The Statistical Impact of World War II on Position Players

In December 1941, the outbreak of the Second World War elicited drastic changes throughout nearly all sectors of American society while the nation struggled in an unprecedented mobilization toward global conflict. This was particularly true in the realm of major league baseball, where over 90% of all active players at the outset of the war eventually served in the armed forces. This subsequently placed teams in the awkward position of having to employ players with little talent, men who were past their athletic primes and, in two cases, even athletes with fewer than four limbs.

The majority of major league players who did serve in the American military lost between one and four years of their baseball careers, which often proved devastating for their professional lives. Although a small number of players suffered debilitating injuries or illnesses, the primary impact of the war on players of the World War II era entailed interruptions in and the curtailment of their careers. In most professional occupations, a hiatus of up to several years is relatively insignificant. However, the brevity of a typical professional baseball player’s tenure magnifies this type of absence, if only from a statistical standpoint. Inevitably, the years missed by players due to the war have led to unending speculation about what might have transpired on the field if not for the war. Each major league player who served in the military had precious years of their careers stripped away, and hundreds of minor leaguers had their careers derailed before they even began.

The most obvious examples of this phenomenon involved several of the most dominant offensive players of the era. Although it is impossible to precisely project career statistics for players who spent substantial time in the armed forces, the years spent away from the game obviously affected their final numbers. Joe DiMaggio and Hank Greenberg, for example, both probably would have exceeded the 500 home run plateau and 2,000 RBI mark if not for their time spent in the military. DiMaggio’s situation is quite fascinating due primarily to the fact that there was such a disparity between his pre- and postwar offensive numbers. In his seven seasons before his induction DiMaggio never accumulated less than 114 RBI in any single campaign. Following his return, the Yankee center fielder drove in more than 100 runs only twice in the six seasons leading up to his retirement. Also, whereas virtually every one of his prewar seasons was truly dominant, only DiMaggio’s 1948 year can be compared favorably to any of his seasons completed before the war.

Despite this relatively precipitous decline following his military service, most students of the game nevertheless recognize Joe DiMaggio as one of the greatest players in history. In contrast, DiMaggio’s contemporary and annual rival for batting superiority in the American League, Detroit Tigers first baseman Hank Greenberg, has traditionally been denied such accolades. Greenberg was arguably the most dominant offensive player in the game and certainly among the five best hitters in baseball during the four years before he began his stint in the Army. The Tiger star then spent nearly five complete seasons away from the diamond at a time when his offensive numbers were still at their apex. With an average no lower than .312 during the four years before his military service, Greenberg led the league in home runs twice, RBI twice, and slugging percentage once. In those same four years he also won the American League’s Most Valuable Player award once and finished third on two other occasions. Once Greenberg returned from his nearly five-year absence, he never regained his prewar brilliance and was out of professional baseball by 1947. 

Another of the great players of the era, Stan Musial, also lost time due to his military service. Although he was absent only for one season, some of his final statistics fell just short of important milestones. By missing the 1945 campaign, Musial narrowly missed the magical number of 500 home runs—a total reached by only 16 other individuals in the history of the game. Less obvious to the casual observer are his career hits and RBI marks, which fell just shy of noteworthy plateaus. If Musial had not been absent in 1945, he almost certainly would have been only the second player to eclipse 2,000 career RBI. Regarding his hit total, although his career tally places him fourth all-time today, at the time of his retirement Musial had accumulated the second highest number of safeties in baseball history, behind only Ty Cobb. With a typical season in 1945 added to his career statistics, Musial would have been within about 350 hits of the great Tigers outfielder. In such a circumstance, it is not inconceivable that Musial would have attempted to prolong his career an extra couple of seasons in an attempt to reach Cobb’s seemingly unattainable record.

Of the elite players of the World War II era, Ted Williams’ career was arguably affected the most by his military service. With nearly five years during the heart of his baseball career spent in the military—three of which he served during the Second World War—Williams narrowly missed shattering some of baseball’s most hallowed records. Although Williams returned from his military stint during World War II and displayed his usual brilliance at the plate despite his three-year absence, he seemed poised to reach even greater heights. When Williams began his military obligation before the 1943 season, he was coming off of the two finest back-to-back seasons of his career, 1941 and 1942, during which he hit .406 in 1941 and led the league in home runs, batting average, and RBI in 1942. The Triple Crown in 1942 was not his last—he won another in 1947—yet Williams never exhibited quite the offensive skill in consecutive seasons as he did in his last two seasons before entering the Navy.

Since he was reaching the prime of his career at that time, it is impossible to determine exactly how impressive his career statistics might have been without the three-year interruption for military service. However, the Red Sox slugger almost certainly would have approached, if not exceeded, Babe Ruth’s career home run record of 714—the record at the time of Williams’ retirement. With less than 500 RBI separating Williams from the most prolific run producer in history, Hank Aaron, the Red Sox star also would probably still claim the career RBI record.

For players such as DiMaggio, Greenberg, and Williams it is therefore abundantly clear that the Second World War had a significant impact on their professional careers. For the players who fell just short of this elite status, however, their careers were arguably affected to an even greater extent. Whereas virtually all of the premier players of the 1930s, ’40s and ’50s have been enshrined in the Hall of Fame, several talented professionals sacrificed prime years of their careers to the war effort and fell just short in their bid for enshrinement in Cooperstown.

Probably the most glaring example of this is Yankees and Indians second baseman Joe Gordon, a nine-time all-star who played in the post-season six times during his stellar career. Gordon’s statistics compare favorably to fellow second baseman and Hall of Farner, Bobby Doerr, who was a close contemporary and also a veteran of the Second World War. Doerr has the slight edge over Gordon in career RBI, although the two campaigns lost by Gordon to only one sacrificed by Doerr explains most of that disparity. Doerr also holds an advantage in career batting average by twenty points, although this might be somewhat deceiving. Doerr played his entire career in Fenway Park, notorious for its cozy left field dimensions, while Gordon played during his prime in the more spacious Yankee Stadium. This almost certainly kept his batting average lower than it could have been in more offensive-friendly confines. Despite the deeper outfield dimensions of Yankee Stadium, however, Gordon struck 30 more home runs than did Doerr during their respective careers. Although Doerr does hold a minimal edge in career fielding percentage, Gordon was by no means a defensive liability with a .970 career fielding average.

The one area where Gordon has a tremendous advantage is in the six championship teams of which he was a major contributor. Gordon was a catalyst for the great Yankee teams of the late ’30s and ’40s and also won a World Series title late in his career with the Cleveland Indians. In contrast, Doerr played in only the 1946 World Series with Boston, and although he hit a sparkling .409 during the seven-game set, he never played in the World Series again.

Comparing Gordon to another Hall of Fame second baseman, Tony Lazzeri, whom Gordon replaced in the Yankees lineup in 1938, an even stronger case can be made for Gordon’s inclusion in the Hall of Fame. When analyzing career statistics for both players, Gordon leads or has nearly identical numbers in almost every category. The only two notable exceptions are Lazzeri’s advantages in career batting average and RBI, 24 points and 216, respectively. Again, the disparity in RBI can be dismissed due to Gordon’s two-year hiatus for military service, while the difference in batting average can be partly offset by Gordon’s superior power numbers—Gordon’s 253 home runs compared to Lazzeri’s 178. In balancing team championships, Lazerri’s impressive five World Series titles fall short the six won by Gordon.

For every elite star like Ted Williams or near-great player like Joe Gordon, there were many other lesser-known position players who also had their careers interrupted or ended by the outbreak of hostilities. Most of these individuals not only had years of their careers stripped away because of their military service, but the hiatus inflicted irreparable harm to their baseball abilities, often causing a premature close to their chosen vocation.

Philadelphia Athletic second baseman Benny McCoy, for example, enjoyed a promising three-year career before the war and seemed destined for stardom with skills that included exceptional speed and occasional power. McCoy, however, was one of the first major league players to enter the military, and he never again played in the big leagues after the war. First baseman Buddy Hassett, a solid player for three teams, also saw his big league career come to a screeching halt with the outbreak of the Second World War. A .292 career hitter, Hassett’s career spanned the seven years leading up to the war and ended when he entered the armed forces.

Unlike McCoy and Hassett, Washington Senator shortstop Cecil Travis did return to the major leagues following a stint in the military but without much success. Travis had been an exceptional hitter in the eight years prior to his entry into the Army, batting lower than .300 only once before the war while exhibiting occasional home run power and a low strikeout ratio. He was also a three-time all-star participant and led the American League in hits with 218 during the 1941 season, his last before joining the Army. The Senators star, however, suffered severe frostbite to his lower extremities during the Battle of the Bulge and never regained the mobility needed to perform at the major league level. Upon his return, the Senators moved Travis to third base to accommodate his limited range hoping that he might regain his potent prewar batting stroke. Travis spent a dismal three years following the war battling American League pitching and managed to hit only .252 in his best postwar season. By 1947 he had retired from baseball, and a promising career had been derailed for reasons beyond his control.

One of Travis’s teammates, outfielder Buddy Lewis, was another of the lesser-known players affected by their military commitment. In the six years before Lewis entered the Army Air Force, Lewis, a below-average defensive player but an exceptional hitter, never hit below .291 and three times batted over .300. While exhibiting occasional power and an ability to steal bases, the Senators outfielder went to the 1938 All-Star game and also led the league in triples in 1939. Upon his return to the major leagues following a three-year absence beginning in 1942, Lewis never again hit .300. Although he did again represent the Senators in the All-Star Game (1947), his statistics that year did not compare favorably to any of his prewar campaigns.

From an individual perspective, therefore, it is abundantly clear that the war affected numerous professional players to a greater or lesser extent. The list of anecdotal stories and statistical information regarding individual professional players returning from the war with diminished skills are quite plentiful. However, the question then arises whether the interruptions in players’ careers, when taken as a group, caused substantial declines in their abilities and statistics or if the trials and tribulations of a few have skewed the perception of those athletes that participated in the war.

First of all, in comparing groups of players who served during the war and those who did not, one can identify startling differences both between and within these groups and decipher some of the changes initiated in major league baseball by World War II. The first striking disparity between the players who served in the armed forces and those who remained in civilian life are the average ages of the two groups. During 1942, the first full year of the war, the mean age of the players who served in the American military was significantly lower (26.9 years old) than those who did not serve (29.4 years old). The logical explanation for this is simply that draft boards and armed forces recruiters preferred younger individuals for induction, while older players were also more likely to have chronic, age-related conditions that might disqualify them from military service. Also, the percentage of older players who were married, and subsequently less desirable for military service than single men, was most likely higher than in younger players.

Another interesting characteristic of major league players during World War II is that players who occupied certain positions were disproportionately represented within the armed forces. The revelation that first basemen (46.7%) and catchers (31. 8%) had the highest and third highest percentages, respectively, of players who did not serve is not exceptionally surprising considering that those position players also had the highest average ages at the outset of the war. In addition, many teams relocated exceptional offensive players to first base from other more athletically demanding positions, such as the outfield, once they had passed their athletic prime or if they had sustained an injury that hampered their efficiency elsewhere. Either scenario would suggest lower numbers of first baseman who were prime candidates for induction into the armed forces. Regarding catchers, many at this time had debilitating hand and finger injuries because of the catching style of the day (two-handed as opposed to the modern one-handed style) along with chronic knee and leg problems common among some due to years of donning the “tools of ignorance.” These factors, along with their elevated mean age, would have excluded many of them from military service. 

Also not surprising, second basemen (4) maintained the highest percentage (94.7%) of military service among all position players. Second basemen predictably were the youngest and, one can assume, healthiest of the position players and thus prime candidates for military service. What is startling is that the percentage of shortstops (6) that did not serve (41.2%) was extremely high despite the fact that their mean age was virtually identical to those of third basemen (5) and outfielders (7), who maintained predictable rates of service in the armed forces. Because it is virtually impossible to compete as a shortstop on the major league level with any kind of physical malady that might disqualify one from military service, the low number of shortstops who served is baffling.

At first glance, the offensive skill of both players who did and did not serve is very comparable, with nearly equal career batting averages for the two groups (.272 vs .274) and similar batting average statistics for the final prewar campaign of 1941 (.272 vs. .271). A closer examination of offensive statistics, however, shows slight deviations between players who did and did not serve, particularly in the power categories. In 1941, players who did not serve tended to hit more home runs (9.1) and compile more RBI (59.3) than their contemporaries who lost time due to the war (7.9 home runs and 54.7 RBI). This is most likely due partly to the fact that most teams relied on first basemen to be sluggers and run producers, and a disproportionate number of first basemen did not serve in the armed forces. Interestingly, the slugging percentages of those who did and did not serve is virtually identical (.397 vs .395), which reveals that players who served were more apt to hit doubles and triples than their civilian counterparts.

One might expect that since players who did not serve were more apt to be sluggers, they then would be more likely to be free swingers and therefore exhibit higher numbers of strikeouts, which was true only to a slight extent. What is somewhat surprising is that players who did not serve had higher mean numbers of stolen bases, at-bats, and walks during the 1941 season, although their on-base percentages were virtually the same. Those numbers clearly suggest that players who did not serve were more often utilized as starters and batted higher in the order in 1941 than those who did serve. The higher number of at-bats and walks is logical considering that teams usually tended to rely on more experienced and thus older players. Regarding stolen bases, however, the disparities are confounding when one considers that the group that did serve had higher percentages of second basemen and outfielders, positions that normally account for the majority of stolen bases. The only apparent explanation is that players that did not serve, because they accumulated approximately 10% more at-bats (438 vs. 400), were on base more often and thus had more opportunities to steal bases.

Possibly a more equitable test in balancing the offensive production of these two groups would be to compare their statistics at similar stages in their careers. When comparing statistics for the years 1937 and 1940, when the mean ages of those who did not serve and those who served, respectively, was approximately 25.5, there are several interesting revelations. First of all, the offensive production of those who served surpassed that of those who did not serve in several vital areas. While mean home runs, slugging percentage, and stolen bases were virtually identical, the mean batting average (.282) and on-base percentage (.350) of those who served was significantly higher than their counterparts at comparable ages (.277 batting average and .338 OBP). The nearly 12-point disparity in the on-base percentages in favor of those who did serve is particularly noteworthy, for teams and players especially prize that statistic as demonstrating a player’s value to his team.

Comparing both groups’ on-base percentages in those years to the league averages further evidences the offensive superiority of those who served. In 1937, the group that did not serve maintained an on-base percentage of .338, approximately six points below the league average, while in 1940 the group that did serve compiled an on-base percentage of .350, about 16 points above the league average. Therefore, the resulting differential is a very significant plus 23 in favor of the group that served. Also telling is the fact that those players who did serve surpassed those who did not serve in RBI production (57.4 vs. 54.7) and, most important, in Total Player Rating (.667 vs .205). The elevated TPR of the players that did serve suggests that they were more valuable and more productive than their civilian counterparts. One can conclude that at similar points in their careers, those players that did serve were more efficient offensive players.

Furthermore, besides their careers being interrupted, for the players that served, their absence apparently also statistically affected them to varying degrees. The first striking statistical disparity within the group of players that served is the nine-point decrease in batting average (.272 to .263) from the final season before the outbreak of the war, 1941, to the first full season following the war’s conclusion, 1946—the year in which virtually all of the players in this study who served were again active.

The first logical question that then arises is whether the decline in average was caused by a deterioration of skill because of years spent in the service or simply an age-related decline typical in the latter portions of a player’s career. In 1941, players that did serve had a mean age of slightly over 26 and in 1946 that number rose to slightly over 30. In comparing the statistics of 1939 and 1943 for those who did not serve—the seasons during which those players maintained approximately the same mean ages—a determination can be made regarding the possibility of an age-related decline in production.

From a superficial point of view, when comparing the two groups at similar ages it seems that the theory suggesting an age-related decline is the most logical conclusion to the decrease in averages—both groups witnessed a substantial decline in their averages at the age of 30 compared to their marks at the age of 26. However, looking closer at the data undermines that conclusion to some extent. In 1941, the players who served hit 11 points over the major league average of .262 while in 1946 they dipped to nine points over the major league norm of .256. Conversely, in 1939 the players that did not serve managed to compile a mean average which exceeded the major league average of .275 by six points, while in 1943 they managed to exceed the major league mark of .253 by 15 points.

Thus, the differences between 1941 and 1946 in the group that served was minus two while between 1939 and 1943 in the group that did not serve was plus nine. Subsequently, this results in a disparity of 11 points between the two groups at similar ages. Therefore, even though the group that did not serve aged to a degree that one might expect a decrease in batting average, they actually increased their mean average when compared to the major league norm. In contrast, those that did serve witnessed a decline in their relative postwar batting averages, indicating a factor not associated with an age-related decline in productivity.

In dismissing age as a factor in leading to a dip in batting average between 1941 and 1946, another logical explanation might be then that players who spent one to four years in the military lost some of their skills because of inactivity. This would not be completely surprising considering the reflexes and reaction times that are necessary to compete on the major league level. However, the statistics indicate several interesting anomalies within the group that served. The revelation that those who spent only one year in the service improved on their 1941 averages by about six points is not extremely surprising, given the fact that many professional players may have retained their skills during such a brief absence by competing on military baseball teams during the war, albeit usually not against major league competition on a consistent basis. The improvement in the one-year group is even more impressive when considered in relation to the league averages of those years. In 1941, players who served one year batted just a shade under the league norm of .262, yet in 1946 they hit 13 points above the league average. Thus, it appears that forfeiting one season due to the war greatly assisted some players in compiling high averages. 

More predictably, those who spent two and three years in the service witnessed a substantial decline, 9 and 23 points respectively, in their 1941 and 1946 batting averages. Part of this decline should be viewed as a general trend-the league averaged dropped seven points in 1946 compared to the 1941 season. Thus, for those who spent two years away, their nine-point dip is relatively insignificant and suggests that their absence impacted their batting skills only negligibly. In contrast, those who lost three years of their careers due to military service seem to have been affected the most by their time spent away from the diamond. As a group, they compiled a very impressive .289 average in 1941, 27 points better than the league standard and 18 points better than any of the other groups that served, before a precipitous postwar slip. In 1946 they dropped dramatically to just 11 points over the league average, and maintained only the second highest average among those who served.

Amazingly, those players who sacrificed four years of their careers to WWII actually enjoyed an increase of five points between their 1941 and 1946 batting averages. This finding is tempered somewhat by the fact that their prewar average was nine points lower than any other group’s 1941 average and subsequently 11 points below the league average. Also, their 1941 mean age was much lower than the other players who served, indicating inexperience at the major league level and thus less offensive expertise. In addition, even after their five-point increase, the group that missed four years still had the second lowest postwar batting average of those that served.

When an analysis of the two final prewar years is undertaken in relationship to the first postwar season in order to negate any one-season anomalies and obtain a more comprehensive view of the effects of the wartime absence on those who served, several interesting facts become increasingly clear. First of all, for those who spent one year in the service, their dramatic increases in batting average following their absence does not seem so startling. In combining the 1940 and 1941 averages of the players who missed one year and comparing those to the league standards, the one-year group hit six points above the league norm during those two seasons. In comparison to the 1946 numbers in which those who served one year batted 12 points over the league average, this difference of six points is substantially less than the nearly 13 point differential which is evident if considering the last prewar year alone. The numbers, however, still suggest that those who missed one year actually benefited statistically from their absence.

For the group that served two years, very little difference is evident when considering the two final prewar years compared to only one. The numbers simply reinforce the conclusion that their wartime absence had little effect on their batting averages. In contrast, among the group that missed three years, utilizing the two final prewar years strengthens the determination that their hiatus did affect their batting statistics significantly. An average of the variations from the league norms for their 1940 and 1941 batting averages results in the figure of plus 28. During the first postwar year that figure dropped dramatically to plus 11, thus again suggesting that the absence affected the group negatively to a great extent. 

Interestingly, among the group that served four years one can see the most dramatic reinterpretation of the statistics once the two final prewar years are included. When only variations from the 1941 and 1946 league batting averages were considered, the resulting conclusion was that the group that was inactive for four years witnessed an increase of 12 points relative to the league average upon their return. However, when the 1940 season is also included, their prewar numbers and postwar numbers are virtually identical, blunting the seemingly remarkable gains they made after the war.

Utilizing similar methods regarding the impact of the war on the power statistics of players who served, no discernible patterns emerge from the general data. Among both players who served and those who did not, home run totals dipped at least slightly in 1946 compared to 1941. However, this is not particularly revealing, since the overall number of home runs tended to decline after 1941 and remained low through 1946. In 1941, major league hitters struck a total of 1,331 home runs, with the numbers steadily declining from that point until in 1946, when a modest offensive power surge transpired. It was not until the following year, however, when batters smacked 1,565 home runs, that the number of round-trippers surpassed prewar totals. Therefore, it is not surprising that the statistics for the groups of players who both served and did not serve followed this general trend.

When one looks closer at the statistics, however, it seems obvious that the extended absences endured by those players that served in the military also negatively affected their home run totals in the years following their return. Again utilizing comparable data from the 1939 and 1943 seasons—the years when the ages of players who did not serve were almost identical to the 1941 and 1946 ages of those that served—notable differences are clearly evident.

In comparing the years 1939 and 1943 for those players who did not serve, totals decreased an average of approximately one per person, or 13%, while the major league home run totals between those two years decreased a drastic 38%. Therefore, in relation to the rest of the league, the players who did not serve actually witnessed an increase in their power statistics when comparing their statistics at the age of 30 in relation to their numbers at 26.

Despite earlier revelations that those players who spent one or two years away from the diamond due to military service increased their offensive productivity, their power statistics seem to have been affected by their absence. In 1946, the number of home runs in the major leagues was about 9% lower than in the last prewar war year of 1941. When comparing the home run totals during those same two years for players who missed one year of action, a decline of 12% is observed (9.2 home runs to 8.1) while those who missed two years witnessed a steeper decline of 26% (4.8 home runs to 3.6).

The disparity for the one-year group in relation to the league average decline, therefore, was a mild 3% while those players who missed two years endured a drop of 17% below the league norm. The three- and four-year groups also had drastic declines in their home run production, even when considering the 9% decline by the league as a whole between 1941 and 1946. The players who missed three years dipped 18% (10.3 home runs to 8.4), while the players with four years of military service sank 50% in their home run numbers (3.2 home runs to 1.6).

Other power statistics observed in 1941 and 1946 also reveal several more interesting variations. Whereas one would expect the slugging percentages of players who served to be detrimentally affected by their absence due to the fact that home runs play such an instrumental part in the calculation of that statistic, it seems to be only marginally true. In comparing 1941 slugging percentages of those who served with their 1946 numbers, only the group who missed three years showed any substantial decline beyond the aforementioned league-wide offensive dip with a drop of 52 points. Furthermore, when considering the slugging statistics for those who did not serve in the years 1939 and 1943, little, if any, inference can be made from the statistics. The slugging percentage of this group declined by about 51 points, which was virtually identical to the league average decline. The difference between the groups that served and did not serve was minimal at best.

However, when considering the RBI production for both groups at similar points in their careers, large disparities are clear, and it is evident that extended absences by players who served detrimentally affected their offensive output. For those players who served at least one year, a decrease in RBI output is plainly evident with those who were inactive longer suffering the most. Each subgroup of those who served endured a substantial decline in their run production when their 1941 seasons are compared to the first postwar campaign.

However, this again was partly due to the overall trend in professional baseball, for during the 1946 season major league teams scored just over 1,215 fewer runs than in 1941, thus leading to lower RBI totals across the board. This 11% decrease partly but not completely explains the drop in RBI production by every group that served. As has been the pattern previously, the players who missed only one year of action were affected least by their absence, knocking in only 12% fewer runs in 1946 (51.3) than in the last prewar season (58.1)—a negligible 1 % disparity from the league decline. Those who spent two years in military service seemed to have been affected to a greater degree, dropping their run production 19% (43.4 RBI to 35)—8% lower than the rest of the league.

Continuing the descent, the players who missed three years sagged 23% from 1941 to 1946 (64.3 RBI to 49.6), while those who missed four years dipped precipitously by driving in 32% fewer runs between those seasons (39.8 RBI to 27.4). These dips in production, 12 and 21% below the league average decline, respectively, indicates that players returning from military obligations did not retain their prewar abilities in hitting with men in scoring position. 

In comparing the numbers of those who did not lose seasons due to the war to those who did miss substantial playing time, the decline in RBI production by the group that served becomes more revealing. Weighing the years of 1939 and 1943 for the group that did not serve, those players witnessed a rather unexpected increase in RBI output (49.7 RBI to 56.3). This is somewhat surprising because in comparison to the 1939 season, the numbers of runs scored in the major leagues dropped dramatically by 2,182 or 18%. When combined with the modest increase in RBI of 12% by those who did not serve during those years, they boosted their production by 30% in relation to the league average. When compared to the decline among those that served, this is particularly impressive and suggests that military service did in fact affect RBI productivity.

In analyzing the vitally important statistic of on-base percentage in the same manner, players who missed seasons due to military service seemed to have been affected negligibly. The overall on-base percentage in major league baseball declined about four points in 1946 compared to 1941. However, only the players that missed three years actually saw a dip in their on-base percentages during the first postwar campaign (.369 OBP to .339). The remaining groups witnessed modest increases in their 1946 on base percentages of approximately nine, one, and 24 points in the one-year, two-year, and four-years-served groups, respectively.

These numbers, however, are very comparable to the disparities in the on-base percentages of players who did not serve in the years of 1939 and 1943. The average league on-base percentage declined 20 points within those two years, or about 6%, while the players who did not serve saw their on-base percentages decline by approximately 10 points or 3%. Thus, no direct correlation between this statistic and wartime absence can be proven to a high degree of certainty. However, when using Total Baseball’s statistic, Total Player Rating, in players who did and did not serve, once again evidence of the negative impact of military service becomes clear. Of the players who missed at least one season, the TPR’s of those players varied greatly both before and after the war. According to the TPR statistic, those players who missed three years were the most valuable group to their teams before the war while their numbers following the war sank dramatically. This confirms earlier analyses, which suggest the wartime absence for that group had a sizable impact on their postwar production.

One baffling anomaly is that the group who missed two years showed a remarkable improvement in their 1946 TPR ratings when compared to their 1941 numbers. This can be somewhat explained by their low 1941 TPR rank, which was the second lowest of the four groups. However, the other groups who served had either very modest gains in their TPR or, more predictably, a decline in those numbers.

When compared to the average increase in the TPR statistic for those players who did not serve for the years 1939 and 1943, the results of the group that served again decreased in relation. The group who avoided military service enjoyed a .530 increase in their TPR between 1939 and 1943 (.176 TPR to .706), while the players who served exhibited a relative decline in their on-field performance (.528 TPR to .255). Most notably, the group who served three years endured a startling decline in their TPR (1.264 to .382) from 1941 to 1946. Also, despite earlier revelations that the group who missed one year actually witnessed moderate to substantial improvement in their production, their slight increase of .14 in their TPR statistic (.431 to .445) reveals that improvement may have been overstated. 

Therefore, while the majority of major league players lost at least one season due to military service, it should come as no surprise that extended absences negatively affected the careers of the athletes involved. This is evident not only in individual cases where some lost as many as four years of their prime to the war, but also collectively for the group of players who served. For some, serving in the armed forces proved detrimental in reaching statistical milestones and for others prevented them from possibly reaching the Hall of Fame. Clearly military service initiated a general offensive decline among position players, the repercussions of which were felt years after the conclusion of the war both by the individual players and major league baseball as a whole.

STEVE BULLOCK is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and specializes in sport history. His book, Playing for their Nation: Baseball and the American Military during World War II, was awarded the Malloy prize by SABR and the University of Nebraska Press and will be available in early 2004.

 

Notes

1. Although Greenberg’s postwar statistics do not rival his prewar numbers, he was instrumental in Detroit’s 1945 World Series victory upon his release from the Army and playing in the final weeks of the season. Also, the Tiger star did lead the American League in home runs and RBI in his first full season back but had a batting average much below his norm. Following the war, Greenberg never again hit over .300 and retired within two years of his return to the major leagues.

2. At the time of Musial’s retirement, only Babe Ruth had surpassed that total. Hank Aaron eventually accomplished the feat several years after Musial’s departure from the game.

3. Doerr also spent time in the military during the war, though only one year compared to Gordon’s two-season absence.

4. For the purpose of this study, players who played at least one season before and after their military service with at least 50 at-bats in each of those seasons will be considered for the group that served. For a control group, players who played at least the 1941-1946 seasons with no time missed due to military service will be considered.

5. Total Player Rating is a statistic devised by Total Baseball researchers which determines a player’s worth by comparing his statistics to players throughout his league at his position during a particular season. The higher the TPR rating, theoretically the more valuable a player is to his team. For an in-depth description as to exactly how a player’s TPR is calculated, see John Thorn, et al., eds., Total Baseball (New York: Total Sports, 1999), p. 655.