From the Braves to the Brewers: Great Games and Exciting History at Milwaukee’s County Stadium, edited by Gregory H. Wolf

Milwaukee County Stadium and its Historic Role in Postwar Ballpark Construction

This article was written by Robert Trumpbour

This article was published in From the Braves to the Brewers: Great Games and Exciting History at Milwaukee’s County Stadium (2016)


From the Braves to the Brewers: Great Games and Exciting History at Milwaukee’s County Stadium, edited by Gregory H. WolfMilwaukee County Stadium’s construction was something that put the Wisconsin city on the map and served to identify it as a major-league city. The stadium attracted an enthusiastic local audience, but also brought in luminaries from afar. In addition to attracting top-level baseball executives such as Ford Frick and Warren Giles, several Hollywood stars, including Lola Albright, Jack Carson, Forrest Tucker, Tony Romano, and Connie Russell, attended the home opener on April 14, 1953. Media titan William Randolph Hearst Jr., publisher of the Milwaukee Sentinel, was also on hand and noted that, “[A]fter seeing this wonderful stadium and the things that Milwaukee has done with it, as well as the other forward moving things that are happening here, I know Milwaukee’s potential firsthand.”1

Although few would regard Milwaukee County Stadium as an example of revolutionary architecture, it was one of the most influential sports structures to be built in 20th-century America.  After a half-century of geographic stability among all major-league teams, the newly constructed ballpark enticed Braves owner Lou Perini to shift his team from Boston to Milwaukee, setting off a chain of events that prompted franchise relocation, stadium construction, and subsequent expansion elsewhere.

The decision to erect a large-scale sports structure with taxpayer funding also opened the floodgates for similar projects later on. Prior to County Stadium, team owners generally expected to pay for ballpark construction and civic leaders typically shared that expectation.2

County Stadium was influential in its strategic planning as well. It was among the first ballparks designed to be surrounded by a sea of parking spaces, and it was positioned in a manner that would allow for easier access to major roads. Unlike other ballparks in use at the time, County Stadium was intentionally planned in ways that would cater to a fan base that was increasingly moving to the suburbs. As metropolitan areas throughout postwar America replicated residential construction trends popularized by William Levitt, using the largesse of Federal Housing Administration loan guarantees to recalibrate the housing stock of major metropolitan areas, families moved rapidly to seemingly idyllic suburban communities and baseball team owners with older inner-city ballparks struggled to retain their core fan bases.

The ballpark was prudently designed to be upgraded to handle major-league capacities even before Milwaukee power brokers knew that they would have a major-league team. As plans were made for the structure, the prevailing thought was that the stadium would open to the Brewers, then in the Triple-A American Association, but its overall design was predicated on luring a major-league team to Milwaukee, not for a continued role as a minor-league venue. Although its maximum capacity never exceeded 55,000, County Stadium was flexibly structured to be expanded to up to a 70,000-seat capacity if desired, with increased office space, improved lighting, and other major-league amenities possible.3

If civic officials had retained the 13,000-seat Borchert Field instead of pushing for altogether new construction, no major-league franchise would have considered Milwaukee as a destination. In short, the construction of County Stadium served to light the fuse of franchise relocation. Though change in some form was probable over the next decade, the construction in Milwaukee likely accelerated the undoing of five decades of geographic stability in major-league baseball.

As construction plans took shape, Bill Veeck, then owner of the St. Louis Browns, was seen as one possible suitor for a move. However, because Veeck lacked the territorial rights to relocate to Milwaukee, he was unable to move without first gaining permission from Perini, whose controlling interest of the minor-league Brewers put him in complete control of the Milwaukee market.

If the Braves had been successful in Boston, a city the team had called home since the 1870s, Milwaukee’s fate might have been different. However, by the early 1950s, the rival Red Sox, after making major renovations to Fenway Park during the Great Depression, solidified their popularity in Boston while the Braves were struggling to draw fans. During 1952, the Braves’ last season in Boston, the team drew a mere 281,000 spectators, a situation that, if it had continued, could have ended in bankruptcy. In fact, a local sportswriter derisively described the Boston Braves as “a $600,000 bouncing check.”4

Because Perini controlled Milwaukee’s minor-league franchise as well as the Braves’ future, he was in a position to dictate how and when Milwaukee would get a major-league team. Perini may have wanted to wait to shift the Braves or he could have orchestrated another team’s move, but his hand was forced when Milwaukee Journal sports editor Russell Lynch stepped up pressure, initially trying to lure Veeck to move the  Browns to Wisconsin, and then exposing Perini’s potential role in keeping major-league baseball out of Milwaukee.

After sparring with the Braves owner about how the stadium might make Perini’s minor-league team more valuable at the expense of Milwaukee’s taxpayers whose desire was to host a major-league team, Lynch pointedly told Perini that “unless you inform us to the contrary, we must conclude that you think the stadium was built for your benefit.” Perini understood that Lynch’s aggressive columns could hurt both his image and his ability to make money as a minor-league owner in Milwaukee. Realizing that his options were limited and that his reputation was in danger of shifting from community leader to pariah, Perini chose in March 1953, weeks before the season was set to begin, to shift the Braves from Boston to Milwaukee, much to the delight of the Milwaukee citizenry.5

As a result, the building of County Stadium also led to a shift in power, a moment where local-level media pressure became a more visceral element in the future of major-league sports. For better or worse, from this point onward, journalists in cities throughout the nation were more inclined to act as boosters rather than watchdogs when it came to new stadium construction that might attract a major-league team.

Its construction and subsequent success at the gate also inspired other team owners and civic leaders in non-major-league cities to replicate the formula established in Milwaukee. After this move was undertaken, the dramatic financial success of Perini’s team became evident. The 1953 opener, with 34,357 paid fans, exceeded the attendance for any Braves game in Boston during the entire 1952 season. Only Cleveland, with its cavernous Municipal Stadium, was able to outdraw Milwaukee in 1953 season openers. Yet full-season attendance data reveal that the strong attendance was not a novelty. The Braves led all teams in total attendance for the duration of the 1953 season, bringing more than 1.8 million fans through County Stadium turnstiles. The 1954 season saw the Braves increase their attendance once again, breaking the 2-million mark. Subsequent seasons were successful, too. With a dramatic turnaround in the Braves’ financial fortunes, fellow owners more aggressively looked for new opportunities elsewhere, with many of them seeking similar taxpayer-subsidized facilities as a means of achieving greater profitability.

The Milwaukee construction project was by no means the first-ever allocation of taxpayer funds for sports-related construction. For instance, grand edifices were built with taxpayer funding, most notably in Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Chicago during the 1920s and 1930s; Baltimore rebuilt its Memorial Stadium with municipal funds in 1950. In addition, the Works Progress Administration, a program established by President Franklin Roosevelt to take on the ravages of the Great Depression, was responsible for the construction or renovation of over 2,500 stadiums and ballparks throughout the nation, though none of the projects were as large as the Milwaukee project. Among the most impressive was Roosevelt Stadium, built in Jersey City, New Jersey, with an initial capacity of 24,000. The majority of WPA facilities seated less than 10,000 and were the kinds of facilities that would be useful for high-school, college, or minor-league play.6

Milwaukee was different from the massive prewar projects in major cities such as Los Angeles, Cleveland, and Chicago, however, in that it was constructed first and foremost to house a baseball team, not to serve as an all-purpose civic monument. On the heels of an attendance record, Milwaukee County Stadium was identified as a revenue generator by fellow owners as well as civic leaders elsewhere who wanted their cities to jump into the major leagues.

In short, the facility’s success became a trigger to taxpayer-funded construction that was to follow in other major metropolitan areas.  Major-league owners could see the benefits of a taxpayer-funded facility, and booster-oriented community leaders began to step up the call for new construction so as to lure big-league teams to their cities. Among the old-guard owners, Walter O’Malley would refer to a “Milwaukee formula” when lobbying for a new ballpark for his Brooklyn Dodgers.7 Even though his desire was to construct a privately funded facility, he aggressively lobbied civic leaders in New York and later Los Angeles to assist him in land acquisition. This was something he was unable to arrange in New York, but was able to accomplish on the West Coast.

Cities wishing to become major league similarly tried to emulate the “Milwaukee formula” to the degree that was possible. As an example, in 1958 when George Kirksey was working to lure a major-league team to Houston, eventually leading to the construction of the posh Astrodome, one strategy that was undertaken to energize civic leaders was to bring in Ray Weisbrod, executive vice president of the Milwaukee Association of Commerce, to extol the virtues of being a major-league city.

Speaking before the Downtown Rotary Club, Weisbrod told influential Houstonians that the Braves were responsible for bringing “seven or eight million dollars” to the Milwaukee economy, while asserting that the team “gives us world renown.” He also argued that having a major-league team “generated a spirit of civic enthusiasm” that led to successes elsewhere in the city. He pointedly suggested that modern stadium construction was necessary in Milwaukee and elsewhere because having “antiquated parks in run down neighborhoods … is the reason for the exodus” of several teams from major cities.8

At the time, the Twin Cities were planning construction of a new ballpark and were fighting with rival Houston to enter the realm of major-league cities. San Francisco was also building, while other metropolitan areas were considering similar plans. Such construction struck fear in the hearts of existing major-league cities with old ballparks, with ample evidence of this fear in newspapers during the late 1950s.

As one example, in July 1959 the Cincinnati Enquirer ran a multipart series that showcased the fortunes of other cities, highlighting the success of Milwaukee while touting construction progress made in San Francisco and Minneapolis.9 The series opened with two ominous questions: “Can the Cincinnati Reds be lured away? Would the availability of a fancy, modern stadium in another city do it?”10

When Milwaukee christened its shiny new stadium on April 14, 1953, the ballpark was visited by Hollywood celebrities, political luminaries, media moguls, beer barons, and a multitude of average citizens. But one visitor, completely unnoticed at the time, had a greater influence on future of ballpark construction in major-league baseball than anyone else on hand that day.

A young college student named Allan “Bud” Selig, drove to the ballpark from Madison, Wisconsin, and watched the game from the first-base grandstand. Decades later, in 1999,  Selig asserted that as a result of Milwaukee’s success, Walter O’Malley told the baseball world that “he had to move” to the West Coast. Reflecting on the significance of O’Malley’s belief, Selig exclaimed, “Imagine that. O’Malley said he couldn’t compete with the Braves of Milwaukee. County Stadium was the place to be in those days.”11

Selig long remembered how the construction of a new stadium contributed to the financial success of the Milwaukee Braves, and those memories were likely to weigh heavily in his priorities when he assumed the role of baseball’s most powerful executive, a position he held for more than two decades. Washington Post reporter Steve Fainaru argued that, for better or worse, during Selig’s tenure, he “made construction of ballparks the centerpiece of his business strategy.”12

With new ballparks opened in Arizona, Arlington, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C., during Selig’s reign, one might argue that Milwaukee County Stadium’s role as a sports facility was as profound as any project of its kind during the 1950s and perhaps beyond.

ROBERT TRUMPBOUR is associate professor of communications at Penn State Altoona. He is the author and editor of two texts, The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium Construction, and Cathedrals of Sport: The Rise of Stadiums in the Modern United States. Trumpbour is co-authoring a book on Houston’s Astrodome that will be published in 2016. He has taught at Pennsylvania State University, Southern Illinois University, Saint Francis University, and Western Illinois University. Prior to teaching, Trumpbour worked in various capacities at CBS for the televi- sion and radio networks in New York. He initially joined SABR in 1999.

 

Notes

1 Robert J. Riordan, “He Likes Dem Bums? Ha! Braves Convert Publisher Hearst at Opener,” Milwaukee Sentinel, April 15, 1953: 1B.

2 For a more thorough overview of stadium construction history and tensions between team owners and civic leaders, see: Robert Trumpbour,  The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium Construction. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007).

3 “Stadium Not Yet Complete,” Milwaukee Journal, April 16, 1953: Section 2, 4.

4 Bob Buege, The Milwaukee Braves: A Baseball Eulogy (Milwaukee: Douglas American Sports Publications, 1988), 14-16.

5 Roger Birtwell, “Fighting Irishman – Russ Lynch Pushed Perini into a Corner,” The Sporting News, March 25, 1953: 24.

6 Arthur MacMahon, John Millett, and Gladys Ogden, The Administration of Federal Work Relief (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941).

7 Neil Sullivan, The Dodgers Move West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 92.

8 Mickey Herskowitz, “Perini, Says Weisbrod, Rates Houston as a 10-Club Possibility,” Houston Post, July 17, 1958: Section 4, 1.

9 George Amick, “The Stadium Race: As Redlegs Pasture at Crosley Field, Other Cities Build,” Cincinnati Enquirer, July 12, 1959: 1E; “Milwaukee County Gambles on Stadium,” Cincinnati Enquirer, July 13, 1959: 2A; “New Frisco Stadium Ready in September,” Cincinnati Enquirer, July 14, 1959: 2A.

10 “Cincinnati Reds Forever?” Cincinnati Enquirer, July 12, 1959: 1A.

11 Tom Haudricourt, “Ballpark Gave Selig Thrills of a Lifetime,” Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, April 16, 1999: C1.

12 Steve Fainaru, “Selig Plays Hardball on Stadium Deals,” Washington Post, June 27, 2004: A1.

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