept in hiding prior to the announcement, appeared on stage for their introductions. The crowd went wild and shouted for joy as the players were surrounded by fans and members of the media. Throughout the evening, as additional players were selected, the fans continued to welcome the new team with wild enthusiasm.36

Spring Training

After the players, coaches, and managers were selected, Gebhard and the staff turned their attention to spring training. Major improvements at Hi Corbett field were underway, including additional seating, improved clubhouse facilities, extended practice fields, and improved media facilities.

Several weeks before spring training, manager Don Baylor and players David Nied and Eric Wedge went on the first Caravan trip throughout the Mountain Time zone. They visited Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, and many cities in Colorado. It was a promotional trip for the coming season and a time to thank the fans for their support in attracting a franchise. Many people had moved to the region from throughout the country where they had previously enjoyed major-league baseball. They knew what they were missing. Now it was time for them to change their allegiance and become fans of the Rockies. The annual Caravans proved to be a big success and have continued over the years.

The pitchers reported to Tucson about February 22 and the position players reported by February 27. The players needed to become acquainted with their teammates and coaches. To add a little levity to the situation, pitcher Bryn Smith handed out name tags to his teammates. The players responded with clever additions and exchanges, which confused some unsuspecting fans and media writers.

Once the team began practicing, the focus turned to preparation for the coming exhibition games. Veteran Don Zimmer was hired as bench coach and veteran Larry Bearnarth became the pitching coach, giving the team confidence that they would be ready to play at the major-league level.

The first exhibition game was played on March 6 against the San Francisco Giants. The opening game ceremony began with a flyby performed by the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base aerial team. The Sons of the Pioneers sang the national anthem. A crowd of 7,726 was on hand to see the Rockies win, 7-2.

The first regular-season game was played on April 5 in New York against the New York Mets. The first home game followed on April 9 at Mile High Stadium against the Montreal Expos before a record crowd of 80,227.37

The founding of the Colorado Rockies is a unique story involving many people from all walks of life, uniting and working together to enrich the quality of life with the major-league baseball experience. Colorado Rockies baseball is a game for all ages, all nationalities, and all creeds. It is a reflection of our national heritage, the bedrock of our common values, and involves the constant struggle to play the game, win or lose, to the best of one’s ability. And now, throughout the Rocky Mountain area, it is a cherished part of our history – and our future lives, to be shared throughout the ages.

ROGER L. KINNEY is a Colorado native and he won three varsity letters playing baseball at the University of Colorado. He is a past President of the Colorado Sports Hall of Fame. Kinney was the Director of the Colorado Baseball Commission and he served on the Board of the Denver Metropolitan Stadium Authority. He was the first employee of the Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, where he served as the Director of Community Relations and the Executive Director of the Colorado Rockies Baseball Club Foundation. He retired from the Colorado Rockies in 2004 and now lives in Colorado where he enjoys coaching, writing, playing catch with his seven grandchildren, and rooting for the Rockies.

 

Metropolitan Stadium Authority Board Members

(who served prior to April 1, 1993)

Ray Baker, Chairman Dan Muse

John McHale, Past Chairman Jack Shapiro

Debra Brody Joe Talarico

Steve DelCastillo Penfield Tate

Edmundo Gonzales Dean Quamme

Josie Heath Max Wiley

Roger Kinney

Colorado Baseball Commission Board Members

Sam Suplizio, Co-Chairman

Larry Varnell, Co-Chairman

Neil Macey, Past Director

Roger Kinney, Director

Helen Anderson Bob Howsam,

Gary Antonoff Robert Howsam Jr.

Odell Barry James Murray

John Benitez Trygve Myhren

Joe Blake Sue O’Brien

Robert Bows Chris Paulson

Irv Brown Jim Turner

Chris Christiansen Gil Whiteley

John Dikeou Kathi Williams

Jim Harrington Zee Ferrufino

Don Hinchey

Denver Baseball Commission Members

Federico Pena, Mayor

Steve Katich, Chairman

Dean Bonham, Vice Chairman

Jerry Arca Eloy Mares

Jim Burris| John McHale

Forrest Cason Bill Michaels

Don Carlsen Sherm Miller

Craig Caukin Dan MuDeb Dowling

Mike Raabe

Richard Fleming Bob Russo

John Gawaluck Elwyn Schaefer

Tom Grimshaw Carl Scheer

Bruce Hellerstein Rob Simon

Dave Herlinger Steve Stern

Don Hinchey Irv Sternberg

Neil Hinchman Ruben Valdez

Steve Kaplan Larry Varnell

Willie Kellum Steve Welchert

Elena Metro Kroll

Dan Kubby

Bob Litchard

MLB Visitation Team Members

Don Hinchey, Chairman

Carolyn Writer, Vice Chairman

Alan Bossart Robert Howsam Jr.

Lew Cady Chuck Javernick

Tom Clark Doug Kinney

Butch Cosby Ken Reed

Mike Flaherty Roger Smith

Lana Fry Michelle Strauss

Kevin Hannon Joe Talty

Linda Hantman Howard Weese

Ed Henderson Nancy Holst

 

Notes

1 Robert Lee Howsam, My Life In Sports (Denver: Bob Jones, 1999), 44.

2 Howsam, 46.

3 Jay Sanford, Before the Rockies (Denver: KEM Publishing, 2016), introduction page.

4 Sanford, 1.

5 Matthew Kasper Repplinger II, Baseball in Denver (Charleston, South Carolina: Arcadia Publishing, 2013), 7.

6 Alan Gottlieb, In the Shadow of the Rockies (Niwot, Colorado: Roberts, Rinehart Publishing, 1994), 12.

7 Gottlieb, 13.

8 Mary Kay Connor, Dick Connor Remembered (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 1995), 122.

9 David Whitford, Playing Hardball (New York: Doubleday Press, 1993), 26.

10 Whitford, 26.

11 Irv Moss and Mark Foster, Home Run in the Rockies, The History of Baseball in Colorado (Denver: Publication Design, Inc., 1995), 26.

12 Whitford, 58.

13 Whitford, 59.

14 Whitford, 70.

15 Moss, 41.

16 Whitford, 77.

17 Whitford, 84.

18 Whitford, 51.

19 See Appendix for a full list of appointments.

20 “Rockies Timeline,” Rockies.com, accessed April 23, 2017, colorado.rockies.mlb.com/col/history/timeline2jsp.

21 Whitford, 124.

22 Whitford, 87.

23 Personal interview with Carolyn Writer, June 12, 1990.

24 Moss, 51.

25 Norm Clarke, High Hard Ones (Denver: Phoenix Press, 1993), 151.

26 Clark, 151.

27 Gottlieb, 23.

28 Clarke, 154.

29 Moss, 62.

30 Benjamin M. Leroy, Colorado Rockies (Madison, Wisconsin: Quiz Master Books, 2008), 8.

31 Carolyn Writer, Colorado Welcomes Major League Baseball, Banquet Program (Denver: Hirschfeld Press, 1991), 1.

32 Colorado Rockies Inaugural Media Guide, 1993, 3.

33 Moss, 70.

34 Leroy, 8.

35 Leroy, 12.

36 Leroy, 13.

37 Leroy, 13.

ROUND 3
27	Brad Ausmus	c	New York Yankees
28	Marcus Moore	p	Toronto Blue Jays
29	Armando Reynoso	p	Atlanta Braves
30	Steve Reed	p	San Francisco Giants
31	Mo Sanford	p	Cincinnati Reds
32	Pedro Castellano	ss	Chicago Cubs
33	Curtis Leskanic	p	Minnesota Twins
34	Scott Fredrickson	p	San Diego Padres
35	Braulio Castillo	of	Philadelphia Phillies
36	Denis Boucher	p	Cleveland Indians

 

 

The date was September 4, 1967. As Canada’s centennial summer drew to a close, a sparse crowd of 802 gathered at Maple Leaf Stadium to watch the hometown Leafs of the International League host the Syracuse Chiefs.1 A ninth-inning home run by Syd O’Brien could not overcome a 7-2 loss to Stan Bahnsen and the Chiefs. The once-proud Maple Leafs franchise drew an aggregate total for the year of only 67,216 spectators and was teetering on bankruptcy.2 After the season, Toronto Community Baseball Ltd. sold the franchise and its debts to Indiana developer Walter Dilbeck for $65,000. The Leafs were moved immediately to Louisville, Kentucky.3 Baseball, a summer tradition in Toronto since 1886, had “crept out … without a whimper of public protest.”4

Baseball was not absent from the Toronto sports scene for long. In 1969, boxing promoter Jack Dominico was awarded an expansion team, also called the Maple Leafs, in the Ontario Inter-County League. However, municipal leaders like Paul Godfrey were not satisfied. Up the Macdonald-Cartier Freeway in Montreal, the Expos set an attendance record for expansion teams as 1.2 million flocked to Jarry Park. Godfrey surmised that if Montreal was major league, then Toronto should be as well.

“It disturbed me that Montreal was given a franchise,” Godfrey told Bob Elliott of the Toronto Sun in 1993. “I made up my mind that now was the time to champion baseball for Toronto.”5 The alderman from North York received a terse response from Commissioner Bowie Kuhn in 1969 when he approached Kuhn without a venue:

“Son, here’s the way baseball works. You get a stadium to play in and baseball will decide whether we’ll come.”6 According to Louis Cauz of the (Toronto) Globe and Mail, “Downsview Airport [in North York] and the Woodbine Racetrack in Etobicoke were bandied about as possible locations, but those sites would involve many more millions to develop than [was cost feasible].”7

The question of a proper venue was addressed in 1973 when Godfrey, now Metro Toronto Chairman, met Ontario Premier William Davis prior to the Grey Cup finals at Exhibition Stadium. Davis asked, “Where can we put it?” Godfrey replied “Why not here?”8 The two Conservative politicians agreed to split the costs to expand and upgrade Exhibition Stadium to meet the standards of major-league baseball.

Amid double-digit inflation and a global energy crisis, Metro Toronto taxpayers demanded to know that any proposed renovation would be profitable. Although Godfrey estimated a $15 million investment, a Globe and Mail editorial rebutted by asking, “Should be we satisfied with ‘ballpark figures’ just because the topic under discussion is a stadium?”9 Metro aldermen approved the project in 1974 by a vote of 23 to 6; it would serve only as a temporary facility until a domed stadium was ready. The capacity for baseball was estimated at 40,000.10

As is often the case with municipal projects, the Exhibition Stadium budget was a gross underestimate. Once the renovation was ratified, the budget was closer to $17.8 million, not including the scoreboard, private boxes, and concessions. The dressing rooms required additional renovation, adding another $2 million. Several corporations agreed to absorb construction costs and receive advertising rights and a share of the profits once a team began to play.”11

Also in 1974, former Boston Red Sox executive John Alevizos sought to purchase the Cleveland Indians and move them to Toronto.12 Upon approaching Davis for partners, Alevizos was advised to get in touch with local construction magnate Sydney Cooper.13 Meanwhile, in London, Labatt’s Breweries executives Donald McDougall and Ed Bradley brainstormed marketing ideas to improve the popularity of their product in Ontario.

“We were the number-3 market share in Ontario behind Molson and Carling O’Keefe and we knew that professional sports were a positive way to brand our product. We had recently become the sponsor of the Winnipeg Blue Bombers [of the Canadian Football League] and the product was so successful that we changed the name from Labatt Pilsener to Labatt’s Blue,” McDougall said. “Being on the ground floor [to sponsor] a major-league baseball franchise was a good place to solve the Toronto problem.”14

Although Labatt’s had sponsored local sporting events in Ontario like golf and curling, the brewery could not make inroads with any hockey or football teams in the province. In September, McDougall and his adviser, Alan Eagleson, met with Cooper to discuss a strategic alliance to bring baseball to Toronto. Cooper, who died in 2018, appreciated their interest but rejected their offer. He thought that asking a brewer to sponsor a baseball team would send the wrong message to the “Tory blue” Toronto of 1974. McDougall remembered:

“We got out on the street and Eagleson said, ‘I’ve never heard such [nonsense] in my life. You should be competing with them, not going with them.’”15 Thus, the idea of owning a team, rather than merely sponsoring one, was planted in McDougall’s mind. The next step was to speak to league presidents Lee MacPhail and Chub Feeney at the 1974 World Series.

A third consortium spearheaded by Lorne Duguid and Harold Ballard joined the baseball sweepstakes.16 As McDougall recalled, “the Duguid group [jovially] handed out brochures at the World Series. By contrast, we went to every place National League and American League owners met. Our market share responded positively to our effort to bring a team to Toronto, even if we hadn’t achieved it yet.”17 McDougall’s next hurdle was to convince his fellow executives at Labatt’s that owning a baseball team was a good business venture.

“They took the position that we shouldn’t own the team [outright],” he said. “We could associate ourselves with the team … as long as we didn’t own more than 45 percent of the shares.”18 By the end of 1975, a partnership was cobbled out. Montreal financier R. Howard Webster pledged to finance an additional 45 percent, with Page Wadsworth of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce contributing the remaining 10 percent.”19

This was not the first attempt to bring a major-league baseball franchise to Toronto. In the 1950s, when Jack Kent Cooke owned the Maple Leafs, he initiated unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Boston Braves, the Detroit Tigers, the Philadelphia Athletics, and the St. Louis Browns to relocate from their respective cities.”20 In 1959, Cooke became a catalyst for the Continental League to emerge as a third major league. When the American League voted to expand for 1961, thereby crushing the Continental League, Cooke abandoned the Leafs.21

In addition to the Indians, the city of Toronto also entered preliminary talks with the San Diego Padres and the Baltimore Orioles to move their teams north of the border. However, these discussions all occurred before the stadium renovation was complete in August 1975.22 Solway and his associates tried to purchase an existing team and move it to Toronto. The San Francisco Giants, owned by Horace Stoneham, became their test case.

“It was common knowledge [Stoneham] was trying to sell,” recalled Solway. “If he had been able to find a buyer in San Francisco, we wouldn’t ever have been involved.”23 The 72-year-old owner was nearly bankrupt and suffering from a chronic heart ailment.24

Once a perennial contender in the National League, as recently as 1971, the Giants struggled under baseball’s new economic structure. The team was $4.5 million in debt, compounded by massive losses for 1974 and 1975.25 The league recalled a $500,000 loan on December 1, 1975.26 As the club was saddled with a municipal lease through 1994, Stoneham decided to clot the red ink. The Giants were officially for sale. John D’Acquisto, a pitcher for the Giants, remembered:

“They were talking about the National League taking over the official business of the team but had to cut salaries to make it affordable. Just a bad situation for a team. We didn’t know if we were going to Tampa or Toronto … or if we were staying home in San Francisco.”27

To compound matters, the Giants had become accustomed to playing their home games before a sea of empty bleachers. Having inherited the team in 1936, Stoneham was “oblivious to modern marketing methods.”28 Fans who continued to purchase overpriced tickets could expect to eat rotten food at the concessions before returning to slashed tires in the parking lot.29 Though they finished a respectable third in 1975, the Giants drew a paltry 522,919. That attendance figure was actually an improvement over 1974!

Giants vice president Charles Rupert and solicitor Jim Hunt met with McDougall and Solway at the winter meetings in Hollywood, Florida, to negotiate the sale of the team. The parties agreed on $13.25 million: $8 million for the team and $5.25 million to finance litigation costs associated with breaking the municipal lease.30 After both ownership groups received approval from their boards, Stoneham made the announcement official on January 9, 1976.31

This was not how George Moscone envisioned spending his first day as mayor of San Francisco. Almost immediately, he filed an injunction with Superior Court to prevent the Giants from moving. One of Stoneham’s directors, real-estate magnate Bob Lurie, formed a partnership with Minnesota hotelier Bob Short to purchase the Giants and keep them in San Francisco. Feeney insisted that he was through granting loans to float the franchise.32 Lurie had until noon on February 11 to find appropriate financing.33 With one day to spare, Short backed out.34 McDougall remained hopeful that the Giants would play the 1976 season in Toronto.

“Logic is still on our side,” said McDougall. “Changing ownership is not going to put people in the ballpark and it’s not going to pay the bills.”35 Lurie asked the National League for an extension to find a partner. The league gave him five hours! At 2:45 P.M. on February 11, Lurie took a long-distance call from Arizona. It was meatpacker Arthur Herseth, offering to invest the funds required to keep the Giants in San Francisco. An agreement in principle on a deal was reached, and the offer to purchase was approved by Feeney with only minutes to spare.36 Judge John Benson ruled that the Giants were remaining in … “Baghdad by the Bay.” Godfrey described the ensuing atmosphere in Toronto as “letting a ground ball go through your legs.”37

 

 

Although Toronto struck out in San Francisco, a white knight appeared on the horizon in Seattle. After the city lost the Pilots in 1970, the State of Washington filed a $32 million antitrust lawsuit against the American League.38 The suit was dropped when the junior circuit agreed to expand to Seattle and one additional city. Godfrey recalled that “all the time we spent … trying to focus on buying a National League team, Lee MacPhail would tell us, ‘Don’t be surprised if you wind up in our league.’”39

MacPhail was not wrong. On March 20, 1976, the American League voted 11 to 1 to award its second expansion franchise to Toronto.”40 In the words of Bob Elliott, “Irish wakes lasted longer than the [city’s] mourning period.”41 After establishing a $7 million entrance fee, McDougall exclaimed that “we are very pleased, needless to say.”42

Charles Bronfman, the owner of the Montreal Expos, and John McHale, the club president, began to campaign among their fellow National League owners to expand to Toronto. As McDougall assessed, “They knew they didn’t have a successful product on the field and that a team in Toronto would help them at the gate.”43 A preliminary vote showed 8 in favor and 4 against but league rules required unanimity. As long as August A. Busch of the Cardinals remained resolute in his opposition to expansion, it was not going to happen. Don McDougall said he could still hear the words of his fellow brewer from St. Louis:

“I have no problem with Labatt’s, I have no problem with Toronto, but I do have a problem with watering down our product. That’s what I fear expansion is going to do.”44 A second vote was taken, 9 in favor and 3 against. When the Reds and Phillies echoed Busch’s concerns, Commissioner Kuhn advised Toronto officials to refrain from signing any paperwork with the American League, as he envisioned that the strategy would generate enough time for National League owners to arrive at a consensus.45

The American League remained prepared to expand to Toronto, but not until the National League had committed not to do so. Somehow, the Cardinals had switched their bias and after a third vote, the score was now 10 to 2. Kuhn told Godfrey to “give me a couple of weeks and I’ll work on the two votes.”46 The final vote was 7 to 5; Toronto was going to the American League.

Although the league issue had been resolved, McDougall now had competition from a second ownership group, headed by Philip and Irving Granovsky of Atlantic Packaging. Their presence posed a problem for the Labatt’s consortium. The brothers were friends of Jerold Hoffberger, owner of the Orioles and former president of the National Breweries in Baltimore.

In 1975, Hoffberger had sold National to none other than Carling O’Keefe. As per Louis Cauz, “[he] was against the Labatt’s group, which needed at least nine of twelve votes to be awarded a franchise. Hoffberger had control of three votes and needed one more owner to side with him at league meetings.”47 The Labatt’s people hatched a plan to convince the American League to award the franchise to them.

“Lee MacPhail was flying to Toronto to meet with [Phil and Irving],” Don McDougall remembered. “I had a guy meet him at the airport and said, ‘After you meet with him, come downtown and meet with us.’ We entertained MacPhail for the rest of the day.”48

The ploy worked and the American League voted 11 to 1 to award the franchise to Labatt’s as Hoffberger cast the dissenting ballot. Webster was named chairman of the board of Metro Baseball Ltd. while Labatt’s vice president Peter Hardy became vice chairman. Rounding out the Board of Directors were CIBC vice president David Lewis and former Premier of Ontario John P. Robarts. Toronto’s membership in the American League became official on April 27, 1976.”49

The first employee of Metro Baseball Ltd. was Paul Beeston, a chartered accountant from Welland appointed to oversee business operations. After initially considering Frank Cashen, the club hired Peter Bavasi away from the Padres to become general manager.50

“What an opportunity!” recalled Bavasi. “At age 34, to have a chance to build a club from scratch for a wealthy and detached ownership group didn’t take much thought on my part. Padres owner Ray Kroc and my father [Buzzie Bavasi] both said, ‘You’ve been in training for this job since you were a kid. Go do it!’”51

Pat Gillick soon followed from the Yankees to serve as vice president, bringing his assistant Elliott Wahle with him. Gillick’s mentor with the Astros and the Yankees, Tal Smith, encouraged him to accept the Toronto position: “Pat has been a dear friend ever since we worked together with the Houston Colt .45s, when he joined us in 1963. When I went to New York I was able to encourage Pat to join us there. I had a hand in recommending him to Don McDougall to head up their operation.”52

Beeston was not the only Canadian hired by the original Blue Jays. Scarborough’s Bob Prentice was hired from the Detroit Tigers to become the director of Canadian scouting. Barrie’s Ken Carson left the Pittsburgh Penguins to become the trainer while Howard Starkman moved across town from the hockey Toronto Maple Leafs to become the director of public relations.53 Whom would Bavasi hire to manage the team? What nobody realized is that the position was preordained as far back as 1964.

“During that first year at Albuquerque, I was so grateful to Roy Hartsfield for having been such a big part of my baseball education, that I said to him, ‘Skip, if I ever get a big-league club of my very own, I hope you’ll consider being my manager,’” Bavasi said. “I was, what, 22? The chance of me making it out of the Texas League was a distant thought back then.”54 In 1976, Hartsfield led the Hawaii Islanders to their second consecutive Pacific Coast League championship.55 The Georgia native was as famous for his unintelligible homespun expressions as his exceptional ability to mold young players with patience and understanding.56

Rod Gaspar, who played four years for Hartsfield, retains fond memories of his manager: “Roy was a good man and I enjoyed playing for him in Hawaii. Of course, I enjoyed any manager who played me regularly.”57

 

 

Bavasi made the unilateral decision on Father’s Day to hire Hartsfield. “I called Roy at his hotel in Honolulu and told him I was making good on my promise. He’d be the team’s manager if he wanted the job. Roy accepted. I told him we’d wait to announce his appointment until later September, so as to milk the story of who might manage the club.”58 Names like Yogi Berra, Elston Howard, and Dick Williams were all linked as potential managers.59

In hindsight, Bavasi was amazed that in a city with three daily newspapers, the story never leaked. He said, “Neil MacCarl [of the Toronto Star] came knocking on my door at 4 A.M., yelling, ‘We know it’s Joe Altobelli! We’re going with it.’ But now someone said Walter Alston is considering your offer.’ I would call Roy often, warning him that no matter what he read on the wire, he was our manager.”60

Torontonians submitted more than 30,000 entries in a “name the team” contest and the results were announced on August 12. Metro Baseball Ltd. was now officially known the Toronto Blue Jays.61 According to the press release, “The blue jay is a North American bird. … [I]t is strong, aggressive, and inquisitive. It dares to take on all comers yet is down-to-earth, gutsy, and good looking.”62 Initial reaction to the name was lukewarm if not cynical. Harvey Sahker, then a high-school sophomore, said he did not “remember what I suggested but it was not Blue Jays.”63 Budding sports author Eric Zweig added, “[T]o be honest, ‘Blue Jays’ seemed a little wimpy as a name but I think it was the logo that won us all over.”64

Bavasi aimed to introduce a logo that was “as easily recognizable as [Ray] Kroc’s golden arches.”65 He argued that “the logo did three important things: it said who we are, what we do, and where we’re from.”66 Though the logo was popular with the fans, it was not approved immediately. American League rules prohibited the image of a baseball on any logo because the graphic hindered the hitter’s ability to follow the trajectory of the actual horsehide. As Bavasi recalled, “[F]ortunately for us, no one complained.”67 Forty years later, Howard Starkman observed that “the logo was ranked among the best in baseball.”68

Once the regular season had concluded, the Blue Jays hired their coaching and broadcasting staff. Bob Miller, Hartsfield’s pitching coach in Hawaii, followed him to Toronto. Other coaches included Don Leppert, Harry Warner, Jackie Moore, along with former Red Sox All-Star second baseman Bobby Doerr. Two Southerners, Tom Cheek and Early Wynn, were hired to broadcast baseball on the radio to millions of Canadians.

 

With a coaching staff in order, it was time to assemble the team. On October 21, 1976, Phil Roof became the first Blue Jay when the club acquired the former Leafs catcher from the Chicago White Sox. The following day, the team purchased the contracts of Dave Hilton, Dave Roberts, and John Scott from the Padres and Chuck Hartenstein from Hawaii – all disciples of Bavasi and Hartsfield.

The Plaza Hotel in New York played host to the expansion draft on November 5. With their first pick, the Blue Jays selected Bob Bailor. A star prospect in the Orioles farm system, Bailor was unable to displace Mark Belanger at shortstop in Baltimore. On Gillick’s advice, the club drafted Otto Velez and Garth Iorg from the Yankees. Meanwhile, Bill Singer, who had pitched a no-hitter for the Dodgers, was drafted from the Twins. Former Leaf Rico Carty was drafted from the Indians. Other notable names included Jim Clancy, Pete Vuckovich, and Ernie Whitt – all of whom continued to play well into the 1980s.

The one Canadian Blue Jay, Dave McKay, was at home in Vancouver when he was drafted from the Twins: “I found out watching the late-night news. We turned our phone off having put the baby [Cody McKay] down that afternoon, and forgot to turn it back on. Friends and family were calling all evening.69

In a pre-orchestrated deal with the Indians, the Blue Jays sent drafted pitcher Al Fitzmorris to Cleveland for Alan Ashby and Doug Howard. A month later, Carty was traded back to the Indians for John Lowenstein and Rick Cerone. Dave Roberts and Mike Weathers were soon traded for two more Bavasi players, Jerry Johnson and Ron Fairly, respectively.

The best trade of all, as it were, was the one that was never executed. Here is how Elliott Wahle recalled what transpired: “At the very end of spring training, sitting in an office with one desk and two telephones. We sat with the polyester uniforms drying over our heads with the heat on. The phone rang and it was Gabe Paul with the Yankees. He offered us Ron Guidry for Bill Singer, straight up. Peter says, ‘We’re not making the trade because Singer is the marketing face of the new Blue Jays.’ Gillick says, ‘I can put the uniform on and people will think I’m Singer.’ Peter was unmoved.”70

As training camp broke in Dunedin, Florida, in 1977, the Blue Jays estimated their payroll budget at $5.2 million.71 Although Singer had pitched well, the fledgling franchise experienced growth pains in many other areas. While watching Bob Bailor play shortstop, Pat Gillick noted “questions about his arm,” and the prospect was moved to the outfield.72 The top-rated hitter, John Lowenstein, batted .222 and butted heads with the manager, prompting a trade back to Cleveland for Hector Torres.73 Even a man of Hartsfield’s optimism could not hide his low expectations, offering that “the guys I managed in Hawaii were probably a better team.”74

Ultimately, the Blue Jays posted a Grapefruit League record of 8-16. Errors were commonplace both on and off the field. One game in Sarasota, Starkman neglected to bring a tape of “O Canada” from Dunedin. After “The Star Spangled Banner” concluded, the numerous Canadians in the crowd began to sing their anthem in unison. Home-plate umpire Jim McKean, a Montrealer, halted the first pitch until “O Canada” had concluded.75 Tom Cheek recalled the cramped quarters of the broadcast booth in Dunedin that forced the engineer to sit in the stands adjacent to the players’ wives. One game, the sound of a baby crying was being carried by a microphone on the field; it belonged to Ashley Whitt, Ernie’s infant daughter.76

Moving north to Toronto, the Blue Jays faced additional obstacles as they prepared to host the White Sox on April 7. As the team was celebrated by a civic parade the day before, Ed Roete of Environment Canada forecast, “[T]he weather isn’t going to be terrific for baseball, but there will be no snow or rain.”77 Louis Cauz recalls that at 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the game, he “didn’t think it would be possible to play because of a swirling snowstorm [just west of Toronto].”78

As the scheduled 1:30 start time approached, Eric Zweig was eating lunch at a restaurant near Exhibition Stadium: “At some point, standing in the buffet line, someone said, “It’s snowing!” We looked out the window and it was really coming down!”79 White Sox infielder Jack Brohamer strapped on a pair of shin pads to be used as cross-country skis as the teams waited for a Zamboni to arrive. Would the weather postpone or cancel the game? For 44,649 fans, the climate hardly seemed to matter. Louis Cauz observed the pregame atmosphere as follows:

“Earlier, when I arrived at the stadium and saw the field, I had my doubts that a game would be played. But knowing the importance of the historic moment, and witnessing other snow-plagued fields on Opening Day in places like Cincinnati. … I hoped the Zamboni could do the job of clearing the field.”80

He added, “[P]late umpire Nestor Chylak joked about his crew, saying that third-base rookie umpire Steve Palermo had never seen snow before.” Although no fans were brave enough to streak across the frigid field, Cauz can still picture “one group of fans behind home plate, from Quebec, removed their sweaters and shirts and was bare-breasted for a few innings.”81

Toronto industrialist Harvey Wagman, who died in 2003, described the crowd passing his factory on Dufferin Street as “a parade of people wearing their parkas and carrying coolers.”82 In times of less restrictive security and archaic blue laws, the coolers were required to sneak beer into Exhibition Stadium. Even though the Blue Jays were owned by Labatt’s, “Prohibition Stadium” could not legally sell alcoholic beverages.

Despite the awful weather, Chylak insisted that the game go on. Anne Murray sang the national anthems and was accompanied by the 48th Highlanders. Robin Godfrey, Paul’s son, threw out the ceremonial first ball as chants of “We want beer!” could be heard throughout the stadium.83

Finally, at 1:48 P.M., Bill Singer delivered the first pitch of the game to Chicago leadoff hitter Ralph Garr. It was a strike. Baseball was back in town.

Epilogue

The Blue Jays defeated the White Sox, 9-5, in their inaugural game despite the frigid temperatures. After posting a record of 10-11 in April, the wheels fell off the engine. The Blue Jays completed the 1977 season with a record of 54-107. Failing to crack even the 60-win barrier, the club fired Roy Hartsfield as manager in 1979. Pat Gillick estimated that it would take a decade for the team to contend and he was not far off. The Blue Jays won 99 games and their first division title in 1985, their ninth American League campaign, before falling one game short of the World Series to the Kansas City Royals.

MAXWELL KATES is a CPA who lives and works in Toronto. He has worked in commercial radio and he writes a monthly column for the Houston-based Pecan Park Eagle. Maxwell’s articles and essays have appeared in The National Pastime along with several SABR BioProjects. He served as Director of Marketing for the Hanlan’s Point Chapter for 12 years and has spoken at SABR meetings and conventions in Seattle, Montreal, and Houston. His baseball highlights include to have witnessed Magglio Ordonez’s home run to win the 2006 American League Championship Series for the Detroit Tigers, along with the final out of the 2017 World Series. This is his first SABR project in an editorial capacity.

 

Acknowledgments

Marty Appel, Alan Ashby, Peter Bavasi, Louis Cauz, Scott Crawford, John D’Acquisto, Alan Eagleson, Bob Elliott, Dan Epstein, Marsha Franty, Rod Gaspar, Pat Gillick, Jerry Howarth, Donald McDougall, Dave McKay, Jim Prime, Harvey Sahker, Robin Silverberg, Tal Smith, Howard Starkman, Harvey Wagman (1919-2003), Elliott Wahle, Sam Zeifman, and Eric Zweig.

 

Notes

1 Louis E. Cauz, Baseball’s Back in Town (Toronto: Controlled Media Corporation, 1977), 143.

2 Lloyd Johnson and Miles Wolff, The Encyclopedia of Minor League Baseball, 2nd edition (Asheville, North Carolina: Baseball America Inc., 1997), 496.

3 Jane Finnan Dorward, “The Fleet Street Flats,” in Dominionball: Baseball Above the 49th (Cleveland: Society for American Baseball Research, 2005), 68.

4 Interview with Louis Cauz, January 5, 2018 (Hereafter Cauz interview).

5 Bob Elliott, Canada’s World Champions: Blue Jays Trivia Quiz Book (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993), 24.

6 Elliott, 24.

7 Cauz interview.

8 Elliott, 25.

9 Dorward, 94.

10 Cauz, 185.

11 Dorward, 95.

12 Neil MacCarl, „In the Beginning…“ in Eric Zweig, ed., Toronto Blue Jays Official 25th Anniversary Commemorative Book (Toronto: Dan Diamond and Associates Inc., 2001), 10.

13 Helena Moncrieff, “Sydney Cooper, P.Eng. (ON), M.E.I.C., Athlete and Family Man, Shares Talent, Time and Treasures,” Canadian Jewish News: October 12, 2017: B7.

14 Interview with Don McDougall, January 13, 2018 (Hereafter McDougall interview).

15 Ibid.

16 Cauz, 187

17 McDougall interview.

18 Ibid.

19 Elliott, 27.

20 Cauz, 102.

21 Dorward, 94.

22 Ibid.

23 Elliott, 28.

24 Dan Epstein, Stars and Strikes: Baseball and America in the Bicentennial Summer of ‘76 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), 36.

25 Ron Fimrite, “A Giant Step in the Right Direction,” Sports Illustrated, April 19, 1976: 19.

26 Steve Clarke. “The San Toronto Giants,” in Keith McArthur, ed., Bat Flip: The Greatest Toronto Blue Jays Stories Ever Told (Toronto: FanReads Inc., 2016), 2.

27 Interview with John D’Acquisto, December 27, 2017.

28 Epstein, 36.

29 Ibid.

30 Elliott, 29.

31 Clarke, 3.

32 Epstein, 50.

33 Elliott, 32.

34 Cauz, 189.

35 Epstein, 50.

36 Fimrite: 19.

37 Elliott, 32.

38 Ken Hogan, The 1969 Seattle Pilots: Major League Baseball’s One-Year Wonders (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company Inc., 2006), 139.

39 Elliott, 46-47.

40 Cauz interview.

41 Elliott, 32.

42 Epstein, 83.

43 McDougall interview.

44 Ibid.

45 Epstein, 84.

46 Elliott, 48.

47 Cauz interview.

48 McDougall interview.

49 Cauz, 189.

50 Stephen Brunt, Diamond Dreams: 20 Years of Blue Jays Baseball (Toronto: Viking Canada AHC, 1996), 69.

51 Interview with Peter Bavasi, December 30, 2017 (Bavasi interview).

52 Interview with Tal Smith, November 7, 2017.

53 MacCarl, 11.

54 Bavasi interview.

55 Maxwell Kates, “Rod Gaspar,” in Matthew Silverman and Ken Samelson, eds., The Miracle Has Landed (Hanover, Massachusetts: Maple Street Press LLC, 2009), 75.

56 Jim Prime, Tales from the Toronto Blue Jays Dugout (New York: Sports Publishing, 2014), 116.

57 Interview with Rod Gaspar, December 2, 2017.

58 Bavasi interview.

59 Elliott, 59.

60 Bavasi interview.

61 MacCarl, 10.

62 Epstein, 252.

63 Interview with Harvey Sahker, December 29, 2017.

64 Interview with Eric Zweig, December 28, 2017 (Zweig interview).

65 David H. Flaherty and Frank E. Manning, The Beaver Bites Back: American Popular Culture in Canada (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993), 159.

66 Bavasi interview.

67 Elliott, 58.

68 Interview with Howard Starkman, January 10, 2018.

69 Interview with Dave McKay, January 3, 2018.

70 Interview with Elliott Wahle, January 17, 2018.

71 Elliott, 59.

72 Interview with Pat Gillick, January 20, 2018.

73 Interview with Louis Cauz, January 5, 2018 (Cauz interview).

74 Prime, 116.

75 MacCarl, 12.

76 Ibid.

77 Elliott, 41.

78 Cauz interview.

79 Zweig interview.

80 Cauz interview.

81 Ibid.

82 Conversation with Harvey Wagman, June 15, 2003.

83 Cauz interview.

 

When considering the formation of the Seattle Mariners, one should look to two key developments. The first was the long-term task of building a major-league-appropriate stadium in Seattle. The second was the departure of the Seattle Pilots, prior to the 1970 season, and the lawsuit it generated. The State of Washington and King County sued the American League for breach of contract and antitrust violations.

Talk of a domed stadium had begun in the 1950s. In 1957, Washington Governor Albert Rosellini said, “We in this area must have the facilities to accommodate big-time sports events, whether they be major-league baseball, professional football or championship boxing.” He added, “I immediately will explore the possibilities of what this office can do to hasten the day when such facilities can be available.”1

Dave Cohn, chairman of the board of Consolidated Restaurants and a major player in downtown politics, first proposed the idea of a domed stadium in 1950. For several years, Cohn’s idea gained little or no traction. Seattle and King County officials were acquainted with the pitfalls of asking taxpayers to underwrite the construction of a multimillion-dollar stadium. The potential of luring a major-league team to the new ballpark might not be sufficient to draw voter support. In 1960, despite a hurried and somewhat ramshackle campaign, an omnibus bill that included a $15 million stadium bond proposal almost got over the hump. More than 146,000 voters, 48.3 percent of the voting electorate, favored the measure, but 60 percent was required for approval.2

Despite this early failure at the ballot box, the need for a domed stadium had become apparent. However, local officials were focused to prepare for another major project, the Seattle World’s Fair of 1962. Any serious discussion of a domed stadium was deferred until after the fair.

By the mid-1960s, ongoing debate about the stadium had resumed, especially on its location and funding. With the success of the World’s Fair and the region’s ensuing economic boom, led by Boeing, the interest in bringing major-league sports to Seattle continued to amplify. Ongoing stadium proposals suggested multiple locations in Seattle, along with outlying cities including Tukwila and Bellevue. There even were proposals for a floating stadium situated on Elliott Bay.3 Ultimately, however, the Seattle Center location won out, primarily due to its centrality. The State Stadium Commission endorsed it in December 1968.4

By 1967, the stadium budget had risen to $40 million. To finance its construction, public funding was included under the auspices of a set of ambitious urban infrastructure and growth proposals by King County. Known as the Forward Thrust package, it consisted of sweeping locally funded improvements encompassing multiple bond proposals totaling $815.2 million that embodied transportation, community housing, water issues, and other publicly financed capital improvements, including a proposition for a multipurpose stadium.5 Voters approved a portion of the proposals, authorizing $334 million in bonds on February 13, 1968, including $40 million earmarked for the stadium.6

Despite financing approvals and the award of an expansion franchise, actual construction was delayed, as cost increases and the stadium site met public pressure. A new vote was necessary in 1970 to approve the location, which was soundly defeated.7 With the project now in jeopardy, King County Commissioners stepped up and approved an alternate King Street site, near the International District and the eventual Kingdome location.8 Finally, on November 2, 1972, King County commissioners, led by County Executive John Spellman, initiated the construction at groundbreaking ceremonies.9

The 1967 American League plan to expand was driven by its decision to let Charlie Finley’s Kansas City A’s to move to Oakland. The move left Stuart Symington, a US senator from Missouri, furious. Only after Symington threatened to attack baseball’s antitrust exemption was Kansas City awarded a replacement club. In order to maintain an even number of teams, a second franchise was added in Seattle.10 A key problem with this plan was that the new teams would begin play in 1969. This created an unrealistic timetable to prepare the team for success in Seattle.11

Knowing that this stadium funding measure was prepared for approval, the American League in 1967 awarded an expansion franchise to Seattle. As a condition, the city and county were expected to build a ballpark within three years. With the approval of the funding, via Forward Thrust, it appeared that they would meet this stipulation.

The new team, the Seattle Pilots, was underfunded and undercapitalized. Significant local support failed to materialize and the owners had to borrow heavily to keep the team afloat.12

These financial problems of the Pilots were, in many ways, the beginning of the history of the Seattle Mariners. On April 1, 1970, Federal Bankruptcy Referee Sidney Volinn declared the Pilots insolvent, just six days before Opening Day. They were free to move to Milwaukee, where a group led by automobile dealer Allan H. “Bud” Selig had become their suitor.

A few months before the Pilots departed, Washington Attorney General Slade Gorton and King County Executive John Spellman assessed Seattle’s dire baseball situation. They retained Seattle attorney William Dwyer to represent the state and county in a legal effort to keep the Pilots in Seattle.13 In creating his claim, Dwyer argued that a contract was created between the American League, on one side, and the state, county, and city – in effect, the people – on the other. He contended that the American League had violated this contract.

Dwyer further argued that the implied contract called for the American League to place and keep an expansion franchise in Seattle. In return, citizens, through their government, would fund the renovation of the aging Sicks Stadium, home of Seattle’s Pacific Coast League teams, before supporting a $40 million bond issue to fund a domed stadium. When new facility was completed, the team would move from Sicks Stadium, to become the new ballpark’s prime tenant.

In the fall of 1970, Dwyer filed a $32 million antitrust lawsuit against the American League on behalf of Washington citizens. He alleged breach of contract, fraud, and antitrust violations, even though baseball was exempt from prosecution under antitrust law.

The case did not go to trial until January of 1976. The court date was prolonged in order to afford the American League and Washington’s government entities the opportunity to reach a settlement aimed at securing a new major-league team. In 1975, a plan was hatched to move the Chicago White Sox to Seattle. The plan assumed that the White Sox’ owner, John Allyn, would sell the team to a group in Seattle, who would relocate to play in the multipurpose domed stadium under construction. To replace the White Sox, Charlie Finley would move the Oakland A’s closer to his insurance interests in Chicago.14

This prospect looked encouraging until Bill Veeck offered to purchase the White Sox to keep the team in Chicago. After the American League initially vetoed his offer, it relented and approved the purchase in December 1975.15

With confidence that major-league baseball would return to Seattle within a few years, King County continued to build the multipurpose Kingdome. However, it was not without construction woes. In January 1973, steel towers that formed the core of the stadium’s concrete piers fell on a workman and toppled other standing towers like dominoes.16 Donald M. Drake Co., the original contractor, fell behind schedule and then walked away from the project in late 1974. They claimed they weren’t being paid by King County for work beyond the original scope. The parties sued each other. Four years later, after the Kingdome had opened for events, a federal court ruled against Drake and ordered it to pony up $13 million.

Despite financial relief for the Kingdome, the judgment did not cover the increased $27 million tab over its original $40 million budget.17 Throughout the construction, local and project officials hailed the stadium for being economically sound, making it possible that corners were cut during construction to keep the project closer to budget. In the end, it is possible that this contributed to many of the later issues with the ballpark, such as roof leaks and tiles falling.18

The stadium was ready for major-league sports by 1976 and celebrated its opening on March 27. In addition to housing the Mariners, it became the home to the NFL expansion Seattle Seahawks and even hosted the NBA’s Seattle SuperSonics from 1978 through 1985.

For baseball, the Kingdome, named for the stadium’s location in King County, Washington, was an early domed stadium built with multipurpose use in mind. The publicly funded stadium ultimately cost $67 million. In the future, repairs would exceed the original construction cost.19

The ballpark offered some unique features.20 A large American flag was flown above the concrete dome. The AstroTurf carpet was rolled out by a “Rhinoceros” machine and smoothed by the “Grasshopper” machine after it had been zipped together. The stadium displayed home plate from Sicks Stadium in its Royal Brougham trophy case. For fan comfort, the stadium contained 42 air-conditioning units, 16 in fair territory and 26 in foul territory, with eight ducts in each unit. The units would blow air in toward the field, which meant fewer home runs in what would normally be a home-run hitter’s park because of its short 357-foot power alleys. For speakers located within the field of play, a ball that hit a speaker would be considered in play.

When the lawsuit commenced in 1976, the American League awarded Seattle an expansion baseball franchise in return for dropping the suit. To maintain an even number of teams, a formal expansion proceeding resulted in a second team awarded to Toronto.21

The expansion vote by the American League, conducted in advance of any settlement, was held on January 14, 1976. American League owners voted 11 to 1 to place an expansion franchise in Seattle for the 1977 season. There were two conditions: sustainable ownership and a suitable ballpark.

 

 

The formal settlement of the antitrust lawsuit, however, was not reached until February 14. The Seattle legal team argued that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, including reimbursement of legal fees. Considering Dwyer’s success in presenting his case and the overall damages to the American League if it lost, the league caved. It agreed to pay damages to the State of Washington, King County and the City of Seattle. It marked the first time a major-league franchise had been secured through litigation.22 Sportswriter Emmett Watson of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer commented that the team should be named the Litigants instead of the Mariners.23

 

 

After the Kingdome was approved as a host venue, the American League awarded the Seattle franchise to a group of investors for $6.5 million.24 The ownership group was led by entertainer Danny Kaye, who provided most of the initial financing, and Lester Smith. Kaye and Smith had built a radio network, Kaye-Smith Enterprises. Their ventures also included a concert promotion company (Concerts West), a recording studio, a film-production company (Kaye-Smith Productions), and a radio syndication company.25 The syndicate owned several major radio stations in the Pacific Northwest, including KJR-AM in Seattle and KXL-AM in Portland.26

Other owners included Stanley Golub, a local jewelry wholesaler; Walter Schoenfeld, founder of the designer jeans company Brittania Sportswear and a founding partner of the Seattle Supersonics and the original Seattle Sounders soccer team; and James Stillwell, owner of Stillwell Construction, which was active in highway construction in the Pacific Northwest.

The formation of the Seattle Mariners was the beginning of a franchise whose general lack of success on the field has not necessarily matched its historical accomplishments. Despite never playing in a World Series, the franchise eventually generated interest beyond its accomplishments on the field. From unique plays to special players to a few exceptional seasons, the Mariners have earned attention beyond their on-field success, or lack thereof.

After the American League awarded the franchise, the ownership group set about setting up its initial management team in preparation for its first season, which was to begin in April 1977. On April 18, 1976, the team hired Lou Gorman away from the Kansas City Royals, to become its first director of baseball operations. Gorman held numerous roles with Kansas City dating back to 1968, when he served as their first scouting director. Gorman brought to the Mariners experience in building an organization from scratch.27

On June 2, the team named Dick Vertlieb as its first executive director. Vertlieb had been instrumental in the early development of the NBA’s Seattle SuperSonics and NFL’s Seattle Seahawks.

The lack of a nickname was resolved on August 24, 1976. “Mariners” was selected as the winning entry from more than 600 suggestions in a name-the-team contest. Multiple fans submitted the nickname, but the team determined that Roger Szmodis of Bellevue provided the best reason. “I’ve selected Mariners because of the natural association between the sea and Seattle and her people, who have been challenged and rewarded by it,” said Szmodis, who received two season tickets and an all-expenses-paid trip to an American League city on the West Coast.28

With their executive team hired, and a team name selected, the Mariners began to prepare their product on the field. On September 3, they hired Darrell Johnson as their first manager from a candidate pool that included Bob Lemon, Joe Altobelli, and Vern Rapp. Johnson had been fired earlier in the 1976 season after 86 games with the Boston Red Sox. His real success, however, was in leading the Red Sox to the pennant in 1975 and an exciting seven-game World Series. Despite losing to the Cincinnati Reds, Johnson was named Manager of the Year by The Sporting News.

On November 5, 1976, the Seattle Mariners and the Toronto Blue Jays held their expansion draft. Each team drafted 30 players from the other American League teams, paying a fee of $175,000 for each player drafted. Existing American League teams were allowed to protect 15 players in the first round, plus three more after each of the first three rounds (and two more players after the fourth round).29 Highlighting the Mariners selections was their first pick, outfielder Ruppert Jones of Kansas City.

The Mariners began to develop their minor-league system by participating in the 1977 amateur draft. With their first pick, they selected Dave Henderson. “Hendu” became a popular player in Seattle, playing in parts of six seasons with the Mariners before settling in Seattle after his retirement.30 Their sole minor-league franchise that year was the Bellingham Mariners of the short-season Northwest League. By 1978, their farm system had expanded to include the San Jose Missions of the Pacific Coast League and the Stockton Ports of the California League.31

Before the two drafts, the Mariners had already begun building their team as they purchased the contracts of seven players, including Dave Johnson, Jose Baez, and former Seattle Pilot Diego Segui.32

Spring-training games were played in Tempe Diablo Stadium, the same Arizona site used by the short-lived Seattle Pilots. It remained the Mariners’ site through 1993, when they moved to Peoria, Arizona, where as of 2018 they continued to conduct spring training in a facility shared with the San Diego Padres.

 

 

On April 6, 1977, the Seattle Mariners played their inaugural game in the Kingdome before a sellout crowd of 57,762. The opposing team was the California Angels. The Mariners’ starting pitcher was veteran Diego Segui, who, ironically, had pitched the final inning of the final game in Pilots history.33 Segui allowed six runs in the first 3²/3 innings, and the Mariners went on to lose 7-0, the mirror-image of the Pilots’ home-debut win against Chicago eight years earlier. Despite the team’s struggles on the field, it was, at least and at last, baseball.

Leading off for the Mariners was the designated hitter Dave Collins. He was followed by Jose Baez at second base, left fielder Steve Braun, and cleanup hitter and right fielder Leroy Stanton. Bill Stein and Danny Meyer played each of the corner infield positions. Batting seventh was center fielder Ruppert Jones, followed by catcher Bob Stinson and shortstop Craig Reynolds.34

Jose Baez connected for the first hit, a single in the first inning off Frank Tanana. It was not until April 10, their fifth game, that designated hitter Juan Bernhardt hit the team’s first home run.35 The team was shut out in its first two games, but finally earned a win on April 8, defeating the Angels 7-6. For the season, the team finished 64-98. Thanks to a late-season collapse by the Oakland A’s, the Mariners finished one-half game ahead of Oakland. They drew 1,338,511 fans, an attendance total they would not exceed until 1990.

That season, the team’s offense was led by Leroy Stanton, who hit .275 with 27 home runs and 90 RBIs. The pitching was led by Glenn Abbott, who threw 204 1/3 innings and posted a 12-13 record with an ERA of 4.45.

The Mariners struggled in their early years to build a successful product. After a relatively successful first year at the gate, attendance dwindled each year under the initial ownership group and never topped 900,000 after the first year. By the end of 1980, the team was cash-strapped and weary. While accepting a 1981 award from the National Conference of Christians and Jews, Stanley Golub quipped, “When Danny Kaye and Lester Smith came to ask me to become involved in the Mariners, they said it would be a new chapter in my life. Little did I know it would be Chapter 11.”36

On January 14, 1981, California real-estate developer George Argyros agreed to purchase 90 percent of the Mariners for $10.2 million from the original ownership group. Argyros subsequently bought the other 10 percent for $2.9 million. Argyros, who had also just purchased Richard Nixon’s former Western White House in San Clemente, California, assumed the Kingdome lease after negotiating a provision that removed his personal liability for bankruptcy.37

Thus continued a period in which the Mariners struggled both on the field and at the gate. They did not post a winning season until 1991. Highly leveraged and arguably inept owners failed to build a quality organization. Only in 1992 were the Mariners sold to a strong ownership group, which consisted of Nintendo and local prominent business owners. The group saved the team from a potential relocation and eventually created a stable and strong franchise with a lasting and positive effect on the community.

 

Notes

1 Georg N. Meyers, “Build New Park or Lose out – Soriano,” Seattle Times, May 29, 1957.

2 David Eskenazi and Steve Rudman, “Wayback Machine: The Floater That Didn’t Fly,” SportspressNW.com, May 6, 2014, https://sportspressnw.com/2184239/2014/wayback-machine-the-floater-that-didnt-fly.

3 Heather MacIntosh, “Kingdome: The Controversial Birth of a Seattle Icon (1959-1976),” HistoryLink.org, March 1, 2000, https://historylink.org/File/2164.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Associated Press, “Voters in Seattle Reject Proposal,” Spokane Spokesman-Review, May 20, 1970.

8 Heather MacIntosh.

9 “Kingdome Groundbreaking and Construction,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, December 31, 2009.

10 Maury Brown, “The Team That Nearly Wasn’t: The Montreal Expos,” The Hardball Times, January 16, 2006, fangraphs.com/tht/the-team-that-nearly-wasnt-the-montreal-expos/.

11 Matt Blitz, “The Only Major League Baseball Team to Go Bankrupt: The Story of the Seattle Pilots,” Today I Found Out, September 5, 2014, todayifoundout.com/index.php/2014/09/happened-seattle-pilots/.

12 Kenneth Hogan, The 1969 Seattle Pilots: Major League Baseball’s One-Year Team (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2006).

13 David Eskanazi and Steve Rudman, “Wayback Machine: Dwyer KO’s American League,” SportsPressNW sportspressNW.com /2124781/2011, October 25, 2011.

14 John Owens, “Bill Veeck, Baseball’s Barnum,” Chicago Tribune, February 9, 2014.

15 Rob Hart, “Switching Sox: When the A’s Almost Move In,” SB Nation, November 16, 2012, southsidesox.com/2012/11/16/3649842/switching-sox.

16 Heather MacIntosh.

17 Seattle Kingdome, thisgreatgame.com/ballparks-kingdome.html.

18 Jordan Miller, “King Dome – Roof Performance Failures and Ceiling Collapse,” Pennsylvania State University 2014. failures.wikispaces.com/King+Dome+-+Roof+Performance+Failures+and+Ceiling+Collapse.

19 Ballparks.com, ballparks.com/baseball/american/kingdo.htm.

20 Ibid.

21 David Eskanazi and Steve Rudman, “Wayback Machine: Dwyer KO’s American League.”

22 Steven A. Riess, Encyclopedia of Major League Baseball Clubs (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 802.

23 Ibid.

24 Baseball Club of Seattle LP, International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 50. (Detroit: St. James Press, 2003).

25 “Lester M. Smith Obituary,” Seattle Times, October 27, 2012.

26 History of Kaye-Smith Enterprises, kayesmith.com/about-us/history/.

27 Larry Stone and Associated Press, “Obituary/Former Mariners GM Lou Gorman,” Seattle Times April 1, 2011.

28 Associated Press, “The Mariners Chosen as Name for New Team, Eugene (Oregon) Register-Guard, August 26, 1976.

29 MLB Expansion Drafts History, baseball-reference.com/draft/1976-expansion-draft.shtml.

30 Baseball Draft Research, thebaseballcube.com/draft/research.asp.

31 Baseball Reference, baseball-reference.com/register/affiliate.cgi?id=SEA.

32 1977 Seattle Mariners Trades and Transactions, Baseball reference, baseball-reference.com/teams/SEA/1977-transactions.shtml.

33 Seattle Mariners Baseball Information Department, From the Corner of Edgar & Dave, marinersblog.mlblogs.com/on-this-date-mariners-play-inaugural-game-4984af8e53e3.

34 Seattle Mariners Baseball Information Department, On This Date: Mariners Play Inaugural Game, From the Corner of Edgar & Dave, marinersblog.mlblogs.com/on-this-date-mariners-play-inaugural-game-4984af8e53e3.

35 Seattle Mariners, Mariner Firsts. seattle.mariners.mlb.com/sea/history/club_firsts.jsp.

36 Carol Beers, “Stanley Golub, 85; Jeweler Was Part Owner of Mariners,” Seattle Times, October 10, 1998.

37 SPNW Staff, Mariners: Ownership, Organizational Timeline, sportspressnw.com/2163322/2013/mariners-ownership-organizational-timeline 9/26/13.

 

“Dewey was in a dream world. He had no money. I swear to God, the whole franchise was being run on a Visa card.” The Seattle Times’s Dick Rockne was exaggerating, but he caught the essence of the Pilots’ precarious situation at the end of 1969, their first and only season in Seattle.1 Dewey was Dewey Soriano, one of the principal co-owners of the team whose boyhood dream of bringing major-league baseball to the Pacific Northwest had turned into a nightmare. The Pilots became the second team in major-league history to last only a single year in its original city. Ironically, given the ultimate landing spot of the Pilots, the other instance of a one-year sojourn was the 1901 Milwaukee Brewers, who moved to St. Louis in 1902 to become the Browns.

Despite a nucleus of enthusiastic fans, overall passion for baseball in Seattle in the late 1960s was lukewarm at best. Between 1919 and 1968, attendance for the minor-league Rainiers, and later the Seattle Angels, had been steady, even robust. The Pacific Coast League team led the circuit in ticket sales for several years after World War II, but by the 1960s, attendance was slumping.2 Several local entrepreneurs, such as Dewey Soriano and his brother Max, were eager to bring major-league baseball to Seattle.

Chief among these boosters was Joe Gandy, a local Ford dealer, who was indefatigable in his efforts to build a ballpark to attract a team. And, of course, the entire contingent of sportswriters at the two local daily newspapers, the Post-Intelligencer and the Times, beat the drum enthusiastically.

In an era when one might speak of “City Fathers,” there were civic leaders, usually not politicians, who set the course for the city behind the scenes. Ed Carlson, the president of Western International Hotels, was one of them. Carlson provided the impetus for the Seattle World’s Fair in 1962. Attorney James Ellis was another municipal visionary. He worked to prepare Seattle for growth, cleaning up the polluted Lake Washington to the east of the city, while successfully urging citizens to modernize infrastructure for future economic development. His multifaceted Forward Thrust election campaign to approve construction bonds included a domed stadium.

These men smiled upon the idea of big-league sports in their city, but, unlike the boosters, did little in the beginning to facilitate a team. It was not until Seattle battled to preserve major-league baseball for their city that the civic leaders took a real interest in the Pilots.

 

 

The third group of decision-makers in the city was the politicians; some were uninterested in sports while others incorporated campaign promises to build a stadium. Mayor James D’Orma “Dorm” Braman was of the former group. He and his successor, Floyd Miller, had little interest in advancing sports in the city and no desire to finance a playing venue. At the other end of the spectrum sat John Spellman, the King County executive (something like the mayor of Seattle’s home county) and County Commissioner turned Councilman John O’Brien. O’Brien had been a star basketball player at Seattle University and an infielder and pitcher for the Pittsburgh Pirates, while his twin brother, Eddie O’Brien, became the bullpen coach for the Pilots. With his pedigree, John O’Brien could also be included in the circle of boosters.

Today there is serious debate about who bears responsibility to build a ballpark in order to lure a new team or perpetuate an established club. Historians of sports business have argued that construction is surely a losing economic proposition for the local government. In the mid- to late twentieth century the economics might have been debated, but a city without a new venue would be a city without a franchise.3

The attempts undertaken by the City of Seattle and King County to build a major-league ballpark followed an exceptionally bumpy road. The first effort was clearly premature. As early as 1957, Dewey Soriano suggested that a stadium with a plastic dome could serve as a multisport and convention building in order to circumvent Seattle’s rainy climate. In 1960, stimulated by support from Washington Governor Albert Rosellini, the city and county hired Stanford Research Institute to conduct an economic study of the region and the feasibility of building a stadium. SRI concluded that a stadium could be built for $15 million; baseball would almost surely plant a franchise in the Northwest to furnish nearby playmates for the Giants and Dodgers.4 Stadium bonds were placed on the November 1960 ballot. A tepid campaign consisting of fliers and bumper stickers was launched and encouraged by the local media. A 60 percent supermajority was required. The campaign garnered less than 48 percent of the vote.5

After the surprise success of the Century 21 Exposition (Seattle World’s Fair), the boosters were ready to attempt another public stadium campaign. Joe Gandy had assumed the leadership of the Fair from Ed Carlson midway through the project and brought it to fruition. He later proclaimed, “The Fair was a dying dog. And a lot of people thought I’d be the one to bury it.”6 His next project oversaw the construction of a ballpark to lure a team. The vote, originally scheduled for 1964, was delayed until 1966. In the meantime, something stoked the boosters’ fire. Gabe Paul and William Daley, owners of the Cleveland Indians, examined Seattle as a possible target to move their team. Mayor Braman met with the two and effectively dissuaded them from coming to Seattle. When Paul asked Braman when Seattle would be ready for major-league baseball, the mayor responded, “Oh, in about five years.” The mayor’s assistant helpfully added, “Seattle is not panting with excitement, mind you, but is in favor of [a franchise].”7 To be fair, Braman’s lack of optimism was not misplaced. A ticket sale to lure the Indians fell well short; and Seattle did not boast a truly established team until the Mariners years later. The Indians remained in Cleveland.

Nonetheless, Gandy and his crew persevered. When the National Football League deliberated expansion in 1966, it dropped broad hints that Seattle would be considered with an appropriate stadium. The drive for stadium bonds gained momentum. This time, the venue in question would be a $38 million domed stadium. Gandy went into overdrive. An array of civic leaders enthusiastically endorsed the bond issue.8 The sportswriters spilled gallons of ink in support.9 Even Braman agreed to follow the will of the public.10 In a televised debate, when two of Gandy’s opponents questioned why the public had to finance the stadium for a private ownership, his response was unconvincing. Consequently, the wind seemed to blow out of the sails.11 The voters endorsed the bonds by 52.5 percent – but 60 percent was required.12 Once again the stadium and the possibility of an NFL franchise and a major-league baseball team went a-glimmering.

Charlie Finley accomplished what Joe Gandy, the other boosters, and the sportswriters failed to do: He won a baseball franchise for Seattle, and made possible a domed stadium in the city. Finley did not do this wittingly, but he turned out to be the essential catalyst for Seattle’s entrance into the major leagues. The owner of the Kansas City A’s was certainly aware of Seattle. Finley had visited the city in 1967 with an eye to moving his team to the Puget Sound region. He and Mayor Braman had more encouraging conversations than were held with the Cleveland ownership, but any agreement foundered on the terms of use for the city’s minor-league field, Sicks’ Stadium, and Finley’s freedom to move if the third time of approving stadium bonds was not the charm.

Finley’s dalliance with Seattle may have been a ploy to leverage the best deal he could from Oakland. In any case, Finley moved his team to the Bay Area in 1968, leaving Missouri Senator Stuart Symington furious. Symington, like any US senator spurned, attacked baseball’s Achilles heel, its antitrust exemption. Not only did he demand a replacement team but he demanded that it begin play in 1969 rather than 1971. Those were two years of preparation lost to Pilots ownership. The American League quickly complied, approving an expansion team for Kansas City. And the AL decided to beat the National League to the unoccupied Pacific Northwest by granting Seattle a team.13

The boosters who attended the American League meeting were not caught unprepared. They presented a film of the Great Northwest and then detailed the economic strength of the region. But to even the most optimistic Seattleites, winning a franchise at the October 1967 League meeting was a surprise, and the city had done little to earn it.

 

 

Ownership was not contested. Shortly before the meeting, American League President Joe Cronin contacted Dewey Soriano to form a partnership in case Finley’s demands toppled the dominoes toward Seattle.

Soriano was a baseball insider and a logical choice. Born in Prince Rupert, British Columbia, he grew up in Seattle constantly involved with local baseball. He had served as general manager of the Rainiers and had risen to the presidency of the Pacific Coast League when Cronin called. Soriano assured Cronin that he could form a local ownership syndicate.14 The promise did not hold. Though Dewey and brother Max, PCL counsel, were the local face of the team, they held only 33 percent of the franchise shares. The primary owner was William Daley, with 47 percent of the stock.15

The former Indians owner must have been impressed with Seattle’s potential when he visited in 1964. He proclaimed, that he “would enjoy the opportunity of getting in bed” with the Sorianos.16 The consortium became known as Pacific Northwest Sports, Incorporated. Daley verbally guaranteed the $8 million that the league required to capitalize the team, but only in the event of a cash shortage.17 In the meantime, the Bank of California issued a $4 million loan. In May 1969, two months into the season, concessionaire Sportservice provided an additional $2 million loan in return for a 20-year “follow the team” contract.18 That meant Sportservice was the team’s concessionaire no matter where it played.

As the American League approved the new owners, Jerold Hoffberger of the Orioles fretted, “We are actually convinced there is no other group in Seattle, they have been scared off for some reason.” Later he regretted not having examined the ownership more carefully.19 The leveraged arrangement and Daley’s $8 million promise loomed large in the ultimate fate of Seattle’s new baseball team.

Staffing a front office, assembling a team, assuring an adequate temporary place to play, and building a permanent domed stadium were pressing priorities for Dewey Soriano. The most important front-office hire was general manager Marvin Milkes. Milkes started in the Cardinals organization and won his credentials with the Los Angeles/California Angels. To say he was intense is an understatement. As he described himself, “I’m very candid. I get a little impatient sometimes and I don’t smile all the time when we lose. … This is not a buddy-buddy organization. I believe in results.”20 Sportswriter Hy Zimmerman observed, “[Milkes] has splendid mental furniture, but it may need re-arranging.”21 The intense will to win while overseeing an expansion team resulted in 53 different players on its 25-man roster.22

The front office consisted of a capable collection of professionals who were knowledgeable about the local market along with experienced baseball hands. Bill Sears, erstwhile public-relations director for the Rainiers, held the same role for the Pilots. Harry McCarthy came from the San Francisco Giants as ticket manager. Ray Swallow and Art Parrack, both from the A’s, headed scouting and the farm system, respectively. Harold Parrott, longtime Dodgers official, and most recently with the Angels, was hired at twice his Dodgers salary to oversee promotions and sales. He was gone by the first of June, a cost-cutting casualty, and an indication of apprehension over cash flow.

 

Bringing together a team also signaled some early financial concerns. The team purchased the contracts of outfielder Mike Hegan and pitcher Jim Bouton from the Yankees in June 1968, almost a year before the team’s debut. (Bouton, of course, became famous as the chronicler of the Pilots’ one and only season with his tell-all book Ball Four.) The expansion draft occurred in October 1968. Initially, the Pilots decided to build for the future, selecting promising players left unprotected from the draft. The day before the draft, Dewey Soriano had a change of heart. Season-ticket sales, which had been running for two or three months, were lagging. A member of the front office told the New York Times, “We felt we needed a product someone could understand right now.”23 So it would be veterans, not emerging major leaguers. Many had been stars, but now were aging, injured, or both. Don Mincher, drafted from the Angels, was beaned in 1968; Tommy Davis (White Sox) never fully recovered from a broken ankle in 1965; Rich Rollins (Twins) had sore knees; Steve Barber (Yankees), a sore arm. Tommy Harper from the Indians was probably the best draftee. As a Pilot, he led the American League with 73 stolen bases. Others were typical expansion picks: Ray Oyler (Detroit) hit under .200, Marty Pattin (Angels) had his moments, but finished 7-12, and catcher Jerry McNertney (White Sox) was steady but unspectacular. Milkes hired Joe Schultz, St. Louis third-base coach, to manage the team. The easygoing, affable Schultz was a good buffer between the players and the hard-driving Milkes. The former catcher was a baseball man, but ill at ease with reporters. “He was as rough as his gnarled fingers,” his press liaison remembered.24 Schultz was able to select one of his coaches, conditioning coach Ron Plaza. Pitching coach Sal Maglie and third-base coach Frankie Crosetti were probably chosen for name recognition.

The Pilots’ publicity crew devised several engaging ideas. There was a name-the-team contest. Few were surprised that Dewey Soriano, part-time harbor pilot, declared that Pilots was the winning name. The logo was both nautical and aeronautical, featuring a ship’s wheel around a baseball, with wings attached. A catchy song was written for the team: “Go, Go, You Pilots.” The uniforms sported a cap with a naval officer’s “scrambled eggs” on the bill. The radio deal was probably the Pilots’ greatest business accomplishment. The team signed a deal with Golden West Broadcasting for $850,000 a year. The network ranged from Alaska to North Dakota and south to Elko, Nevada. (This hinterland proved to be more supportive of baseball in the Northwest than the locals. Numerous families planned their vacations to Seattle when the Pilots were at home.) Jimmy Dudley, whose soft Southern drawl was reminiscent of Red Barber, came from Cleveland to anchor the broadcasts.25 A TV contract never materialized. Soriano reportedly asked for $20,000 per game, then lowered it to $10,000, but could not strike a deal.26

But the crucial negative decision involved ticket prices. Soriano believed that a new major-league market would pay for the privilege to watch the team; prices ranged from $6 box seats to $2.50 for backless bleacher seats. Only the San Francisco Giants sold tickets priced that high; and a number of clubs charged as little as 75 cents.27 The reaction was immediate. The Seattle Times sports editor exclaimed in print, “Great Soriano! Where are the cheap seats?”28

Season-ticket sales lagged from the beginning. At the end of the 1969 season, Pilots attendance stood fifth lowest among major-league clubs at 677,944, some 150,000 below break-even.29 Could layoffs at Boeing have restrained fan enthusiasm? It’s possible. The Boeing recession that crested in 1971 was just getting started in 1969. Unemployment in Seattle was steady at 3.6 percent in the Pilots’ only season, but some Boeing families might have decided that a brace of high-priced baseball tickets was not the wisest choice in the shadow of increasing layoffs at the city’s largest employer.30 But premium prices for expansion baseball were a more likely culprit.

The quality of play outpaced expectations for over half the season. Although they were 16 games under .500, the Pilots were in third place among six teams in the American League West by the end of July. Then age and ability began to show. Injuries and losses multiplied. At the end of the 1969 season the record was 64 wins and 98 losses. That landed them in last place in the division. Only Cleveland suffered more losses in the American League.

If there was a worse plague than a lagging box office for the Pilots, it was a ramshackle playing field. They were scheduled to play in an upgraded minor-league ballpark, Sicks’ Stadium, for four years, then move into a new domed stadium. The American League granted Seattle a franchise on the condition that voters approve the King County Multipurpose Domed Stadium. The ballot to ratify stadium construction bonds passed with 62 percent in a February 1968 election.31 The success of that vote was the good news.

Virtually all of the other stadium stories were bad news. Sicks’ was a model minor-league park when it opened in 1938, but work was required to bring the city-owned facility up to the undefined major-league standards. Negotiations to use the ballpark continued until the early fall of 1968. The city was determined for rental fees to pay for all remodeling costs. Braman was all but immune to any threats to withdraw the franchise. The final agreement settled for a five-year lease at $165,000 per year, though the Pilots fully expected to move to a new building in four. The city promised $1.75 million to refurbish Sicks’ and expand it to 28,000 seats.32

The timing of the September 1968 agreement left seven rainy months to remodel the stadium. Initial bids came in 65 percent over budget.33 Corners were cut and seating scaled down to 25,000. The ballpark never reached major-league quality, according to Charlie Berry (Joe Cronin’s man in the field), Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, and several American League owners who visited Sicks’.34 Fans filing into the gates on Opening Day, April 11, could hear hammers ringing as workmen continued to install seats. Post-Intelligencer sportswriter John Owen captured it best, commenting, “Not bad for a bunch of brash amateurs. Even if they did get caught with a few of their bleachers down.”35 An estimated 19,000 seats were completed by Opening Day and capacity probably never reached 25,000.

Problems with Sicks’ vexed the Pilots ownership throughout the season. The sound system failed, the bench seats warped, and a short circuit in an electrical vault almost burned down the ballpark. Worst of all, there was no water pressure in the ballpark after the seventh inning if attendance rose above the season’s average level of 8,370.36 Soriano complained to the press about these shortcomings, hardly an ideal strategy to advertise his product to a less than passionate fan base. Pacific Northwest Sports then withheld a promised surety bond, demanding repairs and upgrades. In March 1969, Floyd Miller replaced Braman as mayor and was no more enamored of baseball than his predecessor. By August 1969 Miller threatened to evict the Pilots. Daley and Cronin came to Seattle and smoothed things over.

The great hope amid this wrangling was the promise of the brand-new domed stadium. After the successful ballot initiative in February 1968, things bogged down. A squabble over the ballpark’s location erupted. The Stadium Commission’s consulting firm recommended a spot at the southern edge of Seattle. Meanwhile, civic leaders lobbied hard for Seattle Center, the site of the World’s Fair. Though closer to downtown, it was a more expensive location. When the commission bowed to the downtown pressure, a successful petition was circulated for an initiative vote. In January 1970 voters rejected the Seattle Center site. A new Stadium Commission would have to start all over. Pacific Northwest Sports understood the ramifications of the siting controversy: The ballpark might not be under construction by the December 1970 deadline imposed by the American League.

The situation in Seattle had become bleak. The region was not excited about the team. The current ballpark was inadequate. Relations with the city were strained at best. Moving to the new venue was becoming a steadily more distant prospect. Daley made his displeasure known. “We don’t seem to be getting support from the Seattle business people,” he groused at the end of August 1969, “If I continue to get the brush-off I’m going to lose interest too.”37 Hy Zimmerman, rebutted in a Seattle Times column entitled “Won’t You Go Home Bill Daley?”38 This may not have been the final straw. However, by early September, Pacific Northwest Sports had begun to negotiate with the Milwaukee Brewers, a civic group led by Allan H. “Bud” Selig, to move the Pilots to Wisconsin.39 Unlike Daley’s group, Selig’s partners were well-heeled. Firms such as Schlitz, Evinrude, Northwest Mutual Life, and Oscar Meyer were represented. Also, they had Milwaukee County Stadium, and it was in good shape.40 A deal was struck at the 1969 World Series in Baltimore to sell the Pilots to the Milwaukee consortium, and it quickly became an open secret in Seattle. Although that is what ultimately happened, the Pilots had not yet become the Brewers.

Persuaded by obvious comments about baseball’s antitrust exemption from Washington’s two U.S. senators, Warren Magnuson and Henry Jackson, Cronin gave Seattle about a month to devise a competing offer for the Pilots. Ed Carlson spearheaded the effort, mainly to preserve Seattle’s esteem. Fred Danz, a local theater owner, was the face of the undertaking. Carlson appealed to his fellow city fathers’ sense of civic pride and rounded up a bevy of Seattleites to pledge $100,000 or more. Daley would become a 25 percent owner and the Sorianos, at Cronin’s insistence, would be cashed out. The goal was to add $4.8 million to the $4 million Bank of California loan and the $2 million advanced by Sportservice to cover the purchase price and furnish operating capital of $1.7 million.41 On November 18, 1969 the Post-Intelligencer’s front page proclaimed, “It’s the SEATTLE Pilots.”42 But a month later, Danz announced, “I felt I should tell the public there is trouble in Paradise.” The Bank of California had informed the Sorianos in September that if the team was transferred, its loan would be due and payable.43 After a futile appeal to Seattle banks for loans to replace the Bank of California financing and an unsuccessful ticket drive, the Danz initiative was done.

 

 

Now Ed Carlson openly took up the reins. The Pilots would become a publicly held nonprofit organization. Here was civic leadership at its purest. Hundreds of community leaders invested what they could afford to keep the team and keep egg off the public face of Seattle. Any profits that were not reinvested into the organization would go to city charities and amateur sports.44 When Carlson issued his proposal at the American League meeting that was supposed to approve the Danz ownership, the owners were dumbfounded. Cronin observed, “I think we are dealing with a different breed of cat.”45 Some owners saw it as a threat, fearing they would have to follow suit and distribute their profits to their communities. The American League owners gave Carlson permission to try to create a viable ownership team, but privately expected – hoped – he would fail. Behind closed doors the Orioles’ Frank Cashen commented, “By going along with them, all we are doing is giving them enough rope to hang themselves because they just can’t make it.”46

The next meeting was in 15 days, in early February 1970. More than 60 businesses, labor organizations, and individuals agreed to assist Carlson. He persuaded Bank of California and Sportservice to perpetuate their loans and for Daley to remain a partner. When Carlson and his allies met in Chicago on February 6, everything was in place (although it is questionable whether the prospective ownership team was sufficiently capitalized). The American League owners were nervous about the funding, but could not accept the nonprofit. They wondered who would be in charge of a public-ownership syndicate. After questioning Carlson, the owners tried to make a decision. Cronin announced to the press that “We took nine million votes.” (Actually, it was nine.) The Carlson plan fell one vote short.47 The owners then voted to keep the Pilots in Seattle, retain Pacific Northwest Sports Incorporated as owners, and lend them $650,000.48 The American League understood that moving the team would awaken the wrath of two powerful senators. Consequently, the league scrambled to find a buyer to save the team. Bowie Kuhn even sounded out Carlson to see if he would try again. The answer was a firm “No.”49 The league owners’ decision proved to be no more than a liferaft. The Seattle press was incredulous.

Wisely, the Sorianos stepped aside from active participation to leave Roy Hamey and Marvin Milkes to run the team. There was some shuffling. Dave Bristol and a new group of coaches replaced Joe Schultz. Milkes, as was his wont, traded several players, including Don Mincher, mainstay pitcher Diego Segui, and fan favorite Ray Oyler. There was some attempted civic fence-mending, but ticket sales were slipping.

The team was collapsing financially and the league, fearful of having baseball’s antitrust exemption questioned, had no remedies. The state of Washington let Cronin know it would file an $82.5 million lawsuit for breach of promise, financial damage, and fraud if the team moved, and had obtained a court restraining order against relocation.50 Pacific Northwest Sports Incorporated was not going to continue in Seattle and the only solution was to declare bankruptcy. Everyone knew that if the declaration was approved, the sale to the Milwaukee group would be the bankruptcy court’s remedy.

The deal to sell the team to the Milwaukee Brewers group became official on March 8, 1970. All that was lacking was American League approval. The last days of the Pilots were spent in court. In the morning, there were hearings in King County Superior Court over the restraining order. In the afternoon, the federal bankruptcy court heard arguments. Pacific Northwest Sports asserted that it had lost $2.3 million in 1969 and was unable to pay its debts. The accounting firm Peat Marwick later estimated losses at about $630,000. Most importantly, Pacific Northwest Sports could not repay its loans from Bank of California and Sportservice. Moreover, if player salaries were deferred by 10 days, the players would become free agents.51 Not mentioned was Daley’s crucial written promise of $5 million to $8 million in the event of insolvency.52 In addition, bankruptcy judge Sidney Volinn overlooked the clause that the American League by its own constitution was responsible for the club if it became insolvent.53

With the regular season just days away, the $10 million deal offered by the Milwaukee syndicate was too attractive a solution to ignore. Volinn declared Pacific Northwest Sports Incorporated bankrupt. The injunction against moving the team to Milwaukee had already been stayed. On April 2, 1970, the formal papers were signed.54 With “Brewers” newly stitched on their uniform tops, the team opened the season in Milwaukee County Stadium against the California Angels on April 7.

Volinn’s ruling protected Pacific Northwest Sports from any lawsuits. But since the American League was liable, the State of Washington sued the circuit. After six years of litigation, the league settled out of court in January 1976, granting Seattle a new franchise that would become the Mariners.

The Seattle Pilots story is one of more errors than hits. The American League was eager to stake out a new territory. The AL owners’ enthusiasm probably outpaced that of most Seattleites. Attendance was not the worst in the league, but it fell short of reasonable expectations. Charging the highest prices in the league did little to kindle enthusiasm among the fans. Ownership, including those who scrambled to save the team at the last minute, was undercapitalized. William Daley is the only figure who could have afforded to absorb even moderate losses and he reneged on his $8 million pledge to shore up the franchise. The ballpark situations – both Sicks’ and the squabbles over the new domed stadium – burdened an already struggling franchise. For the boosters it was a bittersweet experience. For the civic leaders the Pilots brought more embarrassment than pride. And for most of the politicians the whole situation was an annoying distraction. In short, Seattle was not ready in 1969 for a major-league team. Groundbreaking on the Kingdome did not take place until December 1972, nearly three years after the Pilots departed Seattle for greener pastures in Milwaukee.