The Player’s Fraternity: They Fought the Good Fight

The creation of the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs in February, 1876, brought stability and strong leadership to organized baseball. The eight-team National League promised a respectable game for its patrons, with no play on Sundays, no liquor sales on the grounds, and no gambling.1 To insure roster stability and salary control, the owners, over the next few years, instituted the reserve clause, which in essence gave clubs ownership of players.

Ballplayers, at first honored to be important enough to be reserved, soon understood their loss of freedom and its economic ramifications. By 1885 dissatisfaction surfaced in the form of the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players. Led by John Montgomery Ward, a ballplayer with a law degree, the Brotherhood sought to organize its members and have a voice in the governing process of the major league.2 Finally, locating backers who were willing to finance the operation, Ward and his followers bolted from the National League and began play as the Players’ League in 1890.3 When the Brotherhood was shattered with the folding of the PL after that season, owners solidified their control over the players.4

The story of the Brotherhood and the Players’ League is reasonably well known to baseball fans interested in the history of the game.

It is less well known that ten years later the players again attempted to organize themselves against the owners. Calling their new alliance the Players Protective Association, they took a more conservative path than the defunct Brotherhood. Players were careful to avoid appointing any officers who had participated in the Players’ League. 5 They did, however, attract attention by inviting Dan Harris, a representative of the American Federation of Labor, to speak at their inaugural meeting. Harris brought the greetings of the famed labor leader Samuel Gompers, assuring the players of his moral support. 6 The Association put forward a platform that called for players to receive half the sale price whenever they were sold to another team.

Despite AFL support, the Players Protective Association crumbled when the American League was formed. With the opportunity to jump to the new league for bigger contracts, players quickly lost interest in the Association. By 1903, when the war between the two major leagues ended and the reserve clause began to be strictly enforced again, the Players Association had disappeared.

Renewed interest

Players again began brooding about the lack of a pension fund and the clubs’ practice of suspending injured players without pay. By 1908, several ballplayers began to seek out attorney Dave Fultz for advice concerning their individual contracts.7 Like Ward before him, Fultz was respected because he had been a big league ballplayer.

A 1911 event demonstrated the players’ renewed willingness to act together in opposition to the owners. When Cleveland’s great pitcher, Addie Joss, suddenly died in 1911, his teammates asked the American League to postpone a scheduled game with Detroit so they could attend the funeral in Toledo. American League president Ban Johnson refused, and the players called a one day strike.8 Faced with strong player solidarity, Johnson reversed his position.

The next year, Ty Cobb raced into the stands, at, tackling a fan who had been heckling him. Johnson suspended the American League’s best player for ten days without pay. Cobb’s teammates met and agreed to go out on strike until their unpopular teammate’s suspension was rescinded.9 Johnson reacted with fines of $100 for each player. After boycotting one game, which the Tigers played with a pickup team, the players returned at Cobb’s urging. Their fines were reduced to $50. Once again, though, players had stood together for a principle.

Throughout the summer of 1912, small groups of players began to meet secretly with Fultz to discuss a union. Players believed to be involved in the planning stages were Brooklyn’s Jake Daubert, Detroit’s Sam Crawford, and Chicago Cubs pitcher Ed Reulbach.10 Reulbach told F. C. Lane of Baseball Magazine that the idea for a union of ballplayers was first described to him by Addie Joss in 1907,11 the year Joss held out to fight a cut in pay. Reulbach took the conversation to heart, and with several others met with Dave Fultz before the 1912 Cobb strike. Final preparations were made in the Detroit rooms of Tiger players Davey Jones and Sam Crawford. Until the players could meet and hold formal elections, Fultz temporarily named himself president with Crawford and Jones as vice presidents.12

Fraternity

The Base Ball Players’ Fraternity was officially incorporated in the state of New York on September 6, 1912. The charter read in part, “To have every reasonable obligation of the players con, tracts lived up to by both contracting parties … To advise the player concerning any real or fancied grievance, and, in the event the former exists, to prepare his case for him.”13 The charter further stressed the need for adequate protection from rowdy fans and for the players to give owners the best service possible. Fultz made certain the charter conveyed a sense of cooperation to demonstrate the aims of the Fraternity were reasonable.

Provided a monthly forum by Baseball Magazine, Fultz, an 1895 graduate of Brown University, wrote eloquently of the rationale behind the formation of his new organization. He responded to assertions that player grievances could be arbitrated by baseball’s ruling body, the National Commission. “The National Commission is composed of three members: the presidents of the two major leagues and a third person selected by them; this person at present time is a club owner … The player who has a grievance goes before a body composed of men paid and chosen from the very faction with which he has his controversy. This is contrary to the basic principles of equity.”14

In addition, Fultz addressed the issue of players being fairly compensated for their efforts. He wrote, “It is argued the player is well paid. That he is well paid is no reason he should not organize. The star is well paid, the average player not so well, and some players very poorly.”15

Initial reaction to the Players’ Fraternity was mixed. Ban Johnson took a wait,and,see approach, declaring that players had a right to organize. News, papers were divided on the issue. Some, including Baseball Magazine and Sporting Life, were supportive. Others chastised the players. The Philadelphia North American sarcastically listed a number of player “grievances,” such as having to leave their homes and travel south during the winter while working a total of twenty weeks a year. The writer facetiously protested the fact that the players got free medical care during the season and were forced to travel around the country by rail at the owners’ expense.16

Star power

To be successful, the Players’ Fraternity needed the support of the game’s great stars. One by one they came into the fold. Pitching great Ed Walsh of the Chicago White Sox told Baseball Magazine, “I consider the fraternity has great work to do and I shall only be too glad to give it my full share of support.”17 Jake Daubert commented, “I know there are many players who are not getting along well, and it is for their interests we have organized.”18 Christy Mathewson, who had attended Bucknell University, and Ty Cobb, already a successful businessman, let it be known they were firmly in support of the Players’ Fraternity. With this solid backing, Fultz called for the organizational meeting to elect officers and prepare a formal platform of issues.

The players met in New York on October 20, 1912, to prepare an agenda for the upcoming season. The players officially elected Fultz president. Cobb and Mathewson were elected vice presidents. The selection of the two stars proved to the public that the Fraternity was a serious effort. Joining Fultz, Cobb, and Mathewson were directors Sam Crawford, Johnny Evers, Miller Huggins, and Washington catcher John Henry. Henry would become one of the most steadfast supporters of the Fraternity, resulting in Ban Johnson’s eventual threat to have him barred from organized baseball for his union activities.19

Equity and discipline

The first case examined by the Fraternity was that of Boston pitcher Kurt Hageman. Early in the 1912 season, Hageman was optioned to Jersey City. After several weeks the minor league club decided it did not need the pitcher, returning him to Boston. The club then advised Hageman he was being optioned to Denver and would have to negotiate a new contract with that club’s owners.20 The pitcher reacted with anger when Denver offered him $1,500, $900 less than his contract with Boston called for. Hageman demanded his outright release from Boston, citing several offers he’d had from minor league clubs willing to pay him his original salary of $2,400. The Red Sox refused to release him or sell him to another club. Hageman refused to report to Denver, and sac out the remainder of the season. Once the Players’ Fraternity opened its doors, he appealed for help.

Fultz sued the Red Sox on Hageman’s behalf, citing the Rules and Regulations of the National Commission which read, “A player recalled under an optional agreement or who has been in the service of a Major League Club for a season, shall not be subject to release again under an optional agreement.”21 Fultz correctly stated that Boston’s actions were in clear violation of the rules of baseball, and that the club had denied Hageman his right to earn his livelihood.

Fultz’s office was on Wall Street, and the case went before the New York State Supreme Court. The Red Sox won. Fultz appealed the ruling, watching the case drag through the judicial system for five years. In 1919 the courts ruled in favor of Hageman, awarding him $2,300 in back pay plus interest and court costs.22

Though victory in the Hageman case came after the demise of the Fraternity, at the time it was filed the suit demonstrated to major league owners that the players were serious about fighting for their rights in an organized way.

In April 1913, Fultz wrote to Johnson about the procedure followed when a player was ejected from a game. It had long been the policy of the National Commission to suspend and fine ejected players without a hearing. In a carefully worded text, Fultz wrote, “We … request that when a prima facie case has been made out against a player, that he be accorded the privilege of replying to the charges.”24 Fultz received a terse reply denying his request. Writing from his office in Chicago, Johnson stated that ninety percent of the ballplayers suspended were dealt with for using vicious and profane language. He explained it had taken years to minimize this evil and that his league would do nothing to alter its policy. 25 Johnson wrote firmly, “Your suggestion, if adopted, would be too obstructive to good discipline, and cannot have our serious consideration.”26

Fultz printed the letter in Baseball Magazine to demonstrate to readers the high handedness of the National Commission. Johnson claimed that the umpires simply conveyed the facts, and he would not acknowledge the possibility of an error by any of his umpires. Fultz explained the Fraternity’s position that the ballplayers merely wanted a chance to respond to the charges against them before a final decision was reached. Although the National Commission did not issue any further statements, within a few years players gained the right to a hearing.

A victory

In January of each year, the National Commission met to discuss business for the upcoming season. The Players’ Fraternity assembled in the fall of 1913, developing a list of seventeen suggestions for the Commission to review. In the context of a threatened third major league to begin play in 1914, the National Commission invited a Fraternity delegation to meet and discuss the proposals, although at first it refused to allow Fultz to attend. Cooler heads prevailed, and owner Garry Herrmann announced that Fultz could attend if he did not demand an individual audience.27

The most important of the Fraternity’s proposals suggested that a player be free to negotiate with any team for his services when he had received ten days’ notice of unconditional release by his current club. The existing rule allowed a player to negotiate only with a team in the same league.

Other requests presented were that all teams must furnish two uniforms to each player at no charge; that traveling expenses to spring training must be the responsibility of the owners; and that players must be provided with a copy of their contracts.

The Fraternity asked that any major league player with ten years service be given his unconditional release if his club did not exercise its option on him. It asked the same for minor league players with twelve years of service. 28

Many of the seventeen requests were granted-a huge victory for the Players’ Fraternity. The result, known as “The Cincinnati Agreement,” was clearly an effort by the National Commission to appease the players in the face of the coming competition from the Federal League, but no movement would have been likely without the Fraternity. The organization had played its cards skillfully, drawing praise from fans and sportswriters alike.

“A menace to the game”

Fultz still had a difficult task ahead of him. The victory had left owners and league officials full of indignation at Fultz’s influence over the players. Cries of “agitator” and “outlaw baseball anarchist” found their way into The Sporting News and other publications. Fultz found himself in a similar position to other labor organizers who had clashed with management. He became the target of the owners, who sought to remove him from the game of baseball.

The threat of the Federal League kept the Fraternity’s president temporarily out of harm’s way. Fultz skillfully took no official position on the “Outlaw League.” He conducted business as usual, while the owners fretted about possible defections to the Federals. For a short time, the Fraternity enjoyed a cease-fire.

In July, 1914, Clarence Kraft sought the protection of the Fraternity after he received notification of his demotion from Brooklyn to Nashville of the Class A Southern Association. Kraft had read the Cincinnati Agreement, which stated in Section 18 that, “before a major league player shall be released outright or under an optional agreement to Class A or a lower classification, his services shall first be tendered to all Class AA clubs.”29 Newark, a Class AA club, claimed Kraft, but Ban Johnson, acting for the National Commission, ruled that Nashville had put in a claim first and as such were entitled to his services.

Fultz protested this action, citing a clear violation of the Cincinnati Agreement. He sent a letter to Johnson, informing him that the Fraternity Board of Directors and all members would cease to honor their contracts after July 22 if Kraft was not authorized to report to Newark.30 Johnson accused Fultz of being a “menace to the game,” but he also, according the The Sporting News, advised Brooklyn owner Charles Ebbets to take whatever steps were necessary to reacquire Kraft and return him to Newark. While both sides postured, Ebbets quietly sent $2,500 to Nashville in return for their withdrawal of the claim on Kraft. After a month on the sidelines, Kraft appeared in the Newark lineup on July 22, and celebrated his return to the game with a home run against Providence. Ebbets’ willingness to pay off the Nashville club suggests that the owners took the players’ new strength seriously.

In the next year, the Fraternity did not bring any significant actions against major league baseball. However, the organization was busy answering inquiries from members and publishing no fewer than thirty-two articles. In his President’s Report of October 1915, Fultz reported a membership of slightly over 1,000 major and minor league players.31 Income from membership dues of $18 per player totaled $10,316.04, which was earning between three and four percent yearly. Fultz reported thirty-two meetings held with various clubs over the course of the year in which attendance reached ninety per cent.32 A total of 410 players applied to the Fraternity for advice on contract matters. The President’s Report proudly noted that $3,184.35 had been recovered from the owners on behalf of its members. Appeals to the National Commission were being accepted at a higher rate than ever before.

The Fraternity never addressed the question of establishing a pension fund for retired ballplayers, but did on several occasions send money to old players who needed help. For example, Cal McVey, one of the members of the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, had fallen ill and had little savings to pay for medical care. The Fraternity sent him a check for $160. The Players’ Fraternity was, in fact, at the peak of its effectiveness.

Baseball’s ownership and management had begun an attempt to undermine the ballplayers’ solidarity by borrowing the techniques of espionage and blacklisting used by their counterparts in the steel and textile industries.

In the fall of 1914, Fultz revealed that Fraternity member Ira Thomas of the Philadelphia Athletics had attempted to organize a separate union for American League players only. Thomas told American League players that they had fewer grievances than the National’s and therefore stood a better chance of gaining ground if they split from the Fraternity. He assured the players that Johnson would recognize the new organization and meet regularly with a players’ committee.33 Fultz immediately expelled Thomas, castigating Philadelphia owner Connie Mack for masterminding the plot. Fultz stated, “We don’t for a moment think that every one who opposes us is a crook and a blackleg. But Mr. Mack is against us and will beat us if he can. He wasn’t called ‘Connie’ for nothing.”34

Two months later Fultz filed a $50,000 libel suit against Sporting Life. The magazine, along with the Sporting News, had been stepping up attacks on Fultz and the Fraternity. On this occasion, Sporting Life insinuated that Fultz was secretly negotiating with the rival Federal League to become its president. The article further accused Fultz of misappropriating Fraternity funds and claimed that he would shortly lose his job.

Fultz was not the only Fraternity official to feel the anger of the baseball establishment. Ed Reulbach, executive secretary of the organization, came under fire for his activities. The Brooklyn pitcher had been to college and taken an active role since the Fraternity’s beginnings. A ten-year veteran, Reulbach gave contract advice to many of the younger players, which drew the ire of Brooklyn owner Charles Ebbets.35 While players debated jumping to the newly established Federal League, Ebbets approached Reulbach, asking him to help sign players for the next season. Ebbets told Reulbach he would delete the tenday clause in the contracts, thus rendering them guaranteed. At this time the Players Fraternity took no official stance on the Federal League, leaving it up to the unsigned players to determine their course of action. Ebbets felt he could use Reulbach s influence to keep his team intact.

Reulbach declined to help. Ebbets offered him a two-year contract at a substantial raise. 36 Reulbach asked Ebbets to offer raises to the other players for not jumping to the Federal League but the owner refused. Reulbach declined the offer again, citing unfairness to the other ballplayers. Angered by Reulbach’s stance, Ebbets at season’s end asked for waivers on the pitcher, but did not inform him until January 27. Strangely, no AL or NL club put in a claim for Reulbach’s services. Reulbach signed with a Federal League team. Baseball Magazine asserted that Reulbach had been blacklisted for his active role in the Fraternity.

In March 1916, the Players Fraternity moved back into the courtroom, filing a lawsuit on behalf of William Cristall, manager of the Hamilton club of the Canadian League. Cristall received notice from the National Board, the governing body of the minor leagues, that he was being fined and suspended for unspecified reasons. Fultz discovered that manager Cristall had negotiated with a prospective player, but ultimately decided not to offer him a contract.37 The player believed he had a verbal agreement, and filed a complaint with the National Board. Without contacting Cristall, the Board ruled on behalf of the player, fining and suspending Cristall for his actions. Fultz had received copies of the letters sent by Cristall, however, and in no instance did they indicate any agreement between the two parties.

Before the suit could be brought forward, the National Board rescinded the fine and suspension, claiming a telegram had been sent to Cristall but was returned due to a incorrect address. In its edit0rial section, Sporting Life found the actions of the Board puzzling. The editorial stated, “He (Cristall) was tried and convicted without the slightest notice to him or anyone representing him.”38 Fultz withdrew the suit, suggesting that the National Board should review its procedures before sanctioning players and managers.

Hard line

The National Commission and National Board convened on December 14, 1916 to discuss business for the new season. The Players’ Fraternity submitted a list of four recommendations for review. The first dealt with a clause in the players’ contracts that allowed owners to suspend injured players without pay after a certain time period. The other three requests centered on minor league issues, including reimbursement for travel expenses to spring training, and copies of all defenses of player claims submitted to the National Board.39

In his annual letter to the Fraternity members, Fultz had included a pledge card which requested the members to delay signing their contracts until the four demands had been approved. Fultz received signed pledges from six or seven hundred major and minor league players.40 Convinced of the Fraternity’s solidarity, Fultz announced the players were prepared to strike if the four demands were not approved.

This was a time when labor throughout the United States was working hard to organize. Large World War I orders from overseas and some support from the Wilson administration had revitalized labor efforts. The climate was such that the Fraternity believed the time had come for collective action.

Ban Johnson vowed to lock the players out if they did not sign. He called Fultz a “half-baked New York attorney.”41 The owners were determined to crush the Fraternity once and for all, and went on the offensive. Ban Johnson falsely announced there had never been an instance where a player was not paid while injured. He further demanded to see a copy of a contract in which a clause existed that would deny payment to an injured player. He threatened to publicly declare Fultz a liar and a falsifier if he could not produce a sample contract. 42

Fultz retorted that, “Johnson may smash the Fraternity, but we would advise him to go slow as it is a bigger job than he anticipates.”43 Then he forwarded a copy of Fraternity vice-president John Henry’s contract to Johnson. The contract contained the clause which the National Commission claimed did not exist.

Many fans and sportswriters were confused why major league players would strike for minor league demands. Fultz explained to Fred Lieb of Sporting Life that sooner or later most players wound up their careers in the minors, and that they want conditions in the minors brought up to standard.44

In January 1917, the National Commission announced its rejection of the Fraternity’s three minor league demands. It stated that it was the jurisdiction of the minor league’s ruling board to review the demands and that the Commission could only rule in the event of an appeal.45 Garry Herrmann seated that he expected the Fraternity to file an appeal and would address the issue at that time. He further added that the demand concerning the injury clause had been addressed in December, when the National Commission had adopted a new clause in the players’ contract providing for the full payment of salary for injured players, thus negating any need to issue a ruling.46

Several days later, National League President John Tener announced that the National Commission would not hear any appeals from the Players Fraternity. Instead, the Commission advised appeals would have to come from individual players.47 Fultz replied the players were ready to go to the limit in their fight. To demonstrate their solidarity, Fultz announced the expulsion of Slim Sallee of the New York Giants for signing his contract. Fultz said, “We expect some desertions, but lee no one think because a few traitors quit, the Fraternity is crumbling.”48

Fatal misstep

Several days later the New York Times announced the Fraternity had taken action to file for membership in the American Federation of Labor. Samuel Gompers welcomed the ballplayers, stating he heartily approved of the threatened strike.49 The Times revealed that Gompers and Fultz had met numerous times concerning the Fraternity’s wish to join the AFL. According to the report, Gompers’ full support would strengthen the players’ position.

In response to the Fraternity’s pending AFL affiliation, the National Commission announced it would no longer deal with the Players Fraternity as an organization, only with players as individuals.50 The commission also announced it would not accept or respond to any communication from Fultz. This action came as no surprise to Fultz. With the Fraternity’s affiliation with the AFL seemingly imminent, he defied baseball to fight it out with organized labor. He questioned how strikebreakers would fare in opposition to a strong union.51

Near the end of the month, Fultz held a meeting of the Fraternity in New York. Twenty-five members attended to reaffirm their support. Tris Speaker sent a wire pledging his support and his regret for not being able to attend.52 Paul Turner, the attorney for the Actors Equity Association, spoke to the members on the advantages of being affiliated with the AFL.53 A decision on the Fraternity’s application was expected in a few days.

Encouraged by the meeting, Fultz announced plans to rent a New York theater and invite fans to hear the players’ version of the dispute. He had set a February 20 deadline for the strike, wanting to drum up as much support as possible. He waited anxiously for word from the APL, which had delayed issuing a ruling. Speculation now existed that the owners had secretly conferred with Samuel Gompers and had persuaded him to moderate his stance on the Fraternity.54

Gompers’ sudden waffling has never been fully explained. He did issue a statement to the New York Times claiming that the AFL was still in sympathy with the ballplayers. However, there is a big difference between being sympathetic and taking direct action. The AFL was, by the lights of the labor movement, a conservative organization, one that concentrated its membership on the skilled workers in the steel industry. It represented no more than ten percent of all workers. Perhaps after some reflection, Gompers concluded that an alliance with the Players’ Fraternity was too radical a move for his unadventurous union to take. Whether it was for this reason or that baseball owners were leaning hard on him, Gompers clearly decided to limit his support for ballplayers to cheering from the grandstand.

With the prospects of an AFL affiliation fading, Fultz canceled plans to take the Fraternity’s case to the public. Newspapers reported daily on players giving up the fight and signing their contracts. On February 13, 1917, the National Commission passed a resolution revoking the Cincinnati agreement of 1914. According to the owners, the pact made with the Fraternity was void.55 Fultz issued a statement releasing the players from their strike pledge.56

The capitulation by the Players Fraternity effectively crippled the five-year union. It had lost its most important fight, and with it the public support it had gained through Baseball Magazine and various other publications. The threatened strike had turned baseball fans against the players, while inadvertently strengthening the owners’ position. The promised support of the AFL never materialized, leaving the Fraternity with few allies. Players drifted away from the Fraternity, causing it to cease doing business within months. Dave Fultz left for Europe to become an aviator for the United States Army. Ironically, when Fultz returned home in 1919, he was offered the Presidency of the International League.57 He served in that office for two years, staying long enough to witness the demise of the National Commission and the dramatic fall of Ban Johnson to mere figurehead under new Commissioner Judge Landis.

Disappointment

Before departing for Europe, Fultz consented to one final interview with Baseball Magazine editor F. C. Lane. He elaborated on his reasoning for calling the strike, stating that he wished to unite the members of the Fraternity in a closer bond of union. He believed the time had come to impress organized baseball with the union’s strength.58 Fultz commented on the results, saying, “It has been the biggest disappointment of my life. I staked everything on this one cast and lost.”59 He firmly believed he had the power to force the National Commission to intercede with the National Board, thus compelling the minor leagues to accede to his demands. The magazine noted that at the very end there were still 200-250 ballplayers committed to sitting out.

Before the strike ended, Baseball Magazine published an anonymous letter from a prominent member of the Fraternity. The player unknowingly predicted the outcome of the conflict. He wrote, “They don’t like Fultz because he interferes with the baseball machinery and brings to light and publicity some of their deals … Suppose the Fraternity was out of the way — it doesn’t take much intelligence to see that the players would have a fine chance of dealing with the magnates direct.”60 Unfortunately for the Players’ Fraternity, truer words were never spoken.

Legacy

In its five years of existence, the Fraternity won some significant victories over the owners in their struggle for an equal voice in major league affairs on and off the field. The Cincinnati Agreement represented a landmark pact in favor of the ballplayers, something without precedent in baseball’s early days. The court battles orchestrated by Fultz gave the Fraternity credibility, and the number of players who regularly paid their membership dues demonstrated a solidarity that truly unnerved the owners.

The collapse of the Federal League took away a large piece of the Fraternity’s bargaining power. Fighting a battle with the Federals kept the baseball hierarchy distracted. Without a third league to deal with, the owners could focus all their efforts on the players. It was a time for Dave Fultz to recognize that the Federal League no longer shielded him.

In the end, the owners remained triumphant. It is easy to see in retrospect that the call for a strike was a disaster that lost the Fraternity support from fans, the press, and some of its own members. The Fraternity was crushed. The best that can be said for it is that is that it laid down a gauntlet that would be successfully picked up many years later.

 

Notes

1. Robert Burk, Never Just a Game (Chapel Hill, 1994), pp.54-55.

2. Ibid., pp. 95-97.

3. Ibid., pp. 105-106

4. Ibid., pp. 112-114.

5. Lee Lowenfish, The Imperfect Diamond (New York, 1980), pp. 61-62.

6. Ibid., p. 61.

7. Harold Seymour. Baseball, The Golden Age (New York, 1971). pp. 194-195.

8. Cleveland Plain Dealer. April 15, 191l.

9. Burk, Never Just a Game, pp. 185-186.

10. Baseball Magazine, April, 1917.

11. Ibid.

12. Sporting News, March 1969. (Dave Fultz file, National Baseball Library. )

13. Baseball Magazine, November, 1912.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Philadelphia North American, August 31, 1912 (Dave Fultz file) NBL.

17. Baseball Magazine, February, 1913, p. 17.

18. Ibid., p.17.

19. New York Times. February 10, 1917.

20. Baseball Magazine. December, 1912, pp. 109-110.

21. Ibid., pp.109-110.

22. Seymour, Baseball: The Golden Age, pp. 223-224.

23. Baseball Magazine, May, 1913. pp. 70-71.

24. Ibid., pp. 70-71.

25. Ibid., pp. 70-7 I.

26. Ibid., pp. 70-7 I.

27. Burk, Never Just a Game, pp. 197-199.

28. Baseball Magazine, January, 1914, pp. 81-84.

29. Baseball Magazine, September, 1914, pp. 82.

30. Seymour, Baseball: The Golden Age, pp. 228-229

31. President’s Report. (Dave Fultz file, NBL.)

32. Ibid.

33. Baseball Magazine, November, 1914, pp. 88-89.

34. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

35. Baseball Magazine, May, 1914.

36. Ibid.

37. Sporting Life, March 18, 1916, p. 6.

38. Ibid., March 25, 1916.

39. Baseball Magazine, December, 1916, pp. 85-87.

40. Burk, Never Just a Game, p. 213.

41. Eugene Murdock, Ban Johnson, Czar of Baseball (Westpon, 1982), p. 71.

42. Baseball Magazine,, January I 917.

43. Ibid.

44. Sporting Life, December 23, 1916.

45. Sporting News, January 1917.

46. Ibid.

47. Sporting Life, January 20, 1917.

48. Ibid.

49.New York Times, January 16, 1917

50. Sporting News, January 27, 1917., p. 4.

51. Ibid,, p, 4.

52. New York Times, January 27, 1917.

53. Ibid.

54. New York Times, January, 29, 1917.

55. New York Times, February, 14, 1917.

56. New York Times, February, 15, 1917.

57. Dave Fultz file. NBL.

58. Baseball Magazine, April 1917 p. 92.

59. Ibid., p. 92.

60. Baseball Magazine, April 1917.